Sortal
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| + | '''Sortal''' is a concept that has been used by some philosophers in discussing issues of identity, persistence, and change. The simplest property of a sortal is that it can be counted, i.e., can take numbers as [[grammatical modifier|modifiers]]. For example, "pea" is a sortal in the sentence "I want two peas", whereas "water" is not a sortal in the sentence "I want water". Countability is not the only criterion. Thus "red thing" in the sentence "There are two red things on the shelf" is not treated as a sortal by some philosophers who use the term. There is disagreement about the exact definition of the term as well as whether it is applied to linguistic things (such as predicates or words), abstract entities (such as properties), or psychological entities (such as [[concept]]s). | ||
| - | In [[metaphysics]], a '''universal''' is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things. For example, suppose there are two beds in a room, each of which is green. These two beds both share the quality of "[[bedness]]", as well as greenness or the quality of being green; in other words, they share a "universal". There are three major kinds of qualities or characteristics: [[type (metaphysics)|types or kinds]] (e.g. mammal), [[property (metaphysics)|properties]] (e.g. short, strong), and [[relation (metaphysics)|relations]] (e.g. father of, next to). These are all different types of universals. | + | ==Differing perspectives== |
| + | According to the [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], the sortal/nonsortal distinction can be characterized in at least six different ways. It is said that a sortal: | ||
| - | Paradigmatically, universals are ''[[abstract (philosophy)|abstract]]'' (e.g. humanity), whereas particulars are ''[[concrete (philosophy)|concrete]]'' (e.g. the personhood of Socrates). However, universals are not necessarily abstract and particulars are not necessarily concrete. For example, one might hold that numbers are [[abstract particular|particular yet abstract objects]]. Likewise, some philosophers, such as [[David Malet Armstrong|D.M. Armstrong]], consider universals to be concrete. | + | *gives a criterion for counting the items of that kind |
| + | *gives a criterion of identity and non-identity among items of that kind | ||
| + | *gives a criterion for the continued existence of an item of that kind | ||
| + | *answers the question "what is it?" for things of that kind | ||
| + | *specifies the essence of things of that kind | ||
| + | *does not apply to parts of things of that kind | ||
| - | Most do not consider [[class (philosophy)|classes]] to be universals, although some prominent philosophers do, such as John Bigelow. | + | ==History== |
| + | While some philosophers have argued that the notion of a sortal is similar to that of the idea of a "secondary substance" in [[Aristotle]], the first actual use of the term 'sortal' did not appear until [[John Locke]] in his 1690 ''[[Essay Concerning Human Understanding]]'': | ||
| - | ==Problem of universals== | + | {{quote |But it being evident, that things are ranked under Names into sorts or Species…the Essence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract Idea, which the General, or Sortal (if I may have leave so to call it, from Sort, as I do General from Genus) Name stands for. And this we shall find to be that, which the word Essence imports, in its most familiar use. |
| + | |Locke, Bk.III, Ch.III, 15}} | ||
| - | ''The [[problem of universals]]'' is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. The problem arises from attempts to account for the phenomenon of similarity or attribute agreement among things. For example, [[grass]] and [[Granny Smith|Granny Smith apples]] are similar or agree in attribute, namely in having the attribute of greenness. The issue is how to account for this sort of agreement in attribute among things. | + | [[Gottlob Frege]] is also named as an antecedent to the present debate over sortals. Frege pointed out that in counting things, we need to know what kind of thing it is that we are counting; that is, there needs to be a "criterion of identity". |
| - | There are many philosophical positions regarding universals. Taking "beauty" as an example, three positions are: | + | ===Contemporary discussion=== |
| - | * Idealism or conceptualism: beauty is a property constructed in the mind, so it exists only in descriptions of things. | + | Sortals make a return with the work of [[P. F. Strawson]], [[W.V.O. Quine]], [[Peter Geach]], and [[David Wiggins]]. Strawson holds that sortals are universals, Quine thinks they are predicates, and Wiggins sees them as concepts. Geach did not use the exact term "sortal"; however, his idea of the "substantival expression" is identical or nearly so to that of "sortal". |
| - | * Platonic realism: beauty is a property that exists in an ideal form independently of any mind or thing. | + | |
| - | * Aristotelian realism: beauty is a property that only exists when beautiful things exist. | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | Taking a broader view, the main positions are generally considered classifiable as: [[Philosophical realism|realism]], [[nominalism]], and [[idealism]] (sometimes simply named "anti-realism" with regard to universals). Realists posit the existence of independent, abstract universals to account for attribute agreement. Nominalists deny that universals exist, claiming that they are not necessary to explain attribute agreement. Conceptualists posit that universals exist only in the [[philosophy of mind|mind]], or when conceptualized, denying the independent existence of universals. Complications which arise include the implications of language use and the complexity of relating language to [[ontology]]. | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | ==Particular== | + | |
| - | :''[[Particular]] | + | |
