Francis Hutcheson (philosopher)  

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While living in Dublin, Hutcheson published anonymously the four essays he is best known by: the ''[[Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design]]'', the ''Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil'', in 1725, the ''Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections'' and ''Illustrations upon the Moral Sense'', in 1728. The alterations and additions made in the second edition of these Essays were published in a separate form in 1726. To the period of his Dublin residence are also to be referred the ''[[Thoughts on Laughter]]'' (1725) (a criticism of [[Thomas Hobbes]]) and the ''Observations on the Fable of the Bees'', being in all six letters contributed to ''Hibernicus' Letters'', a periodical that appeared in Dublin (1725–1727, 2nd ed. 1734). At the end of the same period occurred the controversy in the ''London Journal'' with Gilbert Burnet (probably the [[Gilbert Burnet (pamphleteer)|second son]] of [[The Right Reverend|The Rt. Rev.]] [[Doctor (title)|Dr]] [[Gilbert Burnet]], [[Bishop of Salisbury|Lord Bishop of Salisbury]]) on the "True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness." All these letters were collected in one volume (Glasgow, 1772). While living in Dublin, Hutcheson published anonymously the four essays he is best known by: the ''[[Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design]]'', the ''Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil'', in 1725, the ''Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections'' and ''Illustrations upon the Moral Sense'', in 1728. The alterations and additions made in the second edition of these Essays were published in a separate form in 1726. To the period of his Dublin residence are also to be referred the ''[[Thoughts on Laughter]]'' (1725) (a criticism of [[Thomas Hobbes]]) and the ''Observations on the Fable of the Bees'', being in all six letters contributed to ''Hibernicus' Letters'', a periodical that appeared in Dublin (1725–1727, 2nd ed. 1734). At the end of the same period occurred the controversy in the ''London Journal'' with Gilbert Burnet (probably the [[Gilbert Burnet (pamphleteer)|second son]] of [[The Right Reverend|The Rt. Rev.]] [[Doctor (title)|Dr]] [[Gilbert Burnet]], [[Bishop of Salisbury|Lord Bishop of Salisbury]]) on the "True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness." All these letters were collected in one volume (Glasgow, 1772).
==Full text "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue"[]== ==Full text "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue"[]==
 +Knud Haakonssen
 +General Editor
 +Francis Hutcheson
 +An Inquiry
 +into the Original
 +of Our Ideas of
 +Beauty and Virtue
 +in Two Treatises
 +Francis Hutcheson
 +Edited and with an Introduction by
 +Wolfgang Leidhold
 +The Collected Works and Correspondence
 +of Francis Hutcheson
 +This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to
 +encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.
 +The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motif
 +for our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word
 +“freedom” ( amagi ), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written
 +about 2300 b.c. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash.
 +© 2004 Liberty Fund, Inc.
 +All rights reserved
 +Printed in the United States of America
 +08 07 06 05 04 c 5 4 3 2 1
 +08 07 06 05 04 p 5 4 3 2 1
 +Frontispiece: Detail of a portrait of Francis Hutcheson by Allan Ramsay
 +(ca. 1740-45), oil on canvas, reproduced courtesy of the Hunterian Art
 +Gallery, University of Glasgow.
 +Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
 +Hutcheson, Francis, 1694-1746.
 +An inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue:
 +in two treatises / Francis Hutcheson;
 +edited and with an introduction by Wolfgang Leidhold.
 +p. cm. — (The collected works of Francis Hutcheson)
 +(Natural law and enlightenment classics)
 +Includes bibliographical references and index.
 +ISBN 0-86597-428-4 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-86597-429-2 (paper: alk. paper)
 +1. Ethics, Modern — 18th century. 2. Aesthetics — Early works to 1800.
 +I. Leidhold, Wolfgang, 1950- II. Title. III. Series.
 +BJ1005.H88 2004
 +I7i'.2 — dc22 2003065286
 +8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite 300
 +Indianapolis, Indiana 46250-1684
 +Introduction ix
 +References and Further Reading xix
 +Note on the Text xxiii
 +Acknowledgments xxvii
 +Treatise I
 +An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, &c. 17
 +Treatise II
 +An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of
 +Virtue or Moral Good 83
 +Textual Notes 199
 +Index 249
 +Liberty and Happiness
 +The political dimension of liberty is at least twofold: civil liberties and
 +independence. The former is a matter of the political order of a country;
 +the latter, of freedom from foreign domination. Liberty and happiness
 +can be related to each other as they were in the third section of the “Vir-
 +ginia Bill of Rights,” from 6 June 1776:
 +That government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit,
 +protection and security of the people, nation or community; of all the
 +various modes and forms of government, that is best which is capable
 +of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety and is most
 +effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that
 +when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these
 +purposes, a majority of the community has an indubitable, inalienable
 +and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as
 +shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.
 +The preceding section puts forward a short argument: The right to
 +reform, alter, or abolish government is founded on the judgment of
 +whether such government is adequate or contrary to its main purpose,
 +namely the greatest degree of happiness and safety of the community.
 +The argument has a philosophical background. The criterion of “pro-
 +ducing the greatest degree of happiness” is part of the principal maxim
 +of utilitarian ethics. The right of resistance against inadequate govern-
 +ment, on the other hand, is part of the liberal creed. In the eighteenth
 +century the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), in his
 +Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London,
 +1725), linked the two sides of the argument for the first time. 1 There he
 +even coined the phrase, “That action is best, which procures the greatest
 +happiness for the greatest numbers.” 2
 +Hutcheson’s philosophy became part of the ideas that formed the
 +American polity. In the eighteenth century his books were imported to
 +America and his philosophy was well known through his students and
 +learned visitors to Scotland — among them was Benjamin Franklin in
 +1759. Hutcheson’s ideas even became part of the colonial curriculum. 3
 +The Inquiry, which is published here in a new edition, was the book that
 +established Hutcheson’s reputation as a philosopher.
 +The Argument of the Inquiry
 +Already in this early work, Hutcheson detailed some of his political
 +ideas. 4 However, his main task was examining the foundations of his
 +aesthetic, moral, and political philosophy. This was done in two treatises,
 +one dealing with the principles of aesthetics, 5 the other with those of
 +ethics and, to some extent, their political consequences. 6 In both treatises
 +1. For Hutcheson’s biography, see W. R. Scott, Francis Hutcheson, His Life, Teach-
 +ing and Position in the History ofPhilosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
 +1900; reprint, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1966). Also see the brief overview of Hutch-
 +eson’s early life and writings in the editor’s introduction to Hutcheson, An Essay on
 +the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral
 +Sense (1728), edited by Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003).
 +2. The formula was first used by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in a critical remark
 +on Samuel Cocceji’s thesis De Principio Juris Natural is Unico, Vero, et Adaequato
 +(Frankfurt: Schrey/Hartmann, 1699); see Joachim Hruschka, pp. 166—69.
 +3. For the impact of Hutcheson’s philosophy in Europe and America, see the in-
 +troduction to Hutcheson, Uberden Ursprungunserer Ideen von Schonheitund Tugend,
 +edited by Wolfgang Leidhold (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), pp. xi-xiv.
 +4. Especially in the second and the third editions, 1726 and 1729, respectively.
 +5. On Hutcheson’s aesthetic philosophy, see the works and articles of Peter Kivy,
 +Caroline Korsmeyer, E. Michael, and M. Strasser, listed in “References and Further
 +Reading” (p. xix of this volume).
 +6. For discussion of Hutcheson’s central ideas, see “References and Further Read-
 +ing” (p. xix of this volume), especially the works and articles of Giovanni de Cres-
 +cenzo, William K. Frankena, Knud Haakonssen, Peter Kivy, Wolfgang Leidhold,
 +David Fate Norton, D. D. Raphael, Jane Rendall, and William Robert Scott; still
 +the structure of the argument is similar: (i) Our ideas have their origin
 +in our perceptions and are received by senses. (2) For different percep-
 +tions we have different senses. (3) Perceptions are founded in certain
 +qualities of the objects perceived. (4) These qualities we can describe in
 +a maxim or formula. Hutcheson’s theory in both treatises therefore is a
 +complex of three related components: a subjective sense, an objective
 +foundation, and an analytical formula. Hutcheson presents the outline
 +of his theory of perception in the first treatise.
 +The First Treatise
 +Hutcheson’s theory of perception starts with the ideas of John Locke. * * 7
 +For Locke all materials of reason and knowledge come “from experience”
 +and our senses are “the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the
 +inlet of all the materials of it.” 8 Hutcheson accordingly defines different
 +senses as the powers “of receiving . . . different Perceptions” (I. I. §§ I,
 +II) and maintains that we also acquire the material for our aesthetic and
 +ethical knowledge by some sort of perception. However, what is the spe-
 +cific quality we perceive in aesthetic perceptions? Here Hutcheson relies
 +on Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury’s analysis of aesthetic perception is based on
 +the Platonic concept of form ( forma is the Latin version of the Greek
 +Platonic term idea) . Beauty then is the “outward form” of things, re-
 +flecting the “inward form” of some “forming power.” 9 Accordingly
 +Hutcheson defines beauty as a “form” or as “Figures ... in which there
 +is Uniformity amidst Variety” (I. II. § III).
 +Hutcheson implies that form and uniformity cannot be perceived by
 +the normal senses but by a special sense only. Therefore he expands the
 +notion of experience beyond the confines of the ordinary five senses.
 +valuable as a basic bibliography is T. E. Jessop. For a wider British context, see Isabel
 +7. Locke is mentioned in the Inquiry: I. I. § VII. Here and in the following the
 +Inquiry is quoted by treatise, section, and article; for example, “I. I. § VII” means first
 +treatise, first section, article seven.
 +8. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II. I. § 2; see II. IX. § 15.
 +9. See J. V. Arregni and P. Arnau, “Shaftesbury: Father and Critic of Modern
 +Aesthetics,” British Journal of Aesthetics 34 (1994): 350-62.
 +Form or uniformity then is the particular quality in objects which is the
 +“Foundation or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men” (I. II. §§
 +I, II). Beauty is our perception or knowledge of this objective quality,
 +and in accord with his definition of “sense” as the power of perceiving
 +these objective qualities, he assumes a special sense of beauty. This sense
 +is but one of a group of “internal senses” which include among others
 +the “good Ear” or “sense of harmony” (I. VI. § IX). The formula by
 +which the objective form in things themselves can be described is, as
 +already noted, “uniformity amidst variety.” With these words Hutche-
 +son paraphrases Shaftesbury’s concept of beauty. As in his analysis of
 +moral actions, Hutcheson thinks that aesthetic phenomena are capable
 +of a mathematical analysis, which he sketches in his study of “original
 +or absolute beauty” (title of I. II.).
 +After delineating his theory of aesthetic knowledge, Hutcheson in the
 +remaining chapters of the first treatise develops a general aesthetic theory.
 +This theory of beauty is not limited to a theory of art but extends to a
 +general, almost cosmological theory. This becomes clear when we look
 +at his basic distinction of original or absolute beauty from comparative
 +or relative beauty at the end of the first section. Absolute beauty we “per-
 +ceive in Objects without comparison to any thing external, of which the
 +Object is suppos’d an Imitation, or Picture” (I. I. § XVI). Examples of
 +such beauty are the works of nature — like heaven and earth, plants and
 +animals — the harmony of music; some works of art, when their beauty,
 +as in architecture or gardening, is not an imitation of something else.
 +Even theorems, such as those in mathematics, can in the absolute sense
 +be beautiful. Relative beauty is “founded on a Conformity, or a kind of
 +Unity between the Original and the Copy” (I. IV. § I). Instances here
 +are poetry and painting, and the creation as a whole — since in the beauty
 +of the effects it reflects the design and wisdom of its cause, which is God
 +the Father as the Creator (I. V.).
 +It is the general theory of perception as developed in the first treatise
 +that forms the basis of the similar argument in the second. We may as-
 +sume that Hutcheson wanted first to establish the idea of additional
 +senses in a field that was not as controversial as that of moral philosophy.
 +The Second Treatise
 +The moral controversy is found right in the title of the book. In the first
 +edition we read that Hutcheson wants to defend Shaftesbury’s ideas
 +against the author of the “Fable of the Bees,” that is, Mandeville. The
 +two names reflect the clash between the “benevolent” and the “selfish”
 +system. The first position argues that men have by nature moral prin-
 +ciples, the second that these principles are but a political invention that
 +is socially useful and based only on self-love or self-interest. Shaftesbury
 +had taught that social affections were the foundation of morals and that
 +a moral sense was the origin of our moral ideas . 10 Where Shaftesbury
 +speaks of “social affections” as the foundation of morals, Hutcheson pre-
 +fers the Christian concept of “love” as “benevolence. ” The logical struc-
 +ture of the second treatise is similar to the first. Again we can discern
 +three major components: an objective foundation, which here is benev-
 +olence; a particular sense, which is the moral sense; and the analytical
 +formula of “the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.”
 +In the second treatise, Hutcheson wants to establish the notion of a
 +moral sense as the “Original of our Ideas of . . . Virtue” and love or
 +benevolence as the particular quality we perceive in virtue:
 +The Affections which are of most Importance in Morals, are Love and
 +Hatred: All the rest seem but different Modifications of these two origi-
 +nal affections. (II. II. § II)
 +Since Hutcheson wanted to follow Locke’s theory of knowledge (as
 +in the first treatise), he had to analyze love or benevolence in accordance
 +io. See Anthony, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opin-
 +ions, Times, edited by Philip Ayres, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), I, pp. 55-57,
 +62 ff. , 93-101, 196-274. Also see Stanley Grean. The term moral sense was first used
 +by Thomas Burnet, a student of Ralph Cudworth, in his discussion of John Locke,
 +cf. Ernest Tuveson.
 +with Locke’s ideas. According to Locke, all materials of experience con-
 +sist either of simple ideas or of complex ideas, which are composed of
 +simple ideas. Complex ideas can be real or they can be fictitious (being
 +put together by the imagination or by reason). However, neither imag-
 +ination nor reason can invent simple ideas. Therefore, only simple ideas
 +necessarily represent something real. If Hutcheson thinks benevolence
 +is the objective foundation of morals, he must show what simple ideas
 +constitute it.
 +Locke had defined love by the simple ideas of pleasure and pain. 11
 +Love for him is the subj ective pleasure of something and is identical with
 +self-love. This definition of love is compatible only with the selfish sys-
 +tem. Hutcheson wants to avoid just that. Therefore he distinguishes two
 +versions of “good” and “evil,” that is, natural and moral good or evil. A
 +natural good is perceived only in inanimate beings. This perception is
 +one of advantage or disadvantage, of pleasure or pain. A moral good is
 +perceived in rational agents since “they study the interest, and desire the
 +Happiness of other Beings.” Our moral relationship with rational agents
 +then is twofold: (i) a moral perception and (2) a moral affection or desire.
 +The moral perception is generally called “approbation” or “disappro-
 +bation”; the desire is generally named “love” and “benevolence” or “dis-
 +like” and “hate” (II. Introduction; II. I. § I; II.).
 +Hutcheson defines love by the “simple idea of desire.” In the first
 +edition of the Inquiry the terminology is not yet quite consistent; re-
 +finements are added later. 12 In the Essay he defines love as the “desire”
 +for the happiness of others and addresses desire as a simple idea (Essay,
 +p. 64). 13 In contrast to Locke, 14 Hutcheson considers desire to be an act
 +of the will. This is consistent with the Christian idea of love. Love in the
 +11. See Locke, Essay, II. XX. § 4.
 +12. Here the reader is confronted with an irritating number of terms used to de-
 +scribe love: affection, intention, sentiment, design, disposition, inclination, motive,
 +determination, instinct, even passion, see Inquiry (first edition 1725), pp. 104, 107,
 +112, 119, 131, 137, 143; “passion”: pp. 132, 134, 141, 175 ff.
 +13. The same argument is added to the third and the fourth editions of the Inquiry
 +(II. II. § IV and § V).
 +14. Locke, Essay, II. XXI. §§ 28 ff.
 +Christian sense of benevolence is not an emotion or a feeling, but an act
 +of the will. 15 Otherwise, the words of the Sermon on the Mount —
 +“Thou shah love thy neighbor as thyself” (Matthew 19.19) — would be-
 +come a very strange commandment: a feeling cannot be commanded.
 +A contemporary Christian author, Richard Cumberland (1631-1718),
 +knew this very well. 16
 +While benevolence is the foundation of the moral good, the moral sense
 +is the source of moral ideas, of approbation and disapprobation. Hutch-
 +eson concedes that the moral sense is a “secret sense” (II. Introduction;
 +II. I. § III). That means the existence of such a sense is not immediately
 +known and calls for an indirect proof. On the basis of his theory of per-
 +ception he demonstrates that there are distinct moral perceptions and
 +concludes that there must be a distinct sense:
 +since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to
 +receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us,
 +independent on our Will. (II. I. § I)
 +15. On the Christian idea of love see M. C. DArcy, The Mind and Heart of Love
 +(London: Faber and Faber, 1944); J. Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St.
 +Augustine (London: FFodder and Stoughton, 1947); V. Warnach, “Agape, Not Eros —
 +or Caritas,” Anglican Theological Review, 37 (1955): 67-73; most comprehensive: Ces-
 +laus Spicq, Agape dans le Nouveau Testament: Analyse de textes, 3 vols. (Paris: Gabalda,
 +z 958 — 59) . A good introduction is C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves, 21st ed. (Glasgow:
 +Collins, 1981).
 +16. See R. Cumberland, A Treatise of the Law of Nature (London: Phillips, Knap-
 +ton, 1727; first edition in Latin, London 1672), 42. For Hutcheson the conceptual
 +situation was rather complicated, and it took him a while to clarify it. Finally, in the
 +fourth edition of the Lnquiry the definition of love is given the most precise wording.
 +Here Hutcheson identifies the “Desire of the Good of Others” with the Aristotelian
 +“orexis bouleutike,” translating it as a “settled Disposition of the Will, or a constant
 +Determination, or desire to act . . . , or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner of
 +Conduct.” Since the foundation of morals sometimes had been called an “instinct,”
 +he at the same time defines “instinct” as an “Essential or Natural Disposition of the
 +Will, an Affectionate Determination” (p. 195).
 +For Hutcheson, the particular moral perception is approbation. We
 +perceive a “moral good” when a person acts from benevolence, and this
 +“(excites) . . . Approbation or Perception of moral Excellence.” The “nat-
 +ural good,” on the other hand, raises the “Desire of Possession toward
 +the good Object.” Hutcheson emphasizes that approbation should not
 +be mixed up with the “Opinion of Advantage,” and later on throughout
 +the first and the following chapters he strengthens his position with a
 +number of instances. That the perception of approbation or moral ex-
 +cellence is different from other perceptions is for Hutcheson a matter of
 +evidence. 17 Evidence for him seems to be a proof from experience, which
 +cannot be supported by other sufficient reasons (II. I. § I).
 +To be sure, the moral quality of actions is not the same in all cases. Some-
 +times we approve one act more than another, or we may have to choose
 +between different options. To clarify the difference, we have to analyze
 +the object of perception, that is, the moral quality itself. In this case we
 +would make a judgment about moral quality. This is what Hutcheson
 +does with his maxim of the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.
 +In the third section Hutcheson introduces the formula:
 +that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the great-
 +est Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.
 +(II. III. § VIII).
 +The formula is based on the moral sense, the objective moral quality,
 +and a rational procedure, namely a comparison of the varying moral
 +qualities of actions. The subsequent judgment is based on the moral
 +sense that still performs a leading role. In the earlier editions, the pre-
 +sentation of the maxim was followed by a number of mathematical al-
 +gorithms that, however, are omitted in the fourth edition. Hutcheson
 +states in the preface to the latter that he had left out the mathematical
 +1 7. Hutcheson uses the word “evidence,” for example, in Inquiry II. I. § I.
 +XVI 1
 +expressions since they “appear’d useless, and were disagreeable to some
 +Readers” (4th ed., Preface, p. xxi; see Preface note 28 of the present edi-
 +tion). The term “happiness” is defined as a “natural good. ” To be sure,
 +the greatest good turns out to be benevolence itself (II. III. § XV) or the
 +“Possession of good moral Qualities” (II. VI. § I). The greatest happiness
 +for Hutcheson cannot be found in wealth and external pleasures, but
 +virtue is “the chief Happiness in the Judgment of all Mankind” (II. VI.
 +Hutcheson’s moral philosophy has a political perspective. 18 This be-
 +comes clear in phrases like the “common good” or “public interest” that
 +he uses throughout the Inquiry. Especially in its final chapter he treats
 +the basic questions of political order. His main subjects are the corrup-
 +tion of human nature, prudence, rights, and the form of government.
 +The political problem emerges right from the center of Hutcheson’s
 +moral philosophy. Since virtue is the highest form of happiness, and vir-
 +tue is based on benevolence and benevolence in turn on the free will,
 +then only people who can exert their free will can be happy. Liberty there-
 +fore becomes a central political idea. At the same time, liberty can pro-
 +vide difficulties: it may happen that people do not follow the path of
 +What shall we do if the moral foundation is weak and if the moral
 +ideas are insufficient? The argument is based on the insight that not all
 +citizens may be virtuous all the time. Although the moral sense and all
 +good reasons may point toward a virtuous life, human nature is open to
 +corruption because men are free. Man is moved by two opposing prin-
 +ciples, love and self-love, and is free to follow either. Therefore liberty
 +and happiness sometimes counteract each other. It is difficult to deter-
 +mine the prevailing motive, benevolence or self-love, particularly in pub-
 +18. See Wolfgang Leidhold, Etbik undPolitik bei Francis Hutcheson (Freiburg, Mu-
 +nich: Alber, 1985), especially chapters 6-10.
 +lie life (II. III. § XII). The polity therefore can be based not on good
 +intentions but on good results. Government can rest only on prudence,
 +not on moral perceptions. The importance of prudence as opposed to
 +moral reflections is typical for both the republican tradition of James
 +Harrington and the Whig tradition, and Hutcheson was close to both. 19
 +Accordingly, the moral sense must be supplemented by an external mo-
 +tive to “beneficent Actions ... for the publick Good ... to counter-
 +ballance those apparent Motives of Interest.” This external motive is “a
 +law with Sanctions” (II. VII. § I). For Hutcheson the transfer and re-
 +striction of liberty therefore is the central question of political order and
 +of the limits of government:
 +Men have [the Right] to constitute Civil Government, and to subject
 +their alienable Rights to the Disposal of their Governours, under such
 +Limitations as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have
 +subjected their Rights, so far their Governours have an external Right
 +at least, to dispose of them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining
 +the Ends of their Institution; and no further. (II. VII. § VIII)
 +To be acceptable, liberty and its restriction must be in balance with
 +happiness. If a government assumes all rights from its people and ne-
 +glects the “publick Good of the State” altogether, it is called despotism.
 +For Hutcheson a “Despotick Government” is directly inconsistent with
 +his idea of a civil government (II. VII. §X). With despotism, liberty and
 +happiness are at stake. In such cases, Hutcheson advocates a right of
 +resistance (II. VII. § X). And later on he argued that this is “When it is
 +that colonies may turn independent. ” 20
 +Wolfgang Leidhold
 +19. See Caroline Robbins and Charles Blitzer, An Immortal Commonwealth (New
 +Haven: Yale University Press, i960), and J. G. A. Pocock, ed., The Political Works of
 +James Harrington (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
 +20. Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols. (Glasgow: Foulis, 1755), II,
 +p. 308.
 +Arregni, J. V., and P. Arnau. “Shaftesbury: Father and Critic of Modern Aes-
 +thetics.” British Journal of Aesthetics 34 (1994): 350-62.
 +Blackstone, William T. Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory.
 +Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1965.
 +Bredvold, Louis J. “The Invention of the Ethical Calculus.” In The Seven-
 +teenth Century: Studies in the History of English Thought and Literattire from
 +Bacon to Pope, by Richard Foster Jones and Others, Writing in His Hon-
 +our, 165-80. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951.
 +Campbell, Roy H., and Andrew S. Skinner, eds. The Origins and Nature of
 +the Scottish Enlightenment. Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1982.
 +Crescenzo, Giovanni de. Francis Hutcheson e il suo tempo. Turin: Taylor, 1968.
 +Frankena, William K. “Hutcheson’s Moral Sense Theory.” Journal of the His-
 +tory of Ideas, 16 (1955): 356-75.
 +Grean, Stanley. Shaftesbury’s Philosophy of Religion and Ethics: A Study of En-
 +thusiasm. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1967.
 +Haakonssen, Knud. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the
 +Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
 +Hruschka, Joachim. “The Greatest Happiness Principle and Other Early
 +German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory.” Utilitas 3 (1991): 165-77.
 +Jensen, Henning. Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson ’s Eth-
 +ical Theory. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971.
 +Jessop, T. E. Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy. London:
 +A. Brown and Sons, 1938.
 +Kivy, Peter. The Seventh Sense: A Study of Francis Hutcheson ’s Aesthetics and
 +Its Influence in Eighteenth-Century Britain. New York: Franklin, 1976.
 +Korsmeyer, Carolyn Wilker. “The Two Beauties: A Perspective on Hutche-
 +son’s Aesthetics.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 38 (1979/80):
 +Leidhold, Wolfgang. Ethik und Politik bei Francis Hutcheson. Freiburg, Mu-
 +nich: Alber, 1985.
 +McCosh, James. The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical,
 +from Hutcheson to Hamilton. London: Macmillan, 1875. Reprint, Hildes-
 +heim: Olm, 1966.
 +Michael, E. “Francis Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic Plea-
 +sure.” British Journal of Aesthetics 24 (1984): 241-55.
 +Norton, David Fate. “Francis Hutcheson in America.” Studies on Voltaireand
 +the Eighteenth Century 154 (1976): 1547-68.
 +. “Hutcheson on Perception and Moral Perception.” Archiv fur Ge-
 +schichte der Philosophies, no. 2 (1977): 181-97.
 +Olmstedt, E. H. “The ‘Moral Sense’ Aspect of Aristotle’s Ethical Theory.”
 +American Journal of Philology 69 (1948): 42-61.
 +Raphael, David Daiches. The Moral Sense. London: Oxford University Press,
 +047 -
 +Rendall, Jane, ed. The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment 1706-76. Basing-
 +stoke: Macmillan, 1978.
 +Rivers, Isabel. Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Re-
 +ligion and Ethics in England 1660-1780. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge
 +University Press, 1991, 2000.
 +Robbins, Caroline. The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman. Indianap-
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 +. “ ‘When It Is That Colonies May Turn Independent’: An Analysis
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 +Roberts, T. A. The Concept of Benevolence. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan,
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 +Lund, Leipzig: Gleerup/Harassowitz, 1938.
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 +New York: Teachers College Press, 1971.
 +Stephen, Leslie. History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 3rd ed.
 +2 vols. London: Murray, 1927.
 +Strasser, M. “Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception.” Philosophia 21 (1991/
 +1992): 107-18.
 +Tuveson, Ernest. “The Origins of the ‘Moral Sense.”’ Huntington Library
 +Quarterly 11 (1947-48): 241-59.
 +White, Morton. The Philosophy of the American Revolution. New York: Ox-
 +ford University Press, 1978.
 +The Editions
 +During Hutcheson’s lifetime, four different editions of the Inquiry into
 +the Original of Beauty and Virtue were published. These editions are
 +chronologically referred to as A, B, C, and D. The texts of B, C, and D
 +not only present corrections but also introduce substantial alterations
 +and additions by the author. These changes can be helpful in under-
 +standing Hutcheson’s ideas, and accordingly the present edition presents
 +the variants in a text critical apparatus. It is based on the second edition
 +(B) from 1726, since this is the first corrected text.
 +The first edition (A) was published in London in 1725, “Printed by
 +J. Darby in Bartholomew Close, for Will, and John Smith on the Blind
 +Key in Dublin; and sold by W. and J. Innys at the West End of St. Paul’s
 +Churchyard, J. Osborn and T. Longman in Pater-Noster-Row, and
 +S. Chandler in the Poultry.” This edition was reprinted as a facsimile in
 +vol. 1 of Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson, edited by Bernard Fabian,
 +Hildesheim 1969, 1971, 7 vols.
 +The second edition (B), “corrected and enlarg’d,” was published in
 +London in 1726, “Printed for J. Darby, A. Bettesworth, F. Fayram,
 +J. Pemberton, C. Rivington, J. Hooke, F. Clay,J. Batley, andE. Symon.”
 +There was a facsimile reprint: New York, Garland Publishing, 1971.
 +The third edition (C) was published in London in 1729, “Printed for
 +J. and J. Knapton, J. Darby, A. Bettesworth, F. Fayram, J. Pemberton,
 +J. Osborne and T. Longman, C. Rivington, F. Clay, J. Batley, and
 +A. Ward.”
 +Of the fourth edition three different issues were published in 1738 (Di,
 +D2, D3). Di is a reprint of the 1729 edition (C). D2 and D3 contain
 +changes that were carried out when the printing was already in progress,
 +a practice not uncommon in the eighteenth century. These two issues
 +have identical title pages stating that they were published in London and
 +“Printed for D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and C. Hitch, J. andj. Pem-
 +berton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay, A. Ward, J. and P. Knapton,
 +T. Longman, R. Hett, and J. Wood.” There was a facsimile reprint of
 +D2: Farnborough, Hants., England, 1969. Part of the text of D2 (“Trea-
 +tise I, Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design”) was edited by Pe-
 +ter Kivy, The Hague, 1973.
 +If not otherwise indicated, all notes referring to “D” state variants
 +from D2. The notes refer to the alterations in the text as well as to an
 +appended list of corrigenda titled “Additions and Corrections &c.” Here
 +Hutcheson remarks:
 +This edition having been inadvertently cast off, before the Author’s cor-
 +rections were obtained, a few sheets have been cancelled where it was
 +necessary, and some few additional paragraphs or notes are here sub-
 +joined, with some few corrections of the Expressions referred to their
 +proper pages and lines, where the reader may make a mark.
 +Since the list of corrigenda is not paginated, the pages here are counted
 +consecutively, starting from the last numbered page of the text itself.
 +Textual notes referring to these corrigenda give the page number in
 +square brackets, for example, D [Corrigenda, p. 311]: or Curiosity.
 +D3 carries the same “Additions and Corrections &c.” as D2 and adds
 +a few “Directions to the Bookbinder” (obviously directions that had not
 +been carried out properly in D2): “In the Preface, Cancel from p. 15 to
 +the End. In the Work, Cancel from p. 9 to 17. From 29 to 39. From 57
 +to 59. From 173 to 179. From 185 to 203. From 217 to 223. From 253 to
 +255. From 287 to 293.” (In D3 pages 179 and 180 are printed twice.)
 +Editorial Decisions
 +Editorial intervention in the main text has been minimal. The spelling
 +of Hutcheson’s text has been preserved, as has his punctuation, however
 +much it varies from present conventions. The typography has been stan-
 +dardized and ignores Hutcheson’s, or his printers’, liberal use of italics
 +and small capitals. There are no other silent editorial deletions or ad-
 +ditions. The page breaks of the second edition (B) of the Inquiry are
 +indicated by square brackets [ ]; for example, the text of page 215 begins
 +after [215].
 +The editor’s explanatory notes are marked by lowercase Roman nu-
 +merals, textual notes by Arabic numerals. The textual notes state the
 +differences between the text of B and the other editions, except for var-
 +iations in spelling and punctuation. In all cases, the editions are cited in
 +the order given above (A, B, C, D, D3), followed by the page and the
 +text. For example, C (p. 2), D (p. 2): great means that in edition C, on
 +page 2, and in edition D, on page 2, a word (or phrase) was changed to
 +“great.” The corrections in the Errata list of B are likewise noted (in-
 +cluding punctuation).
 +Where necessary for clarity, pairs of double vertical bars indicate the
 +beginning and the end of a variant. For example, || 4 we enjoy the Delights
 +of Virtue || means that beginning with || 4 and ending with || the words
 +“we enjoy the Delights of Virtue” were altered as per footnote 4. In some
 +cases there are changes within changes. Flere the Arabic numerals for
 +footnotes are supplemented with letters to indicate the beginning and
 +end of the respective variants. For example, amiable or disagreeable
 +Ideas of Actions, when they \\ Ah shall h \\ occur to our Observation a || means
 +that one variant starts after || 3a and ends at a ||, and that another variant
 +concerns only the word “shall” between || 4b and b ||. Square brackets not
 +indicating page breaks mark editorial notes or insertions.
 +For research assistance I thank Frank Limbrock, who typed the text;
 +Steffan Mann for his help with the critical edition and its annotations;
 +and Andreas Kamp, who reviewed the Latin and Greek quotes in the
 +text. I am indebted to Luigi Turco for information about the complicated
 +printing history of the fourth edition of the Inquiry. My special thanks
 +go to Knud Haakonssen, who supported the work on this edition with
 +great patience and professional advice.
 +W. L.
 +An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of
 +Beauty and Virtue;
 +In Two Treatises.
 +II * 1 1. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.
 +II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil.||
 +The Second Edition, Corrected and Enlarg’d.
 +Itaque eorum ipsorum quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum
 +aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam
 +partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab
 +oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis
 +pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis,
 +factisque conservandum putat. Quibus ex rebus conflatur &
 +efficitur id quod quaerimus honestum: Quod etiamsi
 +nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit: quodque etiamsi a
 +nullo laudetur, natura est laudabile. Formam quidem ipsam
 +& tanquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur,
 +mirabiles amores excitaret sapientiae.
 +— Cic. de Off lib. I. c. 4. 1
 +London: 1726.
 +i. Translation: “And so no other animal has a sense of beauty, loveliness, harmony
 +in the visible world; and Nature and Reason, extending the analogy of this from the
 +world of sense to the world of spirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more
 +to be maintained in thought and deed. It is from these elements that is forged and
 +fashioned that moral goodness which is the subject of this inquiry — something that,
 +even though it be not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour; and by its own
 +nature, it merits praise, even though it is praised by none. You see here the very
 +2 To His Excellency, John, Lord Carteret ," Lord
 +Lieutenant ofLreland.
 +May it please your Excellency,
 +When I publish’d these Papers, I had so little Confidence of their Suc-
 +cess, that I was unwilling to own them; and [iv] what I was unwilling
 +myself to own, I durst not presume to inscribe to any great Name.
 +Your Excellency’s favourable Reception of them, soon put me out of
 +all Fears about their Success with the wiser and better Part of the World;
 +and since this has given me Assurance to own them, 1 humbly presume
 +to inscribe them in this second Edition to your Excellency, that 1 may
 +have at once an Opportunity of expressing the sincerest Gratitude for
 +the Notice you were pleas’d to take of me, and have the Pleasure also of
 +letting the [v] World know that this small Work has your Excellency’s
 +The Praise bestow’d by Persons of real Merit and Discernment, is
 +allow’d by all to give a noble and rational Pleasure. Your Excellency first
 +made me feel this in the most lively manner; and it will be a Pleasure as
 +lasting as it is great: ’twill ever be matter of the highest Joy and Satisfac-
 +tion to me, that I am Author of a Book my Lord Carteret approves.
 +I know, my Lord, that much of your Commendation [vi] is to be
 +attributed to your own Humanity: you can entirely approve the Works
 +of those alone, who can think and speak on these Subjects as justly as
 +form and as it were the face of Moral Goodness; and if it could be seen with the
 +physical eye, it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom.” (Cicero, De Officiis, with
 +an English translation by Walter Miller, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
 +1975, pp. 14-17-)
 +ii. John Carteret, First Earl Granville (1690-1763), English orator, diplomat, and
 +statesman, member of the House of Lords since 1711, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland
 +your self; and that is what few, if any, even of those who spend their Lives
 +in such Contemplations, are able to do. In the Conversation, with which
 +your Excellency has been pleas’d to honour me, I could not, I own, with-
 +out the utmost surprize, observe so intimate an Acquaintance with the
 +most valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient, and Modern; so
 +just a Taste of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts, [vii] in so young
 +a man, amidst the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, my Lord, that I
 +mention this part of your Character; ’tis so uncommon that it deserves
 +the highest Admiration; and tis the only one which an obscure Philos-
 +opher, who has receiv’d the greatest Obligations from your Excellency,
 +can with any Propriety take notice of
 +Those other great Endowments which have enabled you, even in
 +Youth, to discharge the most difficult Employments, with the highest
 +Honour to your self and Advantage to your Country, I dare not presume
 +to de-[viii]scribe. He who attempts to do Justice to so great and good a
 +Character, ought himself to be one of uncommon Merit and Distinc-
 +tion; and yet the ablest Panegyrist would find it difficult to add any thing
 +to your Excellency’s Fame. The Voices of Nations proclaim your Worth.
 +I am,
 +May it please your Excellency,
 +Your most obliged,
 +Most obedient, and
 +Most devoted humble Servant,
 +June 19.
 +Francis Hutcheson, [ix]
 +There is no part of Philosophy of more importance, than a just Knowl-
 +edge of Human Nature, and its various Powers and Dispositions. Our
 +late Inquirys have been very much employ’d about our Understanding,
 +and the several Methods of obtaining Truth. We generally acknowledge,
 +that the Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or
 +Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most last-
 +ing Pleasure; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End
 +by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest importance, [x]
 +to have distinct Conceptions of this End it self, as well as of the Means
 +necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest and
 +most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our Reason, after all our labo-
 +rious Improvements of it, in trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear’d indeed,
 +that most of our Studys, without this Inquiry, will be of very little use
 +to us; for they seem to have scarce any other tendency than to lead us
 +into speculative Knowledge it self. Nor are we distinctly told how it is
 +that Knowledge, or Truth is pleasant to us.
 +This Consideration || 3 put|| the Author of the following Papers
 +|| 4 upon|| inquiring into the various Pleasures which Human nature is
 +capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophick
 +Writings, nothing further on this Head, than some bare Division of them
 +into Sensible, and Rational, and some trite [xi] Common-place Argu-
 +ments to prove the latter more valuable than the former. Our sensible
 +Pleasures are slightly pass’d over, and explain’d only by some Instances
 +in Tastes, Smells, Sounds, or such like, which Men of any tolerable Re-
 +flection generally look upon as very trifling Satisfactions. Our rational
 +Pleasures have had much the same kind of treatment. We are seldom
 +taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which we have
 +upon reflecting on our Possession, or Claim to those Objects, which may
 +be Occasions of Pleasure. Such Objects we call advantageous; but Ad-
 +vantage, or Interest, cannot be distinctly conceiv’d, till we know what
 +those Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and
 +what Senses or Powers of Perception we have || 5 with respect to || such
 +Objects. We may perhaps |] 6 find|| such an Inquiry of more importance
 +in Morals, to prove what we call the Reality of Virtue, or [xii] that it is
 +the surest Happiness of the Agent, than one would at first imagine.
 +In reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Per-
 +ceptions of Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Ob-
 +jects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The presence
 +of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others as nec-
 +essarily displeases us. Nor can we by our Will, any otherwise procure
 +Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects,
 +and avoiding the latter. By the very Frame of our Nature the one is made
 +the occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction.
 +The same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains.
 +For there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us
 +as necessarily, as material Objects [xiii] do when they operate upon our
 +Organs of Sense. There || 7 is scarcely any Object which our Minds are
 +employ’d about, which is || not thus constituted the necessary occasion
 +of some Pleasure or Pain. Thus we || 8 find|| our selves pleas’d with a reg-
 +ular Form, a piece of Architecture or Painting, a Composition ofNotes,
 +a Theorem, an Action, an Affection, a Character. And we are conscious
 +that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplation of the Idea,
 +which is then present to our Minds, with all its Circumstances, although
 +some of these Ideas have nothing of what we || 9 call|| sensible Perception
 +in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises from some Uni-
 +formity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not from the simple Ideas
 +of Colour, or Sound, or mode of Extension separately consider’d.
