Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language
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| - | "In his “[[Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache]]” (1931), [[Carnap]] chooses, as examples of metaphysical nonsense, certain | + | "What is to be investigated is being only and—nothing else; being alone and further—<i>nothing</i>; solely being, and beyond being— <i>nothing</i>. <i>What about this Nothing?</i> . . .<i> Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e. the Negation, exists?</i> Or is it the other way around? <i>Does Negation and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists?</i> . . . We assert: <i>the Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation</i>. . . . Where do we seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing. . . . We know the Nothing. . . . <i>Anxiety reveals the Nothing</i>. . . . That for which and because of which we were anxious, was 'really'—nothing. Indeed: the Nothing itself—as such—was present. . . . <i>What about this Nothing?</i>—<i>[[The Nothing itself nothings]].</i>" --[[What Is Metaphysics?]], 1929, Martin Heidegger |
| - | sentences from Heidegger’s [[Was ist Metaphysik?]] (Heidegger, 1969). This has not normally been taken as a serious encounter with Heidegger’s thought. I wish to argue, on the contrary, that Carnap indeed has a serious understanding and criticism of Heidegger. To this end I will show, first, that both Heidegger and Carnap are reacting against Husserl’s philosophical system, in similar ways and for similar reasons. And I will claim, furthermore, that Carnap understands this, and that he therefore criticizes Heidegger for carrying out their common project incorrectly."[https://people.ucsc.edu/~abestone/papers/uberwindung.pdf] | + | <hr> |
| + | "In his “[[Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache]]” (1931), [[Carnap]] chooses, as examples of metaphysical nonsense, certain sentences from Heidegger’s [[Was ist Metaphysik?]] (Heidegger, 1969). This has not normally been taken as a serious encounter with Heidegger’s thought. I wish to argue, on the contrary, that Carnap indeed has a serious understanding and criticism of Heidegger. To this end I will show, first, that both Heidegger and Carnap are reacting against Husserl’s philosophical system, in similar ways and for similar reasons. And I will claim, furthermore, that Carnap understands this, and that he therefore criticizes Heidegger for carrying out their common project incorrectly."[https://people.ucsc.edu/~abestone/papers/uberwindung.pdf] | ||
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| - | [[Rudolf Carnap]]s Aufsatz ''Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache'' (1931) zeigt schon im Titel die metaphysikkritische Ausrichtung. Seiner These zufolge sind metaphysische Sätze lediglich „[[Scheinsatz|Scheinsätze]]“. Gemeint ist: sie besitzen zwar die grammatikalische Form eines sinnvollen Satzes, bringen jedoch keinen möglichen (bestehenden oder nichtbestehenden) Sachverhalt zum Ausdruck - sie können also gar nicht wahr oder falsch sein. Scheinsätze entstehen nach Carnap auf zweierlei Arten: Zum einen dadurch, dass in einem Satz Wörter verwendet werden, die keine [[Bedeutung (Sprachphilosophie)|Bedeutung]] besitzen, da die so gebildeten Sätze empirisch nicht überprüfbar seien. Zum anderen entstehe ein Scheinsatz, wenn Wörter miteinander verknüpft werden, die fundamental unterschiedlichen semantischen [[Kategorie (Philosophie)|Kategorien]] entstammen. So wird in dem Satz „Cäsar ist eine Primzahl“ das Wort „Primzahl“, das nur auf Zahlen anwendbar ist, auf ein Wort bezogen, das keine Zahl bezeichnet: „Cäsar“. Dieser Satz ist somit weder wahr noch falsch, sondern sinnlos. Die Sinnlosigkeit metaphysischer Sätze liegt nun an ihrer von Kant bestimmten Charakteristik: Da sie keine [[synthetisches Urteil a priori|synthetischen Urteile a priori]] sein sollen, die sich empirischer Erkenntnis generell entziehen, seien sie ''per se'' sinnlos. Die Daseinsberechtigung der Metaphysik besteht laut Carnap nur darin, wie die Kunst ein „[[Lebensphilosophie|Lebensgefühl]]“ zum Ausdruck zu bringen. | + | |
| + | "'''Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache'''" (1931, English: "Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language") is an essay by [[Rudolf Carnap]]. | ||
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| + | It is an illustration of some important differences between "[[analytic philosophy|analytic]]" and "[[continental philosophy|continental]]" styles of philosophy. It argues that [[Martin Heidegger]]'s lecture "[[What Is Metaphysics?]]" violates logical syntax to create nonsensical pseudo-statements (Scheinsätze) such as "[[the nothing nothings]]". Moreover, Carnap claimed that many German metaphysicians of the era were similar to Heidegger in writing statements that were not merely false, but devoid of any meaning. | ||
| + | ==See also== | ||
| + | *"[[The Elimination of Metaphysics]]" (1936) by A. J. Ayer | ||
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"What is to be investigated is being only and—nothing else; being alone and further—nothing; solely being, and beyond being— nothing. What about this Nothing? . . . Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e. the Negation, exists? Or is it the other way around? Does Negation and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists? . . . We assert: the Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation. . . . Where do we seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing. . . . We know the Nothing. . . . Anxiety reveals the Nothing. . . . That for which and because of which we were anxious, was 'really'—nothing. Indeed: the Nothing itself—as such—was present. . . . What about this Nothing?—The Nothing itself nothings." --What Is Metaphysics?, 1929, Martin Heidegger "In his “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1931), Carnap chooses, as examples of metaphysical nonsense, certain sentences from Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik? (Heidegger, 1969). This has not normally been taken as a serious encounter with Heidegger’s thought. I wish to argue, on the contrary, that Carnap indeed has a serious understanding and criticism of Heidegger. To this end I will show, first, that both Heidegger and Carnap are reacting against Husserl’s philosophical system, in similar ways and for similar reasons. And I will claim, furthermore, that Carnap understands this, and that he therefore criticizes Heidegger for carrying out their common project incorrectly."[1] |
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"Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" (1931, English: "Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language") is an essay by Rudolf Carnap.
It is an illustration of some important differences between "analytic" and "continental" styles of philosophy. It argues that Martin Heidegger's lecture "What Is Metaphysics?" violates logical syntax to create nonsensical pseudo-statements (Scheinsätze) such as "the nothing nothings". Moreover, Carnap claimed that many German metaphysicians of the era were similar to Heidegger in writing statements that were not merely false, but devoid of any meaning.
See also
- "The Elimination of Metaphysics" (1936) by A. J. Ayer