| - | A universal may have instances, known as its ''particulars''. For example, the type ''dog'' (or ''doghood'') is a universal, as are the property ''red'' (or ''redness'') and the relation ''betweenness'' (or ''being between''). Any particular dog, red thing, or object that is between other things is not a universal, however, but is an ''instance'' of a universal. That is, a universal type (''doghood''), property (''redness''), or relation (''betweenness'') ''[[Substance theory#Inherence|inheres]]'' in a particular object (a specific dog, red thing, or object between other things). | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | ==Platonic realism== | + | |
| - | [[Platonic realism]] holds universals to be the [[referent]]s of general terms, such as the ''[[abstraction|abstract]]'', nonphysical, non-mental entities to which words such as "sameness", "circularity", and "beauty" refer. Particulars are the referents of proper names, such as "Phaedo," or of definite descriptions that identify single objects, such as the phrase, "that bed over there". Other metaphysical theories may use the terminology of universals to describe physical entities. | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | Plato's examples of what we might today call universals included mathematical and geometrical ideas such as a circle and natural numbers as universals. Plato's views on universals did, however, vary across several different discussions. In some cases, Plato spoke as if the perfect circle functioned as the [[substantial form|form]] or blueprint for all copies and for the word definition of ''circle''. In other discussions, Plato describes particulars as "participating" in the associated universal. | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | Contemporary realists agree with the thesis that universals are multiply-exemplifiable entities. Examples include by D. M. Armstrong, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reinhardt Grossmann, Michael Loux. | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | ==Nominalism== | + | |
| - | Nominalists hold that universals are not real mind-independent entities but either merely concepts (sometimes called "conceptualism") or merely names. Nominalists typically argue that properties are abstract particulars (like tropes) rather than universals. [[JP Moreland]] distinguishes between "extreme" and "moderate" nominalism. Examples of nominalists include the medieval philosophers [[Roscelin of Compiègne]] and [[William of Ockham]] and contemporary philosophers [[W. V. O. Quine]], [[Wilfred Sellars]], [[D. C. Williams]], and [[Keith Campbell (philosopher)|Keith Campbell]]. | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | ==Ness-ity-hood principle <!--'Ness-ity-hood principle' and 'Ness-ity-hood Principle' redirect here-->== | + | |
| - | The '''ness-ity-hood principle'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is used mainly by English-speaking philosophers to generate convenient, concise names for universals or [[Property (philosophy)|properties]]. According to the Ness-Ity-Hood Principle, a name for any universal may be formed that is distinctive, "of left-handers" may be formed by taking the predicate "left-handed" and adding "ness", which yields the name "left-handedness". The principle is most helpful in cases where there is not an established or standard name of the universal in ordinary English usage: What is the name of the universal distinctive of chairs? "Chair" in English is used not only as a subject (as in "The chair is broken"), but also as a predicate (as in "That is a chair"). So to generate a name for the universal distinctive of chairs, take the predicate "chair" and add "ness", which yields "chairness". | + | |
| ==See also== | ==See also== | ||
| - | * [[Hypostatic abstraction]] | + | * [[Taxonomy (general)]] |
| - | * [[Philosophy of mathematics]] | + | |
| - | * [[Sortal]] | + | |
| - | * ''[[The Secret of Hegel]]'' | + | |
| - | * [[Universality (philosophy)]] | + | |
| {{GFDL}} | {{GFDL}} | ||
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Sortal is a concept that has been used by some philosophers in discussing issues of identity, persistence, and change. The simplest property of a sortal is that it can be counted, i.e., can take numbers as modifiers. For example, "pea" is a sortal in the sentence "I want two peas", whereas "water" is not a sortal in the sentence "I want water". Countability is not the only criterion. Thus "red thing" in the sentence "There are two red things on the shelf" is not treated as a sortal by some philosophers who use the term. There is disagreement about the exact definition of the term as well as whether it is applied to linguistic things (such as predicates or words), abstract entities (such as properties), or psychological entities (such as concepts).
Contents |
Differing perspectives
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the sortal/nonsortal distinction can be characterized in at least six different ways. It is said that a sortal:
- gives a criterion for counting the items of that kind
- gives a criterion of identity and non-identity among items of that kind
- gives a criterion for the continued existence of an item of that kind
- answers the question "what is it?" for things of that kind
- specifies the essence of things of that kind
- does not apply to parts of things of that kind
History
While some philosophers have argued that the notion of a sortal is similar to that of the idea of a "secondary substance" in Aristotle, the first actual use of the term 'sortal' did not appear until John Locke in his 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding:
Gottlob Frege is also named as an antecedent to the present debate over sortals. Frege pointed out that in counting things, we need to know what kind of thing it is that we are counting; that is, there needs to be a "criterion of identity".
Contemporary discussion
Sortals make a return with the work of P. F. Strawson, W.V.O. Quine, Peter Geach, and David Wiggins. Strawson holds that sortals are universals, Quine thinks they are predicates, and Wiggins sees them as concepts. Geach did not use the exact term "sortal"; however, his idea of the "substantival expression" is identical or nearly so to that of "sortal".
See also
Unless indicated otherwise, the text in this article is either based on Wikipedia article "Sortal" or another language Wikipedia page thereof used under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License; or on research by Jahsonic and friends. See Art and Popular Culture's copyright notice.