 +These Determinations to be pleas’d with || 10 any Forms, or Ideas [xiv]
 +which occur to our Observation, || the Author chuses to call Senses; dis-
 +tinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name,
 +by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Har-
 +mony, an Internal Sense; and that Determination to || n be pleas’d with
 +the Contemplation of those || Affections, Actions, or Characters of ra-
 +tional Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a Moral
 +His principal Design is to shew, “That Human Nature was not left
 +quite indifferent in the affair of Virtue, to form to it self Observations
 +concerning the Advantage, or Disadvantage of Actions, and accordingly
 +to regulate its Conduct.” The weakness of our Reason, and the avoca-
 +tions arising from the || 12 Infirmity|| and Necessitys of our Nature, are
 +so great, that very few || 13 Men could ever|| have form’d those [xv] long
 +Deductions of Reason, which || 14 shew|| some Actions to be in the whole
 +advantageous to the Agent, and their Contrarys pernicious. The Author
 +of Nature has much better furnish’d us for a virtuous Conduct, than our
 +Moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instruc-
 +tions, as we have for the preservation of our Bodys. || 15 He has made
 +Virtue a lovely Form, to excite our pursuit of it; and has given us strong
 +Affections to be the Springs of each virtuous Action. ||
 +This moral Sense of Beauty in Actions and Affections, may appear
 +strange at first View. Some of our Moralists themselves are offended at
 +it in my Lord Shaftesbury , 111 so much are they accustom’d to deduce every
 +Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of || 16 Interest||, (except
 +it be merely in the simple Ideas of the external Senses) and have such a
 +Horror at innate Ideas, [xvi] which they imagine this borders upon. But
 +this moral Sense has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the
 +second Treatise.
 +17 Our Gentlemen of good Taste can tell us of a great many Senses,
 +Tastes, and Relishes for Beauty, Harmony, Imitation in Painting and
 +Poetry; and may not we find too in Mankind a Relish for a Beauty in
 +Characters, in Manners? || 18 I doubt we have made Philosophy, as well
 +as Religion, by our foolish management of it, so austere and ungainly a
 +iii. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), was educated
 +under the supervision of John Locke but was not a follower of his philosophy. Hutch-
 +eson used the collection of Shaftesbury’s works in Characteristicks of Men, Manners,
 +Opinions, Times, 3 vols., London, 1711. According to the subtitle of the first edition
 +of the Inquiry (see footnote i on the title page), Hutcheson’s intention was to defend
 +Shaftesbury’s views against Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees.
 +Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring himself to like it; and those
 +who are Strangers to it, can scarcely bear to hear our Description of it.
 +So much it is changed from what was once the delight of the finest Gen-
 +tlemen among the Antients, and their Recreation after the Hurry of pub-
 +lick Affairs! ||
 +In the first Treatise, the Author perhaps in some Instances has gone
 +too far, in supposing a greater Agree- [xvii]ment of Mankind in their
 +Sense of Beauty, than Experience || 19 will|| confirm; but all he is solicitous
 +about is to shew, “That there is some Sense of Beauty natural to Men;
 +1 1 20 that we find 1 1 as great an Agreement of Men in their Relishes of Forms,
 +as in their external Senses which all agree to be natural; and that Pleasure
 +or Pain, Delight or Aversion, are naturally join’d to their Perceptions.”
 +If the Reader be convinc’d of || 21 such Determinations of the Mind to
 +be pleas’d with Forms, Proportions, Resemblances, Theorems, || it will
 +be no difficult matter to apprehend another superior Sense, natural
 +|| 22 also|| to Men, determining them to be pleas’d with Actions, Char-
 +acters, Affections. This is the moral Sense, which makes the Subject of
 +the second Treatise.
 +The proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to
 +us as soon as we come into the [xviii] World; || 23 whence|| perhaps we
 +easily look upon these Senses to be natural: but the Objects of the su-
 +perior Senses of Beauty and Virtue generally do not. It is probably some
 +little time before Children || 24 reflect ||, or at least let us know that they
 +reflect upon Proportion and Similitude; upon Affections, Characters,
 +Tempers; or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of
 +them. || 25 Hence|| we imagine that their Sense of Beauty, and their moral
 +Sentiments of Actions, must be entirely owing to Instruction, and Edu-
 +cation; whereas it is as easy to conceive, how a Character, a Temper, as
 +soon as they are observ’d, may be constituted by Nature the necessary
 +occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a Taste or a Sound;
 +|| 26 tho it be sometime before these Objects present themselves to our [xix]
 +|| 27 The first Impression of these Papers was so well receiv’d, that the
 +Author hopes it will be no offence to any who are concern’d in the Mem-
 +ory of the late Lord Viscount Molesworth, lv if he lets his Readers know
 +that he was the Noble Person mention’d in the Preface to the first Edi-
 +tion, and that their being published was owing to his Approbation of
 +them. It was from him he had that shreud Objection, which the Reader
 +may find in the first Treatise;* besides many other Remarks in the fre-
 +quent Conversations with which he honour’d the Author; by which that
 +Treatise was very much improved beyond what it was in the Draught
 +presented to him. The Author retains the most grateful Sense of his sin-
 +gular Civilitys, and of the Pleasure and Improvement he received in his
 +Conver-[xx]sation; and is still fond of expressing his grateful Remem-
 +brance of him: but,
 +Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare sepultos/
 +To be concern’d in this Book can be no honour to a Person so justly
 +celebrated for the most generous Sentiments ofVirtue and Religion, de-
 +liver’d with the most manly Eloquence: yet it would not be just toward
 +the World, should the Author conceal his Obligations to the Reverend
 +Mr. Edward Syng; vl not only for revising these Papers, when they stood
 +in great need of an accurate Review, but for suggesting several just
 +Amendments in the general Scheme of Morality. The Author was much
 +iv. Robert Molesworth, a wealthy Irish merchant, politician, diplomat, and author
 +(1656-1725), with short interruptions a member of both the English and Irish Parlia-
 +ments for about 30 years. He was one of the most prominent radical Whigs of his
 +time. At the end of 1722 Molesworth retired to Dublin, where he founded a philo-
 +sophical and literary circle. Hutcheson was a member of the group.
 +* Sect. v. Art. 2. the last Paragraph.
 +v. Translation: “Thinkest thou that dust or buried shades give heed to that?” Virgil,
 +Aeneid, book 4, 1 . 34 ( Eclogues , Georgies, Aeneidl—VI, with an English translation by
 +H. Rushton Fairclough, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935 [revised
 +vi. Edward Synge (i692/94?-iy62) was successively bishop of Clonfert, Cloyne,
 +Firns, and Elphin. He was a friend of Berkeley and probably a member of Moles-
 +worth’s circle in Dublin, where a lasting friendship with Hutcheson developed.
 +Hutcheson’s son dedicated his father’s posthumous A System of Moral Philosophy
 +(London, 1755) to Bishop Synge. As Synge demonstrated in a sermon from 25 October
 +1725 (the anniversary of the Irish rebellion), later published as The Case of Toleration,
 +he was a liberal and tolerant Anglican.
 +confirm’d in his Opinion of the Justness of these Thoughts, upon find-
 +ing, that this Gentleman had fallen into the same way of thinking before
 +him; and will ever look upon his Friendship [xxi] as one of the greatest
 +Advantages and Pleasures of his Life.
 +To recommend the Lord Shaftesbury’s Writings to the World, is a very
 +needless Attempt. They will be esteemed while any Reflection remains
 +among Men. It is indeed to be wished, that he had abstained from mixing
 +with such Noble Performances, some Prejudices he had receiv’d against
 +Christianity; a Religion which gives us the truest Idea of Virtue, and
 +recommends the Love of God, and of Mankind, as the Sum of all true
 +Religion. Flow would it have moved the Indignation of that ingenious
 +Nobleman, to have found a dissolute set of Men, who relish nothing in
 +Life but the lowest and most sordid Pleasures, searching into his Writings
 +for those Insinuations against Christianity, that they might be the less
 +restrained from their Debaucherys; when at the same time their low
 +Minds are [xxii] incapable of relishing those noble Sentiments ofVirtue
 +and Honour, which he has placed in so lovely a Light! ||
 +Whatever Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance, the
 +Author hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to Religion or
 +good Manners: and he shall be well pleased if he gives the learned World
 +an occasion of examining more thorowly these Subjects, which are, he
 +presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his
 +Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took
 +the first Hints of them from some of the greatest Writers of Antiquity,"'
 +so the more he has convers’d with them, he finds his Illustrations the
 +more conformable to their Sentiments.
 +1 1 28 In the former Edition of this Book there were some Mistakes in
 +one or two of the Instances borrowed [xxiii] from other Sciences, to a
 +vii. Hutcheson was familiar with Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and probably with
 +Plotinus. See the quotation from Cicero on the title page (from De Officiis, book i,
 +§§ 14, 15). Also see Plato on the perception of beauty in Phaedrusfa od) and Aristotle’s
 +Nicomachean Ethics, II, 9 (1109b, 20-26) and III, 6 (1113a, 23-35) as well as Politics, I,
 +11 (1253a, 16-19). On this topic, see E. H. Olmsted, “The ‘Moral Sense’ Aspects of
 +Aristotle’s Ethical Theory,” American Journal of Philology 69 (1948): 42-61. See Plo-
 +tinus, On Beauty (Ennead I. 6).
 +perfect Knowledge of which the Author does not pretend; nor would he
 +now undertake that this Edition is every way faultless. He hopes that
 +those who are studious of the true measures of Life, may find his Ideas
 +of Virtue and Happiness tolerably just; and that the profound Con-
 +noisseurs will pardon a few Faults, in the Illustrations borrow’d from
 +their Arts, upon which his Arguments do not depend. || [xxiv]
 +section i. Concerning some Powers of
 +Perception distinct from what is generally
 +understood by Sensation. 19
 +section 11. Of original or absolute Beauty. 28
 +section hi. Of the Beauty of Theorems. 36
 +section iv. Of 1 1 29 comparative or relative 1 1
 +Beauty. 42
 +section v. Concerning our Reasonings about
 +Design and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty
 +or Regularity of Effects. 46
 +section vi. Concerning the Universality of our
 +Sense of Beauty. 61
 +section vii. Concerning the Power of Custom,
 +Education and Example, as to our internal Senses. 70
 +section viii. Of the Importance of the internal
 +Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them, [xxv] 76
 +1 6
 +section i. Of the moral Sense by which we
 +perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve, or
 +disapprove them in others. 89
 +section 11. Concerning the immediate Motive to
 +virtuous Actions. 101
 +section hi. The Sense of Virtue, and the various
 +Opinions about it, reducible to one general
 +Foundation. The manner of computing the
 +Morality of Actions. 116
 +section iv. All Mankind agree in this general
 +Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions.
 +The Grounds of different Opinions about Morals. 135
 +section v. A further Confirmation that we have
 +practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our
 +Nature; with a further Explication of our Instinct to
 +Benevolence in its various Degrees; with the
 +additional Motives of Interest, viz. Flonour, Shame,
 +Pity. 147
 +section vi. Concerning the Importance of this
 +moral Sense to the present Flappiness of Mankind,
 +and its Influence on human Affairs, [xxvi] 162
 +section vii. A Deduction of some complex
 +moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect,
 +Imperfect, and External; Alienable and Unalienable
 +from this moral Sense.
 +An Inquiry Concerning Beauty,
 +Order, &c.[i]
 +An Inquiry ||‘ Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.||
 +ew section i ew
 +Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct
 +from what is generally understood by Sensation.
 +To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to
 +premise some Definitions, and Observations, either universally
 +acknowledg’d, or sufficiently prov’d by many Writers both ancient and
 +modern, concerning our Perceptions called Sensations, and the Actions
 +of the Mind consequent upon them.
 +Art. I. Those Ideas which are rais’d in the Mind upon the presence of
 +external Ob-[2]jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sen-
 +sations. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not
 +Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Re-
 +ception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted upon
 +by the external Object.
 +II. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree
 +in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of re-
 +ceiving those different Perceptions, different Senses. Thus Seeing and
 +Hearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours
 +and Sounds. And altho Colours have || 2 vast|| Differences among them-
 +selves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the
 +most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence
 +The Mind
 +how active.
 +Pleasure. Pain.
 +we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses
 +seem to have their distinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in some
 +degree diffus’d over the whole Body.
 +III. The Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas || 3 , || which were re-
 +ceiv’d separately; of comparing || 4 their|| Objects by means of the Ideas,
 +and of observing their Relations and Proportions; of enlarging and di-
 +minishing its Ideas at pleasure, or in any certain Ratio, or Degree; and
 +of considering separately [3] each of the simple Ideas, which might per-
 +haps have been impress’d jointly in the Sensation. This last Operation
 +we commonly call Abstraction.
 +IV. The Ideas of || 5 Substances || are compounded of the various simple
 +Ideas jointly impress’d, when they presented themselves to our Senses.
 +We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas: And
 +such Definitions may || 6 raise an Idea clear enough |] of the Substance in
 +the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv’d the Substance; pro-
 +vided he has separately receiv’d by his Senses all the simple Ideas which
 +are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substance defin’d: But
 +if || 7 there be any simple Ideas which he has not receiv’d, or if he wants
 +any of the Senses necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition
 +can raise any simple Idea which has not been before perceived by the
 +Senses. ||
 +V. 8 Hence it follows, “That when Instruction, Education, or Prejudice
 +of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desire
 +or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, or
 +of some Deficiency in those Qualitys, for Perception of which we have
 +the proper Senses.” Thus if Beauty be desir’d by one who has not the
 +Sense of Sight, the Desire must be rais’d by some [4] apprehended Reg-
 +ularity of Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness, or some
 +other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the
 +Ideas of Colour.
 +VI. Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful,
 +immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Plea-
 +sure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or
 +without seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such
 +Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these
 +things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it
 +might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise
 +a distinct Joy, from a prospect of further Advantage in the Object, or
 +Aversion, from an apprehension of Evil.
 +VII. The || 9 simple|| Ideas rais’d in different Persons by the same Object,
 +are probably || 10 some way|] different, when they disagree in their Ap-
 +probation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his Fancy at one
 +time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting
 +on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho they were
 +formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some acci-
 +dental Conjunction of a disagreeable Idea, [5] which always recurs with
 +the Object; as in those Wines to which Men acquire an Aversion, after
 +they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation: II 1 'In this case|| we are
 +conscious that the Idea is alter’d from what it was when that Wine was
 +agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of
 +Stomach. The like Change of Idea may be insensibly made by the
 +Change of our Bodys|| 12 ,|] as we advance in Years, || 13 or when we are
 +accustomed to any Object, || which may occasion an Indifference toward
 +Meats we were fond of in our Childhood; || 14 and may make some Ob-
 +jects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our
 +first use of them. Many of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable only
 +thro the too great Intenseness of the Quality: thus moderate Light is
 +agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be
 +pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will
 +necessarily occasion a Change in the Intenseness of the Perception at
 +least; nay sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a
 +warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold hand shall feel
 +warm. 1 1
 +We shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of
 +Fancy || 15a about more complex Ideas of Objects, || 16b in which we re-
 +gard b 1 1 many Ideas of different Senses at [6] once; as || 17c in c || some Per-
 +ceptions of those call’d primary Qualitys, and some secondary, as ex-
 +plain’d by Mr. Locke: 1 for instance, in the different Fancys about
 +Architecture, Gardening, Dress. Of the two former we shall offer some-
 +thing in Sect. VI. As to Dress, we may generally account for the Diversity
 +of Fancys from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus a [|, if either from any
 +thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance,
 +the fancying of glaring Colours be look’d upon as an evidence of Levity,
 +or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any Colour or Fashion be
 +commonly us’d by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable Profession,
 +Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur constantly
 +with that of the Colour or Fashion, and cause a constant Dislike to them
 +in those who join the additional Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be no
 +way disagreeable of themselves, and actually do please others who join
 +no such Ideas to them. But there || 18 does not seem to be any|| Ground
 +to believe such a Diversity in human Minds, as that the same || 19 simple||
 +Idea or Perception should give pleasure to one and pain to another, or
 +to the same Person at different times; not to say that it seems a Contra-
 +diction, that the same simple Idea should do so. [7]
 +Complex VIII. The only Pleasure ofSense, |] 20 which|| || 21 our || Philosophers seem
 +Meas. t0 cons i c [ er) j s that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But
 +there are || 22 vastly || greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects,
 +which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, Fiarmonious. Thus every
 +one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture,
 +than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as
 +possible; and more pleas’d with a Prospect of the Sun arising among
 +settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Flemisphere, a
 +fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth
 +Sea, or alarge open Plain, not diversify’d by Woods, Hills, Waters, Build-
 +ings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite simple. So in
 +Musick, the Pleasure of fine Composition is incomparably greater than
 +that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.
 +i. John Locke (1632-1704) developed the theory of simple and complex ideas, and
 +of primary and secondary qualities in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding
 +(London, 1690), book 2 “Of Ideas” and book 4 “Of Knowledge and Opinion.”
 +IX. Let it be observ’d, that in the following Papers, the Word Beauty is Beauty,
 +taken for the Idea rais’d in us, and a Sense of Beauty for our Power of
 +receiving this Idea. Harmony also denotes our pleasant Ideas arising Harmony,
 +from Composition of Sounds, and a good Ear (as it is generally taken)
 +a Power of perceiving this Pleasure. In the following Sections, an At-
 +tempt is made [8] to discover “what is the immediate Occasion of these
 +pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites
 +X. It is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and internal Sense.
 +Harmony, Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing, or
 +not. I should rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an
 +Internal Sense, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them
 +from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which men may have
 +without Perception of Beauty and Harmony. It is plain from Experience,
 +that many Men have in the common meaning, the Sense of Seeing and
 +Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the simple Ideas separately, and
 +have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one
 +Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of
 +the same Colour, || 23 when they are plac’d beside each other, altho they
 +may often confound their Names, when they occur a-part from each
 +other; as some do the Names of Green and Blue: || they can tell in separate
 +Notes, the higher, lower, sharper or flatter, when separately sounded; in
 +Figures they discern the Length, Breadth, Wideness of each Line, Sur-
 +face, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and seeing at great distances
 +as any men [9] whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall || 24 find|| no Plea-
 +sure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Land-
 +skip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from
 +the same Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas
 +we commonly call a fine Genius or Taste: In Musick we seem universally
 +to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one
 +of Hearing, and call it a good Ear; and the like distinction we || 25 should|]
 +probably acknowledge in other || 26 Objects||, had we also got distinct
 +Names to denote these Powers of Perception by.
 +2 4
 +Different from
 +XI. 27 There will appear another Reason perhaps || 28 afterwards ||, for call-
 +ing this Power of perceiving the Ideas of Beauty, an Internal Sense, from
 +this, that in some other Affairs, where our External Senses are not much
 +concern’d, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, to
 +that observ’d in sensible Objects, and accompany’d with like Pleasure:
 +Such is that Beauty perceiv’d in Theorems, or universal Truths, in gen-
 +eral Causes, and in some extensive Principles of Action.
 +XII. Let || 29a every one here consider, how different we must suppose the
 +Perception to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of
 +any of those Objects [io] of natural Beauty, which ravish us even in his
 +Description; from that cold lifeless Conception which we imagine in a
 +dull Critick, or one of the Virtuosi, without what we call a fine Taste.
 +This latter Class of Men may have greater Perfection in that Knowledge,
 +which is deriv’d from external Sensation; they can tell all the specifick
 +Differences of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals; they know the Form of
 +every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which
 +the Poet is often very ignorant: And yet the Poet shall have a vastly more
 +delightful Perception of the Whole; and not only the Poet but any man
 +of a fine Taste. Our External || 30b Senses' 1 1| may by measuring teach us all
 +the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situ-
 +ation of every Muscle in the human Body; and a good Memory may
 +retain these: and yet there is still something further necessary, not only
 +to make a man a compleat Master in Architecture, Painting or Statuary,
 +but even a tolerable Judge in these Works; or [| 31c capable of receiving^
 +the highest Pleasure in contemplating them. a || Since then there are such
 +different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the
 +External Senses are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge ofwhat
 +the External Senses discover, || 32 often does || not give the Pleasure of
 +Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a good Taste will en-[n]joy at once
 +without much Knowledge; we may justly use another Name for these
 +higher, and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and
 +call the Power of receiving such Impressions, an Internal Sense. The Dif-
 +ference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a dif-
 +ferent Name, || 33 especially when we are told in what meaning the Word
 +is applied. 1 1
 +XIII. 34 This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because
 +of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure || 35 does not
 +arise 1 1 from any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the
 +Usefulness of the Object; || 36 but strikes us at first with the Idea of ||
 +Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this Pleasure of
 +Beauty, however it 37 may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from
 +prospects of Advantage, or || 38 from|| the Increase of Knowledge.*
 +XIV. 39 And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible
 +Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither
 +can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or Dis-
 +advantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the
 +external Sensations, no View of Interest will [ 12 ] make an Object grate-
 +ful, nor 1 1 40 View of 1 1 Detriment, distinct from immediate Pain in the
 +Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole
 +World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a
 +deform’d Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be
 +procur’d by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct
 +abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform’d; but
 +our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue in-
 +variably the same.
 +XV. 41 Hence it plainly appears, “that some Objects are immediately the
 +Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for
 +perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that Joy which arises || 42 from
 +Self-love 1 1 upon Prospect of Advantage.” Nay, do not we often see Con-
 +venience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other prospect
 +of Advantage in the Beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasant
 +Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may pursue beau-
 +Its Pleasures
 +necessary and
 +This Sense
 +antecedent to
 +and distinct
 +from prospects
 +of interest.
 +See above, Art. 6 .
 +2 6
 +tiful Objects from Self-love, with a view to obtain the Pleasures of
 +Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there
 +must be a Sense of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects even of this Advan-
 +tage, without which Sense, these Objects would not be thus [13] Advan-
 +tageous, nor excite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them advanta-
 +geous. Our Sense of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted
 +good to us, is very distinct from our Desire of them when they are thus
 +constituted: Our Desire of Beauty may be counter-ballanc’d by Rewards
 +or Threatnings, but never our Sense of it; even as Fear of Death, || 43 or
 +Love of Life, || may make us || 44 chuse and|| desire a bitter Potion, or ne-
 +glect those Meats which the Sense of Taste would recommend as pleas-
 +ant; || 45 and yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can|| make
 +that Potion agreeable to the Sense, or Meat disagreeable to it, || 46 which
 +was|| not so antecedently to this Prospect. || 47 Just in the same manner
 +as to || the Sense of Beauty and Harmony; that the Pursuit of such Objects
 +is frequently neglected, from prospects of Advantage, Aversion to La-
 +bour, or any other Motive of || 48 Self-love ||, does not prove that we have
 +no Sense of Beauty, but only that our Desire of it may be counter-
 +ballanc’d by a stronger Desire: || 49 So Gold out-weighing Silver, is never
 +adduc’d as a proof that the latter is void of Gravity.||
 +XVI. 50 Had we no such Sense of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gar-
 +dens, Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as conve-
 +nient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as beautiful: || 51 And in Faces I see
 +no- [14] thing which could please us, but Liveliness of Colour, and
 +Smoothness of Surface: || And yet nothing is more certain, than that all
 +these Objects are recommended under quite different Views on many
 +Occasions: || 52 And no Custom, Education, or Example could ever|| give
 +us Perceptions distinct from those of the Senses which we had the use
 +of before, or recommend Objects under another Conception than grate-
 +ful to* them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example,
 +upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below, f
 +* See Art. 5.
 +t Sect. 7.
 +XVII. || 53 Beauty[| is either Original or Comparative; or, if any like the
 +Terms better, Absolute, or Relative: Only let it be || 54 observ’d||, that by
 +Absolute or Original Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos’d to
 +be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to
 +any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible
 +Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of some Mind; so Cold, |] 55 Hot||,
 +Sweet, Bitter, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps
 +there is no resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in us,
 +however we generally imagine || 56 that there is something in the Object
 +just like our Perception. || The Ideas of Beauty and [15] Harmony being
 +excited upon our Perception of some primary Quality, and having re-
 +lation to Figure and Time, may indeed have a nearer resemblance to
 +Objects, than these Sensations, which seem not so much any Pictures of
 +Objects, as Modifications of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no
 +Mind with a Sense of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they
 +could be call’d beautiful. We therefore by* Absolute Beauty understand
 +only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects without comparison to
 +any thing external, of which the Object is suppos’d an Imitation, or Pic-
 +ture; such as that Beauty perceiv’d from the Works of Nature, artificial
 +Forms, Figures, || 57 Theorems||. Comparative or Relative Beauty is that
 +which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as Imitations or
 +Resemblances of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the
 +three following Sections. [16]
 +* This division of Beauty is taken from the different Foundations of Pleasure to
 +our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves: for most of the following
 +Instances of relative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of
 +absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may dis-
 +tinctly consider these two Fountains of Pleasure, Uniformity in the Object it self,
 +and Resemblance to some Original.
 +Original or
 +Of Original or Absolute Beauty.
 +Sense of Men. I. Since it is certain that we have Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, let us
 +examine what Quality in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the occasion
 +of them. And let it be here observ’d, that our Inquiry is only about the
 +Qualitys which are beautiful to Men; or about the Foundation of their
 +Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to
 +the Sense of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally
 +the Objects which occur to us, are beautiful, we mean 1 1 1 that such Ob-
 +jects are 1 1 agreeable to the Sense of Men: |[ 2 for as there are not a few||
 +Objects, which seem no way beautiful to Men, || 3 so we see a variety of ||
 +other Animals || 4 who|| seem delighted with them; they may have Senses
 +otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of
 +Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals
 +fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or
 +loathsom, may be to them a Paradise.
 +II. That we may more distinctly discover the general Foundation or Oc-
 +casion of [17] the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be necessary to
 +consider it first in its simpler Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Fig-
 +ures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all
 +the more complex Species of it.
 +Uniformity III. The Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those
 +with Variety. - n w ]-q c h q lcrc j s Uniformity amidst Variety. There are many Concep-
 +tions of Objects which are agreeable upon other accounts, such as Gran-
 +deur, Novelty, Sanctity, and some others, || 5 which shall be mention’d
 +hereafter. * 1 1 But what we call Beautiful in Obj ects, to speak in the Math-
 +ematical Style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and
 +Variety: so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as
 +the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Unifor-
 +mity. This 1 1 6 will be plain from Examples. ||
 +First, the Variety increases the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The Variety.
 +Beauty of an equilateral Triangle is less than that of the Square; which
 +is less than that of a Pentagon; and this again is surpass’d by the Hexagon.
 +When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas’d, the Proportion of
 +them to the Radius, or Diameter of the [18] Figure, || 7 or of the Circle to
 +which regular Polygons have an obvious Relation, || is so much lost to
 +our Observation, that the Beauty does not always increase with the
 +Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of Heptagons,
 +and other Figures of odd Numbers, may also diminish their Beauty. So
 +in Solids, the Eicosiedron surpasses the Dodecaedron, and this the Oc-
 +taedron, which is still more beautiful than the Cube; and this again sur-
 +passes the regular Pyramid: The obvious Ground of this, is greater Va-
 +riety with equal Uniformity.
 +The greater Uniformity increases the Beauty amidst equal Variety, in Uniformity,
 +these Instances: An Equilateral Triangle, or even an Isosceles, surpasses
 +the Scalenum: A Square surpasses the Rhombus or Fozenge, and this
 +again the Rhomboides, which is still more beautiful than the Trapezium,
 +or any Figure with irregular curve Sides. So the regular Solids || s vastly||
 +surpass all other Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the same
 +is observable not only in the Five perfectly regular Solids, but in all those
 +which have any considerable Uniformity, as Cylinders, Prisms, Pyra-
 +mids, Obelisks; which please every Eye more than any rude Figures,
 +where there is no Unity or Resemblance among the Parts. [19]
 +Instances of the compound Ratio we have in comparing Circles or Compound
 +Spheres, with Ellipses or Spheroids not very eccentric; and in comparing Ratl °'
 +the compound Solids, the Exoctaedron, and Eicosidodecaedron, with
 +See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13.
 +Beauty of
 +the perfectly regular ones of which they are compounded: and we shall
 +find, that the Want of that most perfect Uniformity observable in the
 +latter, is compensated by the greater Variety in the || 9 others||, so that the
 +Beauty is nearly equal.
 +IV. These Observations would probably hold true for the most part, and
 +might be confirm’d by the Judgment of Children in the simpler Figures,
 +where the Variety is not too great for their Comprehension. And however
 +uncertain some of the particular aforesaid Instances may seem, yet this
 +is perpetually to be observ’d, that Children are fond of all regular Figures
 +in their little Diversions, altho they be no more convenient, or useful for
 +them, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We see how early they
 +discover a Taste or Sense of Beauty, in desiring to see Buildings, regular
 +Gardens, or even Representations of them in Pictures of any kind.
 +V. || 10 It is 1 1 the same foundation || 11 which || we have for our Sense of
 +Beauty in the Works of Nature. In every Part of the World [ 20 ] which
 +we call Beautiful, there is a || I2 vast|| Uniformity amidst an almost infinite
 +Variety. Many Parts of the Universe seem not at all design’d for the use
 +of Man; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any ac-
 +quaintance. The Figures and Motions of the great Bodys are not obvious
 +to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many
 +long Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by Rea-
 +soning enlarge our Knowledg, and extend our Imagination, we generally
 +find 1 1 1 3 their Structure, Order||, and Motion, agreeable to our Sense of
 +Beauty. Every particular Object in Nature does not indeed appear beau-
 +tiful to us; but there is a || 14 vast|| Profusion of Beauty over most of the
 +Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings upon Obser-
 +vation: For not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodys
 +in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion’d by
 +the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning distances; the Forms of all
 +the great Bodys in the Universe are nearly Spherical; the Orbits of their
 +Revolutions generally Elliptick, and without great Eccentricity, in those
 +which continually occur to our Observation: || 15 now|| these are Figures
 +of great Uniformity, and therefore pleasing to us. [ 21 ]
 +16 Further, to pass by the less obvious Uniformity in the Proportion
 +of their Quantitys of Matter, Distances, Times of revolving, to each
 +other; what can exhibit a greater Instance of Uniformity amidst Variety,
 +than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each
 +Planet, around its Axis, and the central Fire or Sun, thro all the Ages of
 +which we have any Records, and in nearly the same Orbit? 1 1 1 7 by which 1 1 ,
 +after certain Periods, all the same Appearances are again renew’d; the
 +alternate Successions of Light and Shade, or Day and Night, constantly
 +pursuing each other around each Planet, with an agreeable and regular
 +Diversity in the Times they possess the || 18 several|| Fiemispheres, in the
 +Summer, Fiarvest, Winter and Spring; and the various Phases, Aspects,
 +and Situations, of the Planets to each other, their Conjunctions and Op-
 +positions, in which they suddenly darken each other with their Conick
 +Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable
 +Constancy: These are the Beautys which charm the Astronomer, and
 +make his tedious Calculations pleasant.
 +Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem.* 1 [ 22 ]
 +VI. Again, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part of
 +which is cover’d with a very pleasant inoffensive Colour, how beautifully
 +is it diversify’d with various Degrees of Light and Shade, according to
 +the different Situations of the Parts of its Surface, in Mountains, Valleys,
 +Hills, and open Plains, which are variously inclin’d toward the great Lu-
 +VII. If we descend to the minuter Works of Nature, what || 19 vast|| Uni-
 +formity among all the Species of Plants and Vegetables in the manner of
 +their Growth and Propagation! || 20 what exact || Resemblance among all
 +the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination!
 +And this Uniformity is not only observable in the Form in gross; || 21 nay,
 +* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2 v. 12.
 +i. Translation: “Where the excitement pleasantly beguiles the hard toil.” (Horace,
 +Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, with an English translation by H. Rushton Fair-
 +clough, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 136.)
 +in this it is not so very exact in all Instances||, but in the Structure of
 +their || 22 minutest Parts, || which no Eye unassisted with Glasses can dis-
 +cern. In the almost infinite Multitude of Leaves, Fruit, Seed, Flowers of
 +any one Species, we || 23 often || see || 24 an exact || Uniformity in the Struc-
 +ture and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the Beauty which
 +charms an ingenious Botanist. Nay, what || 25 vast|| Uniformity and Reg-
 +ularity of Figure is found in each particular Plant, || 26 Leaf||, or Flower!
 +In all Trees and || 27 most of the || smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are
 +either Cylinders nearly, or regular [23] Prisms; the Branches similar to
 +their several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Acci-
 +dents retard their natural Growth; In one Species the Branches arise in
 +Pairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the
 +immediately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain of Direction of the in-
 +ferior, nearly at right Angles: In another species, the Branches || 28 spring ||
 +singly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Distances: And the
 +Branches in other Species || 29 sprout|| all in Knots around the Trunk, one
 +for each Year. And in || 30 every || Species, all the Branches in the first
 +Shoots preserve the same Angles with their Trunk; and they again sprout
 +out into smaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their Trunks. Nor
 +ought we to pass over that great Unity of Colours || 31 which we often
 +see 1 1 in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree, and often of a whole
 +Species; and their exact Agreement in many shaded Transitions into op-
 +posite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the same Plant generally agree,
 +nay often all the Flowers of a Species.
 +Animals. VIII. Again, as to the Beauty of Animals, either in their inward Structure,
 +which we come to the Knowledg of by Experiment and long Observa-
 +tion, or their outward Form, we shall find |] 32 vast|| Uniformity among
 +all the Species which are known to [24] us, in the Structure of those Parts,
 +upon which Life depends more immediately. And how amazing is the
 +Unity of Mechanism, when we shall find 1 1 33 an || almost infinite diversity
 +of Motions, all their Actions in walking, running, flying, swimming; all
 +their serious Efforts for Self-preservation, all their freakish Contortions
 +when they are gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform’d by
 +one simple Contrivance of a contracting Muscle, apply’d with incon-
 +ceivable Diversitys to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have
 +obtain’d the same Ends; but then there had been less Uniformity, and
 +the Beauty of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been
 +much less, when this surprizing Unity of Mechanism had been remov’d
 +from them.
 +IX. Among Animals of the same Species, the Unity is very obvious, and
 +this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such Classes
 +or Species, notwithstanding the great Diversitys in Bulk, Colour, Shape,
 +which are observ’d even in those call’d of the same Species. And then in
 +each Individual, || 34 what vast Beauty || arises from the exact Resemblance
 +of all the external double Members to each other, which seems the uni-
 +versal Intention of Nature, when no Accident prevents it! We see the
 +Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an [25] Imperfection,
 +and Want of Beauty, tho no other Inconvenience ensues; as when the
 +Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller
 +than its fellow.
 +|| 35a As to that most powerful Beauty in Countenances, Airs, Gestures,
 +Motion, we shall shew in the second Treatise,* that it arises from some
 +imagin’d Indication of morally good Dispositions of || 36b Mind. llb ||
 +X. There is a further Beauty in Animals, arising from a certain Propor-
 +tion of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases the Sense of
 +Spectators, tho they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a Statuary.
 +The Statuary knows what Proportion of each Part of the Face to the
 +whole Face is most agreeable, and can tell us the same of the Proportion
 +of the Face to the Body, or any Parts of it; and between the Diameters
 +and Lengths of each Limb; When this Proportion of the Head to the
 +Body is remarkably alter’d, we shall have a Giant or a Dwarf. And hence
 +it is, that either the one or the other may be represented to us even in
 +Miniature, without Relation to any external Object, by observing how
 +the Body surpasses the Proportion it should have to the Head in Giants,
 +and falls [26] below it in Dwarfs. There is a further Beauty arising from
 +Sect. vi. Art. 3.
 +that Figure, which is a natural Indication of Strength; but this may be
 +pass’d over, because probably it may be alleg’d, that our Approbation of
 +this Shape flows from an opinion of Advantage, and not from the Form
 +it self.
 +The Beauty arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the Ne-
 +cessitys and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho there
 +be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be consider’d under
 +the Head of Relative Beauty, or Design.*
 +Fowls. XI. The peculiar Beauty of Fowls can scarce be omitted, which arises
 +from the 1 1 37 vast || Variety of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted
 +to many admirable Uses, which retain a || 3S vast|| Resemblance in their
 +Structure among all the Species, || 39 and|| a perfect Uniformity in those
 +of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of
 +each Individual; besides all the Beauty of lively Colours and gradual
 +Shades, not only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, resulting from
 +an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible even in one
 +Feather separately. [27]
 +Fluids. XII. If our Reasonings about the Nature of Fluids be just, the vast Stores
 +of Water will give us an Instance of Uniformity in Nature above Imag-
 +ination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small,
 +polish’d, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos’d form’d in all the parts
 +of this Globe. The same Uniformity there is probably among the Parts
 +of other Fluids as well as Water: and the like must be observ’d in several
 +other natural Bodys, as Salts, Sulphurs, and such like; whose uniform
 +Propertys do probably depend upon an Uniformity in the Figures of
 +their Parts.
 +Harmony. XIII. Under Original Beauty we may include Harmony, or Beauty of
 +Sound, if that Expression can be allow’d, because Harmony is not usually
 +conceiv’d as an Imitation of any thing else. Harmony often raises Plea-
 +See Sect. iv. Art. 7.
 +sure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the
 +Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of Uniformity. When
 +the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations
 +of another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes are
 +call’d || 40 Concords||. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide in
 +Time with || 41 two Vibrations|| of its Octave; and two Vibrations of any
 +Note coincide with three of its Fifth; and so on in the rest of the || 42 Con-
 +[28] cords. Now no Composition can be harmonious, in which the Notes
 +are not, for the most part, dispos’d according to these natural Propor-
 +tions. Besides which, a due Regard must be had to the Key, which gov-
 +erns the whole, and to the Time and Humour, in which the Composition
 +is begun: a frequent and inartificial Change of any of which will produce
 +the greatest, and most unnatural Discord. This will appear, by observing
 +the Dissonance which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes
 +together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A like || Uniformity
 +is also observable among the Bases, Tenors, Trebles of the same Tune.
 +|| 43 There is indeed observable, in the best Compositions, a mysterious
 +Effect of Discords: They often give as great Pleasure as continu’d Har-
 +mony; whether by refreshing the Ear with Variety, or by awakening the
 +Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of
 +Concords, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other
 +means not yet known: Certain it is however that they have their place,
 +and some good Effect in our best Compositions. || Some other Powers
 +of Musick may be consider’d || 44 hereafter||.* [29]
 +XIV. But in all these Instances of 45 Beauty let it be observ’d, That the
 +Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general
 +Foundation; and that all here alledg’d is this, “That the pleasant Sen-
 +sation arises only from Objects, in which there is Uniformity amidst
 +Variety:” We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Oc-
 +casion of it; as a Man’s Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters,
 +tho he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their Motions,
 +which excite these Perceptions in him. [30]
 +See Sect. vi. Art. 12.
 +Of the Beauty of Theorems.
 +Theorems. I. The Beauty of Theorems, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves
 +a distinct Consideration, 1 1 1 being 1 1 of a N ature pretty different from the
 +former kinds of Beauty; and yet there is none in which we shall see such
 +an amazing Variety with Uniformity: and hence arises a very great Plea-
 +sure distinct from Prospects of any further Advantage.
 +II. For in one Theorem we may find included, with the most exact Agree-
 +ment, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often || 2 an In-
 +finity || of Infinites: so that altho the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas,
 +and universal Theorems, arises perhaps from the Limitation of our
 +Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or
 +Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness
 +of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the
 +47 th Proposition of the first Book of Euclid’s Elements contains an in-
 +finite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible Sizes of right-
 +angled Triangles, as you make the Area greater [ 31 ] or less; and in each
 +of these Sizes you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar Triangles,
 +as you vary the Proportion of the Base to the Perpendicular; all which
 +|| 3 Infinitys of || Infinites agree in the general Theorem. || 4a In Algebraick,
 +and Fluxional Calculations, we shall || 5b still find a greater b || Variety of
 +particular Truths included in general Theorems; not only in general
 +Equations applicable to all Kinds of Quantity, but in more particular
 +Investigations of Areas and Tangents: In which one Manner of Opera-
 +tion shall discover Theorems applicable to || 6c infinite 0 1 | Orders or Species
 +of Curves, to the infinite Sizes of each Species, and to the infinite Points
 +of the || 7 d infinite d || Individuals of each Size. a ||
 +III. That we may the better discern this Agreement, or Unity of an In-
 +finity of Objects, in the general Theorem, to be the Foundation of the
 +Beauty or Pleasure attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satis-
 +faction in such Discoverys, with the uneasy state of Mind |[ 8 in which
 +we are||, when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are
 +making Experiments which we can reduce to no general Canon, but
 +|| 9 only|| heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations.
