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Three treatises: the first concerning art; the second concerning music, painting, and poetry; the third concerning happiness [1] (1744) is a text by James Harris.

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T,

CONCERNING

A R

2i A

D I A L O G U E

To the Right Honourable the

Earl of Shaftesbury.

My Lord,

THE following is a Converfatiori in its kind fomewhat uncom^ mon, and for this reafon I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the fame Peculiarity prove a Reafon to amufe your Lordfhip, I fhall think myfelf well rewarded in the Labour of. reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the Intention, and to think there is fome kind, of Merit even in the Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no Jonger Preface, the Fact was as follows.

B 2 A

£ Concerning A R T,

A Fr i e n d from a diftant Country hav^ ing by chance made me a Vifit, we were tempted by the Serenity of a chearful Morn- ing in the Spring, to walk from S — r — m %o fee Lord T?—mbr-~kes at JV-4t--n. The Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Paint- ing, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, were the Subject of great Entertainment to my Friend s Nor was I, for my own part, lefs delighted than he was, to find that our Walk had fo well anfwered his Expectations. We had given a large Scope to our Curiofi- ty, when we left the Seat, and leifurely ber gan our return towards home.

And here, my Lord, in paffing over a few pleafant Fields, commenced the Con- verfation which I am to tell you, and which fell at firft, as was natural, ori the many curious Works, which had afforded us both fo elegant an Amufement. This led us in- fenfibly to difcourflng upoh ART, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been admiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be

referre4

A I)l AJLt)GltE. 5

referred to no other Caufe. And here, I' well remember* I called upon my Friend to give me his Opinion upon the meaning of the Word ART: A Word it was (I told him) in the Mouth of every one $ but for all that* as to its precife and definite Idea, this might ftill be a Secret -> that fo it was in fad with & thoufand Words befide, all no lefs common 3 and equally familiar, and yet all of them equally Vague and undetermined* To this he anfwered, That as to the pre- eife and definite Idea of Art, it was a Que* ftion of fome Difficulty, and not fo foon to be f efolved ; that, however, he could not con- ceive a more likely Method of coming to know it, than by confidering thofe feveral Particulars, to each of which we gave the Name. It is hardly probable, faid he, that Mufic, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, Agriculture, and fo many more fhould be all called by one common Name, if there was not fomething in each, which was common to all. It fhould feem fo, replied I. What then, faid he, fhall we pronounce this to be ? A% this, I remember, I was under

B 3 fome

6 Concerning A R r T i

fome fort of Hefitation. Have Courage* cried my Friend* perhaps the Cafe is not fo defperate. Let me afk you — Is Medi- cine the Caufe of any thing ? Yes furely, faid I, of Health. And Agriculture,

of what ? Of the plentiful Growth of Grain. And Poetry, of what? Of Plays, and Satires, and Odes, and the like.

And is not the fame true, faid he, of Mufic, of Statuary, of Architecture, and, in fhort, of every Art whatever ? I confefs, faid I, it feems fo. Suppofe then, faid he, we fhould fay, It was common to every Art to be a Caufe, — - Should we err ? I replied, I thought not. Let this then, faid he, be remembered, that all Art isCaule,

I promifed him it fhould*

But how then, continued he, if all Art be Caufe^ is it alfo true, that all Caufe is Art ? At this again I could not help hehtating. You have heard, faid he,

without doubt, of that Painter famed in Story, who being to paint the Foam of a Hone, and not fucceeding to his Mind,

threw

^ Dialogue. 7

threw his Pencil at the Fi&ure in a Fit of Paffion and Defpair, and produced a Foam the mod natural imaginable. Now, what fay you to this Fact ? Shall we pro- nounce Art to have been the Caufe ? By no means, faid I. What, faid he, if in- ftead of Chance, his Hand had been guided by mere Compulfwn, himfelf diffenting and averfe to the Violence ? Even here, re- plied I, nothing could have been referred to his Art. But what, continued he, if in- itead of a cafual Throw, or involuntary Com- pulfion, he had willingly and deliberately direct- ed his Pencil, and fo produced that Foam,

which Story fays he failed in ?- Would

not Art here have been the Caufe ? I

replied, in this cafe, I thought it would. It mould feem then, faid he, that Art implies not only Caufe, but the additional •Requifite of Intention, Reafon, Volition, and Confcioufnefs -, fo that not every Caufe is Art, but only voluntary or intentional Caufe. So, faid I, it appears.

