Gilbert Ryle
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| - | '''Quietism''' in [[philosophy]] is an approach to the subject that sees the role of philosophy as broadly therapeutic or remedial. Quietist philosophers believe that philosophy has no positive thesis to contribute, but rather that its value is in defusing confusions in the linguistic and conceptual frameworks of other subjects, including non-quietist philosophy. By re-formulating supposed problems in a way that makes the misguided reasoning from which they arise apparent, the quietist hopes to put an end to man's confusion, and help return to a state of intellectual quietude. | ||
| - | ==Quietist philosophers== | + | '''Gilbert Ryle''' (19 August 1900, [[Brighton]] – 6 October 1976, [[Oxford]]), was a [[United Kingdom|British]] [[philosopher]], a representative of the generation of British [[ordinary language philosophy|ordinary language philosopher]]s that shared [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]]'s approach to philosophical problems, and is principally known for his critique of [[Cartesian dualism]], for which he coined the phrase "the [[ghost in the machine]]". Some of his ideas in the philosophy of mind have been referred to as "behaviourist." Ryle's best known book is ''[[The Concept of Mind]]'' (1949), in which he writes that the "general trend of this book will undoubtedly, and harmlessly, be stigmatised as 'behaviourist'." Ryle, having engaged in detailed study of the key works of [[Bernard Bolzano]], [[Franz Brentano]], [[Alexius Meinong]], [[Edmund Husserl|Husserl]], and [[Martin Heidegger|Heidegger]], himself suggested instead that the book "could be described as a sustained essay in [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], if you are at home with that label." |
| - | Quietism is by its very nature not a philosophical school in the traditional sense of a body of doctrines, but can still be identified by its [[methodology]], which is to focus on language and the use of words, and its objective, which is to show that most philosophical problems are only [[pseudo-problem]]s. | ||
| - | The genesis of the approach can be traced back to [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], whose work greatly influenced the [[Ordinary language philosophy|Ordinary Language philosophers]]. One of the early Ordinary Language works was [[Gilbert Ryle]]'s ''[[The Concept of Mind]]'', an attempt to demonstrate that [[dualism]] arises from a failure to appreciate that mental vocabulary and physical vocabulary are simply different ways of describing one and the same thing, namely human behaviour. [[J. L. Austin|J L Austin's]] ''[[Sense and Sensibilia (Austin)|Sense and Sensibilia]]'' took a similar approach to the problems of scepticism and the reliability of sense perception, arguing that they arise only by misconstruing ordinary language, not because there is anything genuinely wrong with our empirical knowledge. [[Norman Malcolm]], a friend of Wittgenstein's, took a quietist approach to sceptical problems in the philosophy of mind. More recently, two other philosophers to take an explicitly quietist position are [[John McDowell]] and [[Richard Rorty]]. | + | ==Writings== |
| - | + | ===Books=== | |
| - | ==See also== | + | *''[[The Concept of Mind]]'' (1949) |
| - | *[[Pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonian skepticism]] | + | *''Dilemmas'' (1954), a collection of shorter pieces |
| - | *[[Zen]] | + | *''Plato's Progress'' (1966) |
| - | + | *''On Thinking'' (1979) | |
| - | ==References== | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | *Wittgenstein, Ludwig. ''Philosophical Investigations''. 3rd Rev Edn, Blackwell, 2002. ISBN 0631231277 | + | |
| - | *Ryle, Gilbert. ''The Concept of Mind''. London: Hutchinson, 1949. ISBN 0140124829 | + | |
| - | *Austin, J L. ''Sense and Sensibilia''. OUP, 1962. ISBN 0198810830 | + | |
| - | *Macarthur, David. “Pragmatism, Metaphysical Quietism and the Problem of Normativity,” Philosophical Topics. Vol.36 No.1, 2009. | + | |
| - | *Malcolm, Norman. ''Dreaming (Studies in Philosophical Psychology)''. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959. ISBN 0710038364 | + | |
| - | *McDowell, John and Evans, Gareth. ''Truth and Meaning''. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. ISBN 0198245173 | + | |
| - | *McDowell, John. ''Mind and World''. New Ed, Harvard, 1996. ISBN 0674576101 | + | |
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Gilbert Ryle (19 August 1900, Brighton – 6 October 1976, Oxford), was a British philosopher, a representative of the generation of British ordinary language philosophers that shared Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems, and is principally known for his critique of Cartesian dualism, for which he coined the phrase "the ghost in the machine". Some of his ideas in the philosophy of mind have been referred to as "behaviourist." Ryle's best known book is The Concept of Mind (1949), in which he writes that the "general trend of this book will undoubtedly, and harmlessly, be stigmatised as 'behaviourist'." Ryle, having engaged in detailed study of the key works of Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong, Husserl, and Heidegger, himself suggested instead that the book "could be described as a sustained essay in phenomenology, if you are at home with that label."
Writings
Books
- The Concept of Mind (1949)
- Dilemmas (1954), a collection of shorter pieces
- Plato's Progress (1966)
- On Thinking (1979)
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