 +Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or
 +Beauty, notwithstand-[32]ing the Variety, till we can discover some sort
 +of Unity, or reduce them to some general Canon.
 +IV. Again, let us take a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, Every Whole
 +is greater than its Part; and we shall find no Beauty in the Contemplation.
 +|| 10 For tho 1 1 this Proposition || 11 contains || many Infinitys of particular
 +Truths; yet the Unity is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in a
 +vague, undetermin’d Conception of Whole and Part, and in an indefi-
 +nite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great and
 +sometimes small. So, should we hear that the Cylinder is greater than
 +the inscrib’d Sphere, and this again greater than the Cone of the same
 +Altitude and Diameter with the Base, we shall find no pleasure in this
 +Knowledge of a general Relation of greater and less, without any precise
 +Difference or Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agree-
 +ment of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they preserve
 +to each other the constant Ratio of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the Theorem,
 +and how are we ravish’d with its first Discovery!
 +1 1 12a We may likewise observe, that easy or obvious Propositions, even
 +where the Unity is sufficiently distinct, and determinate, do not please
 +us so much as those, which [33] being less obvious, give us some Surprize
 +in the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering that a Line
 +bisecting the vertical Angle of an Isosceles Triangle, bisects the Base, or the
 +Foundation of
 +their Beauty.
 +Little Beauty
 +in Axioms.
 +Reverse; or, that Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular. These Truths we
 +almost know Intuitively, without Demonstration: They are like com-
 +mon Goods, or those which Men have long possessed, which do not give
 +such sensible Joys as much smaller new Additions may give us. But let
 +none hence imagine, that the sole Pleasure of Theorems is from Surprize;
 +for the same Novelty of a single Experiment does not please us much:
 +nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a new,
 +or unexpected Advantage, that Surprize, or Novelty is the only Pleasure
 +of Life, or the only ground of Delight in || 13b Truth. ab ||
 +Corolkrys. V. There is another Beauty in Propositions, || 14 which cannot beomitted;
 +which is |[, When one Theorem || 15 contains || a || 16 vast|| Multitude of
 +Corollarys easily deducible from it. Thus || I7 that Theorem which gives
 +us the Equation of a Curve, whence perhaps most of its Propertys may
 +be deduc’d, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other
 +Proposition ||: Such a Theorem also is the 35th of the 1st Book of Euclid,
 +from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin’d Areas is deduc’d, by
 +[34] Resolution into Triangles, which are the halfs of so many Parallel-
 +ograms; and these are each respectively equal to so many Rectangles of
 +the Base into the perpendicular Altitude: The 47th of the 1st Book is
 +another of like Beauty, and so are many || 18 others||.
 +19 In the search of Nature there is the like Beauty in the Knowledge
 +of some great Principles, or universal Forces, from which innumerable
 +Effects do flow. Such is Gravitation, in Sir Isaac Newton’s Scheme;
 +|| 20 such also is the Knowledge of the Original of Rights, perfect and im-
 +perfect, and external; alienable and unalienable, with their manner of
 +Translations; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be de-
 +duc’d in the various Relations of human Life.|]
 +It is easy to see how Men are charm’d with the Beauty of such Knowl-
 +edge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the
 +Propertys of each Figure from one Genesis, and demonstrating the me-
 +chanick Forces from one Theorem of the Composition of Motion; even
 +after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths
 +from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy
 +even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other || 21 Advantage ||
 +from such [ 35 ] Manner of Deduction, || 22 than || the immediate Pleasure
 +of contemplating the Beauty: nor could Love of Fame excite us to such
 +regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are
 +pleas’d with them immediately, by this internal Sense of their Beauty.
 +It is no less easy to see into what absurd || 23 Attempts |[ Men have been
 +led by this Sense of Beauty, and || 24 a silly Affectation || of obtaining it in
 +the other Sciences as well as the Mathematicks. ’Twas this probably
 +which set Descartes 1 on that hopeful Project of deducing all human
 +Knowledge from one Proposition, viz. Cogito, ergo sum; while others
 +|| 25 with as little Sense contended||, that Impossible est idem simul esse &
 +non esse, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of Principium
 +humanae Cognitionis absolute primum. Mr. Leibnitz ' 1 had an equal Af-
 +fection for his favourite Principle of a sufficient Reason for every thing
 +in N ature, and 1 1 26 brags to Dr. Clarke" 1 1 1 of the Wonders he had wrought
 +in the intellectual World by its Assistance; || 27 but his learned Antagonist
 +seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting.* || If we
 +look into particular Sciences, we || 28 may see in the Systems learned Men
 +have given us of them,|| [ 36 ] the Inconveniences of this Love of Unifor-
 +mity. || 29 How|| aukardly || 30 is Puffendorf forc’d to || deduce the several
 +Dutys of Men to God, themselves, and their Neighbours, from his single
 +fundamental Principle of Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind ? 31
 +This Observation || 32 might easily be extended farther, were it necessary;
 +i. Rene Descartes (1596-1650), French philosopher and mathematician, published
 +the cogito-ergo-sum principle first in his Discours de la methode (1637) an< I i n Us
 +Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), meditations 2 and 3.
 +ii. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646— 1716), German philosopher, mathema-
 +tician, historian, and jurist, discovered differential and integral calculus, and devel-
 +oped the first binary arithmetic. Of his numerous writings and extensive correspon-
 +dence, little was published during his lifetime. The principle of sufficient reason is
 +central to his metaphysics and logic; see his Monadologie (1720). In an exchange of
 +letters with Samuel Clarke (see note iii below), he discussed the philosophical prin-
 +ciples of Newton’s physics, especially space and time ( The Leibniz-Clarke Correspon-
 +dence, ed. by H. G. Alexander, New York: Manchester University Press, 1998).
 +iii. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), English theologian and philosopher, was a friend
 +of Newton whose philosophical doctrine he defended against Leibniz (see note ii
 +* See the Letters which pass’d between Dr. Clarke and Mr. Leibnitz, Pag. 23.
 +and 1 1 is a strong Proof that Men || 33 have a Sense of Beauty in || Unifor-
 +mity in the Sciences, || 34 even from the Contortions of common Sense
 +they are led into by pursuing it||.
 +VI. This Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal Theorems,
 +may really be call’d a kind of Sensation; since it necessarily accompanys
 +the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare Knowledge
 +it self 35 , being most violent at first, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly
 +the same. And however Knowledge enlarges the Mind, and makes us
 +more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects in some kinds of
 +Business, whence Advantage may also arise to us; yet we may leave it in
 +the Breast of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt
 +this Pleasure without any such prospect of Advantage from the Discov-
 +ery ofhis Theorem. All || 36 which|| can thence be infer’d is only this, that
 +as in our external Senses, so in our internal ones, the pleasant Sensations
 +generally arise from those Objects which calm Reason [37] would have
 +recommended, had we understood their Use, and which might have en-
 +gag’d our pursuits from Self-interest.
 +VII. 37 If any alledge, “that this Pleasure in Theorems arises only at first,
 +upon the Novelty of the Discovery, which occasions Surprize:” It must
 +be own’d indeed that* Novelty is generally very agreeable, and heightens
 +the Pleasure in the Contemplation of Beauty; but then the Novelty of a
 +particular Truth, found out by measuring, as above mention’d, gives no
 +considerable Pleasure, nor Surprize. That then which is pleasant and
 +surprizing, is the first Observation of this Unity amidst such a great Va-
 +riety. There is indeed another kind of Surprize, which adds to the Beauty
 +of some Propositions less universal, and may make them equally pleasant
 +with more universal ones; as when we discover a general Truth which
 +seem’d before, upon some confus’d Opinion, to be a Falshood: as that
 +Assymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve. This is like
 +that Joy, which may be very strong and violent, upon the unexpected
 +Arrival of a small Advantage, from that Occasion from which we ap-
 +See Sect. vi. Art. 13. and the Spectator there referr’d to.
 +prehended great Evil; but still this Unity of many Particulars in the gen-
 +eral Theo-[38]rem, is necessary to make it pleasant, in any case.
 +VIII. 38 As to the Works of Art, were we to run thro the various artificial Works of Art.
 +Contrivances or Structures, we should constantly find the Foundation
 +of the Beauty which appears in them, || 39 to be|| some kind of Unifor-
 +mity, or Unity of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Part to the
 +Whole. As there is a || 40 vast|| Diversity of Proportions possible, and dif-
 +ferent Kinds of Uniformity, so there is room enough for that Diversity
 +of Fancys observable in Architecture, Gardening, and such like Arts in
 +different Nations; they all may have Uniformity, tho the Parts in one
 +may differ from those in another. The Chinese or Persian Buildings are
 +not like the Grecian and Roman, and yet the former has its Uniformity
 +of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter.
 +In that kind of Architecture which the Europeans call Regular, the Uni-
 +formity of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are regular Figures, and
 +either equal or similar at least in the same Range; the Pedestals are Par-
 +allelopipedons or square Prisms; the Pillars, Cylinders nearly; the Arches
 +Circular, and all those in the same Row equal; there is the same Pro-
 +portion every where observ’d in the same Range between the Diameters
 +of Pillars and their Heights, their Capitals, the Dia-[39]meters ofArches,
 +the Heights of the Pedestals, the Projections of the Cornice, and all
 +1 1 4 The 1 1 Ornaments in each of our five Orders. And tho other Countrys
 +do not follow the Grecian or Roman Proportions; yet there is even
 +among them a Proportion retain’d, a Uniformity, and Resemblance of
 +corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one part from || 42 that||
 +Proportion which is observ’d in the rest of the Building, is displeasing
 +to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the Beauty of the Whole.
 +43 IX. The same might be observ’d thro all other Works of Art, even to
 +the meanest Utensil; the Beauty of every one of which we shall always
 +find to have the same Foundation of Uniformity amidst Variety, without
 +which they || 44 appear || mean, irregular and deform’d. [40]
 +Description in
 +Of Relative or Comparative Beauty.
 +I. If the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of absolute
 +Beauty be just, we may easily understand wherein relative Beauty con-
 +sists. All Beauty is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but
 +what we call relative is that which is apprehended in any Object, com-
 +monly consider’d as an Imitation of some Original: And this Beauty is
 +founded on a Conformity, or a kind of Unity between the Original and
 +the Copy. The Original may be either some Object in Nature, or some
 +establish’d Idea; for if there be any known Idea as a Standard, and Rules
 +to fix this Image or Idea by, we may make a beautiful Imitation. Thus a
 +Statuary, Painter, or Poet, may please us with an Hercules, if his Piece
 +retains that Grandeur, and those marks of Strength, and Courage, which
 +we imagine in that Hero.
 +1 And farther, to obtain comparative Beauty alone, it is not necessary
 +that there be any Beauty in the Original; the Imitation of absolute Beauty
 +may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet [41] an exact
 +Imitation shall still be beautiful, tho the Original were intirely void of
 +it: Thus the Deformitys of old Age in a Picture, the rudest Rocks or
 +Mountains in a Landskip, if well represented, shall have abundant
 +Beauty, tho perhaps not so great as if the Original were absolutely beau-
 +tiful, and as well || 2 represented.||
 +II. The same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets
 +either of natural Objects or Persons; and this relative Beauty is what they
 +should principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar Beauty of their
 +Works. By the Moratae Fabulae, or the tfdr) of Aristotle, we are not to
 +understand virtuous Manners || 3 in a moral Sense||, but a just Represen-
 +tation of Manners or Characters as they are in Nature; and that the Ac-
 +tions and Sentiments be suited to the Characters of the Persons to whom
 +they are ascrib’d in Epick and Dramatick Poetry. Perhaps very good Rea-
 +sons may be suggested from the Nature of our Passions, to prove that a
 +Poet should || 4 not|| draw || 5 his Characters perfectly Virtuous||; these
 +Characters indeed abstractly consider’d might give more Pleasure, and
 +have more Beauty than the imperfect ones which occur in Life with a
 +mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against
 +this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of imperfect Men with all
 +their Passions, [42] than of morally perfect Heroes, such as really never
 +occur to our Observation; and of || 6 which || consequently we cannot judg
 +exactly as to their Agreement with the Copy. And further, thro Con-
 +sciousness of our own State, we are more nearly touch’d and affected by
 +the imperfect Characters; since in them we see represented, in the Per-
 +sons of others, the Contrasts of Inclinations, and the Struggles between
 +the Passions of Self-Love and those of Honour and Virtue, which we
 +often feel in our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of Beauty for which
 +Homer is justly admir’d, as well as for the Variety of his Characters.
 +III. Many other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc’d under this Class of
 +relative Beauty: The Probability is absolutely necessary to make us imag-
 +ine Resemblance; it is by Resemblance that the Similitudes, Metaphors
 +and Allegorys are made beautiful, whether either the Subject or the
 +Thing compar’d to it have Beauty or not; the Beauty indeed is greater,
 +when both have some original Beauty or Dignity as well as Resemblance:
 +and this is the foundation of the Rule of studying Decency in Metaphors
 +and Similys as well as Likeness. The Measures and Cadence are instances
 +of Harmony, and come under the head of absolute Beauty. [43]
 +IV. We may here observe a strange Proneness in our Minds to make
 +perpetual Comparisons of all things which occur to our Observation,
 +even [| 7 those which would seem very remote||. There are certain Resem-
 +Proneness to
 +blances in the Motions of all Animals upon like Passions, which easily
 +found a Comparison; but this does not serve to entertain our Fancy:
 +Inanimate Objects have often such Positions as resemble those of the
 +human Body in various Circumstances; these Airs or Gestures of the
 +Body are Indications of 1 1 8 certain 1 1 Dispositions in the Mind, so that our
 +very Passions and Affections as well as other Circumstances obtain a
 +Resemblance to natural inanimate Objects. Thus a Tempest at Sea is
 +often an Emblem of Wrath; a Plant or Tree drooping under the Rain, of
 +a Person in Sorrow; a Poppy bending its Stalk, or a Flower withering
 +when cut by the Plow, resembles the Death of a blooming Hero; an aged
 +Oak in the Mountains shall represent an old Empire, a Flame seizing a
 +Wood shall represent a War. In short, every thing in Nature, by our
 +strange inclination to Resemblance, shall be brought to represent other
 +things, even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstances
 +of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern’d; and to confirm
 +this, and furnish Instances of it, one [44] need only look into Homer or
 +Virgil. A fruitful Fancy would find in a Grove, or a Wood, an Emblem
 +|| 9 for || every Character in a Commonwealth, and every turn ofTemper,
 +or Station in Life.
 +intention. V. Concerning that kind of comparative Beauty which has a necessary
 +relation to some establish’d Idea, we may observe, that some Works of
 +Art acquire a distinct Beauty by their Correspondence to some univer-
 +sally suppos’d Intention in the || 10 Artificer||, or the Persons who em-
 +ploy’d II 11 him ||: And to obtain this Beauty, sometimes they do notform
 +their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of original Beauty sep-
 +arately consider’d; because a Composition of this relative Beauty, along
 +with some degree of the original Kind, may give more Pleasure, than a
 +more perfect original Beauty separately. Thus we see, that strict Regu-
 +larity in laying out of Gardens in Parterres, Vista’s, parallel Walks, is often
 +neglected, to obtain an Imitation of Nature even in some of its Wild-
 +nesses. And we are more pleas’d with this Imitation, especially when the
 +Scene is large and spacious, than with the more confin’d Exactness of
 +regular || 12 Works||. So likewise in the Monuments erected in honour of
 +deceased Heroes, although a Cylinder, or Prism, or regular Solid, may
 +have more original Beauty than a very acute Pyramid or Obelisk, [45]
 +yet the latter pleases more, by answering better the suppos’d Intentions
 +of Stability, and being conspicuous. For the same reason Cubes, or
 +square Prisms, are generally chosen for the Pedestals of Statues, and not
 +any of the more beautiful Solids, which do not seem so secure from roll-
 +ing. This may be the reason too, why Columns or Pillars look best when
 +made a little taper from the middle, or a third from the bottom, that
 +they may not seem top-heavy and in danger of falling.
 +VI. The like reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to
 +depart from the Rules of original Beauty, as above laid down. And yet
 +this is no Argument against our Sense of Beauty being founded, as was
 +above explain’d, on Uniformity amidst Variety, but only an Evidence
 +that our Sense of Beauty of the Original Kind may be vary’d and over-
 +ballanc’d by another kind of Beauty.
 +VII. This Beauty arising from Correspondence to Intention, would open
 +to curious Observers a new Scene of Beauty in the Works of Nature, by
 +considering how the Mechanism of the various Parts known to us, seems
 +adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the
 +Good of some System or Whole. We generally suppose the Good of [46]
 +the greatest Whole, or of all Beings, to have been the Intention of the
 +Author of Nature; and cannot avoid being pleas’d when we see any part
 +of this Design executed in the Systems we are acquainted with. The Ob-
 +servations already made on this Subject are in every one’s hand, in the
 +Treatises of our late Improvers of mechanical Philosophy. || 13 We shall
 +only observe here, that every one has a certain Pleasure in || seeing any
 +Design well executed by curious Mechanism, even when his own Ad-
 +vantage is no way concern’d; || 14 and also || in discovering the Design to
 +which any complex Machine is adapted, when he has perhaps had a gen-
 +eral Knowledge of the Machine before, without seeing its Correspon-
 +dence or Aptness to execute any Design. 15
 +The Arguments by which we prove Reason and Design in any Cause
 +from the Beauty of the Effects, are so frequently us’d in some of the
 +highest Subjects, that it may be necessary to enquire a little more par-
 +ticularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degree
 +of Evidence. [47]
 +Arbitrary in its
 +Concerning our Reasonings about Design
 +and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty
 +or Regularity of Effects.
 +I. There seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of
 +Beauty with the Uniformity or Regularity of the Objects, from the Na-
 +ture of things, 1 1 1 antecedent 1 1 to some Constitution of the Author of our
 +Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other Minds
 +|| 2 may || be so fram’d as to receive no Pleasure from Uniformity; and we
 +actually find that the same regular Forms || 3 seem not|| equally to please
 +all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear || 4 afterwards ||.
 +Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the
 +present Argument|| 5 , viz. || That the Constitution of our Sense so as to
 +approve Uniformity, is merely arbitrary in the Author of our Nature;
 +and that there are an infinity of Tastes or Relishes of Beauty possible; so
 +that it would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles,
 +which should not make an agreeable Fiabitation for some Animal or
 +other, and appear beautiful to it. And then it is [ 48 ] plain, that from the
 +Perception of Beauty in any one Effect, we should have no reason to
 +conclude Design in the Cause: for a Sense might be so constituted as to
 +be pleas’d with such Irregularity as may be the effect of an undirected
 +Force.* But then, as there are an Infinity of Forms Impossible || into which
 +* || 6a By undirected Force, or undesigning Force, is to be understood, That Force
 +with which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Design or
 +any System may be reduc’d, an Infinity of Places in which Animals may
 +be situated, and an Infinity of Relishes or Senses |] 10 in these Animals ||
 +is suppos’d possible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should
 +by Chance be plac’d in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be im-
 +probable as infinite to one at least: And much more unreasonable is it
 +to expect from Chance, that a multitude of Animals agreeing in their
 +Sense of Beauty should obtain agreeable Places. [49]
 +II. || 11 There is also 1 1 the same Probability, that in any one System of
 +Matter an Undirected Force || 12 will|| produce a regular Form, as anyone
 +given irregular one, of the same degree of Complication: But still the
 +irregular Forms into which any System may be rang’d, surpass in mul-
 +titude the Regular, as Infinite does Unity; for what holds in one small
 +System will hold in a Thousand, a Million, a Universe, with more Ad-
 +vantage, viz. that the irregular Forms possible infinitely surpass the Reg-
 +ular. For Instance, the Area of an Inch Square is capable of an Infinity
 +of regular Forms, the Equilateral Triangle, the Square, the Pentagon,
 +Hexagon, Heptagon, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an
 +Infinity of Irregular, as an Infinity of Scalena for the one equilateral Tri-
 +angle, an Infinity of Trapezia for the one Square, of irregular Pentagons
 +for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposing any one System
 +agitated by undesigning Force, it || 13 is|| infinitely more probable that it
 +|| 14 will || resolve itself into an irregular Form, than a regular. Thus, that
 +a System of six Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a reg-
 +ular Hexagon, is at least infinite to Unity; and the more complex we
 +Intention to produce any particular Form. || 7b This b || Conatus ad motum, without an
 +actual Line of Direction, seems such a gross absurdity in the Cartesian Scheme, that
 +it is || 8c below the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute it c ||. But Men
 +have so many confus’d Notions of some Nature, or Chance impressing Motions with-
 +out any Design or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be useful
 +to shew, that even this very absurd Postulatum, tho it were granted them, is insuffi-
 +cient to answer the appearances in the Regularity of the World; and this is what is
 +attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section. These Arguments would really
 +be useless, if all Men were persuaded of what to a Man of just Thought will appear
 +pretty Obvious, that there can be no Thought-less Agent; and that Chance and Na-
 +ture are mere empty Names, as they are us’d on this Occasion, relative only to our
 +Ignorance. a ||
 +make the System, the greater is the hazard, from a very obvious Reason.
 +15 We see this confirm’d by our constant Experience, that Regularity
 +never arises from any undesign’d Force of ours; and from this we con-
 +clude, that wherever there is any Regularity in the disposition of a System
 +capable of many other || 16 Dispositions||, there must have been Design
 +in the Cause; and the Force of this Evidence increases, according to the
 +Multiplicity of Parts imploy’d.
 +But this Conclusion is too rash, unless some further Proof be in-
 +troduc’d; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense of
 +Beauty in Regularity, are led generally in all their Arrangements ofBodys
 +to study some kind of Regularity, and seldom ever design Irregularity;
 +|| 17 hence || we judge the same of other Beings too, || 18 viz.|| that they study
 +Regularity, and presume upon Intention in the Cause wherever we see
 +it, making Irregularity always a Presumption of Want of Design:
 +|| 19 Whereas if other Agents have different Senses of Beauty, || or if they
 +have no Sense of it at all, Irregularity may as well be design’d as Regu-
 +larity. And then let it be observ’d, that in this Case there is just the same
 +reason to conclude Design in the Cause from any one irregular Effect,
 +as from a regular one; for since there are an Infinity of other Forms pos-
 +sible as well as this irre- [51] gular one produc’d, and since to such a Being*
 +void of a Sense of Beauty, all Forms are as to its own Relish indifferent,
 +and all agitated Matter meeting must make some Form or other, and all
 +* There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention’d, and a
 +Being which has no Intention for any reason whatsoever to produce one Form more
 +than another. This latter sort of Being, as to the present Argument, would be the same
 +with Chance, but not the former. For tho a Being has no sense of Beauty, he may
 +notwithstanding be capable of Design, and of Intention to produce regular Forms;
 +and the observation of greater Regularity in any number of Effects, than could be
 +expected from undirected Force, is a presumption of Design and Intention in the
 +Cause, even where the Cause is suppos’d to have no sense of Beauty in such Forms,
 +since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms. Thus
 +supposing the Deity || 20 no way necessarily|| pleas’d with Regularity, Uniformity, or
 +Similarity in Bodys, yet there may be Reasons moving him to produce such Objects,
 +such as the pleasing his Creatures, having given them a sense of Beauty founded on
 +these Qualitys. See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section.
 +Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is apply’ d by an Agent void of
 +a Sense of Beauty, would equally prove Design; it is plain that no one
 +Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a
 +general metaphysical Consideration, || 21 too subtile to be certain ||, that
 +there is no proper Agent without Design and Intention, and that every
 +Effect flows from the Intention of some Cause.
 +III. This however follows from the above || 22 mention’d || Considerations,
 +that supposing a Mass of Matter surpassing a cubick Inch, as [52] infinite
 +of the first Power does Unity, and that this whole Mass were some way
 +determin’d from its own Nature without any Design in a Cause (which
 +perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into 1 1 23 the solid Content of
 +a cubick Inch||, and into a prismatick Form whose Base should always
 +be 7 of a square Inch; suppose these Conditions determin’d, and all oth-
 +ers left to undirected Force; all || 24 which|| we could expect from undi-
 +rected Force in this Case would be one equilateral Prism, or two perhaps;
 +because there are an Infinity of irregular Prisms possible of the same Base,
 +and solid Content: and when we || 25 met|| with many such Prisms, we
 +must probably conclude || 26 them produc’d by Design, || since they are
 +more than could have been expected by the Laws of Flazard.
 +IV. But if || 27 this || infinite Mass was || 28 no way|| determin’d to a pris-
 +matick Form, we could only expect from its casual Concourse one Prism
 +of any Kind, since there || 29 is an Infinity of other Solids || into which the
 +Mass might be resolv’d; and if we found any great number of Prisms,
 +we should have || 30 reason to presume|| Design: so that in a Mass ofMat-
 +ter as infinite of the first Power, we could not from any Concourse or
 +Agitation expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions
 +or Size, and of any given [53] Form; since of any Dimension there are
 +infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Di-
 +mensions; and if we found several Bodys of the same Dimension and
 +Form, we should have so much Presumption for Design.
 +V. There is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the
 +crystallizing of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they
 +Similar Forms
 +by Chance,
 +by Chance,
 +were swimming; for in this we frequently see regular Forms arising, tho
 +there is nothing || 31 suppos’d in this Affair but an undirected Force of
 +Attraction ||. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that
 +we have good Reason to believe, that the smallest Particles of crystalliz’d
 +Bodys have fix’d regular Forms given them in the Constitution of Na-
 +ture; and then it is easy to conceive how their Attractions may produce
 +regular Forms: but unless we suppose some preceding Regularity in the
 +Figures of attracting Bodys, they || 32 can|| never form any regular Body
 +at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of
 +Matter, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by
 +our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astron-
 +omers suppose, could in any Concourse have produc’d any Number of
 +similar Bodys Regular or Irregular. [54]
 +VI. And let it be here observ’d, that there are many Compositions of
 +Bodys which the smallest Degree of Design could easily effect, which
 +yet we would in vain expect from all the Powers of Chance or undesign’d
 +Force, || 33 after || an Infinity of Rencounters; even supposing a Dissolu-
 +tion of every Form except the regular one, that the Parts might be pre-
 +par’d for a new Agitation. Thus, supposing we could expect one equi-
 +lateral Prism of any given Dimensions should be form’d from undirected
 +Force, in an Infinity of Matter some way determin’d to resolve || 34 itself ||
 +into Bodys of a given solid Content, (which is all we could expect, since
 +it is infinite to one after the solid Content is obtain’d, that the Body shall
 +not be Prismatical; and allowing it Prismatical, it is infinite to one that
 +it shall not be Equilateral:) And again, supposing another Infinity of
 +Matter determin’d to resolve itself into Tubes, of Orifices exactly equal
 +to the Bases of the former Prisms, it is again at least as the second Power
 +of Infinite to Unity, that not one of these Tubes shall be both Prismatick
 +and Equiangular; and then if the Tube were thus form’d, so as to be
 +exactly capable of receiving one of the Prisms and no more, it is infinite
 +to one that they shall never meet in infinite Space; and should [55] they
 +meet, it is infinite to one that the Axes of the Prism and Tube shall never
 +happen in the same strait Line; and supposing they did, it is again as
 +infinite to three, that Angle shall not meet Angle, so as to enter. We see
 +then how infinitely improbable it is, “that all the Powers of Chance in
 +infinite Matter, agitated thro infinite Ages, could ever effect this small
 +Composition of a Prism entering a Prismatick Bore; and, that all our
 +hazard for it would at most be but as three is to the third Power of In-
 +finite.” And yet the smallest Design could easily effect it.
 +VII. May we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an
 +absolute strict Impossibility, “That all the Powers of undirected Force
 +should ever effect such a complex Machine || 35 as|| the most imperfect
 +Plant, or the meanest Animal, even in one Instance?” for the Improba-
 +bility just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in these natural
 +Bodys surpasses that simple Combination above mention’d.
 +VIII. Let it be here observ’d, “That the preceding Reasoning from the
 +Frequency of regular Bodys of one Form in the Universe, and from the
 +Combinations of various Bodys, is intirely inde- [56] pendent on any Per-
 +ception of Beauty; and would equally prove Design in the Cause, altho
 +there were no Being which perceiv’d Beauty in any Form whatsoever;”
 +for it is in short this, “That the recurring of any Effect oftner than the
 +Laws of Hazard determine, gives Presumption of Design; and, That
 +Combinations which no undesign’d Force could give us reason to ex-
 +pect, must necessarily prove the same; and that with superior probability,
 +as the multitude of Cases in which the contrary || 36 might|| happen, sur-
 +pass all the Cases in which this could happen:” which appears to be in
 +the simplest Cases at least as Infinite || 37 does|| Unity. And the frequency
 +of similar irregular Forms, or exact Combinations of them, is an equal
 +Argument of Design in the Cause, since the Similarity, or exact Com-
 +binations of irregular Forms, are as little to be expected from all the Pow-
 +ers of undirected Force, as any sort whatsoever.
 +IX. To bring this nearer to something like a Theorem, altho the Idea of
 +Infinite be troublesome enough to manage in Reasoning. The Powers
 +of Chance, with infinite Matter in infinite Ages, may answer Hazards as
 +the fifth Power of Infinite and no more: thus the Quantity of Matter
 +may be conceiv’d as the third Power of [57] Infinite and no more, the
 +various Degrees of Force may make another Power of Infinite, and the
 +Number of Rencounters may make the fifth. But this last only holds on
 +Supposition, that after every Rencounter there is no Cohesion, but all
 +is dissolv’d again for a new Concourse, except in similar Forms or exact
 +Combinations; which Supposition is entirely groundless, since we see
 +dissimilar Bodys cohering as strongly as any, and rude Masses more than
 +any Combinations. Now to produce any given Body, in a given Place or
 +Situation, and of given Dimensions, or Shape, the Flazards of the con-
 +trary are, one Power of Infinite at least to obtain the Place or Situation;
 +when the Situation is obtain’d, the solid Content requires another Power
 +of Infinite to obtain it; the Situation and Solidity obtain’d require, for
 +accomplishing the simplest given Shape, at least the other three Powers
 +of Infinite. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided Prism or Paral-
 +lelopiped; that the Surfaces should be Planes requires one Power; that
 +they should be Parallel in this Case, or inclin’d in any given Angle in
 +any other Case, requires another Power of Infinite; and that they should
 +be in any given Ratio to each other, requires at least the third Power: for
 +in each of these Pleads there || 38 is|| still an Infinity at least of other Cases
 +possible beside the one given. So that all [58] the Powers of Chance could
 +only produce perhaps one Body of every simpler Shape or Size at most,
 +and this is all we could expect: we might expect one Pyramid, or Cube,
 +or Prism perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions requir’d, the
 +Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more complex Figures, and
 +in all Combinations of Bodys, and in similar Species, which we never
 +could reasonably hope from Chance; and therefore where we see them,
 +we must certainly ascribe them to Design.
 +Combinations X. The Combinations of regular Forms, or of irregular ones exactly
 +of irregular ac J a p tec q t0 each other, require such vast Powers of Infinite to effect them,
 +Forms, equally
 +impossible, and the Flazards of the contrary Forms are so infinitely numerous, that
 +all Probability or Possibility of their being accomplish’d by Chance
 +seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in Art. vi. || 39 of|| this Sec-
 +tion about the Prism and Tube, to our simplest Machines, such as a pair
 +of Wheels of our ordinary Carriages; each Circular, Spokes equal in
 +length, thickness, shape; the Wheels set Parallel, the Axle-tree fix’d in
 +the Nave of both, and secur’d from coming out at either End: Now the
 +Cases in which the contrary might have happen’d from undirected Con-
 +courses, were there no more requir’d than what is just now mention’d,
 +must amount in Multitude to a Power of || 40 Infinite 1 1 [59] equal to every
 +Circumstance requir’d. What shall we say then of a Plant, a Tree, an
 +Animal, a Man, with such multitudes of adapted Vessels, such Articu-
 +lations, Insertions of Muscles, Diffusion of Veins, Arterys, Nerves? The
 +Improbability that such Machines || 41 should be the Effect of Chance,
 +must be near the infinitesimal Power of Infinite to Unity. ||
 +XI. Further, were all the former Reasoning from Similarity of Forms and
 +Combinations groundless, and could Chance give us ground to expect
 +such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise 1 1 42 our-
 +selves || one of these Forms among an Infinity of others. When we see
 +then such a multitude of Individuals of a Species, similar to each other
 +in a || 43 vast|| number of Parts; and when we see in each Individual, the
 +corresponding Members so exactly || 44 like|| each other, what possible
 +room is there left for questioning Design in the Universe? None but the
 +barest Possibility against an inconceivably great Probability, surpassing
 +every thing which is not strict Demonstration.
 +XII. This Argument, || 45 as|| has been already observ’d,* is quite ab-
 +stracted from any Sense of Beauty in any particular Form; for the exact
 +Similarity of a hundred or a [60] thousand Trapezia, proves Design as
 +well as the Similarity of Squares, since both are equally above all the
 +Powers of undirected Force or Chance||, 46 as the hundredth or thou-
 +sandth Power of Infinite surpasses Unity; |[ and what is above the Powers
 +of Chance, must give us proportionable Presumption for Design.
 +Thus, allowing that a Feg, or Arm, or Eye, might have been the Effect
 +of Chance, (which was shewn to be most absurd, and next to absolutely
 +impossible) that it |[ 47 would|| not have a corresponding Feg, Arm, Eye,
 +exactly similar, must be a hazard of a Power of Infinite proportion’d to
 +the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the multitude of
 +See above, Art. viii.
 +Similarity by
 +Cases increas’d, in which it would not have a corresponding Member
 +similar: so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it
 +would be as the twentieth or thirtieth Power of Infinite to Unity, that
 +the corresponding Part should not be similar. What shall we say then of
 +the similar Forms of a whole Species?
 +48 XI 1 I. If it be objected, “That natural Bodys are not exactly similar, but
 +only grosly so to our Senses; as that a Vein, an Artery, a Bone is not
 +perhaps exactly similar to its Correspondent in the same Animal, tho it
 +appears so to [61] our Senses, which judge only of the Bulk, and do not
 +discern the small constituent Parts; and that in the several Individuals
 +of a Species the Dissimilarity is always sensible, often in the internal
 +Structure, and || 49 often, nay|| always in the external Appearance.” To
 +remove this Objection it will be sufficient to shew, “That the multitude
 +of Cases wherein sensible Dissimilitude cou’d have happen’d, are still
 +infinitely more than all the Cases in which sensible Similitude
 +|| 50 might|[;” so that the same Reasoning holds from sensible Similarity,
 +as from the mathematically exact: And again, “That the Cases of gross
 +Dissimilarity do in the same manner surpass the Cases of gross Similarity
 +possible, as infinite does one.”
 +51 XIV. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple Instance.
 +|| 52 Suppose|| a Trapezium of a foot Square in Area || 53 should appear
 +grosly 1 1 similar to another, while no one side differs, by To of an Inch; or
 +no Angle in one surpasses the corresponding one in the other above ten
 +|| 54 Minutes||: now this tenth of an Inch is infinitely divisible, as are also
 +the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of insensible Dissimilarity under ap-
 +parent Similarity are really Infinite. But then it is also plain that there
 +are an Infinity of different sensibly dissimilar Trapezia, even of the same
 +Area, ac- [62] cording as we vary a Side by one Tenth, two Tenths, three
 +Tenths, and so on, and || 55 vary|| the Angles and another Side so as to
 +keep the Area equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of sensible
 +Dissimilitude the several Tenths are infinitely divisible as well as in the
 +first Case; so that the multitude of sensible Dissimilaritys are to the mul-
 +titude of insensible Dissimilaritys under apparent Resemblance, still as
 +the second Power of Infinite to the first, or as Infinite to Unity. And then
 +how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible sensible Dis-
 +similaritys in such complex Bodys as Legs, Arms, Eyes, Arterys, Veins,
 +56 XV. As to the Dissimilaritys of Animals of the same Species, it is in the
 +same manner plain, that the possible Cases of gross Dissimilarity are
 +Infinite; and then every Case of gross Dissimilarity contains also all the
 +Cases of insensible Dissimilarity. Thus, if we would count all Animals
 +of a Species grosly similar, while there was no Limb which in Length or
 +Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a third of the Head;
 +it is plain that there are an Infinity of || 57 gross|| Dissimilaritys possible,
 +and then in each of these Cases of gross Dissimilarity, there are an Infinity
 +of Cases of nicer Dissimilarity, since J of the Head may be infinitely
 +divided. To take a low [63] but easy Instance; two Cockle-Shells which
 +fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of insensible Differ-
 +ences, but still there are an Infinity of possible sensible Differences; and
 +then in any one of the sensibly different Forms, there may be the same
 +Infinity of insensible Differences beside the sensible one: So that still the
 +hazard for even gross Similarity from Chance is Infinite to one, and this
 +always increases by a Power of Infinite for every distinct Member of the
 +Animal, in which even gross Similarity is retain’d; since the Addition of
 +every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of
 +Cases, in which sensible Dissimilarity may happen; and this Infinity
 +combin’d with the infinite Cases of the former Parts, raises the Hazard
 +by a Power of Infinite.
 +Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the Cartesian or
 +Epicurean Hypothesis, even granting their Postulatum of undirected
 +Force impress’d on infinite Matter; and seems almost a Demonstration
 +of Design in the Universe.
 +58 XVI. One Objection more remains to be remov’d, viz. “That some
 +imagine, this Argument may hold better a Priori than a Posteriori; that
 +is, we have better Reason to believe, when we see a Cause about to act,
 +without Knowledge, [64] that he will not attain any given, or desir’d
 +End; than we have on the other hand to believe, when we see the End
 +actually attain’d, that he acted with Knowledge: Thus, say they, when a
 +particular Person is about to draw a Ticket in a Lottery, where there is
 +but one Prize to a thousand Blanks, it is highly probable that he shall
 +draw a Blank; but suppose we have seen him actually draw for himself
 +the Prize, we have no ground to conclude that he had Knowledge or
 +Art to accomplish this End.” But the Answer is obvious: In such Con-
 +trivances we generally have, from the very Circumstances of the Lot-
 +tery, very strong moral Arguments, which almost demonstrate that Art
 +can have no place; so that a Probability of a thousand to one, || 59 does||
 +not surmount those Arguments: But let the Probability be increas’d,
 +and it will soon surmount all Arguments to the contrary. For instance,
 +If we saw a Man ten times successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where
 +there were but ten Prizes to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would
 +question whether he us’d Art or not: much less would we imagine it were
 +Chance, if we saw a Man draw for his own Gain successively a hundred,
 +or a thousand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater number of
 +Blanks. Now in the Works of Nature the Case is entirely different: we
 +have not the least [65] Argument against Art or Design. An intelligent
 +Cause is surely at least as probable a Notion as Chance, general Force,
 +Conatus ad Motum, or the Clinamen Principiorum, to account for any
 +Effect whatsoever: And then all the Regularity, Combinations, Similar-
 +itys of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was Design and
 +Intelligence in the Cause of this Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all
 +Art in drawing is made, if not actually impossible, at least highly im-
 +does not prove
 +want of
 +60 XVII. Let it be here observ’d also, “That a rational Agent may be ca-
 +pable of impressing Force || 61 without|| intending to produce any partic-
 +ular Form, and of designedly producing irregular or dissimilar Forms,
 +as well as regular and similar:” And hence it follows, “That altho all the
 +Regularity, Combination and Similarity in the Universe, are Presump-
 +tions of Design, yet Irregularity is no Presumption of the contrary; unless
 +we suppose that the Agent is determin’d from a Sense of Beauty always
 +to act regularly, and delight in Similarity; and that he can have no other
 +inconsistent Motive of Action:” Which last is plainly absurd. We do not
 +want in the Universe many Effects which seem to have been left to the
 +general Laws of Motion upon some great Impulse, and [66] have many
 +Instances where Similarity has been || 62 plainly design’d || in some re-
 +spects, and probably neglected in others; or even Dissimilarity design’d.
