Cognitive closure (philosophy)
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| - | The '''subjective character of experience''' is a term in psychology and the [[philosophy of mind]] denoting that all [[subjectivity|subjective]] [[phenomena]] are associated with a single [[perspective (cognitive)|point of view]] ("[[Id, ego and super-ego|ego]]"). The term was coined and illuminated by [[Thomas Nagel]] in his famous paper ''What is It Like to Be a [[Bat]]?'' | + | In [[philosophy of science]] and [[philosophy of mind]], '''cognitive closure''' is the proposition that humans minds are constitutionally incapable of solving certain perennial philosophical problems. [[Owen Flanagan]] calls this position ''anti-constructive naturalism'' or the ''[[new mysterianism]]'' and the primary advocate of the hypothesis, [[Colin McGinn]], calls it ''transcendental naturalism'' because it acknowledges the possibility that solutions might fall within the grasp of an intelligent non-human of some kind. According to McGinn, such philosophical questions include the [[mind-body problem]], [[personal identity (philosophy)|identity of the self]], [[meaning (philosophy of language)|foundations of meaning]], [[free will]], and [[epistemology|knowledge]], both ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' and [[empiricism|empirical]]. |
| + | ==New mysterians== | ||
| + | In his (famous) essay "[[What Is It Like to Be a Bat?]]" [[Thomas Nagel]] mentions the possibility of cognitive closure to the [[subjective character of experience]] and the (deep) implications that it has for [[materialism|materialist]] [[reductionist]] [[science]]. [[Owen Flanagan]] noted in his 1991 book ''Science of the Mind'' that some modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness will never be completely explained. Flanagan called them "[[New Mysterianism|the new mysterians]]" after the rock group [[Question Mark and the Mysterians]]. According to McGinn, the solution to the [[mind-body problem]] cannot be grasped, despite the fact that the solution is "written in our genes". | ||
| - | Nagel argues that, because bats are apparently [[conscious]] [[mammals]] with a way of perceiving their environment entirely different from that of [[human beings]], it is possible to speak of "what is like to ''be'' a bat ''for'' the bat" or, while the example of the bat is particularly illustrative, any conscious species, as each organism has a unique point of view from which no other organism can gather [[experience]]. To Nagel the subjective character of experience implies the [[Cognitive closure (philosophy)|cognitive closure]] of the human [[mind]] to some facts, specifically the [[mental state]]s that [[body|physical states]] create. | + | [[Emergent materialism]] is a similar but different claim that humans are not smart enough to determine "the relationship between [[mind]] and matter." |
| - | ==Subjective reality== | ||
| - | The subjectivity of perception of reality implies that perception of all of the things, concepts, and "truths" in the universe differ between individuals: we all live in different worlds, each of which may have things in common, because of our unique perspectives on our worlds. The only thing to which one can hold oneself is something one has experienced or perceived. Until someone has had an experience of something the object or concept within itself is not real. Someone in Africa is aware of the existence of fire and sees it but for an Eskimo who has never seen fire before the fire does not exist in the same way. So, if we could all know god from the same standpoint then we would all agree while, as it is, there are different perspectives and interpretations of different events and philosophies. The idea of the subjectivity of reality also hints at an aspect of moral relativism, that each person's opinions are the only things they can hold themselves to. | ||
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| - | ==Dual-subjective reality== | ||
| - | A dual-subjective reality arises when an individual's mind interrupts information and, instead of creating only one interpretation that the conscious mind can make sense of, creates several. These differing "realities" then cause conflict in that individual who may confuse what is actually happening around them with alternative realities formulated in their mind. | ||
| ==See also== | ==See also== | ||
| - | * [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)]] | + | * [[Inquiry]] |
| - | * [[Inverted spectrum]] | + | * [[Reductionism]] |
| - | * [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalism]] | + | * [[Dialetheism]] |
| - | * [[Map–territory relation|The map is not the territory]] | + | * [[Mystical experience]] |
| - | * [[Mary's Room]] | + | * [[Uncertainty]] |
| - | * [[Philosophy of mind]] | + | * [[Strong agnosticism]] is a religious application of a similar position. |
| - | * [[Philosophy of perception]] | + | * [[Epistemological nihilism]] |
| - | * [[Physicalism]] | + | |
| - | * [[Qualia]] | + | |
| - | * [[Philosophical zombies|Zombies]] | + | |
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In philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, cognitive closure is the proposition that humans minds are constitutionally incapable of solving certain perennial philosophical problems. Owen Flanagan calls this position anti-constructive naturalism or the new mysterianism and the primary advocate of the hypothesis, Colin McGinn, calls it transcendental naturalism because it acknowledges the possibility that solutions might fall within the grasp of an intelligent non-human of some kind. According to McGinn, such philosophical questions include the mind-body problem, identity of the self, foundations of meaning, free will, and knowledge, both a priori and empirical.
New mysterians
In his (famous) essay "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel mentions the possibility of cognitive closure to the subjective character of experience and the (deep) implications that it has for materialist reductionist science. Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book Science of the Mind that some modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness will never be completely explained. Flanagan called them "the new mysterians" after the rock group Question Mark and the Mysterians. According to McGinn, the solution to the mind-body problem cannot be grasped, despite the fact that the solution is "written in our genes".
Emergent materialism is a similar but different claim that humans are not smart enough to determine "the relationship between mind and matter."
See also
- Inquiry
- Reductionism
- Dialetheism
- Mystical experience
- Uncertainty
- Strong agnosticism is a religious application of a similar position.
- Epistemological nihilism
