Value pluralism
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| - | In [[philosophy]], '''moral relativism''' is the position that [[Morality|moral]] or [[Ethics|ethical]] propositions do not reflect [[Moral objectivism|objective]] and/or [[universal]] moral truths, but instead make claims [[relativism|relative]] to [[Society|social]], [[Culture|cultural]], [[History|historical]] or [[person]]al circumstances. Moral relativists hold that no universal standard exists by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth. Relativistic positions often see moral [[values]] as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or in the context of individual preferences. An extreme relativist position might suggest that judging the moral or ethical judgments or acts of another person or group has no meaning, <!--note I rephrased to remove reference to "cannot or should not be judged", as "should not" implies a moral ought, which an extreme relativist would reject--> though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory. <!--Who would suggest the former?--><!--I would, for what that is worth.--> | + | In [[philosophy|philosophical]] [[ethics]], '''value pluralism''' (also known as '''ethical pluralism''' or '''moral pluralism''') is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. In addition, value-pluralism postulates that in many cases, such incompatible values may be [[commensurability (ethics)|incommensurable]], in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance. |
| - | Some moral relativists — for example, the [[Existentialism|existentialist]] [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] — hold that a personal and [[Subjectivity|subjective]] [[moral core]] lies or ought to lie at the foundation of individuals' moral acts. In this view public [[morality]] reflects social convention, and only personal, subjective morality expresses true [[Authenticity (philosophy)|authenticity]]. <!-- Did Sartre use the expression public morality?--> | + | Value-pluralism is a theory in [[metaethics]], rather than a theory of [[normative ethics]], or a set of values in itself. [[University of Oxford|Oxford]] philosopher and historian of ideas, [[Isaiah Berlin]], is credited with being the first to write a substantial work describing the theory of value-pluralism, bringing it to the attention of academia. (cf. the Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library). However, the idea that fundamental values can, and in some cases, do conflict with each other is prominent in the thought of Max Weber, captured in his notion of 'polytheism'. |
| + | == See also == | ||
| + | * [[Moral skepticism]] | ||
| + | * [[Perspectivism]] | ||
| + | * ''[[Summum bonum]]'' | ||
| + | * [[Value system]] | ||
| - | Moral relativism differs from [[Value pluralism|moral pluralism]] — which acknowledges the co-existence of opposing ideas and practices, but accepts limits to differences, such as when vital human needs get violated. Moral relativism, in contrast, grants the possibility of moral judgments that do not accept such limits. | + | {{GFDL}} |
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| - | In popular culture people often describe themselves as "morally relativist," meaning that they are accepting of other people's values and agree that there is no one "right" way of doing some things. However, this actually has little to do with the philosophical idea of relativism; relativism does not necessarily imply tolerance, just as moral objectivism does not imply intolerance. These people's moral outlook can be explained from both theoretical frameworks.{{GFDL}} | + | |
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In philosophical ethics, value pluralism (also known as ethical pluralism or moral pluralism) is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. In addition, value-pluralism postulates that in many cases, such incompatible values may be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance.
Value-pluralism is a theory in metaethics, rather than a theory of normative ethics, or a set of values in itself. Oxford philosopher and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin, is credited with being the first to write a substantial work describing the theory of value-pluralism, bringing it to the attention of academia. (cf. the Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library). However, the idea that fundamental values can, and in some cases, do conflict with each other is prominent in the thought of Max Weber, captured in his notion of 'polytheism'.
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