 +Thus we see the general exact Resemblance between the two Eyes of most
 +persons; and yet perhaps no other third Eye in the World is exactly like
 +them. We see a gross Conformity of shape in all Persons in innumerable
 +Parts, and yet no two Individuals of any Species are undistinguishable;
 +which perhaps is intended for valuable Purposes to the whole Species.
 +63 XVII 1 . Elitherto the Proof amounts only to Design or Intention barely,
 +in opposition to blind Force or Chance; and we see the Proof of this is
 +independent on the arbitrary Constitution of our internal Sense of
 +Beauty. Beauty is often suppos’d an Argument of more than Design, to
 +wit, Wisdom and Prudence in the Cause. Let us enquire also into this.
 +Wisdom denotes the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means;
 +and therefore before we can from any Effect prove the Cause to be wise,
 +we must know what is best to the Cause or Agent. Among men who have
 +pleasure in contemplating Uniformity, the Beauty of Effects is an Ar-
 +gument of Wisdom, because this is Good to [67] them; but the same
 +Argument would not hold as to a Being void of this Sense of Beauty.
 +And therefore the Beauty apparent to us in Nature, will not of itselfprove
 +Wisdom in the Cause, unless this Cause, or Author of Nature be sup-
 +pos’d Benevolent; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desir-
 +able or Good to the Supreme Cause; and that Form which pleases us, is
 +an Argument of his Wisdom. And the Strength of this Argument is in-
 +creased always in proportion to the Degree of Beauty produc’d in Na-
 +ture, and expos’d to the View of any rational 1 1 64 Agent ||; since upon sup-
 +position of a benevolent Deity, all the apparent Beauty produc’d is an
 +Evidence of the Execution of a Benevolent Design, to give || 65 him|| the
 +Pleasures of Beauty.
 +66 But what more immediately proves Wisdom is this; when we see
 +any Machine with a |] 67 vast|| Complication of Parts actually obtaining
 +an End, we justly conclude, “That since this could not have been the
 +Effect of Chance, it must have been intended for that End, which is
 +obtain’d by it;” and then the Ends or Intentions, being in part known,
 +the Complication of Organs, and their nice Disposition adapted to this
 +End, is an Evidence “of a comprehensive large Understanding in the
 +Cause, according to the Multi- [68] plicity of Parts, and the Appositeness
 +of their Structure, even when we do not know the Intention of the
 +General 68 XIX. There is another kind of Beauty |] 69 also which is still pleasing to
 +Causes. our s ense) anc J|| f ro m which we conclude Wisdom in the Cause as well
 +as Design, |] 70 and that is, || when we see many useful or beautiful Effects
 +flowing from one general Cause. There is a very good Reason for this
 +Conclusion among Men. Interest must lead Beings of limited Powers,
 +who are uncapable of a great diversity of Operations, and distracted by
 +them, to chuse this frugal Oeconomy of their Forces, and to look upon
 +such Management as an Evidence of Wisdom in other Beings like them-
 +selves. Nor is this speculative Reason all which influences them, for even
 +beside this Consideration of Interest, they are determin’d by a Sense of
 +Beauty where that Reason does not hold; as when we are judging of the
 +Productions of other Agents about whose Oeconomy we are not sollici-
 +tous. Thus, who does not approve of it as a Perfection in Clock-work,
 +that three or four Motions of the Hour, Minute, and second Hands, and
 +monthly Plate, should arise from one Spring or Weight, rather than from
 +three, or four Springs, or Weights, in a very Compound Machine, which
 +should perform the same Effects, and answer all [69] the same Purposes
 +with equal exactness? Now the Foundation of this Beauty plainly appears
 +to be || 71 Uniformity! | or Unity of Cause amidst Diversity of Effects.
 +General Laws. 72 XX. We || 73 shall* hereafter|| offer some Reasons, why the Author of
 +Nature || 74 may|| chuse to operate in this manner by General Laws and
 +Universal extensive Causes, altho the Reason just now mention’d does
 +not hold with an Almighty Being. This is certain, That we have some
 +See the last Section.
 +of the most delightful Instances of Universal Causes in the Works of
 +Nature, and that the most studious men in these Subjects are so delighted
 +with the Observation of them, that they always look upon them as Ev-
 +idences of Wisdom in the Administration of Nature, from a Sense of
 +75 XXI. The wonderfully simple Mechanism which performs all Animal
 +Motions, was mention’d* already; nor is that of the inanimate Parts of
 +Nature less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one Prin-
 +ciple of Heat, deriv’d to us from the Sun, which is not only delightful
 +to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but is
 +the Cause of Rains, Springs, Rivers, Winds, [70] and the universal Cause
 +of Vegetation! The uniform Principle of Gravity preserves at once the
 +Planets in their Orbits, gives Cohesion to the Parts of each Globe, and
 +Stability to Mountains, Hills, and artificial Structures; it raises the Sea
 +in Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their Channels; it
 +drains the Earth of its superfluous Moisture, by Rivers; it raises the Va-
 +pours by its Influence on the Air, and brings them down again in Rains;
 +it gives an uniform Pressure to our Atmosphere, necessary to our Bodys
 +in general, and more especially to Inspiration in Breathing; and furnishes
 +us with an universal Movement, capable of being apply’d in innumerable
 +Engines. How incomparably more beautiful is this Structure, than if we
 +suppos’d so many distinct Volitions in the Deity, producing every par-
 +ticular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which casually
 +flow from the general Law! || 76 We may rashly imagine that|| this latter
 +manner of Operation might have been more useful to us; and it would
 +have been no distraction to Omnipotence: But then the great Beauty
 +had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasure in the Contempla-
 +tion of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One would rather chuse
 +to run the hazard of its casual Evils, than part with that harmonious
 +Form which has been || 77 an|| [71] unexhausted Source of Delight to the
 +successive Spectators in all Ages.
 +See above, Sect. ii. Art. 8.
 +Miracles. 78 XXII. Hence we see, “That however Miracles may prove the Super-
 +intendency of a voluntary Agent, and that the Universe is not guided by
 +Necessity or Fate, yet that Mind must be weak and inadvertent, which
 +needs them to confirm the Belief of a Wise and Good Deity; since the
 +deviation from general Laws, unless upon very extraordinary Occasions,
 +must be a presumption of Inconstancy and Weakness, rather than of
 +steddy Wisdom and Power, and must weaken the best Arguments we
 +can have for the Sagacity and Power of the universal Mind.” [72]
 +Of the Universality of the Sense of
 +Beauty among Men.
 +I. We before* insinuated, “That all Beauty has a relation to some per-
 +ceiving Power;” and consequently since we know not ||‘how great a||
 +Variety of Senses || 2 there|[ may be among Animals, there is no Form in
 +Nature concerning which we can pronounce, “That it has no Beauty;”
 +for it may still please some perceiving Power. But our Inquiry is confin’d
 +to Men; and before we examine the Universality of this Sense of Beauty,
 +or their agreement in approving Uniformity, it may be proper to con-
 +sider, “|| 3 whether||, as the other Senses which give us Pleasure do also
 +give us Pain, so this Sense of Beauty does make some Objects disagree-
 +able to us, and the occasion of Pain.”
 +4 That many Objects give no pleasure to our Sense is obvious, many
 +are certainly void of Beauty: But then there is no Form which seems
 +necessarily disagreeable of itself, when we dread no other Evil [73] from
 +it, and compare it with nothing better of the Kind. Many Objects are
 +naturally displeasing, and distasteful to our external Senses, as well as
 +others pleasing and agreeable; as Smells, Tastes, and some separate
 +Sounds: || 5 but as|[ to our Sense of Beauty, no Composition of Objects
 +which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or
 +painful of it self, had we never observ’d any thing better of the Kind.
 +Deformity is only the absence of Beauty, or deficiency in the Beauty
 +* See above Sect. i. Art. 17. Sect. iv. Art. 1.
 +Internal Sense
 +not an
 +Source of Pain.
 +expected in any Species: Thus bad Musick pleases Rusticks who never
 +heard any better, and the finest Ear is not offended with tuning of In-
 +struments if it be not too tedious, where no Harmony is expected; and
 +yet much smaller Dissonancy shall offend amidst the Performance,
 +where Harmony is expected. A rude Heap of Stones is no way offensive
 +to one who shall be displeas’d with Irregularity in Architecture, where
 +Beauty was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which
 +we || 6 call now 1 1 ugly or deform’d, and had we never seen or expected
 +greater Beauty, we should have receiv’d no disgust from it, altho the Plea-
 +sure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now ad-
 +mire. Our Sense of Beauty seems design’d to give us positive Pleasure,
 +but not || 7 positive || Pain or Disgust, any further than what arises from
 +disappointment. [74]
 +and Dislike
 +Association of
 +II. There are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dis-
 +like; but this is generally not from any || 8 positive|| Deformity which of
 +it self is positively displeasing, but either from want of expected Beauty,
 +or much more from their carrying some natural indications of morally
 +bad Dispositions, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in Coun-
 +tenances, Airs, and Gestures. That this is not occasion’d by any Form
 +positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if upon long acquain-
 +tance we are sure of finding sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheer-
 +fulness, altho the bodily Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or
 +Displeasure; whereas || 9 if any thing was|| naturally disagreeable, or the
 +occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, it would always continue so, even
 +although the Aversion we might have toward it were counterballanc’d
 +by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais’d by some Objects,
 +which are only the Effect of Fear for our selves, or Compassion toward
 +others, when either Reason, or some foolish Association of Ideas, makes
 +us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form it self:
 +for we find that most of || 10 those|| Objects which excite Horror at first,
 +when Experience or Reason has remov’d the Fear, may become the oc-
 +casions of Pleasure; as || n ravenous || [75] Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a
 +craggy Precipice, a dark shady Valley.
 +III. We shall see* || 12 hereafter||, “That Associations of Ideas make Ob-
 +jects pleasant, and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such
 +Pleasures; and the same way, the casual Conjunctions of Ideas may give
 +a Disgust, where there is nothing disagreeable in the Form it self.” And
 +this is the occasion of many fan tastick Aversions to Figures of some Ani-
 +mals, and to some other Forms: Thus Swines, Serpents of all Kinds, and
 +some Insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with Aversion by many
 +People, who have got some accidental Ideas associated to them. And for
 +Distastes of this Kind, || 13 no|| other Account can be given.
 +IV. But as to the universal Agreement of Mankind in their Sense of
 +Beauty from Uniformity amidst Variety, we must consult Experience:
 +and as we allow all Men Reason, since all Men are capable of under-
 +standing simple Arguments, tho few are capable of complex Demon-
 +strations; so in this Case it must be sufficient to prove this Sense ofBeauty
 +universal, “if all Men are better pleas’d with Uniformity in the [76] sim-
 +pler Instances than the contrary, even when there is no Advantage ob-
 +serv’d attending it; and likewise if all Men, according as their Capacity
 +enlarges, so as to receive and compare more complex Ideas, || l4 have a
 +greater|| Delight in Uniformity, and are pleas’d with its more complex
 +Kinds, both Original and Relative.”
 +Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of this Sense in the
 +simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances
 +of Flarmony, because as soon as we find an Ear || 15 incapable || of relishing
 +complex Compositions, such as our Tunes are, no further Pains are
 +employ’d about such. But in Figures, did ever any Man make choice
 +of a Trapezium, or any irregular Curve, for the Ichnography || 16 or Plan ||
 +of his House, without Necessity, or some great Motive of || 17 Conve-
 +nience||? or to make the opposite Walls not parallel, or unequal in
 +Height? Were ever Trapeziums, irregular Polygons or Curves chosen for
 +the Forms of Doors or Windows, tho these Figures might have answer’d
 +the Uses as well, and would have often sav’d a great part of the Time,
 +Universality of
 +this Sense.
 +See below Art. n, 12. of this Section.
 +Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ’d in suiting the
 +Stones and Timber to the regular Forms? Among all the fantastick
 +Modes of Dress, [ 77 ] none was ever quite void of Uniformity, if it were
 +only in the resemblance of the two Sides of the same Robe, and in some
 +general Aptitude to the human Form. The Pictish Painting had always
 +relative Beauty by resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects
 +were originally beautiful: however justly we || ls might|| apply Horace’s
 +Censure of impertinent Descriptions in Poetry.
 +Sed non erat his locus *'
 +But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made
 +by the casual spilling of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas’d with an
 +inequality of Heights in Windows of the same Range, or dissimilar
 +Shapes of them? with unequal Legs or Arms, || 19 Eyes|| or Cheeks in a
 +Mistress? It must however be acknowledg’d, “That Interest may often
 +counterballance our Sense of Beauty in this Affair as well as in others,
 +and superior good Qualitys may make us overlook such Imperfections.”
 +Real Beauty V. Nay further, it may perhaps appear, “That Regularity and Uniformity
 +lone pleases. are so CO piously diffus’d thro the Universe, and we are so readily deter-
 +min’d to [ 78 ] pursue this as the Foundation of Beauty in Works of Art,
 +that there is scarcely any thing ever fancy’d as Beautiful, where there is
 +not really something of this Uniformity and Regularity.” We are indeed
 +often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible Beauty,
 +where it is but very imperfect; but still it is some degree of Beauty which
 +pleases, altho there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; and
 +our Sense acts with full Regularity when we are pleas’d, altho we are kept
 +by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more.
 +20 A Goth, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imag-
 +ines the Architecture of his country to be the most perfect: and a Con-
 +junction of 1 1 21 some 1 1 hostile Ideas, may make him have an Aversion to
 +* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.
 +i. Translation: But for such things there was no place.
 +Roman Buildings, and study to demolish them, as some of our Reform-
 +ers did the Popish Buildings, not being able to separate the Ideas of the
 +superstitious Worship, from the Forms of the Buildings where it was
 +practised: and yet it is still real Beauty which pleases the Goth, founded
 +upon Uniformity amidst Variety. For the Gothick Pillars are uniform to
 +each other, not only in their Sections, which are Lozenge-form’ d; but
 +also in their Fleights and Ornaments: Their Arches are not one uniform
 +Curve, but yet [79] they are Segments of similar Curves, and generally
 +equal in the same Ranges. The very Indian Buildings have some kind of
 +Uniformity, and many of the Eastern nations, tho they differ much from
 +us, yet have great || 22 Regularity || in their Manner, as well as the Romans
 +in theirs. Our Indian Screens, which wonderfully supply || 23 the regular
 +Imaginations of our Ladys 1 1 with Ideas of Deformity, in which Nature
 +is very churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the Beauty arising from
 +Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to Nature; and yet they cannot
 +divest themselves of all Beauty and Uniformity in the separate Parts: And
 +this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions, may give
 +some wild Pleasure from Variety, since some Uniformity to the human
 +Shape is still retain’d.
 +VI. There is one sort of Beauty which might perhaps have been better
 +mention’d before, but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste
 +or Relish of it is universal in all Nations, and with the Young as well as
 +the Old, and that is the Beauty of Flistory. Every one knows how dull a
 +Study it is to read over a Collection of Gazettes, which shall perhaps
 +relate all the same Events with the Flistorian: The superior Pleasure then
 +of Flistory must arise, like that of Poetry, from the [80] Manners; || 24 as ||
 +when we see a Character well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes
 +of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent Actions; or an Interest of
 +State laid open, or an artful View nicely unfolded, the Execution of
 +which influences very different and opposite Actions, as the Circum-
 +stances may alter. Now this reduces the whole to an Unity of Design at
 +least: And this may be observ’d in the very Fables which entertain Chil-
 +dren, otherwise we cannot make them relish them.
 +History pleases
 +in like manner.
 +Diversity of
 +concerning our
 +The Reason
 +of it.
 +VII. What has been said will probably be assented to, if we always re-
 +member in our Inquirys into the Universality of the Sense of Beauty,
 +“That there may be real Beauty, where there is not the greatest; and that
 +there are an Infinity of different Forms which || 25 may|| all have some
 +Unity, and yet differ from each other.” So that Men may have different
 +Fancys of Beauty, and yet Uniformity be the universal Foundation of
 +our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as Beautiful. And we shall find
 +that it is so in the Architecture, Gardening, Dress, Equipage, and Fur-
 +niture of blouses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where
 +Uniformity still pleases, without any other Advantage than the Pleasure
 +of the Contemplation of it. [81]
 +VIII. It will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like
 +Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the internal and
 +external Senses. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr.
 +Locke have || 26 shaken off the groundless Opinions about || innate Ideas,
 +than to alledge, “That all our Relish for Beauty, and Order, is either from
 +|| 27 prospect of Advantage, || Custom, or Education,” for no other Reason
 +but the Variety of Fancys in the World: and from this they conclude,
 +“That our Fancys do not arise from any natural Power of Perception, or
 +Sense.” And yet all allow our external Senses to be Natural, and that the
 +Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas’d,
 +or diminish’d, by Custom, or Education, and counterballanc’d by In-
 +terest, yet are really antecedent to Custom, Fiabit, Education, or Pros-
 +pect of Interest. Now it is certain, “That there is at least as great a variety
 +of Fancys about their Objects, as the Objects of Beauty:” Nay it is much
 +more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the Fancys or Relishes
 +of the external Senses to any general Foundation at all, or to find any
 +Rule for the agreeable or disagreeable: and yet we all allow “that these
 +are natural Powers of Perception.” [82]
 +IX. The Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this,
 +That we have got distinct Names for the external Senses, and none, or
 +very few, for the Internal; and by this are led, as in many other Cases, to
 +look upon the former as some way more fix’d, and real and natural, than
 +the latter. The Sense of Harmony has got its Name, || 28 viz.|| a good Ear;
 +and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a natural Power of
 +Perception, or a Sense some way distinct from Hearing: now it is certain,
 +“That there is as necessary a Perception of Beauty upon the presence of
 +regular Objects, as of Harmony upon hearing certain Sounds.”
 +X. But let it be observ’d here once for all, “That an internal Sense no
 +more presupposes an innate Idea, or Principle of Knowledge, than the
 +external. ” Both are natural Powers of Perception, or Determinations of
 +the Mind to receive necessarily certain Ideas from the presence of Ob-
 +jects. The internal Sense is, a passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty
 +from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety. Nor does
 +there seem any thing more difficult in this matter, than that the Mind
 +should be always determin’d to receive the Idea of Sweet, when Particles
 +of such a Form enter the Pores of [83] the Tongue; or to have the Idea
 +of Sound upon any quick Undulation of the Air. The one seems to have
 +as little Connection with its Idea, as the other: And the same Power could
 +with equal ease constitute the former the occasion of Ideas as the latter.
 +XI. The Association of Ideas* above hinted at, is one great Cause of the
 +apparent Diversity of Fancys in the Sense of Beauty, as well as in the
 +external Senses; and often makes Men have an aversion to Objects of
 +Beauty, and a liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions
 +than those of Beauty or Deformity. And here it may not be improper to
 +give some Instances of some of these Associations. The Beauty of Trees,
 +their cool Shades, and their Aptness to conceal from Observation, have
 +made Groves and Woods the usual Retreat to those who love Solitude,
 +especially to the Religious, the Pensive, the Melancholy, and the Amo-
 +rous. And do not we find that we have so join’d the Ideas of these Dis-
 +positions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to
 +us along with them? The Cunning of the Heathen Priests might make
 +such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their De-
 +itys; andhencewejoinldeasofsomethingDivine [84] to them. We know
 +An internal
 +Sense does not
 +innate Ideas.
 +Cause of
 +See above Art. 3. of this Section.
 +Musick, how it
 +the like Effect in the Ideas of our Churches, from the perpetual use of
 +them only in religious Exercises. The faint Light in Gothick Buildings
 +has had the same Association of a very foreign Idea, which our Poet shews
 +in his Epithet,
 +A Dim religious Light.* 11
 +In like manner it is known, That often all the Circumstances of Ac-
 +tions, or Places, or Dresses of Persons, or Voice, or Song, which have
 +occur’d at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any
 +Passion, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest
 +recur. And this is often the occasion both of great Pleasure and Pain,
 +Delight and Aversion to many Objects, which of themselves might have
 +been perfectly indifferent to us: but these Approbations, or Distastes, are
 +remote from the Ideas of Beauty, being plainly different Ideas.
 +XII. There is also another Charm in Musick to various Persons, which
 +is distinct from the Harmony, and is occasion’d by its raising agreeable
 +Passions. The human Voice is obviously vary’d by all the stronger Pas-
 +sions; now when our Ear discerns [85] any resemblance between the Air
 +of a Tune, whether sung or play’d upon an Instrument, either in its Time,
 +or || 29 Modulation, || or any other Circumstance, to the sound of the hu-
 +man Voice in any Passion, we shall be touch’d by it in a very sensible
 +manner, and have Melancholy, Joy, Gravity, Thoughtfulness excited in
 +us by a sort of Sympathy or Contagion. The same Connexion is ob-
 +servable between the very Air of a Tune, and the Words expressing any
 +Passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur to
 +us together, tho but one of them affects our Senses.
 +30 Now in such a diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas which may
 +* Milt. II Penseroso.
 +ii. John Milton (1608-74), English poet and author. His major poems are On the
 +Morning of Christ’s Nativity, L’Allegro, and II Penseroso (early works). Paradise Lost
 +and Paradise Regained (later works) . He wrote extensively on theological and political
 +issues as well (for example, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 1643; The Tenure
 +of Kings and Magistrates, 1649; The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Common-
 +wealth, 1660).
 +be || 31 join’d |[ with Forms of Bodys, or Tunes, when Men are of such
 +different Dispositions, and prone to such a variety of Passions, it is no
 +wonder “that they should often disagree in their Fancys of Objects, even
 +altho their Sense of Beauty and Harmony were perfectly uniform;” be-
 +cause many other Ideas may either please or displease, according to Per-
 +sons Tempers, and past Circumstances. We know how agreeable a very
 +wild Country may be to any Person who has spent the chearful Days of
 +his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very beautiful Places may be, if
 +they were the Scenes of his [86] Misery. And this may help us in many
 +Cases to account for the Diversitys of Fancy, without denying the Uni-
 +formity of our internal Sense of Beauty.
 +XIII. Grandeur and Novelty are two Ideas different from Beauty, which
 +often recommend Objects to us. The Reason of this is foreign to the
 +present Subject. See Spectator No. 412. [87]
 +Custom gives
 +no new Sense.
 +Of the Power of Custom, Education, and
 +Example, as to our internal Senses.
 +I. Custom, Education, and Example are so often alledg’d in this Affair,
 +as the occasion of our Relish for beautiful Objects, and for our Appro-
 +bation of, or Delight in a certain Conduct in Life, in a moral || 1 Sense ||,
 +that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear
 +“that there is a natural Power of Perception, or Sense of Beauty in Ob-
 +jects, antecedent to all Custom, Education, or Example.”
 +II. Custom, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As
 +to Actions, it only gives a disposition to the Mind or Body more easily
 +to perform those Actions which have been frequently repeated, but never
 +leads us to apprehend them under any other View than what we were
 +capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new Power
 +of Perception about them. We are naturally capable of Sentiments of
 +Fear, and Dread of any powerful Presence; and [88] so Custom may con-
 +nect the Ideas of religious Elorror to certain Buildings: but || 2 Custom
 +could never || have made a Being naturally incapable of Fear, receive such
 +Ideas. So had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Ac-
 +tions, but as they were advantageous or disadvantageous, Custom could
 +only have made us more ready at perceiving the Advantage or Disad-
 +vantage of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.
 +As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects. When the
 +Blood or Spirits of which Anatomists talk are rouz’d, quicken’d, or fer-
 +mented as they call it, in any agreeable manner by Medicine or Nutri-
 +ment; or any Glands frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain that
 +to preserve the Body easy, we || 3 shall|] delight in Objects of Taste which
 +of themselves are not immediately pleasant to || 4 it||, if they promote that
 +agreeable State which the Body had been accustom’d to. Further, Cus-
 +tom will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais’d uneasy
 +Sensations will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of
 +the same Sense; but Custom can never give us any Idea of || 5 a Sense
 +different from those || we had antecedent to it: It will never make the
 +Blind approve Objects as coloured, or those who have no Taste approve
 +Meats as delicious, however they [89] might || 6 approve them as ||
 +Strengthning or Exhilarating. Were our Glands and the Parts about them
 +void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions
 +in the Blood, |[ 7 Custom could never || make stimulating or intoxicating
 +Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So
 +by like Reasoning, had we no natural Sense of Beauty from Uniformity,
 +Custom could never have made us imagine any Beauty in Objects; if we
 +had had no Ear, Custom could never have given us the Pleasures of Har-
 +mony. When we have these natural Senses antecedently, Custom may
 +make us capable of extending our Views further, and of receiving more
 +complex Ideas of Beauty in Bodys, or Harmony in Sounds, by increasing
 +our Attention and quickness of Perception. But however Custom may
 +increase our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems
 +rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of Beauty, or the Impressions
 +of Pleasure from regular Objects; else how || 8 is|| it possible that any Per-
 +son could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without
 +the most extravagant Raptures, such as Milton* represents our Ancestor
 +in upon his first Creation? For such any Person would certainly fall into,
 +upon the first Representation of such a Scene. [90]
 +Custom in like manner || 9 may|| make it easier for any Person to dis-
 +cern the Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as advantageous; but
 +he would never have imagin’d it Beautiful, had he no natural Sense of
 +See Paradise Lost, Book 8.
 +7 2
 +Beauty. Custom may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of
 +complex Theorems, but we all find the Pleasure or Beauty of Theorems
 +as strong at first as ever. Custom makes us more capable of retaining and
 +comparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more complicated Unifor-
 +mity, which escapes the Observation of Novices in any Art; but all this
 +presupposes a natural Sense of Beauty in Uniformity: for had there been
 +nothing in Forms, which was constituted || 10 the necessary|| occasion of
 +Pleasure to our Senses, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure
 +or Pain, Beauty or Deformity, could ever have made them grow pleasing
 +or displeasing.
 +III. The Effect of Education is this, that thereby we receive many spec-
 +ulative Opinions, || n which are || sometimes true and sometimes false;
 +and are often led to believe that Objects may be naturally apt to give
 +Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, || 12 which in reality have || no such
 +Qualitys. And further, by Education there are some strong Associations
 +of Ideas without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes, as well as
 +[ 91 ] by Design, which it is very hard for us ever after to break asunder.
 +Thus Aversions are rais’d to Darkness, and to many kinds of Meat, and
 +to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground are rais’d in
 +like manner. But in all these Instances, Education never makes us ap-
 +prehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we have not naturally Senses
 +capable of perceiving. We know what Sickness of the Stomach is, and
 +may without Ground believe that very healthful Meats will raise this; we
 +by our Sight and Smell receive disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine,
 +and their Styes, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of these Ideas
 +at Table: but never were Men naturally Blind prejudic’d against Objects
 +as of a disagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour;
 +they perhaps hear Men dispraise one Colour, || 13 and may|| imagine this
 +Colour to be some quite different sensible Quality of the other Senses 1 1 14 ,
 +but that is all 1 1 : And the same way, a Man naturally void of Taste could
 +by no Education receive the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic’d in favour of
 +Meats as delicious: So, had we no natural Sense of Beauty and Elarmony,
 +we could never be prejudic’d in favour of Objects or Sounds as Beautiful
 +or Harmonious. Education may make an unattentive Goth imagine that
 +his Countrymen have attain’d the Perfection of Archi-[92]tecture; and
 +an Aversion to their Enemys the Romans, may have join’d some dis-
 +agreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Dem-
 +olition; but he had never form’d these Prejudices, had he been void of
 +a Sense of Beauty. Did ever blind Men debate whether Purple or Scarlet
 +were the finer Colour? or could any Education prejudice them in favour
 +of either as Colours?
 +Thus Education and Custom may influence our internal Senses,
 +where they are antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of our Minds to
 +retain and compare the Parts of complex Compositions: And || 15 then||
 +if the finest Objects are presented to us, we grow conscious of a Pleasure
 +far superior to what common Performances excite. But all this presup-
 +poses our Sense of Beauty to be natural. Instruction in Anatomy, Ob-
 +servation of Nature, and of those Airs of the Countenance and Attitudes
 +of Body, which accompany any Sentiment, Action, or Passion, may en-
 +able us to know where there is a just Imitation: but why should an exact
 +Imitation please upon Observation, if we had not naturally a Sense of
 +Beauty in it, more than the observing the Situation of fifty or a hundred
 +Pebbles thrown at random? and should we || 16 observe|| them ever so
 +often, we || 17 should|| never dream of their growing Beautiful. [93]
 +IV. There is something worth our Observation as to the manner of root-
 +ing out the Prejudices of Education, not quite foreign to the present
 +purpose. When the Prejudice arises from Associations of Ideas without
 +any natural Connection, we must frequently force our selves to bear Rep-
 +resentations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated from
 +the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable As-
 +sociation, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus
 +Opinions of Superstition are best remov’d by pleasant Conversation of
 +Persons we esteem for their Virtue, or || 18 by observing that they 1 1 despise
 +such Opinions. But when the Prejudice arises from an Apprehension or
 +Opinion of natural Evil, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object
 +or Action; if the Evil be apprehended to be the constant and immediate
 +Prejudices how
 +Example not
 +the Cause of
 +internal Sense.
 +Attendant, a few Trials without receiving any Damage will remove the
 +Prejudice, as in that against Meats: But where the Evil is not represented
 +as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at
 +some time or other accompany the use of the Object, there must be
 +frequent Reasoning with our selves, or a long Series of Trials without any
 +Detriment, to remove the Prejudice; such is the Case of our Fear of Spir-
 +its in the dark, and in Church-yards. And [94] when the Evil is repre-
 +sented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a future State,
 +it is then hardest of all to remove the Prejudice; and this is only to be
 +effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there can be
 +no Trials made: and this is the Case of superstitious Prejudices against
 +Actions apprehended as offensive to the Deity; and hence it is that they
 +are so hard to be rooted out.
 +V. Example seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we
 +act very much for Pleasure, or private Good; and || 19 are thereby|| led to
 +imagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some
 +Perfection in the Objects which we see others pursue, and Evil in those
 +which we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the Example of others
 +may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of Evil in
 +Objects 1 1 20 to which we had an Aversion ||. But all this is done upon an
 +Apprehension of Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which we have; for
 +no Example will induce the Blind or Deaf to pursue Objects as Colour’d
 +or Sonorous; nor could Example any more engage us to pursue Objects
 +as Beautiful or Harmonious, had we no || 21 natural Sense of Beauty or
 +Harmony||. [95]
 +Example may make us || 22 conclude without Examination, || that our
 +Countrymen have obtain’d the Perfection of Beauty in their Works, or
 +that there is less Beauty in the Orders of Architecture or Painting us’d
 +in other Nations, and so content our selves with very imperfect Forms.
 +|| 23 And 1 1 Fear of Contempt as void of Taste or Genius, often makes us
 +join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Coun-
 +try, and restrains those who have naturally a fine Genius, or the internal
 +Senses very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection; it
 +makes also those of a bad Taste pretend to || 24 a|| Perception of 1 1 25 Beauty | [
 +|| 26 which in reality they have not||: But all this presupposes some natural
 +Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty and Harmony Nor can Example ef-
 +fect any thing further, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by
 +implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he
 +does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from
 +the Idea perceiv’d by those of a good Taste in such Affairs. [96]
 +Importance of
 +the internal
 +Of the Importance of the internal Senses in
 +Life, and the final Causes of them.
 +I. The busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams
 +of an inflam’d Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who ra-
 +tionally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy: but a
 +little Reflection will convince us, “That the Gratifications of our internal
 +Senses are as natural, real, and satisfying Enjoyments as any sensible Plea-
 +sure whatsoever; and that they are the chief Ends for which we com-
 +monly pursue Wealth and Power.” For how is Wealth or Power advan-
 +tageous? How do they make us happy, or prove good to us? No otherwise
 +than as they supply Gratifications to our Senses or Facultys of perceiving
 +Pleasure. Now, are these Senses or Facultys only the External ones? No:
 +Every body sees, that a small portion of Wealth or Power will supply
 +more Pleasures of the external Senses than we can enjoy; we know that
 +Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than A-[97]bundance,
 +which cloys that Appetite which is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoy-
 +ment: and hence the Poet’s Advice is perfectly just;
 +Tu pulmentaria quaere Sudando *'
 +* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.
 +i. Translation: “So earn your sauce with hard exercise.” (Horace, Satires, Epistles,
 +andArs Poetica, with an English translation by H. Rushton Fairclough, Cambridge,
 +Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 138.)
 +In short, the only use of a great Fortune, above a very small one (except
 +in good Offices and moral Pleasures) must be to supply us with the Plea-
 +sures of Beauty, Order, and Harmony.
 +|| la It is true indeed, that || 2b the Enjoyment of b || the noblest Pleasures
 +of the internal Senses, in the Contemplation of the Works of Nature,
 +|| 3c is c |] expos’d to every one without Expence; the Poor and the Low,
 +may have as free a use of these Objects, in this way, as the Wealthy or
 +Powerful. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the Property
 +is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often
 +enjoy’d by others beside the Proprietor. But then there are other Objects
 +of these internal Senses, which require Wealth, or Power to procure the
 +use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in Architecture, Mu-
 +sick, Gardening, Painting, Dress, Equipage, Furniture; ofwhich we can-
 +not [98] have the full Enjoyment without Property. And there are some
 +confus’d Imaginations, which often lead us to pursue Property, even in
 +Objects where it is not necessary to the true Enjoyment of them. These
 +are the ultimate Motives of our pursuing the greater Degrees ofWealth,
 +where there are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions. a ||
 +This is confirm’d by the constant Practice of the very Enemys to these
 +Senses. As soon as they think they are got above the World, or extricated
 +from the Hurrys of Avarice and Ambition; banish’d Nature will return
 +upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of Beauty and Order in their
 +Houses, Gardens, Dress, Table, Equipage. They are never easy without
 +some degree of this; and were their Hearts open to our View, we should
 +see Regularity, Decency, Beauty, as what their Wishes terminate upon,
 +either to themselves or their Posterity; and what their Imagination is
 +always presenting to them as the possible Effects of their Labours. Nor
 +without this, could they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.
 +There may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted
 +into a thorow Miser, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy
 +arises no higher than the cold [99] dull Thought of Possession; but such
 +1 1 4 an Instance || in an Age, must not be made the Standard of Mankind
 +against the whole Body.
 +If we examine the Pursuits of the Luxurious, who || 5 in the opinion
 +of the World is 1 1 wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that
 +Final Cause of
 +the internal
 +the far greater part of his Expence is employ’d to procure other Sensa-
 +tions than those of Taste; such as fine Attendants, regular Apartments,
 +Services of Plate, and the like. Besides, a large share of the Preparation
 +must be suppos’d design’d for some sort of generous friendly Purposes,
 +|| 6 as|| to please Acquaintance, Strangers, Parasites. How few would be
 +contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of
 +earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these internal Sen-
 +sations may be overlook’d in our Philosophical Inquirys about the hu-
 +man Facultys, we shall find in Fact, “That they employ us more, and are
 +more efficacious in Fife, either to our Pleasure, or Uneasiness, than all
 +our external Senses taken together.”
 +IF As to the final Causes of this internal Sense, we need not enquire,
 +“whether, to an almighty and all-knowing Being, there be any real Ex-
 +cellence in regular Forms, in acting by general Faws, in [ioo] knowing
 +by Theorems?” We seem scarce capable of answering such Questions any
 +way; nor need we enquire, “whether other Animals may not discern Uni-
 +formity and Regularity in Objects which escape our Observation, and
 +may not perhaps have their Senses constituted so as to perceive Beauty,
 +from the same Foundation which we do, in Objects which our Senses
 +are not || 7 fit|| to examine or compare?” We shall confine our selves to a
 +Subj ect where we have some certain 1 1 8 Foundation 1 1 to go upon, and only
 +enquire, “if we can find any Reasons worthy of the great Author of Na-
 +ture, for making such a Connection between regular Objects, and the
 +Pleasure which accompanys our Perceptions of them; or, what Reasons
 +might possibly influence him to create the World, as it at present is, as
 +far as we can observe, everywhere full of Regularity and Uniformity?”
 +9 Fet it be here observ’d, that as far as we know || 10 concerning|| any
 +of the great Bodys of the Universe, we see Forms and Motions really
 +Beautiful to our Senses; and if we were plac’d in any Planet, the apparent
 +Courses would still be Regular and Uniform, and consequently Beautiful
 +to || n our Sense|[. Now this gives us no small Ground to imagine, that
 +if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the same manner [ioi] adapted
 +to their Habitations, and the Objects occurring to their View, as ours
 +are here, their Senses must be upon the same general Foundation with
 +But to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be
 +contain’d in the following Propositions.
 +1. The manner of Knowledge by universal Theorems, and of Opera-
 +tion by universal Causes, as far as we can attain || 12 it, || must be most
 +convenient for Beings of limited Understanding and Power; since this
 +prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro the Multiplicity of
 +Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: and
 +consequently their Reason, without any Sense of Beauty, must approve
 +of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent Advantage.
 +2. Those Objects of Contemplation in which there is Uniformity
 +amidst Variety, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and re-
 +tain’d, than irregular Objects; because the accurate Observation of one
 +or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can
 +from a Pillar or two, with an intermediate Arch, and Cornice, form a
 +distinct Idea of a whole regular Building, if we know of what Species it
 +is, and have its Length and [102] Breadth: From a Side and solid Angle,
 +we have the whole regular Solid; the measuring one Side, gives the whole
 +Square; one Radius, the whole || 13 Circle||; two Diameters, an Oval; one
 +Ordinate and Abscissa, the Parabola; || 14 and so on in more complexFig-
 +ures which have any Regularity, which can be entirely determin’d and
 +known in every Part|| from a few Data: Whereas it must be a long At-
 +tention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea
 +of any irregular Form, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable
 +of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of rude Rocks, and Pebbles, and
 +confus’d Fleaps, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great
 +as in the regular Forms: for such irregular Objects distract the Mind with
 +Variety, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.
 +3. From these two Propositions it follows, “That Beings of limited
 +Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own Interest,
 +must chuse to operate by the simplest Means, to invent general Theo-
 +rems, and to study regular Objects, if they be 1 1 1 5 as useful as|[ irregular
 +ones; that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by
 +From the
 +a separate Operation, of searching || 16 out|[ each different Truth by a dif-
 +ferent [103] Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless Variety of dissimilar
 +Ideas in irregular Objects.”
 +4. But then, beside this Consideration of Interest, there does not ap-
 +pearto be any necessary Connection, || 17 antecedent|| to the Constitution
 +of the Author of Nature, || 18 between|| regular Forms, Actions, Theo-
 +rems, and that sudden sensible Pleasure excited in us upon observation
 +of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention’d in
 +the former Proposition. And possibly, the Deity could have form’d us
 +so as to have receiv’d || 19 no|| Pleasure from such Objects, or connected
 +Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Pre-
 +sumption of this in the Beautys of various Animals; they give some small
 +Pleasure indeed to every one who views them, but then every || 20 one||
 +seems 1 1 21 vastly || more delighted with 1 1 22 the peculiar Beautys of its own
 +Species, than with those of a different one, || which seldom raise any de-
 +sire || 23 but among Animals of the same Species with the one admir’d||.
 +This makes it probable, that the Pleasure is not the necessary Result of
 +the Form it self, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in
 +what Species soever || 24 ; but depends upon a voluntary Constitution, ||
 +adapted to preserve the Regularity of the Universe, and is probably not
 +the Effect of Necessity [104] but Choice in the Supreme Agent, who
 +constituted our Senses.
 +5. Now from the whole we may conclude, “That supposing the Deity
 +so kind as to connect sensible Pleasure with certain Actions or Contem-
 +plations, beside the rational Advantage perceivable in them; there is a
 +great moral Necessity, from his Goodness, that the internal Sense ofMen
 +should be constituted as it is at present, so as to make Uniformity amidst
 +Variety the Occasion of Pleasure.” For were it not so, but on the contrary,
 +if irregular Objects, particular Truths, and Operations pleased us, beside
 +the endless Toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual
 +Dissatisfaction in all rational Agents with themselves; since Reason and
 +Interest would lead us to simple general Causes, while a contrary Sense
 +of Beauty would make us disapprove them: Universal Theorems would
 +appear to our Understanding the best Means of increasing our Knowl-
 +edge of what might be useful; while a contrary Sense would set us on the
 +search after || 25 particular || Truths: Thought and Reflection would rec-
 +ommend Objects with Uniformity amidst Variety, and yet this perverse
 +Instinct would involve us in Labyrinths of Confusion and Dissimilitude.