B 4 And-

8 Concerning ART,

And fhall we then, added he, pronounce every intentional Caufe to be*Art ? I fee

no reafon, faid I, why not. Confider,

faid he ; Hunger this Morning prompted you to eat. You were then the Caufe, and that too the intentional Caufe •, of con- fuming certain Food : And yet will you refer this Confumption to Art ? Did you chew by Art ? Did you fwallow by Art ? No certainly, faid I. So by

opening your Eyes, laid he, you are the intentional Caufe of Seeing, and by ftretch- ing your Hand, the intentional Caufe of Feeling; and yet will you affirm, that thefe things proceed from Art ? I mould be wrong, faid I, if I did : For what Art can there be in doings what every one is able to do by mere Will^ and a fort of uninflrudled Inflinff ? You fay right, replied he, and the reafon Is manifeft. Were it otherwife, we mould make all Mankind univerfal Ar- tifts in every fingle A&ion of their Lives. And what can be a greater Abfurdity than this ? I confeffed that the Abfurdity ap- peared

A Dialogue. 9

peared to be evident. But if nothing then, continued he, which we do by Com- pulfion, or without intending it, be Art y and not even what we do intentionally, if it pro- ceed from mere Will and uninjlruSied In- ftinft - y what is it we have left remaining, where Art may be found converfant ? Or can it indeed poffibly be in any thing elfe, than in that which we do by life, Praffiice, Experience ', and the like, all which are born with no one, but which are acquired all afterward by Advances unperceived* I can think, faid I, of nothing elfe. Let therefore the Words Habit and Habitual y faid he, reprefent this Requifite, and let us fay, that Art is not only a Caufe, but an intentional Caufe , and not only an inten* tknal Caufe, but an intentional Caufe found- ed in Habit, or, in other Words, an habi- tual Caufe. You appear, faid I, to argue rightly.

But if Art, faid he, be what we have now afferted, fomething learnt and acquired; if it be alfo a thing intentional

or

io Concerning ART,

or voluntary, and not governed either by

Chance or blind Necejjity- If this, I fay,

be the Cafe, then mark the Confequences. And what, faid I, are they ? The jBrft, laid he, is, that no Events, in what we call the natural World, mull be referred to Art\ fuch as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For thefe all happen by Hated Laws ; by a curi- ous NeceJJity, which is not to be withftood, and where the nearer and immediate Caufes appear to be utterly unconfcious. I con-

fefs, faid I, it feems fo. In the next

place, continued he, we mull: exclude all thofe admired Works of the Animal Worlds which, for their Beauty and Order, we me- taphorically call artificial The Spider's Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's Houfe, and the Bird's Nell, mull all be referred to

another Source. For who can lay, thefe

ever learnt to be thus ingenious ? or, that they were ignorant by Nature, and knowing only by Education? None furely, re-

plied I. But we have Hill, faid he, a higher Confideration. And what, faid I,

is

^ Dialogue, ii

is that? It is, anfwered he, this

Not even that Divine Power, which gave Form to all things, then ac7ed by Art, when it gave that Form. For how, continued he, can that Intelligence, which has all Perfection ever in Energy, be fiippofed to have any Power, not original to its Nature^ How can it ever have any thing to learn y when it knows all from the Beginning ; or, being perfedl and complete, admit of what is additional and fecondary ? I fliould

think, faid I, it were impoffible. If fo, faid he, then Art can never be numbered among its Attributes : For all Art is fome- thing learnt, fomething fecondary and ac- quired, and never original to any Being, which poffeffes it. So the Fad:, faid I, has been eftablifhed.

If this therefore, continued he, be true; if Art belong not either to the Divine Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate

Nature, to what Nature fhall we fay it

does belong ? I know not, faid I, unlefs it be to the Human, You are right, faid

he|

j 2 Concerning A R T,

he < for every Nature elle you perceive xi cither too excellent to want it, or too bafe to be capable of it. Befide, except the Human, what other Nature is there left ? Or where elfe can we find any of the Arts already Inftanced, or indeed whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate ? Who are Statuaries, but Men ? Who Pilots, who Muficians? This feems, replied I, td be the Fa&*

Let us then, continued he, fay, not only that Art is a Caufe y but that it is Man becoming a Caufe •> and not only Man* but Man intending to do what is going to be done„ and doing it alfo by Habit; fo that its whole Idea, as far as we have

hitherto conceived it, is Man becoming

a Caufe \ Intentional and HabituaL I con- fels, faid I, it has appeared fo.

