Contingency (philosophy)
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| - | In [[philosophy]] and [[logic]], '''contingency''' is the status of facts that are not logically necessarily true or false. Contingency is opposed to [[necessity]]: a contingent act is an act which could have not been, an act which is not necessary (could ''not'' have not been). Contingency differs from [[possibility]], in a formal sense, as the latter includes statements which are ''necessarily'' true as well as ''not necessarily'' false, while a statement cannot be said to be contingent if it is true necessarily. | ||
| - | In colloquial English, a '''contingency''' is something that can happen, but that generally is not anticipated. Planning for contingencies often requires a more imaginative approach, because contingencies are inherently not obvious. Large organizations, such as governments, are often criticized for not planning for contingencies because the construction of plans to deal with contingencies often involves [[thinking outside the box]]. Beforehand, contingencies are hard to [[prediction|predict]]; this failure to appreciate contingencies ahead of time has led to the formulation of [[Murphy's law]]. | + | In [[philosophy]] and [[logic]], '''contingency''' is the status of [[proposition]]s that are neither true under every possible [[interpretation (logic)|valuation]] (i.e. [[tautology (logic)|tautologies]]) nor false under every possible valuation (i.e. [[contradiction]]s). A contingent proposition is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. Propositions that are contingent may be so because they contain [[logical connective]]s which, along with the [[truth value]] of any of its [[atomic sentence|atomic]] parts, determine the truth value of the proposition. This is to say that the truth value of the proposition is ''contingent'' upon the truth values of the sentences which comprise it. Contingent propositions depend on the [[fact]]s, whereas [[analytic proposition]]s are true without regard to any facts about which they speak. |
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| + | Along with contingent propositions, there are at least three other classes of propositions, some of which overlap: | ||
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| + | * '''[[Tautology (logic)|Tautological]]''' propositions, which ''must'' be true, no matter what the circumstances are or could be (example: "The sky is blue or the sky is not blue."). | ||
| + | * '''[[Contradiction]]s''' which must necessarily be untrue, no matter what the circumstances are or could be (example: "It's raining and it's not raining."). | ||
| + | * '''[[Possible worlds|Possible]]''' propositions, which are true or ''could'' have been true given certain circumstances (examples: x + y = 4; ''There are only three planets''; ''There are more than three planets''). All necessarily true propositions, and all contingent propositions, are also possible propositions. | ||
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In philosophy and logic, contingency is the status of propositions that are neither true under every possible valuation (i.e. tautologies) nor false under every possible valuation (i.e. contradictions). A contingent proposition is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. Propositions that are contingent may be so because they contain logical connectives which, along with the truth value of any of its atomic parts, determine the truth value of the proposition. This is to say that the truth value of the proposition is contingent upon the truth values of the sentences which comprise it. Contingent propositions depend on the facts, whereas analytic propositions are true without regard to any facts about which they speak.
Along with contingent propositions, there are at least three other classes of propositions, some of which overlap:
- Tautological propositions, which must be true, no matter what the circumstances are or could be (example: "The sky is blue or the sky is not blue.").
- Contradictions which must necessarily be untrue, no matter what the circumstances are or could be (example: "It's raining and it's not raining.").
- Possible propositions, which are true or could have been true given certain circumstances (examples: x + y = 4; There are only three planets; There are more than three planets). All necessarily true propositions, and all contingent propositions, are also possible propositions.
Unless indicated otherwise, the text in this article is either based on Wikipedia article "Contingency (philosophy)" or another language Wikipedia page thereof used under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License; or on research by Jahsonic and friends. See Art and Popular Culture's copyright notice.