 +And hence we see “how suitable it is to the sagacious [105] Bounty which
 +we suppose in the Deity, to constitute our internal Senses in the manner
 +in which they are; by which Pleasure is join’d to the Contemplation of
 +those Objects which a finite Mind can best imprint and retain the Ideas
 +of with the least Distraction; to those Actions which are most efficacious,
 +and fruitful in useful Effects; and to those Theorems which most enlarge
 +our Minds.”
 +26 III. As to the other Question, “What Reason might influence the De-
 +ity, whom no Diversity of Operation could distract or weary, to chuse
 +to operate by simplest Means and general Laws, and to diffuse Unifor-
 +mity, Proportion and Similitude thro all the Parts of Nature which we
 +can observe?” Perhaps there may be some real Excellence in this Manner
 +of Operation, and in these Forms, which we know not: but this we may
 +probably say, that since the divine Goodness, for the Reasons above
 +mention’d, has constituted our Sense of Beauty as it is at present, the
 +same Goodness might || 27 determine || the Great Architect to adorn this
 +|| 28 vast|| Theatre in || 29 a manner|| agreeable to the Spectators, and that
 +part which is expos’d to the Observation of Men, so as to be pleasant
 +to them; especially if we suppose that he design’d to discover himself to
 +them as Wise and Good, [106] as well as Powerful: for thus he has given
 +them greater Evidences, thro the whole Earth, of his Art, Wisdom, De-
 +sign, and Bounty, than they can possibly have for the Reason, Counsel,
 +and Good-will of their fellow-Creatures, with whom they converse, with
 +full Persuasion of || 30 these qualities in them, about|| their common Af-
 +As to the Operations of the Deity by general Laws, there is || 31 still a
 +further Reason from a Sense|| superior to these already consider’d, even
 +that of Virtue, or the Beauty of Action, which is the Foundation of our
 +greatest Happiness. For were there no general Laws fix’d in the Course
 +of Nature, there could be no Prudence or Design in Men, no rational
 +Expectation of Effects from Causes, no Schemes of Action projected,
 +Reason of
 +general Laws.
 +|| 32 or|| any regular Execution. If then, according to the Frame of our
 +Nature, our greatest happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may
 +perhaps be made appear it does, “The Universe must be govern’d, not
 +by particular Wills, but by general Laws, upon which we can found our
 +Expectations, and project our Schemes of Action.” || 33 Nay further, tho
 +general Laws did ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopp’d their
 +Ef-[io 7 ]fects whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils;
 +this would effectually, and justly supersede all human Prudence and Care
 +about Actions; since a superior Mind did thus relieve Men from their
 +Charge. 1 1
 +The End of the First Treatise.
 +An Inquiry Concerning the Original of
 +our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good.
 +Quod magis ad nos
 +Perdnet, & nescire malum est, agitamus: utrumne
 +Divitiis homines, an sint Virtute bead:
 +Quidve ad Amicidas, Usus, Rectumne, trahat nos
 +Et quae sit natura Boni, summumque quid ejus. 1
 +— Hor. Sat. 6. Lib. 2. v. 7 2.|| [in]
 +i. Horace, Satires, 6. Lib. 2. w. 72-76. Translation: “We discuss matters which
 +concern us more, and of which it is harmful to be in ignorance — whether wealth or
 +virtue makes men happy, whether self-interest or uprightness leads us to friendship,
 +what is the nature of the good and what is its highest form.” (Horace, Satires, Epistles,
 +andArs Poetica, with an English translation by H. Rushton Fairclough, Cambridge,
 +Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 216.)
 +An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil
 +The Word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of some
 +Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, || 2 and
 +Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the
 +Action. 1 1 Moral Evil, denotes our Idea of a contrary Quality, which ex-
 +cites || 3 Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons un-
 +concern’d in its natural Tendency. || We must be contented with these
 +imperfect Descriptions, until we discover || 4 whether we really have such
 +Ideas, and what general Foundation there is in Nature for || this Dif-
 +[mjference of Actions, as morally Good or Evil.
 +These Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg’d Dif-
 +ference of Moral Good and Evil, from Natural. All Men who speak of
 +moral Good, acknowledge that it procures || 5 Love|| toward those we ap-
 +prehend possess’d of it; whereas natural Good does not. In this matter
 +Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected
 +toward those they suppose possess’d of Honesty, Faith, Generosity,
 +Kindness || 6 , even when they expect no Benefit from these admir’d Qual-
 +itys ||; and those who are possess’d of the natural Goods, such as Houses,
 +Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, Sagacity? We shall find
 +that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but
 +the Possession of the latter procures no || 7 Love|| at all toward the Pos-
 +sessor, but often contrary Affections of Envy and Hatred. In the same
 +manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be morally Evil, raises our
 +|| 8 Hatred|| toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as Treachery,
 +Cruelty, Ingratitude 1 1 9 , even when they are no way hurtful to our selves 1 1;
 +whereas we heartily love, esteem and pity many who are expos’d to nat-
 +Moral Good
 +and Evil.
 +about our
 +Sense of moral
 +Good and Evil.
 +ural Evils, such as Pain, Poverty, Hunger, Sickness, Death|| 10 , even when
 +[113] we our selves suffer Inconveniencies, by these natural Evils of
 +others ||.
 +Now the first Question on this Subject is, “Whence arise these dif-
 +ferent Ideas of Actions.”
 +Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words Interest, Ad-
 +vantage, natural Good, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure
 +in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of natural
 +Good, or Happiness; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this
 +Pleasure are call’d immediately Good. Those Objects which may procure
 +others immediately pleasant, are call’d Advantageous: and we pursue
 +both Kinds from a View of Interest, or from Self-Love.
 +Our Sense of Pleasure is antecedent to Advantage or Interest, and is
 +the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because
 +it is our Interest to do so; but Objects or Actions are Advantageous, and
 +are pursu’d or undertaken from Interest, because we receive Pleasure
 +from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is Ad-
 +vantageous or naturally Good to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure
 +mediately, or immediately. Such Objects as we know, either from Ex-
 +perience or Sense, or Reason, to be immediately, [114] or mediately Ad-
 +vantageous, or apt to minister Pleasure, we 1 1 1 1 are said to || pursue from
 +Self-Interest, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which
 +they have the Power of exciting. Thus Meats, Drink, Harmony, fine
 +Prospects, Painting, Statues, are perceiv’d by our Senses to be immedi-
 +ately Good; and our Reason shews Riches and Power to be mediately
 +so, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and
 +both Kinds of these natural Goods are pursu’d from Interest, or Self-
 +Now the greatest part of our latter Moralists 11 establish it as undeni-
 +able, “That all moral Qualitys have necessarily some Relation to the Law
 +of a Superior, of sufficient Power to make us Happy or Miserable;” and
 +since all Laws operate only by Sanctions of Rewards, or Punishments,
 +which determine us to Obedience by Motives of Self-Interest, they sup-
 +ii. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1651, part 1, chapters 14, 15; John
 +Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London, 1690, book4, chap. 28;
 +pose, “that it is thus that Laws do constitute some Actions mediately
 +Good, or Advantageous, and others the same way Disadvantageous.”
 +They say indeed, “That a benevolent Legislator constitutes no Actions
 +Advantageous to the Agent by Law, but such as in their own Nature tend
 +to the natural Good of the Whole, or, at least, are not inconsistent with
 +it; and that therefore we approve [115] the Virtue of others, because it
 +has some small Tendency to our Happiness, either from its own Nature,
 +or from this general Consideration, That Obedience to a benevolent
 +Legislator, is in general Advantageous to the Whole, and to us in par-
 +ticular; and that for the contrary Reasons alone, we disapprove the Vice
 +of others, that is, the prohibited Action, as tending to our particular
 +Detriment in some degree.” || I2 But|| then they maintain, “That we are
 +determin’d to Obedience to Laws, or deterr’d from Disobedience,
 +merely by Motives of Self-Interest, to obtain either the natural Good
 +arising from the commanded Action, or the Rewards promised by the
 +Sanction; or to avoid the natural evil Consequences of Disobedience, or
 +at least the Penaltys of the Law.”
 +Some other Moralists 111 suppose “an immediate natural Good in the
 +Actions call’d Virtuous; that is, That we are determin’d to perceive some
 +Beauty in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even without
 +reflecting upon any Advantage which can any way redound to us from
 +the Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure || 13 accompany-
 +ing|| such of our own Actions as we call Virtuous, even when we expect
 +no other Advantage from them. ” But they [116] alledge at the same time,
 +“That we are excited to perform these Actions, even as we pursue, or
 +purchase Pictures, Statues, Landskips, from Self-Interest, to obtain this
 +Pleasure which || 14 accompanys the very Action, and which we neces-
 +sarily enjoy in doing it.||” The Design of the following Sections is to
 +enquire into this matter; and perhaps the Reasons to be offer’d may
 +similar views are in Calvin and Calvinist theology, see John Calvin, Commentaries on
 +the Bible, vol. 13, part 2.
 +iii. Here Hutcheson probably thinks of Shaftesbury ( Inquiry Concerning Virtue,
 +part 2, section 1).
 +I. “That some Actions have to Men an immediate Goodness; or, that
 +by a superior Sense, which I call a Moral one, we || 15 perceive Pleasure
 +in the Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin’d to
 +love the Agent, (and much more do we perceive Pleasure in being con-
 +scious of having done such Actions our selves) || without any View of
 +further natural Advantage from them.”
 +II. It may perhaps also appear, “ || 16 That what excites us to these Ac-
 +tions which we call Virtuous, is not an Intention to obtain even this
 +sensible Pleasure ||; much less the future Rewards from Sanctions of Laws,
 +or any other natural Good, which may be the Consequence of the vir-
 +tuous Action; but an entirely different Principle of Action || I7 from In-
 +terest or Self-Love. ||” [117]
 +Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive
 +Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove
 +them in others.
 +I. That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil, are perfectly different
 +from those of natural Good, or Advantage, every one must convince
 +himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds him-
 +self affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no Sense of Good
 +distinct from the Advantage or Interest arising from the external Senses,
 +and the Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony; ||'our Admiration and
 +Love|| toward a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation, would be
 +much the same with what we have toward a generous Friend, or any
 +noble Character; for both are, or may be advantageous to us: And we
 +should no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant Coun-
 +try, or Age, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love the
 +Mountains of Peru, while we are unconcern’d in the Spanish Trade. We
 +should have the same Sentiments and Affections [118] toward inanimate
 +Beings, which we have toward rational Agents; which yet every one
 +knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, “Why should we || 2 admire
 +or love with Esteem || inanimate Beings? They have no Intention of
 +Good to 1 1 3 us ||; their Nature makes them fit for our Uses, which they
 +neither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational Agents:
 +1 1 4 they study our Interest, and delight in our Happiness, and are Benev-
 +olent toward us.N”
 +Different Ideas
 +of Moral and
 +Natural Good.
 +In Actions
 +done to our
 +Of Evil, Moral
 +and Natural.
 +We are all then conscious of the Difference between that || 5 Love and
 +Esteem ||, or Perception of moral Excellence, which Benevolence excites
 +toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of natural
 +Goodness, which only raises Desire of Possession toward the good Ob-
 +ject. Now “what should make this Difference, if all Approbation, or
 +Sense of Good be from Prospect of Advantage? Do not inanimate Ob-
 +jects promote our Advantage, as well as Benevolent Persons who do us
 +Offices of Kindness, and Friendship? Should we not then have the same
 +endearing || 6 Sentiments|| of both? or only the same cold Opinion of Ad-
 +vantage in both?” The Reason why it is not so, must be this, “That we
 +have a distinct Perception of Beauty, or Excellence in the kind Afifec-
 +[ii9]tions of rational Agents; whence we are determin’d to admire and
 +love such Characters and Persons.”
 +Suppose we reap the same Advantage from two Men, one of whom
 +serves us || 7 from Delight in our Happiness, and Love toward us; || the
 +other from Views of Self-Interest, or by Constraint: both are in this Case
 +equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite dif-
 +ferent Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Percep-
 +tions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And that Power of
 +receiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Def-
 +inition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea
 +from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, || 8 independent || on
 +our Will.*
 +This perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of Evil, done to
 +us designedly by a rational Agent. Our Senses of natural Good and Evil
 +would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an Assault,
 +a Buffet, an Affront from a Neighbour, a Cheat from a Partner, or
 +Trustee, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a Beam, a Tile,
 +or a Tempest; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments
 +|| 9 of both ||. Villany, Treachery, [120] Cruelty, would be as meekly re-
 +sented as a Blast, or Mildew, or an overflowing Stream. But I fancy every
 +one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho there may be
 +See the Preface, Page 7.
 +equal natural Evil in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental, may oc-
 +casion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidence only im-
 +potent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention
 +of moral Ideas may prevent our || 10 Hatred|| of the Agent, or bad moral
 +Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest natural Evil.
 +Thus the Opinion of Justice in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of
 +moral Evil in the Execution, or Hatred toward the Magistrate, who is
 +the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.
 +II. In our Sentiments of Actions which affect our selves, there is indeed
 +a Mixture of the Ideas of natural and moral Good, which require some
 +Attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the Actions which
 +affect other Persons only, we may observe the moral Ideas unmix’d with
 +those of natural Good, or Evil. For let it be here observ’d, that those
 +Senses by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they
 +are constituted Advantageous, could never raise in us any Desire of pub-
 +lick Good, but only of what was good to our selves [ 121 ] in particular.
 +Nor could they ever make us approve an Action || 1 1 because|| of its pro-
 +moting the Happiness of others. And yet as soon as any Action is rep-
 +resented to us as flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion,
 +a Study of the good of others, and 1 1 12 a Delight in 1 1 their Happiness, altho
 +it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we
 +feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And
 +on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing || 13 from Hatred,
 +Delight in the Misery of others ||, or Ingratitude, raises Abhorrence and
 +It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally
 +imagin’d to tend to the natural Good ofMankind, or || l4 of|| some Parts
 +of it. But whence this secret Chain between each Person and Mankind?
 +How is my Interest connected with the most distant Parts of it? And yet
 +I must admire || 15 Actions which are beneficial to them||, and love the
 +Author. Whence this Love, Compassion, Indignation and Hatred to-
 +ward even feign’d Characters, in the most distant Ages, and Nations,
 +according as they appear Kind, Faithful, Compassionate, or of the op-
 +posite Dispositions, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is
 +In Actions
 +toward others.
 +Moral Ideas
 +not from
 +no moral Sense, || 16 which makes rational Actions appear Beautiful, [122]
 +or Deform’d 1 1 ; if all Approbation be from the Interest of the Approver,
 +What’s Hecuba to us, or we to Hecuba?* 1
 +III. Some refin’d Explainers of Self-Love may tell us, “That we || 17 hate,
 +or love 1 1 Characters, according as we apprehend we should have been
 +supported, or injur’d by them, had we liv’d in their Days.” But how
 +obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of moral
 +Good in Humanity, Mercy, Faithfulness, why should not Self-Love,
 +|| ls and our Sense of natural Good|| engage us always to the victorious
 +Side, and make us admire and love the successful Tyrant, or Traitor? Why
 +do not we love Sinon, Pyrrhus, in the Aeneid ? for had we been Greeks,
 +these two would have been very advantageous Characters. Why are we
 +affected with the Fortunes of Priamus, Polites, Choroebus or Aeneas? 11
 +19 It is plain we have some secret Sense which determines our Appro-
 +bation without regard to Self-Interest; otherwise we should always favour
 +the fortunate Side without regard to Virtue || 20 , and suppose our selves
 +engaged with that Party||. 21 [123]
 +Suppose any great Destruction occasion’d by mere Accident, without
 +any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author
 +of it: This Action might have been as disadvantageous to us as design’d
 +Cruelty, or Malice; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions,
 +or Sentiments of the || 22 Agents? || “Whence then this Difference?”
 +And further, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from
 +* Tragedy of Hamlet.
 +i. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act 2, scene 2, verse 562: “What’s Hec-
 +uba to him, or he to Hecuba. . . ?”
 +ii. According to Virgil ( Aeneid 2, 57) Sinon used deceit to make the Trojans take
 +the wooden horse into the City. Pyrrhos I, King of Epirus, 306— 302 and 297— 277 b.c.,
 +defeated the Romans in 280/279 but lost most of his own troops, hence the phrase
 +Pyrrhic victory. Priam, King of Troy and grieving father of Hector, who was slain by
 +Achilles in the Trojan War. Choroebos (Greek: Korroibos) liberated Argos from a
 +disaster sent by Apollo; as punishment Choroebos had to carry a holy tripod and to
 +found a city where he dropped it (see Pausanias, Description of Greece, 4.17.4). Ac-
 +cording to legend, Aeneas escaped the conquered Troy and, after a long odyssey,
 +founded Rome.
 +Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even disadvantageous Ac-
 +tions, and perceive moral Good in them. A few ingenious Artisans, per-
 +secuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct
 +us in Manufactures which support Millions of Poor, increase the Wealth
 +of almost every Person in the State, and make us formidable to our
 +Neighbours, in a Nation not far distant from us, some resolute Bur-
 +gomasters, full of Love to their Country, and Compassion toward their
 +Fellow-Citizens, opprest in Body and Soul by a Tyrant, and Inquisition,
 +with indefatigable Diligence, public Spirit, and Courage, support a te-
 +dious perilous War against the Tyrant and form an industrious Repub-
 +lick, which rivals us in Trade, and almost in Power . 111 All the World sees
 +whether the former or the latter have been more ad-[i24]vantageous to
 +us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Char-
 +acters he has the most agreeable Idea of? whether of the useful Refugee,
 +or the public-spirited Burgomaster, by whose Love to his own Country,
 +we have often suffer’d in our Interests? And I am confident he will find
 +some other Foundation of Esteem than Advantage, and will see a just
 +Reason, why the Memory of our Artisans is so obscure among us, and
 +yet that of our Rivals is immortal.
 +IV. Some Moralists, lv who will rather twist Self-Love into a thousand
 +Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than Interest,
 +may tell us, “That whatever profits one Part without detriment to an-
 +other, profits the Whole, and then some small Share will redound to each
 +Individual; that those Actions which tend to the Good of the Whole, if
 +universally perform’d, would most effectually secure to each Individual
 +his own Happiness; and that consequently, we may approve such Ac-
 +tions, from the Opinion of their tending ultimately to our own Advan-
 +23 We need not trouble these Gentlemen to shew by their nice Train
 +iii. Hutcheson refers to the Dutch struggle for freedom from Spain.
 +iv. For example, Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, chapter i, and Bernard Mandeville,
 +Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue (in the second edition of The Fable of the Bees
 +of 1723).
 +Self-Love not
 +the Ground of
 +of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in par-
 +ticular Instances, that [125] we in this Age reap any Advantage from Ores-
 +tes’s killing the treacherous Aegysthus, or from the Actions of Codrus or
 +Decius. v vi. Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove,
 +that after long Reflection, and Reasoning, we may find out some ground,
 +1 1 24 even from Views of Interest, to approve the same Actions || which
 +every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a
 +quite different Conception.
 +25 Should any of our Travellers find some old Grecian Treasure, the
 +Miser who hid it, certainly perform’d an Action more to the Traveller’s
 +Advantage than Codrus or Orestes; for he must have but a small Share
 +of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers’d, and lost
 +in various Ages, and Nations: Surely then this Miser must appear to the
 +Traveller a prodigious Hero in Virtue! For Self-Interest will || 26 make us
 +only esteem Men|| according to the Good they do to our Selves, and not
 +give us high Ideas of public Good, but in proportion to our Share of it.
 +But must a Man have the Reflection of Cumberland, or Puffendorf, vl to
 +admire Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude? Or reason so nicely to
 +apprehend the Evil in Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude? Do not the former
 +excite our Admiration, and Love, [126] and Study of Imitation, wherever
 +we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection; and the
 +latter, our || 27 Hatred||, Contempt and Abhorrence? Unhappy would it
 +be for Mankind, if a Sense of Virtue was of as narrow an Extent, as a
 +Capacity for such Metaphysicks.
 +v. Orestes, according to legend, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, killed his
 +mother and her lover Aegisthus to avenge their assassination of Agamemnon (Aes-
 +chylus, Oresteia, especially The Libation Bearers; Euripides, Electra; Sophocles, Elec-
 +tro). Codrus, the last King of Athens, gave his life fighting against Sparta, in order to
 +free Athens (Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, V, 6 2). Publius Decius Mus
 +(Roman Consul, 340 b.c.) supposedly was killed in the war against the Latins (340-
 +338 b.c.) near Capua (see Cicero, De Finibus, II, 61; see note viii below).
 +vi. Richard Cumberland (1632-1718) criticized Hobbes in the work De Legibus
 +Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica, London, 1672 (translation: A Treatise of the Law of
 +Nature, London, 1727). Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) was the leading author on nat-
 +ural law in the Enlightenment, see De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Lund, 1672 (trans-
 +lation: The Law of Nature and Nations, London, 1703) , and De officio hominis et civis,
 +Lund, 1673 (translation: The Whole Duty of Man, London, 1691).
 +V. This moral Sense, either of our own Actions, or of those of others,
 +has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of
 +Virtue may be counterballanc’d by Interest, our Sentiment or Perception
 +of its Beauty cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our
 +Approbation were Views of Advantage. Let us consider this both as to
 +our own Actions and those of others.
 +A Covetous Man shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever
 +it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an
 +Aversion from Interest. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be
 +the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct.
 +Now is it the same way with our Sense of moral Actions? Should any
 +one advise us to wrong a Minor, or Orphan, or to do an ungrateful Ac-
 +tion toward a Benefactor; we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will
 +be very advantageous to us, propose even a Reward; [127] our Sense of
 +the Action is not alter’d. It is true, these Motives may make us undertake
 +it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than
 +a Physician’s Advice has to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste,
 +when we perhaps force our selves to take it for the Recovery of Health.
 +28 Had we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their Advan-
 +tage, or Disadvantage, could we ever chuse an Action as Advantageous,
 +which we are conscious is still Evil? as it too often happens in human
 +Affairs. Where would be the need of such high Bribes to prevail with
 +Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin’d Party, or of Tortures to force
 +out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Under-
 +standings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is prob-
 +ably more advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils,
 +by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possi-
 +bility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and some-
 +times unexpected? And when Men are overpersuaded by Advantage, do
 +they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their re-
 +maining Life odious, and shameful, in their own Sense of it, as well as
 +in that of others, to whom the base Action was profitable? [128]
 +If any one becomes satisfy’d with his own Conduct in such a Case,
 +upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his
 +Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his private Advantage, or
 +Our Moral
 +Sense cannot
 +be brib’d.
 +In judging of
 +our own
 +Our Moral
 +Sense not
 +founded on
 +Our Moral
 +Sense of the
 +Actions of
 +others, not to
 +be brib’d.
 +alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into
 +the moral Principles of his new Party; for no Party is without them. And
 +thus Men become pleas’d with their Actions under some Appearance of
 +moral Good, distinct from Advantage.
 +It may perhaps be alledg’d, “That in those Actions of our own which
 +we call Good, there is this constant Advantage, superior to all others,
 +which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from
 +Self-love, viz. That we suppose the Deity will reward them.” This will
 +be more fully consider’d* 1 1 29 afterwards ||; At present it is enough to ob-
 +serve, that many have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity,
 +Justice, who have scarce || 30 any Opinions about the Deity, or any
 +Thoughts of future Rewards ||; and abhor any thing which is Treacherous,
 +Cruel, or Unjust, without any regard to future Punishments. [129]
 +31 But further, tho these Rewards, and Punishments, may make my
 +own Actions appear advantageous to me, || 32 and make me approve them
 +from Self-Love, || yet they would never make me approve, and love an-
 +other Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed
 +to me. Those Actions are advantageous indeed to the Agent; but his Ad-
 +vantage is not my Advantage: and Self-Love could never || 33 influence me
 +to approve || Actions as advantageous to others, or || 34 to love|| theAuthors
 +of them on that account.
 +This is the second thing to be consider’d, “Whether our Sense of the
 +moral Good or Evil, in the Actions of others, can be over-ballanc’d, or
 +brib’d by Views of Interest.” Now I may indeed easily be capable of
 +wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as morally Evil, if it
 +were very Advantageous to me: Interest in that Case may overballance
 +my Desire of Virtue in another. But no Interest || 35 to my self || will make
 +me approve an Action as | | 36 morally 1 1 Good, which, without that Interest
 +to my self, would have appear’d morally Evil || 37 ; if, upon computing its
 +whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a Moment of Good in the
 +Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did before when it was. In
 +our Sense of moral Good or [130] Evil, our own private Advantage or
 +See Sect. ii. Art. 7.
 +Loss is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loss of a third Person,
 +to make an Action appear Good or Evil. This Sense therefore cannot be
 +over-ballanc’d by Interest.|| How ridiculous an Attempt wou’d it be, to
 +engage a Man by Rewards, or || 38 to threaten him|[ into a good Opinion
 +of an Action, which was contrary to his moral Notions? We may procure
 +Dissimulation by such means, and that is all.
 +VI. A late witty Author* says, “That the Leaders of Mankind do not
 +really admire such Actions as those of Regulus, or Decius, but only ob-
 +serve, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence of
 +any State; and therefore by Panegyricks, and Statues, they encourage
 +such Tempers in others, as the most tractable, and useful.”™ Here first
 +let us consider, If a Traitor, who would sell his own Country to us, may
 +not often be as advantageous to us, as a Hero who defends us: And yet
 +we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the same time
 +praise a gallant Enemy, who is very pernicious to us. Is there nothing in
 +all this but an Opinion of Advantage? [131]
 +39 Again, upon this Scheme what could a Statue or Panegyrick ef-
 +fect? — Men love Praise — They will do the Actions which they observe
 +to be praised — Praise, with Men who have no other Idea of Good but
 +Self-Interest, is the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as
 +useful to them — Regulus, or Cato, or Decius, v '" had no Advantage by
 +the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves
 +could not admire them, however the Persons who reap’d the Advantage
 +* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d Edition.
 +vii. Hutcheson used the third edition of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, London,
 +1724 (ed. E B. Kaye, 2 vols., Oxford, 1924, vol. 2, p. 393); the text is not a quotation
 +but a paraphrase of Mandeville.
 +viii. Marcus Atilius Regulus (consul 267 and 256 b.c.) was a prisoner of the Car-
 +thagenians during the First Punic War and was later O249 b.c.) sent back to Rome
 +in order to negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he advised against it, went back to
 +Carthage, and was murdered cruelly. M. Porcius Cato Uticensis (94-45 b.c.) was an
 +educated stoic and politician. As a republican he was a firm adversary of Caesar; he
 +committed suicide after the battle near Thapsus in Utica (see Cicero’s Cato). Ac-
 +cording to Livy (8, 6-11) P. Decius Mus sacrificed himself in the war against the Latins
 +in 340 b.c. near Capua; see note v above.
 +Not occasion’d
 +by Praise.
 +might praise such Actions. — Regulus or Cato could not possibly praise
 +or love another Hero for a virtuous Action; for this would not gain them
 +the Advantage of Honour; and their own Actions they must have look’d
 +upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas’d, without
 +any thing amiable in them, which they could contemplate or reflect upon
 +with || 40 Pleasure.|| — Now how unlike is this to what the least Obser-
 +vation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?
 +But says* he, “These wondrous cunning Governours made Men be-
 +lieve, by their Statues and Panegyricks, that there was publick Spirit, and
 +that this was in [132] it self Excellent; and hence Men are led to admire
 +it in others, and to imitate it in themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of their
 +own Advantage.” So easy a matter it seems to him, to quit judging of
 +others by what we feel in our selves! — for a Person who is wholly selfish,
 +to imagine others to be publick-spirited! — for one who has no Ideas of
 +Good but in his own Advantage, to be led, by the Persuasions of others,
 +into a Conception of Goodness in what is avowedly detrimental to him-
 +self, and profitable to others; nay so entirely, as not to approve the Action
 +thorowly, but so far as he was conscious that it proceeded from a dis-
 +interested Study of the Good of others! — Yet this it seems Statues and
 +Panegyricks can accomplish!
 +Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce duri!t IX
 +It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own
 +Hearts must decide the Matter, “Whether some moral Actions do not
 +at first View appear amiable, even to those who are unconcern’d in their
 +Influence? || 41a Whether we do not || 42b sincerely b || love a generous kind
 +Friend, or Patriot, whose [133] Actions procure Honour to him only
 +without any Advantage to our selves? -1 j|” It is true, that the Actions which
 +we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It
 +* See the same Author in the Same Place,
 +f Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.
 +ix. Translation: “The olive has no hardness within, the nut has none without.”
 +(Horace, Satires, Epistles, andArsPoetica, with an English translation by H. Rushton
 +Fairclough, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 398.) The correct
 +location of the text is not Ep. 1. Lib. 2, but Ep. 2. Lib. 1. v. 31.
 +would perhaps be useful to the Whole, that all Men agreed in performing
 +such Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the Advantage:
 +But this only proves, that Reason and calm Reflection may recommend
 +to us, from Self-Interest, those Actions, which at first View our moral
 +Sense determines us to admire, without considering this Interest. Nay,
 +our Sense shall operate even where the Advantage to our selves does not
 +hold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against our selves: A
 +condemn’d Traitor may approve the Vigilance of a Cicero in discovering
 +conspiracies, tho it had been for the Traitor’s Advantage, that there never
 +had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may
 +still approve such Conduct as tending to the publick Good, is a J est from
 +one whose only Idea of Good is Self-Interest. Such a Person has no
 +|| 43 Desire|| of publick Good further than it tends to his own Advantage,
 +which it does not at all in the present Case.
 +VII. If what is said makes it appear, that we have some other amiable
 +Idea of Actions than that of Advantageous to our selves, we may con-
 +clude, “That this [134] Perception of moral Good is not deriv’d from
 +Custom, Education, Example, or Study.” These give us no new Ideas:
 +They might make us see || 44 Advantage to our selves || in Actions whose
 +Usefulness did not at first appear; or give us Opinions of some Tendency
 +of Actions to our Detriment, by some nice Deductions of Reason, or by
 +a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View of the Action we should have
 +observ’d no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend
 +Actions as amiable or odious, without any Consideration of our own
 +VIII. It remains then, “That as the Author of Nature has determin’d us
 +to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Ob-
 +jects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive
 +from uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite
 +us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an
 +Argument to us of his Goodness, as the Uniformity it self proves his
 +Existence, whether we had a Sense of Beauty in Uniformity or not: in
 +the same manner he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions,
 +Nor Custom,
 +This Moral
 +Sense does not
 +infer innate
 +Ideas or
 +and to give us still nobler Pleasures; so that while we are only intending
 +the Good of others, we [135] undesignedly promote our own greatest
 +private Good.”
 +We are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, more than the other
 +Senses, supposes any innate Ideas, Knowledge, or practical Proposition:
 +We mean by it only a Determination of our Minds to receive || 45a amiable
 +or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when || 46b they b || occur to our Obser-
 +vation^, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound
 +to our selves from them; even as we are pleas’d with a regular Form, or
 +an harmonious Composition, without having any Knowledge ofMath-
 +ematicks, or seeing any Advantage in that Form, or Composition, dif-
 +ferent from the immediate || 47 Pleasure.|| [136]
 +Concerning the immediate
 +Motive to virtuous Actions.
 +The Motives of human Actions, or their immediate Causes, would be
 +best understood after considering the Passions and Affections; but here
 +we shall only consider the Springs of the Actions which we call virtuous,
 +as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the Moral
 +I. Every Action, which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is
 +always suppos’d to flow from some Affection toward || ! rational Agents ||;
 +and whatever we call Virtue or Vice, is either some such Affection, or
 +some Action consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make
 +an Action, or Omission, appear vitious, if it argues the Want of such
 +Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted
 +morally good. All the Actions counted religious in any Country, are sup-
 +pos’d, by those who count them || 2 so||, to flow from some Affections
 +toward the Deity; and whatever we call social Virtue, we still suppose to
 +flow from [137] Affections toward our Fellow-Creatures: for in this all
 +seem to agree, “That external Motions, when accompany’d with no Af-
 +fections toward God or Man, or evidencing no Want of the expected
 +Affections toward either, can have no moral Good or Evil in them.”
 +3 Ask, for instance, the most abstemious Hermit, if Temperance of it
 +self would be morally good, supposing it shew’d no Obedience toward
 +the Deity, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind,
 +Affections, the
 +Motives to
 +Love of
 +and Hatred of
 +or the Search after Truth, than Luxury; and he will easily grant, that it
 +would be no moral Good, tho still it might be naturally good or advan-
 +tageous to Health: And mere Courage, or Contempt of Danger, if we
 +conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing
 +of Wrongs, || 4 or Self-Interest, || wou’d only entitle its Possessor to Bed-
 +lam. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir’d, it is upon some
 +secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the use of it | [ 5 , or as a natural
 +Ability capable of an useful Application ||. Prudence, if it || 6 was|| only
 +employ’d in promoting private Interest, is never imagin’d to be a Virtue:
 +and Justice, or observing a strict Equality, if it has no regard to the Good
 +of Mankind, the Preservation of Rights, and securing Peace, is a Quality
 +properer [138] for its ordinary Gestamen, a Beam and Scales, than for a
 +rational Agent. So that these four Qualitys, commonly call’d Cardinal
 +Virtues, obtain that Name, because they are Dispositions universally
 +necessary to promote publick Good, and denote Affections toward ra-
 +tional Agents; otherwise there would appear no Virtue in them.
 +II. Now if it can be made appear, that none of these Affections which
 +we |[ 7 call virtuous, spring from|| Self-love, or Desire of private Interest;
 +since all Virtue is either some such Affections, or Actions consequent
 +upon them; it must necessarily follow, “|| 8 That Virtue is not pursued
 +from the Interest or Self-love of the Pursuer, or any Motives of his own
 +The Affections which are of most Importance in Morals, 1 1 9 are Love
 +and Hatred: All the rest seem but different Modifications of these two
 +original Affections||. Now in discoursing of Love || 10 toward rational
 +Agents ||, we need not be caution’d not to include that Love between the
 +Sexes, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only Desire of
 +Pleasure, and is never counted a Virtue. Love toward rational Agents, is
 +subdivided into Love of Complacence or Esteem, and Love of Be-
 +[i39]nevolence: And Hatred is subdivided into Hatred of Displicence or
 +Contempt, and Hatred of || 11 Malice. || Concerning each of these sepa-
 +rately we shall consider, “Whether they can be influenc’d by Motives of
 +|| 12 Love of 1 1 Complacence, Esteem, or Good-liking, at first view ap-
 +pears to be disinterested, and so || 13 the Hatred of || Displicence or Dis-
 +like; and are entirely excited by some moral Qualitys, Good or Evil, ap-
 +prehended to be in the Objects; which Qualitys the very Frame of our
 +Nature determines us || 14 to love or hate,|| to approve or disapprove, ac-
 +cording to the moral Sense* above explain’d. Propose to a Man all the
 +Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him
 +to || 15 love with || Esteem, and Complacence, || 16 a third || Person entirely
 +unknown, or if known, apprehended to be cruel, treacherous, ungrate-
 +ful; you may procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Dis-
 +simulation || 17 of Love||; but real || 18 Love of || Esteem no Price can pur-
 +chase. And the same is obvious as to || 19 Hatred of || Contempt, which
 +no Motive of Advantage can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Char-
 +acter as generous, kind, faithful, humane, tho in the most distant Parts
 +of the World, and we cannot avoid || 20 loving it with 1 1 Es-[i4o]teem, and
 +Complacence. A Bribe may || 21 possibly || make us attempt to ruin such
 +a Man, or some strong Motive of Advantage may excite us to oppose his
 +Interest; but it can never make us || 22 hate|| him, while we || 23 apprehend
 +him as morally excellent ||. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we
 +shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade our selves to attempt any
 +Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of Advantage, nor exe-
 +cute it, without the strongest Reluctance, and Remorse, until we have
 +blinded our selves into a || 24 bad Opinion of the Person in amoral Sense ||.
 +III. As to the Love of Benevolence, the very Name excludes Self-Interest.
 +We never call that Man benevolent, who is in fact useful to others, but
 +at the same time only intends his own Interest, without any || 25 desire of,
 +or delight in, || the Good of others. If there be any || 26 Benevolence || at
 +all, it must be disinterested; for the most useful Action imaginable, loses
 +all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that it only flowed
 +from Self-Love or Interest. Thus, never were any human Actions more
 +advantageous, than the Inventions of Fire, and Iron; but if these were
 +Are entirely
 +and Malice,
 +See Sect. i.
 +join’d with
 +Cause of
 +casual, or if the Inventor only intended his own Interest in them, there
 +is nothing which can be call’d Benevolent in them. Wherever then Be-
 +nevolence is suppos’d, there it is [141] imagin’d disinterested, and de-
 +sign’d for the Good of || 27 others.||
 +But it must be here observ’d, That as all Men have Self-Love, as well
 +as Benevolence, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the
 +same Action; and then they are to be consider’d as two Forces impelling
 +the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are in-
 +different to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite.
 +Thus, if a Man have such strong Benevolence, as would have produc’d
 +an Action without any Views of Self-Interest; that such a Man has also
 +in View private Advantage, along with publick Good, as the Effect of
 +his Action, does no way diminish the Benevolence of the Action. When
 +he would not have produc’d so much publick Good, had it not been for
 +Prospect of Self-Interest, then the Effect of Self-Love is to be deducted,
 +and his Benevolence is proportion’d to the remainder of Good, which
 +pure Benevolence would have produc’d. When a Man’s Benevolence is
 +hurtful to himself, then Self-Love is opposite to Benevolence, and the
 +Benevolence is proportion’d to the Sum of the Good produc’d, added
 +to the Resistance of Self-Love surmounted by it. In most Cases it is im-
 +possible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc’d by the
 +one or other of these Principles; but yet the [142] general Truth is suf-
 +ficiently certain, That this is the way in which the Benevolence of Actions
 +is to be computed. || 28 Since then, no Love to rational Agents can proceed
 +from Self-Interest, every Action must be disinterested, as far as it flows
 +from Love to rational Agents. ||
 +|| 29 If any enquire, “Whence arises this Love of Esteem, or Benevo-
 +lence, to good Men, or to Mankind in general, if not from some nice
 +Views of Self-Interest? Or, how we can be mov’d to desire the Happiness
 +of others, without any View to our own?” It may be answer’d, “That the
 +same Cause which determines us to pursue Happiness for our selves,
 +determines us both to Esteem and Benevolence on their proper Occa-
 +sions; even the very Frame of our Nature, or a generous Instinct, which
 +shall be afterwards explain’d.”
 +IV. Here we may observe, That as Love of Esteem and Complacence is
 +always join’d with Benevolence, where there is no strong Opposition of
 +Interest; so Benevolence seems to presuppose some small degree of Es-
 +teem, not indeed of actual good Qualitys; for there may be strong Be-
 +nevolence, where there is the Hatred of Contempt for actual Vices; as a
 +Parent may have great Benevolence to a most abandon’d [143] Child,
 +whose Manners he hates with the greatest Displicence: but Benevolence
 +supposes a Being capable of Virtue. We judge of other rational Agents
 +by our selves. The human Nature is a lovely Form; we are all conscious
 +of some morally good Qualitys and Inclinations in our selves, how partial
 +and imperfect soever they may be: we presume the same of every thing
 +in human Form, nay almost of every living Creature: so that by this
 +suppos’d remote Capacity of Virtue, there may be some small degree of
 +Esteem along with our Benevolence, even when they incur our greatest
 +Displeasure by their Conduct. ||
 +|| 30 As to Malice, || Human Nature seems scarce capable of malicious
 +disinterested Hatred, or a sedate || 31 Delight in || the Misery of others,
 +when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our In-
 +terest: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose those whose Interests
 +are opposite to ours, it is only the Effect of Self-Love, and not of dis-
 +interested Malice. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations
 +of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as absolutely
 +Evil; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences
 +of disinterested Malice: but as soon as we reflect upon human Nature,
 +and [144] form just Conceptions, this unnatural Passion is allay’d, and
 +only Self-Love remains, which may make us, from Self-Interest, oppose
 +our Adversarys.
 +Every one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our Pirates; and
 +yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate
 +Island, and that we were assur’d some Fate would confine them there
 +perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more. Now let us
 +calmly reflect that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel,
 +may be happy, and joyful, or may be involv’d in Misery, Sorrow, and
 +Pain; that they may return to a State of Love, Humanity, Kindness, and
 +incapable of
 +sedate Malice.
 +become Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents, with all the sweet Sen-
 +timents which accompany these Relations: then let us ask our selves,
 +when Self-Love or regard to the Safety of better Men, no longer makes
 +us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them, under
 +the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injurys done to us or our
 +Friends, as utterly incapable of any good moral Quality; whether we
 +would wish them the Fate of Cadmus’s Army, 1 by plunging their Swords
 +in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or
 +rather that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, [145]
 +become Kind, Compassionate, and Friendly; contrive Laws, Constitu-
 +tions, Governments, Propertys; and form an honest happy Society, with
 +Marriages, and
 +Relations dear, and all the Charities
 +Of Father, Son, and Brother *
 +I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding
 +our present just Abhorrence of them from Self-Interest, or publick Love
 +and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos’d to
 +their Fury Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever have any
 +sedate Malice against any Person, or || 32 delight in || his Misery. Our
 +|| 33 Hatred || is only from Opposition of Interest; or if we can entertain
 +sedate Malice, it must be toward a Character apprehended necessarily
 +and unalterably Evil in a moral Sense; such as a sudden Passion some-
 +times represents our Enemies to us: and perhaps no such Being occurs
 +to us among the Works of a good Deity.
 +V. || 34 Having|| offer’d what may perhaps prove, That [| 35 our Love either
 +of Esteem, or Benevolence, is not founded on Self-Love||, or views of
 +Interest; let us see “if some other Affections, in which Virtue may be
 +plac’d, do arise from Self-[i46]Love;” such as Fear, or Reverence, arising
 +i. On Athene’s advice Cadmus sowed the teeth of a dragon he had killed. Out of
 +these teeth grew an army, most of which killed each other (except for the five Spartoi,
 +the progenitors of the Thebans).
 +* Milt. Par. Lost. B. iv. v. 756.
 +from an Apprehension of Goodness, Power, and Jusdce. For no body
 +apprehends any Virtue in base Dread and Servitude toward a powerful
 +Evil Being: This is indeed the meanest Selfishness. Now the same Ar-
 +guments which prove || 36 Love of || Esteem to be disinterested, will prove
 +this honourable Reverence to be so too; for it plainly arises from an Ap-
 +prehension of amiable Qualitys in the Person, and Love toward him,
 +which raises an Abhorrence of offending him. Could we reverence a Be-
 +ing because it was our Interest to do so, a third Person might bribe us
 +into Reverence toward a Being neither Good, nor Powerful, which every
 +one sees to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be common to all other
 +Passions, which have || 37 rational Agents for their Objects |[.
 +38 VI. There is one Objection against disinterested || 39 Love||, which oc-
 +curs from considering, “That nothing so effectually excites our Love to-
 +ward rational Agents, as their Beneficence || 40 to us||; whence we are led
 +to imagine, that our Love of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows
 +intirely from Self-Interest.” But let us here examine our selves more nar-
 +rowly. Do we only || 41 love|| the Beneficent, because it is our Interest to
 +|| 42 love them 1 1? Or do we chuse to love them, because our love is the
 +[147] means of procuring their Bounty? If it be so, then we could indif-
 +ferently love any Character, even to obtain the Bounty of a third Person;
 +or we could be brib’d by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heart-
 +ily, as we may be brib’d to external Offices: Now this is plainly impos-
 +|| 43 But further||, is not our || 44 Love always|| the Consequent of
 +Bounty, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequi-
 +ousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of Beneficence; but
 +real Love always presupposes it, and | ] 45 shall 1 1 necessarily arise even when
 +we expect no more, from consideration of past Benefits. 46 Or can any
 +one say he only loves the Beneficent, as he does a Lield or Garden, be-
 +cause of its Advantage? His Love then must cease toward one who has
 +ruin’d himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as
 +we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless
 +a Poetical Prosopopoeia animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude,
 +which is indeed pretty common. || 47 And then again, our Love would be
 +from Religion.
 +the same towards the worst Characters that ’tis towards the best, if they
 +were equally bountiful to us, which is also false. Beneficence then must
 +raise our Love as it is an amiable moral Quality ||: and hence we love even
 +those who are beneficent to others. [148]
 +|| 48 It may be further alledg’d, “That Bounty toward our selves is a
 +stronger Incitement to Love, than equal Bounty toward others.” This is
 +true for a Reason to be offer’d below:* but it does not prove, that in this
 +Case our Love of Persons is from Views of Interest; since this Love is not
 +prior to the Bounty, as the means to procure it, but subsequent upon it,
 +even when we expect no more.|| In the Benefits which we receive our
 +selves, we are more fully sensible of their Value, and of the Circumstances
 +of the Action [ | 49 , 1 1 which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the Do-
 +nor; and || 50 from|| the good Opinion we have of our selves, || 51 we are
 +apt to|| look upon the Kindness as better employ’d, than when it is be-
 +stow’d on others, of whom perhaps we have less favourable Sentiments.
 +It is however sufficient to remove the Objection, that Bounty from a
 +Donor apprehended as morally Evil, or extorted by Force, or conferr’d
 +with some View of Self-Interest, will not procure real || 52 Love||; nay, it
 +may raise Indignation, if we suspect Dissimulation of Love, or a Design
 +to allure us into any thing Dishonourable: whereas wisely employ’d
 +Bounty is always approv’d, and gains love to the Author from all who
 +hear of it. [149]
 +If then no || 53 Love|| toward Persons be influenc’d by Self-Love, or
 +Views of Interest, and all Virtue flows from || 54 Love|| toward Persons,
 +or some other Affection equally disinterested; it remains, “That there
 +must be some other 1 1 55 Motive || than Self-Love, or Interest, which excites
 +us to the Actions we call Virtuous.”
 +1 1 56 VII. There may perhaps still remain another Suspicion of Self-
 +Interest in our Prosecution of Virtue, arising from this, “That the whole
 +Race of Mankind seems persuaded of the Existence of an Almighty Be-
 +ing, who will certainly secure Happiness either now, or hereafter, to those
 +See Sect. v. Art. 2.
 +who are Virtuous, according to their several Notions of Virtue in various
 +Places: and upon this Persuasion, Virtue may in all Cases be pursu’d
 +from Views* of Interest.” Here again we might appeal to all Mankind,
 +whether there be no Benevolence but what flows from a View of Reward
 +from the Deity? Nay, do we not see a great deal of it among those who
 +entertain few if any Thoughts of Devotion at all? Not to say that this
 +Benevolence scarce deserves the Name, when we desire not, nor delight
 +in the Good of others, further than it serves our own Ends.|| [150]
 +|| 58 But if we have no other Idea of Good, than Advantage to our
 +selves||, we must imagine that every rational Being || 59 acts only || for its
 +own Advantage; and however we may call a beneficent Being, a good
 +Being, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon this Scheme || 60 we
 +should not be apt to think|| there is any beneficent Being in Nature, or
 +a Being who acts for the Good of others. Particularly, if there is no Sense
 +of Excellence in publick Love, and promoting the Happiness of others,
 +whence should this Persuasion arise, “That the Deity will make the Vir-
 +tuous happy?” Can we prove that it is for the Advantage of the Deity to
 +do so? This I fancy will be look’d upon as very absurd, || 61 unless we
 +suppose some beneficent Dispositions essential to the Deity, which de-
 +termine him to consult the publick Good of his Creatures, and reward
 +such as co-operate with his kind Intention ||. And if there be such Dis-
 +positions in the Deity, where is the impossibility of some small degree
 +of this publick Love in his Creatures? And why must they be suppos’d
 +incapable of acting but from Self-Love?
 +62 In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in
 +rational Agents than Self-Love, I see no Loundation to expect Benefi-
 +cence, or Rewards [151] from God, or Man, further than it is the Interest
 +of the Benefactor; and all Expectation of Benefits from a Being whose
 +Interests are independent on us, must be perfectly ridiculous. What
 +should engage the Deity to reward Virtue? Virtue is commonly suppos’d,
 +upon this Scheme, to be only a consulting our own Happiness in the
 +most artful way, consistently with the Good of the Whole; and in Vice
 +the same thing is foolishly pursu’d, in a manner which will not so prob-
 +* See above Sect. i. Art. 5. Par. || 57 4||.
 +ably succeed, and which is contrary to the Good of the Whole. But how
 +is the Deity concern’d in this Whole, if every Agent always acts from
 +Self-Love? And what Ground have we, from the Idea of 1 1 63 a God it self 1 1,
 +to believe the Deity is good in the Christian Sense, that is, studious of
 +the Good of his Creatures? Perhaps the Misery of || 64 his|| Creatures may
 +1 1 65 give him as much|| Pleasure, as their Happiness: And who can find
 +fault, or blame such a Being to study their Misery; for what else should
 +we expect? A Manichean 11 Evil God, is a Notion which Men would as
 +readily run into, as that of a Good one, if there is no Excellence in dis-
 +interested Love, and no Being acts but for its own Advantage; unless we
 +prov’d that the Happiness of Creatures was advantageous to the Deity.
 +|| 66a VIII. The last, and only remaining Objection against what has been
 +said, is this, “That Virtue perhaps is pursu’d because of the concomitant
 +Pleasure.” To which we may answer, first, by observing, that this plainly
 +supposes a Sense ofVirtue antecedent to Ideas of Advantage, upon which
 +this Advantage is founded; and that from the very Frame of our Nature
 +we are determin’d to perceive Pleasure in the practice ofVirtue, and to
 +approve it when practis’d by our selves, or others.
 +67b But further, may we not j ustly question, whether all Virtue is pleas-
 +ant? Or, whether we are not determin’d to some amiable Actions in
 +which we find no Pleasure? ’Tis true, all the Passions, and Affections
 +justify themselves; or, we approve our being affected in a certain manner
 +on certain Occasions, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected.
 +So the Sorrowful, the Angry, the Jealous, the Compassionate, think it
 +reasonable they should be so upon the several Occasions which move
 +ii. Manicheanism, named after its Persian founder Mani (209—76?), was a religion
 +of later antiquity, whose syncretic system contained Zoroastrian and Gnostic doc-
 +trines. Hutcheson refers to the Manichean dualism: evil and the demons of matter
 +(hyle) control the present material world and constantly struggle against the powers
 +of light; the human soul, imprisoned in the body, is part of the good god. In Free
 +Thoughts on Religion, the Church and National Fhappiness, 2nd edition, London, 1729
 +(1st edition 1720), pp. 103 ff., Mandeville gives a favorable description of Manichean-
 +these Passions; but we should not therefore say that Sorrow, Anger, Jeal-
 +ousy, or Pity are pleasant, and that we chuse to be in these Passions be-
 +cause of the concomitant Pleasure. The matter is plainly this. The Frame
 +of our Nature, on such Occasions as move these Passions, determines us
 +to be thus [153] affected, and to approve our being so: Nay, we dislike
 +any Person who is not thus affected upon such occasions, notwithstand-
 +ing the uneasiness of these Passions. || 68c This c || uneasiness determines us
 +to endeavour an Alteration in the state of the Object; but not otherwise
 +to remove the painful Affection, while the occasion is unalter’d: which
 +shews that these || 69d Affections are neither chosen for their concomitant
 +Pleasure, nor voluntarily brought upon our selves with a view to private
 +Good d ||. The Actions which these Passions move us to, || 70e tend gener-
 +ally e || to remove the uneasy Passion by altering the state of the Object;
 +but the |[ 7U Removal of our Pain is seldom directly intended in the uneasy
 +Benevolent Passions: nor is the Alteration intended in the State of the
 +Objects by such Passions, imagin’d to be a private Good to the Agent,
 +as it always is in the selfish Passions. If our sole Intention, in Compassion
 +or Pity, was the Removal of our Pain, f || we should run away, shut our
 +Eyes, divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, to avoid the Pain
 +of Compassion, which we seldom do: nay, we croud about such Objects,
 +and voluntarily || 72s expose our selves to s |] Pain, unless Reason, and Re-
 +flection upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our
 +Inclination; or some selfish Affection, as fear of Danger, overbalances
 +it- [154]
 +N ow there are several morally amiable Actions, which flow from these
 +Passions which are so uneasy; such as Attempts of relieving the Dis-
 +tress’d, of defending the Injur’d, of repairing of Wrongs done by our-
 +selves. These Actions are often accompany’d with no Pleasure in the
 +mean time, nor have they any subsequent Pleasure, except as they are
 +successful; unless it be that which may arise from calm Reflection, when
 +the Passion is over, upon our having been in a Disposition, which to our
 +moral Sense appears lovely and good: but this Pleasure is never intended
 +in the Fleat of Action, nor is it any Motive exciting to it.
 +Besides, In the pleasant Passions, we do not love, because it is pleasant
 +to love; we do not chuse this State, because it is an advantageous, or
 +The true
 +Spring of
 +pleasant State: This Passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper Ob-
 +ject, a morally good Character. And if we could love, whenever we see
 +it would be our Interest to love, Love could be brib’d by a third Person;
 +and we could never love Persons in Distress, for then our Love gives us
 +Pain. The same Observation may be extended to all the other Affections
 +from which Virtue is suppos’d to flow: And from the whole we may
 +conclude, “That the virtuous Agent [155] is never apprehended by us as
 +acting only from Views of his own Interest, but as principally influenc’d
 +by some other Motive. ” a ||
 +73 IX. Having remov’d these false Springs of virtuous Actions, let us next
 +establish the true one, viz. some Determination of our Nature to study
 +the Good of others; or some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from
 +Interest, which influences us to the Love of others; even as the moral
 +Sense,* above explain’d, determines us to approve the Actions which
 +flow from this Love in our selves or others. This disinterested Affection,
 +may appear strange to Men impress’d with Notions of Self-Love, as the
 +sole || 74 Motive|| of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems,
 +and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its stron-
 +gest, and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these
 +Instances, we may easily discover its universal Extent.
 +An honest Farmer will tell you, that he studies the Preservation and
 +Happiness of his Children, and loves them without any design of Good
 +to himself. But say some of our Philosophers," 1 “The Happiness of [156]
 +their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery gives them Pain;
 +and therefore to obtain the former, and avoid the latter, they study, from
 +Self-Love, the Good of their Children.” Suppose several Merchants
 +join’d in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them is employ’d
 +abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions
 +Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain || 75 from|| their Share in the
 +Loss: is this then the same Kind of Affection with that of Parents to their
 +Children? Is there the same tender, personal Regard? I fancy no Parent
 +* See Sect. i.
 +iii. For example, Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 75.
 +will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of
 +Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the Parent and
 +Child? Do the Child’s Sensations give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent? Is
 +the Parent hungry, thirsty, sick, when the Child is so? || 76 “No, but his
 +Love to the Child makes him affected with his Pleasures or Pains. ” This
 +Love|| then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest, and the Cause
 +of it, not the Effect: || 77 this Love|| then must be disinterested. “No,
 +|| 78 says another Sophist||, Children are Parts of our selves, and in loving
 +them we but love our selves in them.” A very good Answer! Let us carry
 +it as far as it will go. How are they Parts of our selves? Not as a Leg or
 +an Arm: We are not conscious of their Sensations. “But their [157] Bodys
 +were form’d from Parts of ours.” So is a Fly, or a Maggot which may
 +breed in any discharg’d Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely!
 +There must be something else then which makes Children Parts of our
 +selves; and what is this but that Affection which Nature determines us
 +to have toward them? This Love makes them Parts of our selves, and
 +therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good
 +Metaphor; and wherever we find a Determination among several ra-
 +tional Agents to mutual Love, let each Individual be look’d upon as a
 +Part of a great Whole, or System, and concern himself in the publick
 +Good of 1 1 79 it. 1 1
 +80 But a later Author observes,*" “That natural Affection in Parents
 +is weak, till the Children begin to give Evidences of Knowledge and Af-
 +fections.” Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet I
 +could wish for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alledges
 +was true; as I fancy it is || 81 in some measure, tho we may find in some
 +Parents an Affection toward Idiots ||. The observing of Understanding
 +and Affections in Children, which make them appear moral Agents, can
 +increase Love toward them without prospect of Interest; for I hope this
 +[158] Increase of Love, is not from Prospect of Advantage from the
 +Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are still toiling,
 +and never intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens’d for their
 +* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 68, 3d Ed.
 +iv. Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 75.
 +Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. If then the observing a moral
 +Capacity can be the occasion of increasing Love without Self-Interest,
 +even from the Frame of our Nature; pray, may not this be a Foundation
 +of weaker degrees of Love where there is no preceding tie of Parentage,
 +and extend it to all Mankind?
 +82 X. And that this is so in fact, will appear by considering some more
 +distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps
 +we have receiv’d no good Offices, form’d into Friendships, Familys,
 +Partnerships, and with Fionesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray
 +ask any Mortal if he would not || 83 be better pleas’d with|| their Pros-
 +perity, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than
 +with their Misery, and Ruin; and you shall find a Bond of Benevolence
 +further extended than a Family and Children, altho the Ties are not so
 +strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his native Country,
 +and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any
 +View of returning; and only [159] imagine he had receiv’d no Injurys
 +from his Country: ask such a Man, || 84 would it give him no Pleasure to
 +hear of the Prosperity of his Country||? Or could he, now that his In-
 +terests are separated from that of his Nation, as || 85 gladly hear || that it
 +was laid waste by Tyranny or a foreign Power? I fancy his Answer would
 +shew us a Benevolence extended beyond Neighbourhoods or Acquain-
 +tances. Let a Man of a compos’d Temper, out of the hurry of his private
 +Affairs, only read of the Constitution of a foreign Country, even in the
 +most distant parts of the Earth, and observe Art, Design, and a Study
 +of publick Good in the Laws of this Association; and he shall find his
 +Mind mov’d in their favour; he shall be contriving Rectifications and
 +Amendments in their Constitution, and regret any unlucky part of it
 +which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall bewail any Disaster
 +which befalls them, and accompany all their Fortunes with the Affec-
 +tions of a Friend. Now this proves Benevolence to be in some degree
 +extended to all Mankind, where there is no interfering Interest, which
 +from Self-Love may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of rational
 +Agents, capable of moral Affections, in the most distant Planets/ our
 +v. Travels to moons and planets were a popular literary subject during the sev-
 +enteenth and eighteenth centuries. The most famous was Cyrano de Bergerac, His-
 +good Wishes would sail attend them, and we should || 86 delight in || their
 +|| 87 Happiness.|| [160]
 +88 XI. Here we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call
 +national Love, or Love of one’s native Country. Whatever place we have
 +liv’d in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark’d
 +the various Affections of human Nature; we have known many lovely
 +Characters; we remember the Associations, Friendships, Familys, nat-
 +ural Affections, and other human Sentiments: our moral Sense deter-
 +mines us to approve these lovely Dispositions where we have most dis-
 +tinctly observ’d them; and our Benevolence concerns us in the Interests
 +of the Persons possess’d of them. When we come to observe the like as
 +distinctly in another Country, we begin to acquire a national Love to-
 +ward it also; nor has our own Country any other preference in our Idea,
 +unless it be by an Association of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with
 +the Buildings, Fields, and Woods where we receiv’d them. This may let
 +us see, how Tyranny, Faction, a Neglect of Justice, a Corruption ofMan-
 +ners, || 89 and|| any thing which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, de-
 +stroys this national Love, and the dear Idea of a Country.
 +We ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that apparent want
 +of natural Affection among collateral Rela-[i6i]tions, is, that these nat-
 +ural Inclinations, in many Cases, are overpower’d by Self-Love, where
 +there happens any Opposition of Interests; but where this does not hap-
 +pen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, [ | 90 tho 1 1 with different
 +degrees of Strength, according to the nearer or more remote Relations
 +they stand in to each other; and according as the natural Affection of
 +Benevolence is join’d with and strengthen’d by Esteem, Gratitude,
 +Compassion, or other kind Affections; or on the contrary, weaken’d by
 +Displicence, Anger, or Envy. [162]
 +National Love.
 +The Reason
 +why natural
 +Affections do
 +not always
 +toire comique des etats et empires de la lune, Paris, 1657, translated as Selenarbia, or the
 +Government of the World in the Moon, a Comical History, by Sir Thomas St. Serfe,
 +London, 1659. Other examples include David Russen, Iter Lunare: or, a Voyage to the
 +Moon, London, 1705, and Daniel Defoe, The Consolidator, or, Memoirs of Sundry
 +Transactions from the World in the Moon, London, 1705. Of major importance for
 +scientific speculation was Bernard de Bouvier de Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la pluralite
 +des mondes, Paris, 1686; there were several contemporary English translations.
 +All Virtue
 +The Sense of Virtue, and the various
 +Opinions about it, reducible to one general
 +Foundation. The Manner of computing the
 +Morality of Actions.
 +I. If we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable any where,
 +and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv’d, we shall
 +find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they H 1 al-
 +ways || appear as Benevolent, or flowing from || 2 Love of others ||, and a
 +Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons
 +belov’d, or profited, or not; so that all those kind Affections which in-
 +cline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos’d to flow from
 +such Affections, appear morally Good, if while they are benevolent to-
 +ward some Persons, they be not pernicious to others. Nor shall we find
 +any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no Benev-
 +olence imagin’d; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not sup-
 +pos’d applicable to, and design’d for benevolent Purposes. Nay, as was
 +before observ’d,* [163] the Actions which in fact are exceedingly useful,
 +shall appear void of moral Beauty, if we know they proceeded from no
 +kind Intentions toward others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kind-
 +ness, or of promoting publick Good, shall appear as amiable as the most
 +successful, if it flow’d from as strong Benevolence.
 +* See Sect. ii. Art. 3. Par. 1. Art. || 3 6. Par. z|||.
 +ii 7
 +II. Hence those Affections which would lead us to do good to our Ben-
 +efactor, shall appear amiable, and the contrary Affections odious, even
 +when our Actions cannot possibly be of any advantage or hurt to him.
 +Thus a sincere Love and Gratitude toward our Benefactor, a chearful
 +Readiness to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, a
 +hearty Inclination to comply with his Intentions, and Contentment with
 +the State he has plac’d us in, are the strongest Evidences of Benevolence
 +we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceed-
 +ingly amiable. And under these is included all the rational Devotion, or
 +Religion toward a Deity apprehended as Good, which we can possibly
 +4 We may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the Frame of
 +our Nature, which is wonderfully adapted to promote Benevolence, viz.
 +that as a Benefit conferr’d necessarily raises Gratitude in the [164] || 5 Per-
 +son who receives it||, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the
 +meanest of Mankind, are wonderfully delightful to the Benefactor.
 +Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful
 +Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not
 +rather chuse to be || 6 lov’d||, than hated, if their Love no way evidenc’d
 +us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern’d in their Meanness. And
 +thus the most abject || 7 Person oblig’d || is capable, and inclin’d to make
 +no small addition to our Happiness by his Love, and Gratitude, when
 +he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none
 +from him: Thus,
 +A grateful Mind
 +By owing owes not, || s and|| still pays, at once
 +Indebted and discharg’d *
 +As to external Performances of Religion, they are no doubt very vari-
 +ous in different Nations, and Ages; and Education may give Men Opin-
 +ions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the De-
 +ity: but then wherever any external Rite of Worship is approv’d, there
 +also it is look’d upon to proceed from Love toward the Deity, or some
 +Par. Lost, B. iv. 1 . 55.
 +other Affec- [165] tion necessarily join’d with Love, as Reverence, Repen-
 +tance, or Sorrow to have offended. So that the general Principle of Love,
 +is the Foundation of all the apparent moral Excellence, even in the most
 +fantastick Rites of Worship which were ever approv’d. For as to Rites
 +design’d only to appease a furious Being, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends
 +there is any Virtue, or Excellence in them; but that they are chosen only
 +as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are
 +various || 9 speculative|| Opinions about what is acceptable to the Deity,
 +it necessarily follows, “That, accordingly, Practices, and Approbation,
 +must be various; tho all the moral Goodness of Actions is still presum’d
 +to flow from Love.”
 +Social Virtues. III. Again, that we may see how || 10 Love, or || Benevolence, is the Foun-
 +dation of all apprehended Excellence in social Virtues, let us only ob-
 +serve, That amidst the diversity of Sentiments on this Head among vari-
 +ous Sects, this is still allow’d to be the way of deciding the Controversy
 +about any disputed Practice, viz. to enquire whether this Conduct, or
 +the contrary, will most effectually promote the publick Good. The Mo-
 +rality is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence
 +of the Action upon the universal natural Good of Mankind is agreed
 +upon. That which pro- [166] duces more Good than Evil in the Whole,
 +is acknowledg’d Good; and what does not, is counted Evil. In this Case,
 +we no other way regard the good of the Actor, or that of those who are
 +thus enquiring, than as they make a Part of the great System.
 +In our late Debates about Passive Obedience, and the Right of Re-
 +sistance in Defence of Privileges, 1 the Point disputed among Men of
 +Sense was, “whether universal Submission would probably be attended
 +with greater natural Evils, than temporary Insurrections, when Privileges
 +are invaded; and not whether what tended in the Whole to the publick
 +natural Good, was also morally Good?” And if a divine Command was
 +alledg’d in favour of the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, this would, no
 +i. George Berkeley’s Passive Obedience (1712) was criticized by the Molesworth
 +circle. See The Works of George Berkeley, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E.Jessop, London,
 +1:953, v °f 4 > PP- 17-46, and the editors’ introduction, pp. 3-11.
 +doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the ballance of natural Good to its
 +own side, and determine our Election from Interest; and yet our Sense
 +of the moral Good in Passive Obedience, would still be founded upon
 +some Species of Benevolence, such as Gratitude toward the Deity, and
 +Submission to his Will to whom we are so much oblig’d. But I fancy
 +those, who believe the Deity to be Good, would not rashly alledge such
 +a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did
 +tend more to the universal Good, than the contrary, either by prevent-
 +[167] ing the external Evils of Civil War, or by enuring Men to Patience,
 +or some other Quality which they apprehended necessary to their ever-
 +lasting Happiness. And were it not so, Passive Obedience might be rec-
 +ommended as an inglorious Method of escaping a greater Mischief, but
 +could never have any thing morally amiable in it.
 +But let us quit the Disputes of the Learned, on whom, it may be al-
 +ledg’d, Custom and Education have a powerful Influence; and consider
 +upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are approv’d or con-
 +demn’d, vindicated or excus’d. We are universally asham’d to say an Ac-
 +tion is Just, because it tends to my Advantage, or to the Advantage of
 +the Actor: And we as seldom condemn a beneficent kind Action, because
 +it is not advantageous to us, or to the Actor. Blame, and Censure, are
 +founded on a Tendency to publick Evil, or a Principle of private Malice
 +in the Agent, or Neglect at least of the Good of others; on Inhumanity
 +of Temper, or at least such strong Selfishness as makes the Agent careless
 +of the Sufferings of others: and thus we blame and censure when the
 +Action no way affects our selves. All the moving and persuasive Vindi-
 +cations of Actions, which may, from some partial evil Tendency, appear
 +evil, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some [168] greater
 +Good which counterballanc’d the Evil: “Severity toward a few, is Com-
 +passion toward multitudes. — Transitory Punishments are necessary for
 +avoiding more durable Evils. — Did not some suffer on such Occasions,
 +there would be no living for honest Men.” — and such like. And even
 +when an Action cannot be entirely justify’d, yet how greatly is the Guilt
 +extenuated, if we can alledge; “That it was only the Effect of Inadvertence
 +without Malice, or of partial good Nature, Friendship, Compassion,
 +natural Affection, or Love of a Party?” All these Considerations shew
 +Moral Evil not
 +always Malice.
 +what is the universal Foundation of our Sense of moral Good, or Evil,
 +viz. Benevolence toward others on || n one|| hand, and Malice, or even
 +Indolence, and Unconcernedness about the || 12 apparent || publick Evil
 +on the other. And let it be here observ’d, that we are so far from imagining
 +all Men to act only from Self-Love, that we universally expect in others
 +a Regard for the Publick; and do not look upon the want of this, as barely
 +the absence of moral Good, or Virtue, but even as positively evil and
 +IV. Contrarys may illustrate each other; let us therefore observe the gen-
 +eral Foundation of our Sense of moral Evil more particularly. Disinter-
 +ested Malice, or || 13 Delight in 1 1 the Misery of others, is the [169] highest
 +pitch of what we count vitious; and every Action appears evil, which is
 +imagin’d to flow from any degree of this Affection. Perhaps a violent
 +Passion may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our rash angry
 +Sentiments of our Enemys, may represent them as having such odious
 +Dispositions; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer’d above,*
 +that there is no such degree of Wickedness in human Nature, as in cold
 +blood, to || I4 be pleas’d with 1 1 the Misery of others, when it is conceiv’d
 +no way useful to our Interests.
 +|| 15 The Story of Nero and Paetus' 1 may be alledg’d against this, but
 +perhaps unjustly, even allowing the Fact to be true. Nero was conscious
 +he was hated by those whom the World call’d good Men, and that they
 +were dangerous to him; he fancy’d his best Security lay in being terrible,
 +and appearing such on all Occasions, by making others miserable when
 +he pleas’d, to let his Enemys see, that they should have no Security from
 +that Compassion which a Nero would imagine argu’d Weakness. This
 +unfortunate Gentleman’s Happiness might by some foolish Courtier be
 +so related, as to carry a Reproof of the Tyrant’s unnatural Pursuits,
 +whereby his Passion might be excited to cut off the Per- [170] son admir’d,
 +* See Sect. ii. Art. 4.
 +ii. Thrasea Paetus, a stoic of republican attitude, who had written a biography of
 +Cato with a clear bias against Caesar, was accused of high treason by Nero and com-
 +mitted suicide after his conviction a.d. 66.
 +and prefer’d before him. Any of these Motives of apparent Interest seem
 +more probably to have influenc’d him, than that we should in him, and
 +a few others, suppose || a Principle of calm Malice without Interest, of
 +which the rest of Mankind seem entirely incapable.
 +The Temper of a Tyrant seems probably to be a continu’d state of
 +Anger, Hatred, and Fear. To form our Judgment then of his Motives
 +of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us
 +reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under
 +any of those Passions which to the Tyrant are habitual. When we are
 +under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we plainly find, that our Minds
 +are wholly fill’d with Apprehensions of the Person who injur’d us, as if
 +he was absolutely Evil, and delighted in doing Mischief: We overlook
 +the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ’d in him: we forget
 +|| 16 that|| perhaps || 17 only Self-Love, and not Malice, was his Motive; or ||
 +it may be some generous or kind Intention toward others. These, prob-
 +ably, are the Opinions which a Tyrant constantly forms concerning Man-
 +kind; and having very much weaken’d all kind Affections in himself,
 +however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by
 +his own. And were [171] Men really such as he apprehends them, his
 +Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable. We shall generally
 +find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of oth-
 +ers: if || 18 these be || rashly form’d upon some sudden slight Views, it is
 +no wonder if we find Dispositions following upon them, very little suited
 +to the real State of human Nature.
 +The ordinary || 19 Springs|| of Vice then among Men, must be a mis-
 +taken Self-Love, made 1 1 20 so || violent || 21 , || as to overcome Benevolence; 22
 +or Affections arising from false, and rashly form’d Opinions ofMankind,
 +which we run into thro the weakness of our Benevolence. When Men,
 +who had good Opinions of each other, happen to have contrary Interests,
 +they are apt to have their good Opinions of each other abated, by imag-
 +ining a design’d Opposition from Malice; without this, they can scarcely
 +hate one another. Thus two Candidates for the same Office wish each
 +other dead, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room
 +for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other’s Virtue,
 +as there sometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Opposition
 +Temper of a
 +Springs of
 +Self-Love not
 +excluded by
 +may be without Hatred; and if another better Post, where there is no
 +Competition, were [172] bestow’d on one of them, the other shall rejoice
 +at it.
 +V. The Actions which flow solely from Self-Love, and yet evidence no
 +Want of Benevolence, having no hurtful Effects upon others, |] 23 seem
 +perfectly indifferent in a moral Sense||, and neither raise the Love or
 +Hatred of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain
 +Bounds, within which we may not only act from Self-Love, consistently
 +with the Good of the Whole, but every Mortal’s acting thus within these
 +Bounds for his own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of the
 +Whole; and the Want of such Self-Love would be universally pernicious.
 +Hence, he who pursues his own private Good, with an Intention also to
 +concur with that Constitution which tends to the Good of the Whole;
 +and much more he who promotes his own Good, with a direct View of
 +making himself more capable of serving God, or doing good to Man-
 +kind; acts not only innocently, but also honourably, and virtuously: for
 +in both these Cases, 1 1 24 a Motive of 1 1 Benevolence concurs with Self-Love
 +to excite him to the Action. And thus a Neglect of our own Good, may
 +be morally evil, and argue a Want of Benevolence toward the Whole.
 +But when Self-Love breaks over the Bounds above-mention’d, and leads
 +us into Actions detrimen- [173] tal to others, and to the whole; or makes
 +us insensible of the generous kind Affections; then it appears vitious, and
 +is disapprov’d. So also, when upon any small Injurys, or sudden Re-
 +sentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our Benevolence
 +|| 25 becomes|| so faint, as to let us entertain odious Conceptions ofMen,
 +or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were wholly Evil,
 +or Malicious, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really
 +are; these Conceptions must lead us into malevolent Affections, or at
 +least weaken our good ones, and make us really Vitious.
 +VI. 26 Here we must also observe, that every moral Agent justly considers
 +himself as a Part of this rational System, which may be useful to the
 +Whole; so that he may be, in part, an Object of his own Benevolence.
 +Nay further, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of
 +the System requires every one to be innocently sollicitous about himself.
 +Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings greater Evil to the
 +Agent, than Good to others, however it may evidence || 27 strongBenev-
 +olence or 1 1 a virtuous Disposition in the Agent, yet it 1 1 28 must be founded
 +upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency of publick Good, when it has
 +no such Tendency: so that a|| Man who reason’d [174] justly, and con-
 +sider’d the whole, would not be led into it, || 29 were his Benevolence ever
 +so strong 1 1 ; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however
 +he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the Agent from a
 +kind Action, did evidence a || 30 strong Disposition to Virtue||. Nay fur-
 +ther, if any Good was propos’d to the Pursuit of an Agent, and he had
 +a Competitor in every respect only equal to himself; the highest Benev-
 +olence possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself,
 +were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance
 +to move him to yield to his Competitor. A Man surely of the strongest
 +Benevolence, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who
 +was a Competitor of equal Merit with the other; and as his preferring
 +one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of Benevolence;
 +so, no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only
 +equal Abilitys.
 +|| 3I '‘ Wherever a Regard to my self, tends as much to the good of the
 +Whole, as Regard to another; or where the Evil to my self, is equal to
 +the Good obtain’d for another; tho by acting, in such Cases, for the good
 +of another, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in the
 +contrary manner, from Regard to [175] my self, I evidence no evil Dis-
 +position, nor any want of the most extensive Benevolence; since the Mo-
 +ment of good to the Whole is, in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it
 +be here observ’d, that this does not supersede the necessity of Liberality,
 +or gratuitous Gifts, altho in such Actions the Giver loses || 32b as much
 +as b || the other receives; since the Moment of Good to any Person, in any
 +given Case, is in a compound || 33c Ratio c || of the Quantity of the Good
 +it self, and the Indigence of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift
 +may make a much greater Addition to the happiness of the Receiver,
 +than the Diminution it occasions in the happiness of the Giver: And that
 +the most useful and important Gifts are those from the Wealthy to the
 +Indigent. Gifts from Equals are not useless [| 34d neither d ||, since they often
 +increase the Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of mutual
 +Love: but Gifts from the Poor to the Wealthy are really foolish, unless
 +they be only little Expressions of Gratitude, which are also fruitful of Joy
 +on both Sides: for these Expressions of Gratitude are really delightful
 +and acceptable to the Wealthy, if they have any Humanity; and their
 +Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor Giver.
 +In like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the Agent, than
 +Good to [176] the Publick; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly
 +virtuous Disposition in the Agent, tho ’tis plain he acts upon a mistaken
 +View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the Agent be so great, as to
 +make him incapable at another time, of promoting a publick Good of
 +greater moment than what is attain’d by this Action; the Action may
 +really be Evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater attainable
 +publick Good for a smaller one; tho at present this Action also flows
 +from a virtuous Disposition. a ||
 +how affected
 +by the
 +Qualitys of its
 +35 VII. The moral Beauty, or Deformity of Actions, is not alter’d by the
 +moral Qualitys of the Objects, any further than the Qualitys of the Ob-
 +jects increase or diminish the Benevolence of the Action, or the publick
 +Good intended by it. Thus Benevolence toward the worst Characters,
 +or the Study of their Good, may be as amiable as any whatsoever; yea
 +often more so than that toward the Good, since it argues such a strong
 +Degree of Benevolence as can surmount the greatest Obstacle, the moral
 +Evil in the Object. Hence the Love of unjust Enemys, is counted among
 +the highest Virtues. Yet when our Benevolence to the Evil, encourages
 +them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief;
 +this diminishes or destroys the Beauty of the Action, or even makes [177]
 +it evil, as it betrays a Neglect of the Good of others more valuable; Be-
 +neficence toward whom, would have tended more to the publick Good,
 +than that toward our 36 Favourites: But Benevolence toward evil Char-
 +acters, which neither encourages them, nor enables them to do Mischief,
 +nor diverts our Benevolence from Persons more useful, has as much
 +moral Beauty as any whatsoever.
 +37 VIII. In comparing the moral Qualitys of Actions, in order to regulate
 +our Election among various Actions propos’d, or to find which of them
 +has the greatest moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Vir-
 +tue to judge thus; that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to pro-
 +ceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of
 +Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the Dignity, or
 +moral Importance of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal
 +Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural
 +Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio of the Quantity of
 +Good, and Number of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the moral Evil,
 +or Vice, is as the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; so that,
 +that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the great-
 +est Numbers; and that, [178] worst, which, in like manner, occasions
 +38 IX. Again, when the Consequences of Actions are of a mix’d Nature,
 +partly Advantageous, and partly Pernicious; that Action is good, whose
 +good Effects preponderate the evil, by being useful to many, and per-
 +nicious to few; and that, evil, which is otherwise. Here also the moral
 +Importance of Characters, or Dignity of Persons may compensate N um-
 +bers; as may also the Degrees of Happiness or Misery; for to procure an
 +inconsiderable Good to many, but an immense Evil to few, may be Evil;
 +and an immense Good to few, may preponderate a small Evil to many.
 +|| 39a But the Consequences which affect the Morality of Actions, are
 +not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but
 +also all those Events which otherwise would not have happen’d. For
 +many Actions which have no immediate or natural evil Effects, nay
 +which actually produce good Effects, may be evil; if a man foresees that
 +the evil Consequences, which will probably flow from the Folly of others,
 +iii. This maxim became the central phrase of utilitarianism. Also used by Cesare
 +Beccaria (1738—94) in the introduction to his work Dei dilitti e delle pene (Livorno,
 +1764). Jeremy Bentham calls it the “principle of utility”; compare with the title of
 +chapter 1 oIAn Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London, 1789),
 +edited by H. L. A. Hart (London: Athlone, 1970, p. n).
 +our Election.
 +how they
 +affect the
 +Morality of
 +upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overbalance all the
 +Good produc’d by those Actions, or all the Evils which would flow from
 +the Omission of them: And in such Cases the [179] Probability is to be
 +computed on both sides. Thus if an Action of mine will probably, thro
 +the || 40b Mistakes' 1 1 | or Corruption of others, be made a Precedent in un-
 +like Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho good in it self,
 +will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon some mistaken
 +Notion of their Right; any of these Considerations foreseen by me, may
 +make such an Action of mine evil, whenever the Evils which will prob-
 +ably be occasion’d by the Action, are greater than the Evils occasion’d
 +by the Omission.
 +And this is the Reason that many Laws prohibit Actions in general,
 +even when some particular Instances of those Actions would be very
 +useful; because an universal Allowance of them, considering the Mis-
 +takes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an
 +universal Prohibition; nor could there be any more special Boundarys
 +fix’d between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Duty
 +of Persons to comply with the generally useful Constitution; or if in some
 +very important Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less evil
 +Consequence than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to un-
 +dergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the
 +Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in
 +|| 41c it. ac || [180]
 +how virtuous.
 +X. From || 42 the two last|| Observations, we may see what Actions our
 +moral Sense would most recommend to our Election, as the most per-
 +fectly Virtuous: viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited
 +Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness of all the rational
 +Agents, to whom our Influence can reach. All || 43 Benevolence ||, even
 +toward a Part, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the Good of the
 +Whole: But this is a smaller Degree of Virtue, unless our Beneficence be
 +restrain’d by want of Power, and not want of Love to the Whole. All
 +strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Spe-
 +cies of Beauty, || 44 unless || when the Good of the Whole requires a stricter
 +Attachment to a Part, as in natural Affection, or virtuous Friendships;
 +|| 45 or|[ when some Parts are so eminently useful to the Whole, that even
 +universal Benevolence || 46 would|| determine us with special Care and
 +Affection to study their Interests. Thus universal Benevolence would in-
 +cline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of great and generous
 +Characters in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the In-
 +terests of any generous Society, whose whole Constitution was contriv’d
 +to promote universal Good. Thus a good Fancy in Architecture, would
 +lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence [181] of a compleatly
 +regular Building, to chuse such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep
 +uniformly thro the Whole, and not move him to make a vain unfinish’d
 +Attempt in one Part, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to
 +the Whole. And || 47 the most perfect Rules of Architecture condemn an
 +excessive|| Profusion of Ornament on one Part, above the Proportion of
 +the Whole, unless that Part be some eminent Place of the Edifice, such
 +as the chief Front, or publick Entrance; the adorning of which, would
 +beautify the Whole more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any
 +other Part.
 +|| 48a This Increase of the moral Beauty of Actions, or Dispositions, ac-
 +cording to the Number of Persons to whom the good Effects of them
 +extend, may shew us the Reason why Actions which flow from the nearer
 +Attachments of Nature, such as that between the Sexes, and the Love of
 +our Offspring, are not so amiable, nor do they appear so virtuous as
 +Actions of equal Moment of Good towards Persons less attach’d to us.
 +The Reason is plainly this. These strong Instincts are by Nature limited
 +to small Numbers of Mankind, such as our Wives or Children; whereas
 +a Disposition, which would produce a like Moment of Good to others,
 +upon no special Attachment, |] 49b ifitwas b || accompany ’d with [182] nat-
 +ural Power to accomplish its Intention, would be incredibly more fruit-
 +ful of great and good Effects to the Whole.'* |
 +50 From this primary Idea of moral Good in Actions, || 51 arises the Idea
 +of || Good in those Dispositions, whether natural or acquir’d, which
 +enable us to do good to others; or which are presum’d to be design’d,
 +and acquir’d or cultivated for that purpose 52 . And hence those Abilitys,
 +while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our
 +|| 53 Love|| to the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin’d to be
 +and Abilitys.
 +How we
 +compute the
 +Morality of
 +Actions in our
 +Sense of them.
 +intended for publick Mischief, they make us hate him the more: Such
 +are a penetrating Judgment, a tenacious Memory, a quick Invention;
 +Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching; a Contempt of Wealth,
 +Rumour, Death. These may be rather call’d natural Abilitys, than moral
 +|| 54 Qualitys. Now, a Veneration for these Qualitys, any further than they
 +are employ’d for the publick Good, is foolish, and flows from our moral
 +Sense, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if || we plainly see them ma-
 +liciously employ’d, they make the Agent more detestable.
 +XI. To find a universal || 55 Canon|| to compute the Morality of any Ac-
 +tions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done
 +by our selves, or by others, [183] we must observe the following Propo-
 +sitions, or Axioms.
 +1. || 56a The moral Importance of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick
 +Good produc’d by him, is in a compound Ratio of his Benevolence and
 +Abilitys: or (by substituting the initial Letters for the Words, as M =
 +Moment of Good, and /x = Moment of Evil) M = B X A.
 +2. | [ 57h In like manner, the Moment of private Good, or Interest
 +produc’d by any Person to himself, is in a compound Ratio of his Self-
 +Love, and Abilitys: or (substituting the initial Letters) I = S X A. b ||
 +3. When in comparing the Virtue of two Actions, the Abilitys of the
 +Agents are equal; the || 58c Moment of publick Good produc’d by them
 +in like Circumstances, is as the Benevolence: or M = B X I c .||
 +4. When Benevolence in two Agents is equal, and other Circum-
 +stances alike; the Moment of publick Good is as the Abilitys: or M =
 +A X 1.
 +5. The Virtue then of Agents, or their Benevolence, is always directly
 +as the Moment of Good produc’d in like Circumstances, and inversly
 +as their Abilitys: or B = a. [184]
 +6. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some
 +good to our selves, and evil to the Publick; and others evil to our selves,
 +and good to the Publick; or either useful both to our selves and others,
 +or pernicious to both; the entire || 59d Motive to d || good Actions is not
 +always Benevolence alone; || 60e or Motive to Evil e ||, Malice alone; (nay,
 +|| 61f this last is seldom any Motive at all f ||) but in most Actions we must
 +look upon Self-Love as another Force, sometimes conspiring with Be-
 +nevolence, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of private In-
 +terest, as well as publick Good; and sometimes opposing Benevolence,
 +when the good Action is any way difficult or painful in the Performance,
 +or detrimental in its Consequences to the Agent. In the former Case,
 +M = (B + S) X A = BA + SA; and therefore BA = M — SA
 += M — I, and B — In the latter Case, M = (B — S) X A
 += BA — SA; therefore BA = M + SA = M + I, and B = ^‘H.
 +These selfish Motives shall be* || 62 hereafter|| more fully explain’d;
 +here we may in general denote them by the Word In-[i85]terest: which
 +when it concurs with Benevolence, in any Action capable of Increase, or
 +Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of Good, than Benevo-
 +lence alone in the same Abilitys; and therefore when the Moment of
 +Good, in an Action partly intended for the Good of the Agent, is but
 +equal to the Moment of Good in the Action of another Agent, influenc’d
 +only by Benevolence, the former is less virtuous; and in this Case the
 +Interest must be deducted to find the true Effect of the Benevolence,
 +or Virtue. In the same manner, when Interest is opposite to Benevo-
 +lence, and yet is surmounted by it; this Interest must be added to the
 +Moment, to increase the Virtue of the Action, or the Strength of the
 +Benevolence 1 1 63 : Or thus, in advantageous Virtue, B = M a \ And
 +in laborious, painful, dangerous or expensive Virtue, B = “ir||- By In-
 +terest, in this last Case, is understood all the Advantage which the Agent
 +might have obtain’d by omitting the Action, which is a negative Motive
 +to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes positive.
 +But here we must observe, that no Advantage, not intended, altho
 +casually, or naturally redounding to us from the Action, [186] does at all
 +affect its Morality to make it less amiable; nor does any Difficulty or Evil
 +unforeseen, or not resolved upon, 64 make a kind Action more virtuous;
 +since in such Cases Self-Love neither assists nor opposes Benevolence.
 +Nay, Self-Interest then only diminishes the Benevolence, when without
 +this View of Interest the Action would not have been undertaken, or so
 +much Good would not have been produc’d by the Agent; and it exten-
 +Intention, and
 +affect Actions.
 +Vide Sect. v.
 +Perfect Virtue.
 +Moral Evil,
 +uates the Vice of an evil Action, only when without this Interest the
 +Action would not have been || 65 pleasing to || the Agent, or so much Evil
 +have been produc’d by him.
 +The || 66 sixth|| Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men
 +must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts; for it may really
 +happen in many Cases, that Men may have Benevolence sufficient to
 +surmount any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And
 +in that Case, it is certain there is as much Virtue in the Agent, tho he
 +does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had sur-
 +mounted Difficultys in his kind Actions. And this too must be the Case
 +with the Deity, to whom nothing is difficult. [187]
 +Since then || 67 Benevolence, or Virtue in any Agent, is as x, or as ^"x 1 ,
 +and no Being can act above his natural Ability ||; that must be the Per-
 +fection of Virtue where || 68 M = A 1 1 , or when the Being acts to the utmost
 +of his Power for the publick Good; and hence the Perfection of Virtue
 +in this Case, || 69 or a, ]| is as Unity. And this may shew us the only Foun-
 +dation for the boasting of the Stoicks, “That a Creature suppos’d In-
 +nocent, by pursuing Virtue with his utmost Power, may in Virtue equal
 +the Gods.” For in their Case, if || 70 [A] or || the Ability be Infinite, unless
 +|| 71 [M] or || the Good to be produc’d in the whole, be so too, the Virtue
 +is not absolutely perfect; and the Quotient can never surmount Unity.
 +|| 72a XII. The same Axioms may be apply’d to compute the moral Evil in
 +Actions; that is, calling the Disposition which leads us to Evil, Hatred,
 +tho it is oftner only Self-Eove, with Inadvertence to its Consequences:
 +1st. The Moment of Evil produc’d by any Agent, is as the Product of
 +his Hatred into his Ability, or p = H X A. And, [188]
 +2dly. In equal Abilitys, || 73b H = p, X I b ||.
 +3dly. When Hatred is equal; p. = A X I: And,
 +4thly. The Degree of moral Evil, or Vice, which is equal to the Hatred
 +or Neglect of publick Good, is thus express’d, H = a.
 +5thly. The Motives of Interest may || 74c co-operate with Hatred, or
 +oppose 0 1 1 it the same way as with Benevolence; and then according as
 +Self-Interest may partly excite to the Action, and so diminish the Evil;
 +or dissuade from it, and so increase it, the Malice which surmounts it,
 +or H = in like manner as in the Case of moral Good. a ||
 +But we must observe, that not only Innocence is expected from all
 +Mortals, but they are presum’d from their Nature, in some measure in-
 +clin’d to publick Good 75 ; so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough
 +to make an Agent be reputed Evil; Nor is a direct Intention of publick
 +Evil necessary to make an Action evil, it is enough that it flows from Self-
 +Love, with a plain Neglect of the Good of others|| 76 , or an Insensi-
 +[189] bility of their Misery, which we either actually foresee, or have a
 +probable Presumption of.
 +It is true indeed, that that publick Evil which I neither certainly fore-
 +see, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action,
 +does not make my present Action Criminal, or Odious; even altho I
 +might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Ac-
 +tions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either Malice,
 +or want of Benevolence. But then it is also certain, that my prior Neg-
 +ligence, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evi-
 +dence of the want of that Degree of good Affections which is necessary
 +to a virtuous Character; and consequently the Guilt properly lies in this
 +Neglect, rather than in an Action which really flows from a good Inten-
 +tion. Human Laws however, which cannot examine the Intentions, or
 +secret Knowledge of the Agent, must judge in gross of the Action itself;
 +presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain’d, which we are ob-
 +lig’d to attain.
 +In like manner, no good Effect which I did not actually foresee and
 +intend, makes my Action morally Good; however Human Laws or Gov-
 +ernours, who cannot search into Mens Intentions, or know their [190]
 +secret Designs, justly reward Actions which tend to the publick Good,
 +altho the Agent was engag’d to those Actions only by selfish Views; and
 +consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him to them.
 +The difference in degree of Guilt between Crimes of Ignorance, when
 +the Ignorance is Vincible, and Faulty, as to the natural Tendency of the
 +Action; and Crimes of Malice, or direct evil Intention, consists in this;
 +that the former, by a prior Neglect, argues a want of the due degree of
 +I 3 2
 +distinct from
 +Morality of
 +Benevolence, or right Affection; the latter, evidences direct evil Affec-
 +tions, which are vastly more odious ||.
 +XIII. || 77 From Axiom the 5 th 1 1 , we may form almost a demonstrative
 +Conclusion, “that we have a Sense of Goodness and moral Beauty in
 +Actions, distinct from Advantage;” for had we no other Foundation of
 +Approbation of Actions, but the Advantage which might arise to us from
 +them, if they were done toward our selves, we |[ 78 should || make no Ac-
 +count of the Abilitys of the Agent, but would barely esteem them ac-
 +cording to their Moment. The Abilitys come in only to shew the Degree
 +of Benevolence, which supposes Benevolence necessarily amiable. Who
 +was ever the better pleas’d with a barren rocky [191] Farm, or an incon-
 +venient Flouse, by being told that the poor Farm gave as great Increase
 +as it could; or that the Flouse accommodated its Possessor as well as it
 +could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose Moment is very
 +inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the Beauty to alledge, “That
 +it was all the poor Agent could do for the Publick, or his Friend. ”
 +XIV. The moral Beauty of Characters arises from their Actions, or sincere
 +Intentions of the publick Good, according to their Power. We form our
 +Judgment of them according to what appears to be their fix’d Disposi-
 +tion, and not according to any particular Sallys of unkind Passions; altho
 +these abate the Beauty of good Characters, as the Motions of the kind
 +Affections diminish the Deformity of the bad ones. What then properly
 +constitutes a virtuous Character, is not some few accidental Motions of
 +Compassion, natural Affection, or Gratitude; but such a fix’d Flumanity,
 +or Desire of the publick Good of all, to whom our Influence can extend,
 +as uniformly excites us to all Acts of || 79 Beneficence, according to our
 +utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interests of others: and a strong
 +Benevolence will not fail to make us || careful of informing our selves
 +right, concerning the truest Methods [192] of serving 1 1 80 the Interests of
 +Mankind 1 1 . Every Motion indeed of the kind Affections appears in some
 +degree amiable; but we denominate the Character from the prevailing
 +XV. 1 1 8 1 1 Know not for what Reason some will not allow that to be Virtue,
 +which flows from Instincts, or Passions; but how do they help them-
 +selves? They say, “Virtue arises from Reason.” What is Reason but that
 +Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End? The ultimate End propos’d
 +by the common Moralists is the Happiness of the Agent himself, and
 +this certainly he is determin’d to pursue from Instinct.|| Now may not
 +another Instinct toward the Publick, or the Good of others, be as proper
 +a Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct toward private Happiness? || 82 And
 +is there not the same Occasion for the Exercise of our Reason in pursuing
 +the former, as the latter? || This is certain, that whereas we behold the
 +selfish Actions of others, with Indifference at best, we see something ami-
 +able in every Action which flows from kind Affections or Passions toward
 +others; if they be conducted by Prudence, so as any way to attain their
 +|| 83a End. Our passionate Actions, as we shew’d* above, are not || 84b al-
 +ways b || Self-interested; since our In- [193] tendon is not to free our selves
 +from the Uneasiness of the Passion, but to alter the State of the Object. 2 1 |
 +85 If it be said, “That Actions from Instinct, are not the Effect of Pru-
 +dence and Choice;” this Objection holds full as strongly against the Ac-
 +tions which flow from || 86 Self-Love; since the use of our Reason is as
 +requisite, to find the proper Means of promoting publick Good, as pri-
 +vate Good. And as it must be an Instinct, or a Determination previous
 +to Reason, which makes us pursue private Good, as well as publick
 +Good, as our End; there is the same occasion for Prudence and Choice,
 +in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either. I see || no harm
 +in supposing, “that Men are naturally dispos’d to Virtue, and not left
 +merely indifferent, || 87 to be ingag’d in Actions only as they appear to
 +tend to their own private Good.||” Surely, the Supposition of a benev-
 +olent universal Instinct, would recommend human Nature, and its Au-
 +thor, more to the Love of a good Man, and leave room enough for the
 +Exercise of our Reason, in contriving and settling Rights, Laws, Con-
 +stitutions; in inventing Arts, and practising them so as to gratify, in the
 +most effectual manner, that generous Inclination. And if we must bring
 +in Self-Love to make Virtue Rational, a [194] little Reflection will dis-
 +Instinct may
 +be the spring
 +of Virtue.
 +See Sect. ii. Art. 8.
 +Heroism, in all
 +cover, as shall appear hereafter, that this Benevolence is our greatest Hap-
 +piness; and thence we may resolve to cultivate, as much as possible, this
 +sweet Disposition, and to despise every opposite Interest. Not that we
 +can be truly Virtuous, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which
 +1 1 88 accompanies 1 1 Beneficence, without the Love of others: Nay, this very
 +Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of disinterested Love to oth-
 +ers, as the Spring of our Actions. But Self-Interest may be our Motive,
 +1 1 89 in chusing to || continue in this agreeable State, tho it cannot be the
 +sole, or principal Motive of any Action, which to our moral Sense ap-
 +pears Virtuous 90 .
 +|| 91 The applying a mathematical Calculation to moral Subjects, will
 +appear perhaps at first extravagant and wild; but some Corollarys, which
 +are easily and certainly deduc’d below,* may shew the Conveniency of
 +this Attempt, if it could be further pursu’d. At present, we shall only
 +draw this one||, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the
 +lowest rank of Mankind, viz. “That no external Circumstances of For-
 +tune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the
 +most heroick Virtue.” For how small soever the Moment of publick
 +Good be, [195] which any one can accomplish, yet if his Abilitys are
 +proportionably small, the || 92 Quotient, which expresses the Degree of ||
 +Virtue, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the Prince,
 +the Statesman, the General, are capable of true Heroism, tho these are
 +the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus’d thro various Nations and
 +Ages; but when we find in an honest Trader, the kind Friend, the faithful
 +prudent Adviser, the charitable and hospitable Neighbour, the tender
 +Husband and affectionate Parent, the sedate yet chearful Companion,
 +the generous Assistant of Merit, the cautious Allayer of Contention and
 +Debate, the Promoter of Love and good Understanding among Ac-
 +quaintances; if we consider, that these were all the good Offices which
 +his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to
 +Mankind, we must judge this Character really as amiable, as those, whose
 +external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, “that
 +they are the only Heroes in Virtue.” [196]
 +See Sect. vii. Art. 8, 9.
 +All Mankind agree in this general
 +Foundation of their Approbation of moral
 +Actions. The Grounds of the different
 +Opinions about Morals.
 +I. To H'shewll how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the
 +universal Foundation of this moral Sense, viz. Benevolence, we have ob-
 +serv’d already,* that when we are ask’d the Reason of our Approbation
 +of any Action, we || 2 perpetually|| alledge its Usefulness to the Publick,
 +and not to the Actor himself. If we are vindicating a censur’d Action,
 +and maintaining it lawful, we || 3 always|| make this one Article of our
 +Defence, “That it injur’d no body, or did more Good than Harm.” On
 +the other hand, when we blame any piece of Conduct, we shew it to be
 +prejudicial to others, besides the Actor; or to evidence at least a Neglect
 +of their Interest, when it was in our power to serve them; or when Grat-
 +itude, natural Affection, or some other disinterested Tye [197] should
 +have rais’d in us a Study of their Interest. || 4a Ifwe sometimes blame fool-
 +ish Conduct in others, without any reflection upon its Tendency to pub-
 +lick Evil, it is || 5b still b || occasion’d by our Benevolence, which makes us
 +concern’d for the Evils befalling || 6c the Agent, whom we must always
 +look upon as a part of the System. ac || We all know how great an Exten-
 +uation of Crimes it is, to alledge, “That the poor Man does harm to no
 +* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 3. Par. 3.
 +This Moral
 +body but himself;” and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet
 +1 1 7 if we examine the Matter well, || we shall find, that the greatest part of
 +the Actions which are immediately prej udicial to our selves, and are often
 +look’d upon as innocent toward others, do really tend to the publick
 +Detriment, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we
 +could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have been inclin’d to do.
 +This is the Case of Intemperance and extravagant Luxury.
 +the sole
 +ground of
 +II. And further, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was
 +ever approv’d by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill grounded,
 +of some really good moral Quality. If we observe the Sentiments of Men
 +concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is always some really amiable
 +and benevolent Appearance which engages their Approbation. We may
 +perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging that Actions tend [198] to the pub-
 +lick Good, which do not; or be so || 8 stupidly|| inadvertent, that while
 +our Attention is fix’d on some partial good Effects, we may quite over-
 +look many evil Consequences which counter-ballance the Good. Our
 +Reason may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Repre-
 +sentations of the tendency of Actions; but it is still some apparent Species
 +of Benevolence which commands our Approbation. And this Sense, like
 +our other Senses, tho counter- acted || 9 from Motives of external Advan-
 +tage, which are stronger than it ||, ceases not to operate, but || I0 has
 +Strength enough to make|| us uneasy and dissatisfy’d with our selves;
 +even as the Sense of Tasting makes us loath, and dislike the nauseous
 +Potion which we may force our selves, from Interest, to swallow.
 +It is therefore to no purpose to alledge here, “That many Actions are
 +really done, and approv’d, which tend to the universal Detriment.” For
 +the same way, Actions are often perform’d, and in the mean time ap-
 +prov’d, which tend to the Hurt of the Actor. But as we do not from the
 +latter, infer the Actor to be void of Self-Love, or a Sense of Interest; no
 +more should we infer from the former, that such Men are void of a Sense
 +of Morals, or a desire of publick [199] Good. The matter is plainly this.
 +Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to publick,
 +or private Good: Nay, sometimes violent Passions, while they last, will
 +make them approve very bad Actions || n in a moral|| Sense, || 12 or|| very
 +pernicious ones to the Agent, || 13 as|| advantageous: But this proves only,
 +“That sometimes there may be some more violent Motive to Action,
 +than a Sense of moral Good; or that Men, by Passion, may become blind
 +even to their own Interest.”
 +|| 14 But to prove that Men|| are void of a moral Sense, we should find
 +some Instances of cruel, malicious Actions, done, || 15 and approv’d in
 +others, when there is no Motive of Interest, real or apparent, save grat-
 +ifying that very Desire of Mischief to others ||: We must find a Country
 +where Murder in cold blood, Tortures, and every thing malicious, with-
 +out any Advantage, is, if not approv’d, at least look’d upon with indif-
 +ference, and raises no Aversion toward the Actors, in the unconcern’d
 +Spectators: We must find Men with whom the Treacherous, Ungrateful,
 +Cruel, are in the same account with the Generous, Friendly, Faithful,
 +and Humane; and who approve the latter, no more than the former, in
 +all Cases where they are not affected by the Influence of these Disposi-
 +tions, or when the natural Good or Evil befals other [200] Persons. And
 +it may be question’d, whether the Universe, tho large enough, and stor’d
 +with no inconsiderable variety of Characters, will yield us any Instance,
 +not only of a Nation, but even of a Club, or a single Person, who will
 +think all Actions indifferent, but those which || I 6 regard|| his own Con-
 +III. From what has been said, we may easily account for the vast Diversity
 +of moral Principles, in various Nations, and Ages; || 17 which is indeed a
 +good Argument against innate Ideas, or Principles, but will not evidence
 +Mankind to be void of a moral Sense to perceive Virtue or Vice in Ac-
 +tions, when they occur to their Observation.
 +The 1 1 Grounds of this Diversity are principally these:
 +1st. Different Opinions of Happiness, or natural Good, and of the
 +most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there
 +prevails a courageous Disposition, where Liberty is counted a great
 +Good, and War an inconsiderable Evil, all Insurrections in Defence of
 +Privileges, will have the Appearance of moral Good to our Sense, because
 +of their appearing benevolent; and yet the same Sense of moral Good in
 +Diversity of
 +accounted for.
 +From various
 +Notions of
 +accounts of
 +Benevolence, shall [201] in another Country, where the Spirits of Men
 +are more abject and timorous, where Civil War appears the greatest nat-
 +ural Evil, and Liberty no great Purchase, make the same Actions appear
 +odious. So in Sparta, where, thro Contempt of Wealth, the Security of
 +Possessions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly desir’d, as nat-
 +urally good to the State, was to abound in a hardy shifting Youth; Theft,
 +if dexterously perform’d, was so little odious, that it receiv’d the Coun-
 +tenance of a Law to give it Impunity.
 +18 But in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Appro-
 +bation is founded on Benevolence, because of some real, or apparent
 +Tendency to the publick Good, for we are not to imagine, that this Sense
 +should give us, without Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of
 +their natural Tendencys to Good or Evil: It only determines us to ap-
 +prove Benevolence, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate the
 +contrary. So our Sense of Beauty does not, without Reflection, Instruc-
 +tion, or Observation, give us Ideas of the regular Solids, Temples,
 +Cirques, and Theatres; but determines us to approve and delight in Uni-
 +formity amidst Variety, wherever we observe it. Let us read the Preambles
 +of any Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any dispu-[202]ted
 +Practice by the Moralists, and we shall find no doubt, that Men are often
 +mistaken in computing the Excess of the natural Good, or evil Conse-
 +quences of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is ap-
 +prov’d, is still some Tendency to the greater natural Good of others,
 +apprehended by those who approve it.
 +The same Reason may remove also the Objections against the Uni-
 +versality of this Sense, from some Storys of Travellers, concerningstrange
 +Crueltys practis’d toward the Aged, or Children, in certain Countrys. If
 +such Actions be done in || 19 sudden|| angry Passions, they only prove,
 +that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower Benevolence
 +in its strongest Ties; and if they really be universally allow’d, look’d upon
 +as innocent, and vindicated; it || 20 is certainly || under some Appearance
 +of Benevolence; such as to secure them from Insults of Enemys, to avoid
 +the Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death,
 +or to free the vigorous and useful Citizens from the Charge of main-
 +taining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A love of Plea-
 +sure and Ease, may, in the immediate Agents, be stronger in some In-
 +stances, than Gratitude toward Parents, or natural Affection to Children.
 +But that such Nations are continu’d, notwithstanding all the [203] Toil
 +in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of natural Affection:
 +For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in such Places, com-
 +pelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain number of their
 +Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of publick Good, was
 +the Ground of Laws, equally barbarous, enacted by Lycurgus and Solon,
 +of killing the deform’d, or weak, to prevent a burdensome Croud of
 +useless Citizens. 1
 +|| 21a A late ingenious Author* has justly observ’d the Absurdity of the
 +monstrous Taste, which has possess’d both the Readers and Writers of
 +Travels. || 22b They scarce give us any Account b || of the natural Affections,
 +the Familys, Associations, Friendships, Clans, of the Indians; and as
 +|| 23c rarely c || do they mention their Abhorrence of Treachery among
 +themselves; their Proneness to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their
 +several States; their Contempt of Death in defence of their Country, or
 +upon points of Honour. “These are but common Storys. — No need to
 +travel to the Indies for what we see in Europe every Day.” The Enter-
 +tainment therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting
 +Horror, and making Men Stare. The ordinary Employment of [204] the
 +Bulk of the Indians in support of their Wives and Offspring, or Rela-
 +tions, has nothing of the Prodigious. But a Human Sacrifice, a Feast
 +upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the won-
 +drous Barbarity of Indians, in Nations no strangers to the Massacre at
 +Paris, the Irish Rebellion, or the Journals of the Inquisition. These they
 +i. Concerning Solon, Hutcheson refers to a passage in Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrho-
 +neion Hypotyposeon, Book III, 211; in R. G. Bury (ed.), Sextus Empiricus, Cambridge,
 +Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961, vol. 1, p. 267, reporting that the father had
 +been allowed to kill his son. Lycurgus ’s law on killing of the weak and malformed is
 +mentioned in Plutarch’s Lives, ed. B. Perrin, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
 +Press, 1967, vol. 1, p. 255.
 +* Ld. Shaftesbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.
 +Use of Reason
 +in Morals.
 +behold with religious Veneration; but the Indian Sacrifices, flowing from
 +a like Perversion of Humanity by Superstition, raise the highest Abhor-
 +rence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the
 +wondrous Credulity of some Gentlemen, of great Pretensions in other
 +matters to Caution of Assent, for these marvellous Memoirs of Monks,
 +Fryars, Sea-Captains, Pyrates; and for the Historys, Annals, Chronol-
 +ogys, receiv’d by Oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks. a ||
 +Men have Reason given them, to || 24 judge of the Tendencys of their ||
 +Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of pub-
 +lick Good; but it is still some Appearance of Good which they pursue.
 +And it is strange, that Reason is universally allow’d to Men, notwith-
 +standing all the stupid, ridiculous Opinions receiv’d in many Places, and
 +yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very Opinions, shall seem an
 +Argument against any moral Sense; [205] altho the bad Conduct is not
 +|| 25 owing to|| any Irregularity in the moral Sense, but || 26 to a wrong||
 +Judgment or Opinion. If putting the Aged to death, with all its Con-
 +sequences, really tends to the publick Good, and 1 1 27 to 1 1 the lesser Misery
 +of the Aged, it is no doubt justifiable; nay, perhaps the Aged chuse it, in
 +hopes of a future State. If a deform’d, or weak Race, could never, by
 +Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow
 +an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in
 +Misery, it is just to put them to death. This all allow to be just, in the
 +Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for killing of their Chil-
 +dren, when Parents are sufficiently stock’d, it is perhaps practis’d, and
 +allow’d from Self-love; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action
 +any where. If Wood, or Stone, or Metal be || 28 a Deity ||, have Govern-
 +ment, and Power, and have been the Authors of Benefits to us; it is mor-
 +ally amiable to praise and worship them. Or if the true Deity be pleas’d
 +with Worship before Statues, or any other Symbol of some more im-
 +mediate Presence, or Influence; Image-Worship is virtuous. Ifhe delights
 +in Sacrifices, Penances, Ceremonys, Cringings; they are all laudable. Our
 +Sense of Virtue, generally leads us exactly enough according to our
 +Opinions; and therefore the absurd [206] Practices which prevail in the
 +World, are much better Arguments that Men have no Reason, than that
 +they have no moral Sense of Beauty in Actions.
 +IV. The next Ground of Diversity in Sentiments, is the Diversity of Sys-
 +tems, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their Benevolence.
 +We 1 1 29 insinuated 1 1 above,* that it is regular and beautiful to have
 +stronger Benevolence, toward the morally good Parts of Mankind, who
 +are useful to the Whole, than toward the useless or pernicious. Now if
 +Men receive a low, or base Opinion of any Body, or Sect of Men; if they
 +imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or
 +but useless Burdens of the Earth; Benevolence itself will lead || 30 them||
 +to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason,
 +why, among Nations who have high Notions of Virtue, every Action
 +toward an Enemy may pass for just; why Romans, and Greeks, could
 +approve of making those they call’d Barbarians, Slaves.
 +|| 31 A late ingenious Authorf justly observes, “That the various Sects,
 +Partys, Factions, Cabals of Mankind in larger [207] Societys, are all in-
 +fluenc’d by a publick Spirit: That some generous Notions of publick
 +Good, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at first, and excite
 +Men of the same Faction or Cabal to the most disinterested mutual Suc-
 +cour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the different Factions, and
 +even the fiercest Wars against each other, are influenc’d by a sociable
 +publick Spirit in a limited System.” But certain it is, that Men are little
 +oblig’d to those, who often artfully raise and foment this Party Spirit; or
 +cantonize them into several Sects for the Defence of very trifling Causes.
 +Associations for innocent Commerce, or Manufactures; Cabals for De-
 +fence of Fiberty against a Tyrant; or even lower Clubs for Pleasantry, or
 +Improvement by Conversation, are very amiable and good. But when
 +Mens heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men
 +raise in their Minds some unaccountable notion of Sanctity, and Reli-
 +gion, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Fove to God, or
 +our own Species; when the several Factions are taught to look upon each
 +other as Odious, Contemptible, Profane, because of their different Ten-
 +ets, or Opinions; even when these Tenets, whether true or false, are per-
 +haps perfectly useless to the publick Good; when the keenest Passions
 +pervert the
 +moral Sense.
 +pernicious to
 +* See Sect. iii. Art. 10. Par. 1.
 +t Ld. Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part iii. Sect. ii. Vol. 1. p. no.
 +are rais’d about such Trifles, and [208] Men begin to hate each other for
 +what, of it self, has no Evil in it; and to love the Zealots of their own
 +Sect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and
 +Malice against opposite Sects; (which is what all Partys commonly call
 +Zeal) ’tis then no wonder if our moral Sense be much impair’d, and our
 +natural Notions of Good and Evil almost lost; when our Admiration,
 +and Love, or Contempt, and Hatred, are thus perverted from their nat-
 +ural Objects.
 +If any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the Party-Tenets
 +of most of our Sects; or if they have heard of them, have either never
 +espous’d any Sect, or all equally; they bid fairest for a truly natural and
 +good Disposition, because their Tempers have never been soured about
 +vain Trifles; nor have they contracted any Sullenness, or Rancour against
 +any Part of their own Kind. If any Opinions deserve to be contended
 +for, they are those which give us lovely Ideas of the Deity, and of our
 +Fellow-Creatures: If any Opinions deserve Opposition, they are such as
 +raise Scruples in our Minds about the Goodness of Providence, or rep-
 +resent our Fellow-Creatures as base and selfish, by instilling into us some
 +ill-natur’d, cunning, shreud Insinuations, “that our most generous Ac-
 +tions proceed wholly from [209] selfish Views.” This wise Philosophy of
 +some Moderns, after Epicurus, must be fruitful of nothing but Discon-
 +tent, Suspicion, and Jealousy; a State infinitely worse than any little tran-
 +sitory Injurys to which we might be expos’d by a good-natur’d Credulity.
 +But thanks be to the kind Author of our Nature, that, in spite of such
 +Opinions, our Nature it self leads us into Friendship, Trust, and mutual
 +Were we freely conversant with Robbers, who shew a moral Sense in
 +the equal or proportionable Division of their Prey, and in Faith to each
 +other, we should find they have their own sublime moral Ideas of their
 +Party, as Generous, Courageous, Trusty, nay Honest too; and that those
 +we call Honest and Industrious, are imagin’d by them to be Mean-
 +spirited, Selfish, Churlish, or Luxurious; on whom that Wealth is ill be-
 +stow’d, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintain
 +gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours,
 +who are their profess’d Enemys. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our
 +profess’d Debauchees, our most dissolute Rakes, we shall find their Vices
 +cloth’d, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of Liberty, Gen-
 +erosity, just Resentment against the Contrivers of artful Rules to [210]
 +enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures.
 +32 Perhaps never any Men pursu’d || 33 Vice long with Peace of Mind ||,
 +without some such deluding Imagination of moral Good,* while they
 +may be still inadvertent to the barbarous and inhuman Consequences
 +of their Actions. The Idea of an ill-natur’d Villain, is too frightful ever
 +to become familiar to any Mortal. Hence we shall find, that the basest
 +Actions are dress’d in some tolerable Mask. What others call Avarice,
 +appears to the Agent a prudent Care of a Family, or Friends; Fraud, artful
 +Conduct; Malice and Revenge, a just Sense of Honour, and a Vindi-
 +cation of our Right in Possessions, or Fame; Fire and Sword, and Des-
 +olation among Enemys, a just thorow Defence of our Country; Perse-
 +cution, a Zeal for the Truth, and for the eternal Happiness ofMen, which
 +Hereticks oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a Sense
 +of Virtue upon false Opinions, and mistaken Benevolence; upon wrong
 +or partial Views of publick Good, and the means to promote it; or upon
 +very narrow Systems form’d by like foolish Opinions. It is not a Delight
 +in the Misery of others, or Malice, which occasions the horrid Crimes
 +which fill our [211] Historys; but generally an injudicious unreasonable
 +Enthusiasm for some kind of limited Virtue.
 +Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,
 +Ultra, quam satis est, Virtutem si petat ipsam.t 11
 +V. The last Ground of Diversity which occurs, are the false Opinions of
 +the Will or Laws of the Deity. To obey these we are determin’d from
 +Gratitude, and a Sense of Right imagin’d in the Deity, to dispose at plea-
 +* See below, Sect. vi. Art. 2. Par. 2.
 +f Hor. Ep. 6. Lib. 1. v. 15.
 +ii. Translation: “Let the wise bear the name of madman, the just of unjust, should
 +he pursue Virtue herself beyond due bonds.” (Horace, Satires, Epistles, andArsPoetica,
 +with an English translation by H. Rushton Fairclough, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
 +University Press, 1970, pp. 286-87.)
 +False Opinions
 +of the divine
 +from Incest.
 +sure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known to have
 +produc’d Follys, Superstitions, Murders, Devastations of Kingdoms,
 +from a Sense of Virtue and Duty, that it is needless to mention particular
 +Instances. Only we may observe, “That all those Follys, or Barbaritys,
 +rather confirm than destroy the Opinion of a moral Sense;” since the
 +Deity is believ’d to have a Right to dispose of his Creatures; and Grat-
 +itude to him, if he be conceiv’d good, must move us to Obedience to
 +his Will: if he be not conceiv’d good, Self-love may overcome our moral
 +Sense of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury. [212]
 +As for the Vices which commonly proceed from Love of Pleasure, or
 +any violent Passion, since generally the Agent is soon sensible of their
 +Evil, and that sometimes amidst the heat of the Action, they only prove,
 +“That this moral Sense, and Benevolence, may be overcome by the more
 +importunate Sollicitations of other Desires.”
 +VI. Before we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the
 +strongest Objections against what has been said so often, viz. “That this
 +Sense is natural, and independent on Custom and Education.” The Ob-
 +jection is this, “That we shall find some Actions always attended with
 +the strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, in some whole Nations,
 +|| 34 in which there appears nothing contrary to Benevolence ||; and that
 +the same Actions shall in another Nation be counted innocent, or hon-
 +ourable. 35 Thus Incest, among Christians, is abhorr’d at first appearance
 +as much as Murder; || 36 even by those who do not know or reflect upon
 +any necessary tendency of it to the detriment of Mankind. Now we gen-
 +erally allow, that what is from Nature in one Nation, would be so in all.
 +This 1 1 Abhorrence therefore cannot be from Nature, since in Greece, the
 +[213] marrying half Sisters was counted honourable; and among the Per-
 +sian Magi, 11 ' the marrying of Mothers. Say they then, may not all our
 +Approbation or Dislike of Actions arise the same way from Custom and
 +iii. The Magi were the priestly caste of the ancient Persian Zoroastrian or Mazdean
 +The Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said.
 +Had we no moral Sense natural to us, we should only look upon Incest
 +as hurtful to our selves, and shun it, and never |[ 37 hate|| other incestuous
 +Persons, more than we do a broken Merchant; so that still this Abhor-
 +rence supposes a Sense of moral Good. And further, it is true, that many
 +who abhor Incest do not know, or reflect upon the natural tendency of
 +some sorts of Incest to the publick Detriment; but wherever it is hated,
 +it is apprehended as offensive to the Deity, and that it exposes the || 38 Per-
 +son |[ concern’d to his just Vengeance. Nowit is universally acknowledg’d
 +to be the grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to coun-
 +teract the Will of the Deity, to whom it is under such Obligations. This
 +then is plainly a moral evil Quality apprehended in Incest, and reducible
 +to the general Foundation of || 39 Malice, or rather Want ofBenevolence||.
 +Nay further, where this Opinion, “that Incest is offensive to the Deity,”
 +prevails, Incest must have another direct Contrariety to Benevolence;
 +since [214] we must apprehend the Incestuous, as exposing an Associate,
 +who should be dear to him by the Ties of Nature, to the lowest State of
 +Misery, and Baseness, Infamy and Punishment. But in those Countrys
 +where no such Opinion prevails of the Deity’s abhorring [| 40 or prohib-
 +iting Incest; if no obvious natural Evils attend it||, it may be look’d upon
 +as innocent. And further, as Men who have the Sense of Tasting, may,
 +by Company and Education, have Prejudices against Meats they never
 +tasted, as unsavoury; so may Men, who have a moral Sense, acquire an
 +Opinion by implicit Faith, of the moral Evil of Actions, altho they do
 +not themselves discern in them any tendency to natural Evil; imagining
 +that others [| 41 do: or, by Education, they may have some Ideas associated,
 +which raise an abhorrence without Reason. But|| without a moral Sense,
 +we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View
 +than as naturally disadvantageous to our selves.
 +VII. The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent to
 +Instruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children,
 +upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d as
 +soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest
 +Moral Sense
 +not from
 +themselves on that side where Kindness and Humanity are found; and
 +detest the Cruel, the Covetous, [215] the Selfish, or the Treacherous. How
 +strongly do we see their Passions of Joy, Sorrow, Love, and Indignation,
 +mov’d by these moral Representations, even tho there has been no pains
 +taken to give them Ideas of a Deity, of Laws, of a future State, or of the
 +more intricate Tendency of the universal Good to that of each Individual!
 +A further Confirmation that we have practical
 +Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; with
 +a further Explication IP of our Instinct to
 +Benevolence in its various Degrees ||; with the
 +additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame
 +and Pity.
 +I. We have already endeavour’d to prove, “That there is a universal De-
 +termination to Benevolence in Mankind, even toward the most distant
 +parts of the Species:” But we are not to imagine that || 2 this Benevolence
 +is equal, or in the same degree toward all.|| There are || 3 some|| nearer and
 +stronger Degrees of Benevolence, when the Objects stand in some nearer
 +relations to our selves, which have obtain’d distinct Names; such as nat-
 +ural Affection, || 4 and|| Gratitude, || 5a or when Benevolence is increas’d
 +by greater || 6b Love of ab || Esteem.
 +One Species of natural Affection, viz. That in Parents towards their
 +Children, has [217] been consider’d already;* we || 7 shall only observe
 +further ||, That there is the same kind of Affection among collateral Re-
 +lations, tho in a weaker degree; which is universally observable where no
 +Opposition of Interest produces contrary Actions, or counterballances
 +the Power of this natural Affection.
 +* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2, 3.
 +Degrees of
 +Not founded
 +on Merit, or
 +8 We may also observe, that as to the Affection of Parents, it cannot
 +be entirely founded on Merit || 9 or|| Acquaintance; not only because it
 +is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion the || 10 Love of ||
 +Esteem; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce
 +Hatred, even toward Children apprehended to be vitious. And this Af-
 +fection is further confirm’d to be from Nature, because it is always ob-
 +serv’d to descendll 11 , and not ascend || from Children to Parents mutu-
 +ally. Nature, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly
 +determin’d Parents to the Care of their Children, because they univer-
 +sally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it|| 12 || to
 +Reflection, and a Sense of Gratitude, to produce Returns of Love in Chil-
 +dren, toward such tender kind Benefactors, who very seldom stand in
 +such absolute need of Support from their Posterity, as their Chil-
 +[218] dren did from them. Now did Acquaintance, or Merit produce nat-
 +ural Affection, we surely should find it strongest in Children, on whom
 +all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite
 +contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin’d to Man-
 +kind, but extends to other Animals, where yet we scarcely ever suppose
 +any Ideas of Merit; and is observ’d to continue in them no longer than
 +the Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any service to
 +the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive
 +little Benefit from the Love of their Dams. But as it is otherwise with
 +rational Agents, so their Affections are of longer continuance, even dur-
 +ing their whole lives.
 +II. But nothing will give us a juster Idea of the wise Order in which
 +human Nature is form’d for universal Love, and mutual good Offices,
 +than considering that strong attraction of Benevolence, which we call
 +Gratitude. Every one knows that Beneficence toward our selves makes
 +a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises Gratitude, or a stronger
 +Love toward the Benefactor, than equal Beneficence toward a third Per-
 +son.* Now because of the || 13 vast|| Numbers of Mankind, their distant
 +See above. Sect. ii. Art. 6 . Par. 3 .
 +Habi-[ 2 i 9 ]tations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful
 +to || 14 vast|| Multitudes; that our Benevolence might not be quite dis-
 +tracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally
 +recommend them to our regard; or || 15a become useless, by being equally
 +extended to Multitudes || 16b at vast distances' 3 1|, whose Interest we could
 +not understand 3 1 1, nor be capable of promoting, having no Intercourse
 +of Offices with them; Nature has || 17a more powerfully determin’d us to
 +admire, and love the moral Qualitys of others which affect our selves,
 +and has given us more powerful Impressions of Good-will toward those
 +who are beneficent to our || 18b selves 3 1|. This we call Gratitude. And thus
 +a Foundation is laid b || for joyful Associations in all kinds of Business,
 +and virtuous Friendships.
 +By this Constitution also the Benefactor is more encourag’d in his
 +Beneficence, and better secur’d of an increase of Flappiness by grateful
 +Returns,* than if his Virtue were only to be honour’d by the colder gen-
 +eral Sentiments of Persons unconcern’d, who could not know his Ne-
 +cessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would
 +all be equally determin’d to love innumerable Multitudes, whose equal
 +Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love|| 19 , were there
 +not [ 220 ] an increase of Love, according as the Object is more nearly
 +attach’d to us, or our Friends, by good Offices which affect our selves,
 +or them 1 1.
 +|| 20 This || universal Benevolence toward all Men, we may compare to
 +that Principle of Gravitation, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the
 +Universe; but || 21 , like the Love of Benevolence, || increases as the Dis-
 +tance is diminish’d, and is strongest when Bodys come to touch each
 +other. Now this increase 1 1 22 of Attraction || upon nearer Approach, is as
 +necessary || 23 to the Frame of the Universe, || as that there should be any
 +Attraction at all. For a general Attraction, equal in all Distances, would
 +by the Contrariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all
 +Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it || 24 altogether. ||
 +1 1 25 This increase of Love toward the Benevolent, || according to their
 +nearer Approaches to our selves by their Benefits, is observable in the
 +See above, Sect. iii. Art. 2. Par. 2.
 +Love of
 +high degree of Love, which Heroes and Law-givers universally obtain in
 +their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those
 +who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties of
 +Friendship, Acquaintance, Neighbourhood, Partnership; which are ex-
 +ceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of human Society. [221]
 +III. From considering that || 26 strong Determination in our Nature to |j
 +Gratitude, and Love toward our Benefactors, which was already shewn
 +to be disinterested;* we are easily led to consider another Determination
 +of our Minds, equally natural with the former, which is to || 27 delight ||
 +in the good Opinion and Love of others, even when we expect no other
 +Advantage from them, except what flows from this Constitution,
 +whereby Honour is made an immediate Good. This Desire of Honour
 +I would call Ambition, had not Custom join’d some evil Ideas to that
 +Word, making it denote such a violent desire of Honour, and of Power
 +also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other
 +hand, we are by Nature subjected to a grievous Sensation ofMisery, from
 +the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread
 +no other Evil from them. This we call Shame; which in the same manner
 +|| 28 is constituted an immediate Evil, as we said Honour was an imme-
 +diate Good. ||
 +Now were there no moral Sense, or had we no other Idea of Actions
 +but as advantageous or hurtful, I see no reason why we should be de-
 +lighted with Honour, or sub-[222]jected to the uneasiness of Shame; or
 +how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment
 +for any Action, should ever be uneasy at its being known to all the World.
 +The World may have || 29 the worse Opinion of him for it; but what sub-
 +jects my Ease to the Opinion of the World? Why, perhaps, we|| shall not
 +be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this
 +be the only reason of Shame, and it has no immediate Evil, or Pain in
 +it, distinct from Fear of Loss; then wherever we expose our selves to Loss,
 +See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6.
 +we should be asham’d, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet it
 +is quite otherwise.
 +A Merchant, for instance, || 30 lest it should impair his Credit||, con-
 +ceals a Shipwrack, or a very bad Market, which he has sent his Goods
 +to. But is this the same with the Passion of Shame? Has he that Anguish,
 +that Dejection of Mind, and Self-condemnation, which one shall have
 +whose Treachery is detected? N ay, how will Men sometimes glory in their
 +Losses, when in a Cause imagin’d morally good, tho they really weaken
 +their Credit in the Merchant’s Sense; that is, the Opinion of their
 +Wealth, or fitness for Business? Was any Man ever asham’d of impov-
 +erishing himself to serve his Country, or his Friend? [223]
 +IV. The Opinions of our Country are by some made the first Standard
 +of Virtue. They alledge, “That by comparing Actions to them, we first
 +distinguish between moral Good, and Evil: And then, say they, Ambi-
 +tion, or the Love of Honour, is our chief Motive.” But what is Honour?
 +It is not the being universally known, no matter how. A covetous Man
 +is not honour’d by being universally known as covetous; nor a weak,
 +selfish, or luxurious Man, when he is known to be so: Much less can a
 +treacherous, cruel, or ungrateful Man, be said to be honour’d for his
 +being known as such. A Posture-master, a Fire-eater, or Practiser of
 +Leger-de-main, is not honour’d for these publick Shews, unless we con-
 +sider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of Admiration and
 +Surprize to Multitudes. Honour then is the Opinion of others concern-
 +ing our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum’d to be apply’d that
 +way; for Abilitys constantly apply’d to other Purposes, procure the great-
 +est Infamy. Now, it is certain, that Ambition|| 31 , or Love of Honour is
 +really selfish ||; but then this Determination to love Honour, presupposes
 +a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour,
 +and in him who pursues it. [224]
 +32 And let it be observ’d, that if we knew an Agent had no other Motive
 +of Action || 33 than|| Ambition, we should apprehend no Virtue even in
 +his most useful Actions, since they flow’d not from any Love to others,
 +or Desire || 34 of|| their Happiness. When Honour is thus constituted by
 +Foundation of
 +Morals not the
 +Opinions of
 +our Country.
 +I 5 2
 +Opinions flow
 +from the
 +Moral Sense.
 +Nature pleasant to us, it may be an additional Motive to Virtue, as we
 +said above,* the Pleasure arising from Reflection on our Benevolence
 +was: but the Person whom we imagine perfectly virtuous, acts imme-
 +diately from the Love of others; however these refin’d Interests may be
 +joint Motives to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate
 +every kind Inclination, and to despise every contrary Interest, as giving
 +a smaller Happiness than Reflection on his own Virtue, and Conscious-
 +ness of the Esteem of others.
 +Shame is in the same manner constituted an immediate Evil, and in-
 +fluences us the same way to abstain from moral Evil; not that any Action
 +or Omission would appear virtuous, where the sole Motive was Fear of
 +V. But to enquire further, how far the Opinions of our Company can
 +raise a Sense of moral Good or Evil. If any Opinion [225] be universal
 +in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an
 +Action be believ’d to be advantageous to the Agent, we may be led to
 +believe so too, and then Self-Love may make us undertake it; or may,
 +the same way, make us shun an Action reputed pernicious to the Agent.
 +If an Action pass for advantageous to the Publick, we may believe so too;
 +and what next? If we have no disinterested Benevolence, what shall move
 +us to undertake it? “Why, we love Honour; and to obtain this Pleasure,
 +we will undertake the Action from Self-Interest.” Now, is Honour only
 +the Opinion of our Country that an Action is advantageous to the Pub-
 +lick? No: we see no Honour paid to the useful Treachery of an Enemy
 +whom we have brib’d to our Side, to casual undesign’d Services, or to
 +the most useful Effects of Compulsion on Cowards; and yet we see Hon-
 +our paid to unsuccessful Attempts to serve the Publick from sincere Love
 +to it. Honour then presupposes a Sense of something amiable besides
 +Advantage, || 35 viz.|| a Sense of Excellence in a publick Spirit; and there-
 +fore the first Sense of moral Good must be antecedent to Honour, for
 +Honour is founded upon it. 36 The Company we keep may lead us, with-
 +See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 2.
 +out examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the publick Good;
 +but that our Company honours such Actions, and loves the Agent, must
 +flow from a Sense of some [226] Excellence in this Love of the Publick,
 +and serving its Interests.
 +“We therefore, say they again, pretend to love the Publick, altho we
 +only desire the Pleasure of Honour; and we will applaud all who seem
 +to act in that manner, either that we may reap Advantage from their
 +Actions, or that others may believe we really love the Publick.” But shall
 +any Man ever || 37 really love the Publick, or study the Good of others in
 +his heart, if Self-love be 1 1 the only spring of his Actions? No: that is im-
 +possible. Or, shall we ever really love Men who appear to love the Pub-
 +lick, without a moral Sense? || 38 No: we could form no Idea of such a
 +Temper; and as for these Pretenders to publick Love, we should hate||
 +them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Lame. Now this is all which could
 +be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even supposing they had a
 +moral Sense, provided we had none our selves: They never could make
 +us admire Virtue, or virtuous Characters in others; but could only give
 +us Opinions of Advantage, or Disadvantage in Actions, according as they
 +tended || 39 procure to || us the Pleasures ofHonour, or the Pain ofShame.
 +But if we suppose that Men have, by Nature, a moral Sense of Good-
 +ness in [227] Actions, and that they are capable of disinterested Love; all
 +is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly conclude,
 +that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and are morally
 +Evil, when perhaps they are not so; and then our Sense may determine
 +us to have an Aversion to them, and their Authors; or we may, the same
 +way, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as good; and
 +then our desire ofHonour may co-operate with Benevolence, to move
 +us to such Actions: but had we no Sense of moral Qualitys in Actions,
 +nor any Conceptions of them, except as advantageous or hurtful, we
 +never could have honour’d or lov’d Agents for publick Love, or had any
 +regard to their Actions, further than they affected our selves in particular.
 +We might have form’d the metaphysical Idea of publick Good, but we
 +had never desir’d it, 40 further than it tended to our own private Interest,
 +without a Principle of Benevolence; nor admir’d and lov’d those who
 +|| 41 were|| studious of it, without a moral Sense. So far is Virtue from
 +Moral Sense,
 +not from Love
 +of Honour.
 +being (in the Language of a late* 1 Author) the Offspring of Flattery, begot
 +upon Pride; that Pride, in the bad meaning of that Word, is the spurious
 +Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an Engine,
 +which the [228] Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to
 +the Purposes of Self-love in the Flatterer.
 +VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of Flonour. Suppose a
 +State or Prince, observing the Money which is drawn out of England by
 +Italian Musicians, should decree Flonours, Statues, Titles, for great Mu-
 +sicians: This would certainly excite all who had hopes of Success, to the
 +Study of Musick; and || 42 Men of a good Ear would approve of || the good
 +Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would
 +this give all Men a good Ear, or make them delight in Flarmony? Or
 +could it ever make us really love a Musician, who study’d nothing but
 +his own Gain, in the same manner we do a Patriot, or a generous Friend?
 +I doubt not. And yet Friendship, without the Assistance of Statues, or
 +Flonours, can make Persons appear exceedingly amiable.
 +Let us take another Instance. Suppose Statues, and triumphal Arches
 +were decreed, as well as a large Sum of Money, to the Discoverer of
 +the Longitude, or any other useful Invention in Mathematicks: This
 +would raise a universal Desire of such Knowledge from Self-Love;
 +but would Men therefore love a Mathematician as they do a virtuous
 +Man? Would a Mathema-[229] tician love every Person who had attain’d
 +Perfection in that Knowledge, wherever he observ’d it, altho he knew
 +that it was not accompany’d with any Love to Mankind, or Study of
 +their Good, but with Ill-nature, Pride, Covetousness? In short, let us
 +honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we please, if we do
 +not discern a benevolent Intention in the Application, or presume upon
 +it; we may look upon these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise
 +advantageous to any one who is possess’d of them; but they shall never
 +meet with those endearing Sentiments of Esteem and Love, which our
 +nature determines us to appropriate to Benevolence, or Virtue.
 +* Author of the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 37. 3d Ed.
 +i. Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 51.
 +Love of Honour, and Aversion to Shame, may often move us to do
 +Actions for which others profess to honour us, even tho we see no Good
 +in them our selves: And Compliance with the Inclinations of others, as
 +it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the Agent, from Spec-
 +tators who see no moral Good in the Action it self. But without some
 +Sense of Good in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions
 +in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practising
 +them in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy’ d with themselves
 +when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the case with us, as to
 +Virtue; and therefore we must [230] have, by Nature, a moral Sense of
 +it antecedent to Honour.
 +This will shew us with what Judgment a late* 11 Author compares the
 +Original of our Ideas of Virtue, and Approbation of it, to the manner
 +of regulating the Behaviour of aukard Children by Commendation. It
 +shall appear || 43 afterward||,f that our Approbation ofsome Gestures, and
 +what we call Decency in Motion, depends upon some moral Ideas in
 +People of advanc’d Years. But before Children come to observe this Re-
 +lation, it is only good Nature, an Inclination to please, and Love of
 +Praise, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir’d; and
 +not any Perception of Excellence in this Behaviour. Hence they are not
 +sollicitous about Gestures when alone, unless with a View to please when
 +they return to Company; || 44 nor do they ever|| love or approve others
 +for 1 1 45 any 1 1 Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they
 +either discern the Connexion between Gestures, and moral Qualitys; or
 +reflect on the good Nature, which is evidenc’d by such a Compliance
 +with the desire of the Company. [231]
 +VII. The considering Honour in the manner above explain’d, may shew
 +us the reason, why Men are often asham’d for things which are not vi-
 +tious, and honour’d for what is not virtuous. For, if any Action only
 +appears vitious to any Persons or Company, altho it be not so, they will
 +False Honour.
 +* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d. Ed.
 +ii. Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 52.
 +t See Sect. vi. Art. 4.
 +matter of
 +have a bad Idea of the Agent; and then he may be asham’d, or suffer
 +Uneasiness in being thought morally Evil. The same way, those who look
 +upon an Action as morally good, will honour the Agent, and he may be
 +pleas’d with the Honour, altho he does not himself perceive any moral
 +Good in what has procur’d it.
 +Again, we shall be asham’d of every Evidence of moral Incapacity, or
 +Want of Ability; and with good ground, when this Want is occasion’d
 +by our own Negligence. Nay further, if any Circumstance be look’d
 +upon as indecent in any Country, offensive to others, or deform’d; we
 +shall, out of our || 46 Love to || the good Opinions of others, be asham’d
 +to be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that this
 +Indecency or Offence is not founded on Nature, but is merely the Effect
 +of Custom. Thus being observ’d in those Functions of Nature which are
 +counted indecent and offensive, will make us uneasy, altho we are sen-
 +sible that they really do [232] not argue any Vice or Weakness. But on
 +the contrary, since moral Abilitys of any kind, upon the general Pre-
 +sumption of a good Application, 47 procure the Esteem of others, we shall
 +value our selves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be asham’d of
 +any Discovery of our want of such Abilitys. This is the reason that Wealth
 +and Power, the great Engines of Virtue, when presum’d to be intended
 +for benevolent Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, pro-
 +cure Honour from others, and are apt to beget Pride in the Possessor;
 +which, as it is a general Passion which may be either good or evil, ac-
 +cording as it is grounded, we may describe to be the Joy which arises
 +from the real or imagin’d Possession of Honour, or Claim to it. || 48 The||
 +same are the Effects of Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength; and hence it is
 +that Men are apt to boast of them.
 +But whenever it appears that Men have only their private Advantage
 +in view, in the application of these Abilitys, or natural Advantages, the
 +Honour ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond
 +of displaying them; and much more when there is any Suspicion of an
 +ill-natur’d Application. Thus some Misers are asham’d of their Wealth,
 +and study to conceal it; as the malicious or selfish do their Power: Nay,
 +this is very often done where there is [233] no positive evil Intention;
 +because the diminishing their Abilitys, increases the moral Good of any
 +little kind Action, which they can find in their hearts to perform.
 +In short, we always see Actions which flow from publick Love, ac-
 +company’d with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only mali-
 +cious, but even selfish ones, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and
 +that Men study to conceal them. The Love of private Pleasure is the
 +ordinary occasion of Vice; and when Men have got any lively Notions
 +of Virtue, they generally begin to be asham’d of every thing which be-
 +trays Selfishness, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to
 +imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions
 +of us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such
 +Enjoyments, in most polite Nations, conceal’d from those who do not
 +partake with us. Such are venereal Pleasures between Persons marry’d,
 +and even eating and drinking alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks;
 +whereas a hospitable Table is rather matter of boasting; and so are all
 +other kind, generous Offices between marry’d Persons, where there is
 +no Suspicion of Self-love in the Agent; but he is imagin’d as acting from
 +Love to his Associate. This, || 49 I fancy, first introduc’d Ideas ofModesty
 +in polite Nations, and Custom has strengthen’d [234] them wonder-
 +fully||; so that we are now asham’d of many things, upon some confus’d
 +implicit Opinions of moral Evil, tho we know not upon what account.
 +Here too we may see the reason, why we are not asham’d of any of
 +the Methods of Grandeur, or high-Living. There is such a Mixture of
 +moral Ideas, of Benevolence, of Abilitys kindly employ’d; so many De-
 +pendants supported, so many Friends entertain’d, assisted, protected;
 +such a Capacity imagin’d for great and amiable Actions, that we are never
 +asham’d, but rather boast of such things: We never affect Obscurity or
 +Concealment, but rather desire that our State and Magnificence should
 +be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of moral Ideas, no Mortal
 +could bear the Drudgery of State, or abstain from laughing at those who
 +did. Could any Man be pleas’d with a Company of Statues surrounding
 +his Table, so artfully contriv’d as to consume his various Courses, and
 +inspir’d by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling
 +Returns in praise of their Fare? Or with so many Machines to perform
 +the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee?
 +The Shame we suffer from the Meanness of Dress, Table, Equipage,
 +is entirely owing to the same reason. This Meanness is often imagin’d
 +to argue Avarice, Meanness [235] of Spirit, want of Capacity, or Conduct
 +Honour and
 +Shame, often
 +from some
 +Associations of
 +i 5 8
 +in Life, of Industry, or moral Abilitys of one kind or other. To confirm
 +this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare,
 +when it was occasion’d by a good Action. How many would be asham’d
 +to be surpriz’d at a Dinner of cold Meat, who will boast of their having
 +fed upon Dogs and Horses at the Siege of Derry?' 11 And they will all tell
 +you that they were not, nor are asham’d of it.
 +This ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between external
 +Grandeur, Regularity in Dress, Equipage, Retinue, Badges of Honour,
 +and some moral Abilitys greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more con-
 +sequence in the World than some recluse Philosophers apprehend, who
 +pique themselves upon despising these external Shews. This may pos-
 +sibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count miraculous,
 +viz. That Civil Governors of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours,
 +by some inexpressible Awe, and Authority, quell the Spirits of the Vulgar,
 +and keep them in subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be
 +conquer’d by those Associations || 50 which might be rais’d among|| the
 +Disaffected, or Factious of any State; who are daring enough among their
 +Equals, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such
 +an Enterprize. [236]
 +|| 51 Hence also we may|| discover the reason, why the gratifying our
 +superior Senses of Beauty and Harmony, or the Enjoyment of the
 +|| 52 Pleasures|| of Knowledge, never occasions any Shame or Confusion,
 +tho our Enjoyment were known to all the World. The Objects which
 +furnish this Pleasure, are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights
 +to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one,
 +which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that altho we
 +pursue these Enjoyments from Self-love, yet || 53 , since|[ our Enjoyment
 +cannot be prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin’d any way inhumanly
 +selfish, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same
 +Regularity or Harmony which delights me, may at the same time delight
 +multitudes; the same Theorem shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when
 +it has entertain’d thousands. || 54 Men therefore are not|| asham’d of such
 +iii. Overcrowded with some thirty thousand Protestant refugees, Londonderry (or
 +Derry) withstood a siege by the dethroned King James II from April to July 1689.
 +Pursuits, since they never, of themselves, seduce us into any thing ma-
 +licious, envious, or ill-natur’d; nor does any one apprehend another too
 +selfish, from his pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure. 55
 +This View of Honour and Shame may also let us see the reason, why
 +most Men are uneasy at being prais’d, when they themselves are present.
 +Every one is delighted [237] with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy
 +great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwilling
 +others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is really
 +selfish; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc’d by hopes
 +of it in our good Actions: and therefore we chuse Secrecy for the Enjoy-
 +ment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others do
 +not share with us.
 +VIII. Let us next consider another Determination of our Mind, which
 +strongly proves Benevolence to be natural to us, and that is Compassion;
 +by which we are dispos’d to study the Interest of others, without any
 +Views of private Advantage. This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal
 +is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv’d in, unless
 +the Person be imagin’d || 56 evil|[, in a moral Sense: Nay, it is almost im-
 +possible for us to be unmov’d, even in that Case. Advantage may make
 +us do a cruel Action, or may overcome Pity; but it scarce ever extin-
 +guishes it. A sudden Passion of Hatred or Anger may represent a Person
 +as absolutely evil, and so extinguish Pity; but when the Passion is over,
 +it often returns. Another disinterested View may even in cold blood over-
 +come Pity; such as Love to our Country, or Zeal for Religion. Persecution
 +is generally occasion’d by Love of Virtue, and [238] a Desire of the eter-
 +nal Happiness of Mankind, altho our Folly makes us chuse absurd
 +Means || 57 to promote it||; and is often accompany’d with Pity enough
 +to make the Persecutor uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he
 +chuses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the Heretick as ab-
 +solutely and entirely evil.
 +We may here observe how wonderfully the Constitution of human
 +Nature is adapted to move Compassion. Our Misery or Distress im-
 +mediately appears in our Countenance, if we do not study to prevent it,
 +and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who from Observation, uni-
 +Compassion a
 +motive to
 +versally understand the meaning of those dismal Airs. We mechanically
 +send forth Shrieks and Groans upon any surprizing Apprehension of
 +Evil; so that no regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them|| 58 . This
 +is the Voice of Nature, understood by all Nations, by which || all who are
 +present are rous’d to our Assistance, and sometimes our injurious Enemy
 +is made to relent.
 +We observ’d above,* that we are not immediately excited by Com-
 +passion to desire the Removal of our own Pain: we think it just to be so
 +affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we
 +[239] are excited directly to desire the Relief of the Miserable; || 59 without
 +any imagination that this Relief is a private Good to our selves: And[| if
 +we see this impossible, we may by Reflection discern it to be vain for us
 +to indulge our Compassion any further; and then Self-love prompts us
 +to retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and to || 60 endeav-
 +our|| to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such Reflection, Peo-
 +ple are hurry’d by a natural, kind Instinct, to see Objects of Compassion,
 +and expose themselves to this Pain when they can give no reason for it;
 +as in the Instance of publick Executions.
 +This same Principle leads men to Tragedys; only we are to observe,
 +that another strong reason of this, is the moral Beauty of the Characters
 +and Actions which we love to behold. Fori doubt, whether any Audience
 +would be pleas’d to see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept
 +strangers to the moral Qualitys of the Sufferers, or their Characters and
 +Action. As in such a case, there would be no Beauty to raise Desire of
 +seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose our selves to
 +Pain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.
 +It was the same Cause which crouded the Roman Theatres to see
 +Gladiators. There [240] the People had frequent Instances ofgreat Cour-
 +age, and Contempt of Death, two great moral Abilitys, if not Virtues.
 +Hence Cicero looks upon them as great Instructions in Fortitude. The
 +Antagonist Gladiator bore all the blame of the Cruelty committed,
 +among People of little Reflection; and the courageous and artful one,
 +See Sect. ii. Art. 8. Par. 2 .
 +really obtain’d a Reputation of Virtue, and Favour among the Specta-
 +tors, and was vindicated by the Necessity of Self-defence. In the mean
 +time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to such Sights,
 +and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of
 +Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their natural Instinct to
 +Compassion, was the true occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults
 +which they were sorry for.
 +What Sentiments can we imagine a Candidate would have rais’d of
 +himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of Misery;
 +had he drain’d Hospitals and Infirmarys of all their pityable Inhabitants,
 +or had he bound so many Slaves, and without 61 any Resistance,
 +butcher’d them with his own Hands? I should very much question the
 +Success of his Election, (however Compassion 62 might cause his Shews
 +still to be frequented) if his Antagonist chose a Diversion apparently
 +[241] more virtuous, or with a Mixture of Scenes of Virtue.
 +How independent this Disposition to Compassion is on Custom,
 +Education, or Instruction, will appear from the Prevalence of it in
 +Women and Children, who are less influenc’d by these. That Children
 +delight in some Actions which are cruel and tormenting to Animals
 +which they have in their Power, flows not from Malice, or want of Com-
 +passion, but from their Ignorance of those signs of Pain which many
 +Creatures make; together with a Curiosity to see the various Contortions
 +of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted with these Creatures,
 +or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their Compassion often
 +becomes too strong for their Reason; as it generally does in beholding
 +Executions, where as soon as they observe the evidences of Distress, or
 +Pain in the Malefactor, they are apt to condemn this necessary Method
 +of Self-defence in the || 63 State.|| [242]
 +Importance of
 +the Moral
 +Concerning the Importance of this moral
 +Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind,
 +and its Influence on human Affairs.
 +I. It may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of
 +Manners so justly complain’d of every where, this moral Sense has a
 +greater Influence on Mankind than is generally imagin’d, altho it is often
 +directed by very partial imperfect Views of publick Good, and often
 +overcome by Self-love. But we shall offer some further Considerations,
 +to prove, “That it gives us more Pleasure and Pain than all our other
 +Facultys.” And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, “That ||' where-
 +ever|| any morally good Quality gives Pleasure from Reflection, or from
 +Honour, the contrary evil one will give proportionable Pain, from Re-
 +morse and Shame.” Now we shall consider the moral Pleasures, not only
 +separately, but as they are the most delightful Ingredient in the ordinary
 +Pleasures of Life. [243]
 +All || 2 Men|| seem persuaded of some Excellency in the Possession of
 +good moral Qualitys, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on
 +the contrary, look upon a State of moral Evil, as worse and more
 +wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment
 +in this matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be influ-
 +enc’d by moral Sentiments, yet it is certain, that Self-interested Passions
 +frequently overcome them, and partial Views of the Tendency of Ac-
 +tions, make us do what is really morally evil, apprehending it to be good.
 +But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of the
 +State of others, when they are no way immediately concern’d; for in these
 +Sentiments human Nature is calm and undisturb’d, and shews its true
 +Now should we imagine a rational Creature in a sufficiently happy
 +State, || 3 tho his|| Mind was, without Interruption, wholly occupy’d with
 +pleasant Sensations of Smell, Taste, Touch, & c. if at the same time all
 +other Ideas were excluded? Should we not think the State low, mean and
 +sordid, if there were no Society, no Love or Friendship, no good Offices?
 +What then must that State be wherein there are no Pleasures but those
 +of the external Senses, with such long Intervals as human Nature at pres-
 +ent [244] must have? Do these short Fits of Pleasure make the Luxurious
 +happy? Flow insipid and joyless are the Reflections on past Pleasure? And
 +how poor a Recompence is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the
 +nauseous Satietys, and Languors in the Intervals? This Frame of our Na-
 +ture, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the external Senses, points out
 +to us, “That there must be some other more durable Pleasure, without
 +such tedious Interruptions, and nauseous Reflections.”
 +Let us even join with the Pleasures of the external Senses, the Percep-
 +tions of Beauty, Order, Fiarmony. These are no doubt more noble Plea-
 +sures, and seem to inlarge the Mind; and yet how cold and joyless are
 +they, if there be no moral Pleasures of Friendship, Love and Beneficence?
 +Now if the bare Absence of moral Good, makes, in our Judgment, the
 +State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Presence of contrary Dis-
 +positions is always imagin’d by us to sink him into a degree of Misery,
 +from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to
 +be in the same Condition with a wrathful, malicious, revengeful, or en-
 +vious Being, tho we were at the same time to enjoy all || 4 the Pleasures
 +of the external and internal Senses? The internal Pleasures of Beauty and
 +Fiarmony, contribute greatly indeed toward soothing|| the [245] Mind
 +into a forgetfulness of Wrath, Malice or Revenge; and they must do so,
 +before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while these
 +Affections possess the Mind, there is nothing but Torment and Misery.
 +What Castle-builder, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life,
 +in which he thinks he || 5 should|| be happy, ever made acknowledg’d
 +prove it.
 +Virtue own’d
 +superior to all
 +Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude, the Steps by which he mounted to
 +his wish’d for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain’d
 +it? We always conduct our selves in such Resveries, according to the Dic-
 +tates of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Courage; and the lowest we can sink,
 +is hoping we may be enrich’d by some innocent Accident.
 +O si urnam Argenti Fors qua mihi monstret! *'
 +But Labour, Hunger, Thirst, Poverty, Pain, Danger, have nothing so de-
 +testable in them, that our Self-love cannot allow us to be often expos’d
 +to them. 1 1 6 On the contrary ||, the Virtues which these give us occasions
 +of displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that scarce ever is any imagi-
 +nary Hero in Romance, or Epic, brought to his high- [246] est Pitch of
 +Happiness, without going thro them all. Where there is no Virtue, there
 +is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation; the Romance, or Epos must
 +end. Nay, the Difficulty, f or natural Evil, does so much increase the
 +Virtue of the good Action which it accompanys, that we cannot easily
 +sustain these Works after the Distress is over; and if we continue the
 +Work, it must be by presenting a new Scene of Benevolence in a pros-
 +perous Fortune. A Scene of external Prosperity or natural Good, without
 +any thing moral or virtuous, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest
 +Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of
 +his Hero; for where Virtue ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing
 +to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession
 +of, when we are most studious of his Happiness.
 +Let us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Pos-
 +session of Virtue to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon Vice
 +as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History of
 +Regulus, 117 without concerning himself in the Fortunes of that gallant
 +Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But
 +* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 6. v. 10.
 +i. Translation: “O, that some lucky strike would disclose to me a pot of
 +money. . . .” (Horace, Satires, Epistles, andArsPoetica, with an English translation by
 +H. Rushton Fairclough, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 210.)
 +t Sect. iii. Art. 11. Axiom 6.
 +ii. See editor’s note viii to Treatise II, Sect. I.
 +how || 8 a better|| Fate? Should [247] he have comply’d with the Terms of
 +the Carthaginians, and preserv’d himself from the intended Tortures,
 +tho to the detriment of his Country? Or should he have violated his
 +plighted Faith and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either
 +of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? FI ad he acted thus,
 +that Virtue would have been gone, which interests every one in his For-
 +tunes. — “Let him take his Fate like other common Mortals.” — What
 +else do we wish then, but that the Carthaginians had relented of their
 +Cruelty, or that Providence, by some unexpected Event, had rescued him
 +out of their hands.
 +9 Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin’d to judge
 +Virtue with Peace and Safety, preferable to Virtue with Distress; but that
 +at the same time we look upon the State of the Virtuous, the Publick-
 +spirited, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluence
 +of other Enjoyments? For this is what we chuse to have our Favourite
 +Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains and natural Evils. We || 10 should||
 +never have imagin’d him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought
 +him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the expence of
 +his Virtue. We secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore we
 +never imagine he acted foolishly in secu- [248] ring his Virtue, his Hon-
 +our, at the expence of his Ease, his Pleasure, his Life. Nor can we think
 +these latter Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the former are entirely
 +II. Let us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness
 +of others in common Life. Wealth and External Pleasures bear no small
 +bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this
 +Opinion of Happiness in Wealth, some suppos’d beneficent Intention
 +of doing good Offices to Persons dear to us, at least to our Familys, or
 +Kinsmen? And in our imagin’d Happiness from external Pleasure, are
 +not some Ideas always included of some moral Enjoyments of Society,
 +some Communication of Pleasure, something of Love, of Friendship, of
 +Esteem, of Gratitude? Who ever pretended to a Taste of || 1 1 these || Plea-
 +sures without Society? Or if any seem violent in pursuit of || 12 them||,
 +how base and contemptible do they appear to all Persons, even to those
 +Necessary in
 +1 66
 +The Charm in
 +who could have no expectation of Advantage from their having a more
 +generous Notion of Pleasure?
 +13 Now were there no moral Sense, no Happiness in Benevolence, and
 +did we act from no other Principle than Self-love; sure there is no Plea-
 +sure of the external Sen-[249]ses, which we could not || 14 enjoy alone||,
 +with less trouble and expence than in Society. But a Mixture of the moral
 +Pleasures is what gives the alluring Relish; ’tis some Appearance of
 +Friendship, of Love, of communicating Pleasure to others, which pre-
 +serves the Pleasures of the Luxurious from being nauseous and insipid.
 +And this partial Imagination of some good moral Qualitys, some Be-
 +nevolence, in Actions which have many cruel, inhuman, and destructive
 +Consequences toward others, is what has kept Vice more in countenance
 +than any other Consideration.*
 +But to convince us further wherein the Happiness of Wealth, and
 +external Pleasure lies; let us but suppose Malice, Wrath, Revenge; or only
 +Solitude, Absence of Friendship, of Love, of Society, of Esteem, join’d
 +with the Possession of them; and all the Happiness vanishes like a
 +Dream. And yet Love, Friendship, Society, Humanity, tho accompany’d
 +with Poverty and Toil, nay even with smaller degrees of Pain, such as do
 +not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love from oth-
 +ers, but even of a sort of Emulation: which plainly shews, “That Virtue
 +is the chief Happiness in the Judgment of all Mankind.” [250]
 +III. There is further Consideration which must not be pass’d over, con-
 +cerning the External Beauty of Persons, which all allow to have a great
 +Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended Morality, some
 +natural or imagin’d Indication of concomitant Virtue, which gives it this
 +powerful Charm above all other kinds of Beauty. Let us consider the
 +Characters of Beauty, which are commonly admir’d in Countenances,
 +and we shall find them to be Sweetness, Mildness, Majesty, Dignity, Vi-
 +vacity, Humility, Tenderness, Good-nature; that is, that certain Airs,
 +Proportions, ne seal quoy’s, are natural Indications of such Virtues, or
 +of Abilitys or Dispositions toward them. As we observ’d above f ofMis-
 +* See above. Sect. iv. Art. 4. Par. 4, 5.
 +t See Sect. v. Art. 8. Par. 2 .
 +ery, or Distress appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost all
 +habitual Dispositions of Mind, form the countenance in such a manner,
 +as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our violent Pas-
 +sions are obvious at first view in the Countenance; so that sometimes no
 +Art can conceal them: and smaller degrees of them give some less obvious
 +Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will observe. Now when the
 +natural Air of a Face approaches to that which any Passion would form
 +it unto, we make a [251] conjecture from this concerning the leading
 +Disposition of the Person’s Mind.
 +As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward large
 +Lips, little Noses, narrow Eyes; unless we knew from themselves under
 +what Idea || 15 such Features|| are admir’d, whether as naturally beautiful
 +in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum’d Indications
 +of some moral Qualitys; we may more probably conclude that it is the
 +latter; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation, or Aversion
 +towards Faces among our selves. And as to those Features which we
 +count naturally disagreeable as to Form, we know the Aversion on this
 +account is so weak, that moral Qualitys shall procure a liking, even to
 +the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the Irregularity, or want of that
 +Regularity which is common in others. With us certain Features are im-
 +agin’d to denote Dulness; as hollow Eyes, large Lips; a Colour of Flair,
 +Wantonness: and may we not conclude the like Association of Ideas,
 +|| 16 perhaps in both Cases without Foundation in Nature, || to be the
 +Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?
 +In the same manner, when there is nothing grosly disproportion^ in
 +any Face, what is it we dispraise? || 17 It is || Pride, FIaugh-[252]tiness,
 +Sourness, Ill-nature, Discontent, Folly, Levity, Wantonness; which some
 +Countenances discover in the manner above hinted at? And these Airs,
 +when brought by Custom upon the most regular Set of Features, have
 +often made them very disagreeable; as the contrary Airs have given the
 +strongest Charms to Countenances, which were far from Perfection in
 +external Beauty.
 +|| 18 One cannot but observe the Judgment of Flomer, in his Character
 +of Flelen. Flad he ever so much rais’d our Idea of her external Beauty, ||
 +it would have been ridiculous to have engag’d his Countrymen in a War
 +for such a Helen as Virgil has drawn her. He therefore still retains some-
 +thing || 19 amiable in a moral Sense, || amidst all her Weakness, and often
 +suggests to his Reader,
 +'EAevijs opp-rpjLard re owayas tc * 111