And thus, faid he, have you had exhi- bited a fort of a Sketch of Art . You muft re- member however, it is but a Sketch : there! is ftill fomething wanting to make it a

finished

'i? Dialogue. 13

finifhed Piece. I begged to know what this was. In order to that, replied he,

I cannot do better, than remind you of a PafTage in your admired Horace. It is con- cerning Alfenus-y who (if you remember) he tells us, though his Tools were laid afide, and his Shop fhut up, was frill an Artift as much as ever.—*—

. — ,-,— Alfenus wafer omni Abjeflo injirumento Artis, claufdq-, tabema, Sutor er at .— ^— «- I remember,

faid I, the PafTage, but to what purpofe is it quoted ? Only, replied he, to ihew you ? that I mould not be without Prece- dent, were I to affirm it not abfolutely ne- ceflary to the being of Art, that it mould be Man actually becoming a Caufe j but that it was enough, if he had the Power or Capo* city of fo becoming. Why then, faid I, did you not fettle it fo at firft ? Becaufe, replied he, Faculties, Powers, Capacities (call them as you will) are in them- felves abftrad: from A&ion, but obfcure and hidden things. On the contrary. Energies find Operations lie open to the Senfes, and

cannot:

14 Concerning ART,

cannot but be obferved, even whether we will or no. And hence therefore, when firft we treated of Art, we chofe to treat of it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured fomewhat farther. Repeat then, faid I, if you pleafe, the Alteration, which you have made. At firft, anfwered he, we reafoned upon Art, as if it was only Man actually becoming a Caufe intentional and habitual. Now we fay it is a Power in Man of becoming fuch Caufe; and that, though he be not aBually in the Exercife of fuch a Power. I told him, his Amende inent appeared to be juft.

There is too another Alteration, added he, which, for the fake of Accuracy, is equally wanting $ and that is with reiped: to the Epithet, Intentional or Voluntary. And what, faid I, is that ? We have agreed it, replied he, to be neceffary, that all Art fhould be under the Guidance of Intention or Volition^ fo that no Man a&ing by Com-* pulfion^ or by Chance^ fhould be called

A Dialogue. 15

an Artijt. We have. Now tho*

this, faid he, be .true, yet it is not fufficient. We muft limit this Intention or Volition to a peculiar Kind. For were every little Fancy, which we may work up into Habit, a fufficient Foundation to conftitute an Art, we mould make Art one of the loweft and moft deipicable of things. The meaneft Trick of a common juggler might, in fuch cafe, entitle a Man to the Charadter of ant Artift. I confefTed, without fome Lirru> tation, that this might be the Confequence. But how limit Intentions to a Kind or Species ? What think you, replied he, if we were to do it, by the Number and Dignity of the Precepts^ which go to the directing of our Intentions ? You mud explain, faid I ; for your Meaning is ob- fcure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sow- ing ? Are there not Precepts in Archi- tecture, about Orders and Proportions ? Are there not the fame in Medicine, in Navigation, and the reft? There are. And what is your Opinion of thefe

feveral

1 6 Concerning ART,

feveral Precepts ? Are they arbitrary and capricious ; or rational and Jleady ? Are they the Inventions of a Day ; or well- approved by long Experience ? I told him, I ihould conlider them for the mod as rational, fteady, and well-approved by long Experience. And what, continued he, fhall we fay to their Number ? Are they few ? Or are they not rather fo ?7umerous > that in every particular Art, fcarce any comprehend them all, but the feveral Ar- tifts themfelves ; and they only by length of time, with due Attendance and Appli- cation ? I replied, It feemed fb. Suppofe then We were to pronounce, that to every Art there was a Syjlem of fuch various and well-approved Precepts : Should we err ? No certainly. And fuppofe we fhould fay, that the Intention of every Artift, in his feveral Art, was directed by fuch a Syjlem : Would you allow this ? Surely. And will not this limiting of Intentions to fuch only, as are fo directed, fufficiently diftinguifh Art from any thing clfe which may refemble it ? -**-- In other

words,

f ^ Dialogue. 1 \j

words, Is it likely, under this Diftinction, to be confounded with other Habits of a trifling, capricious and inferior Kind ? I replied, I thought not.

Let us then fee, faid he, and colleclt all that we have faid, together. We have already agreed, that the "Power of affii?ig after a certain manner is fufficient to con- flitute Art, without the actually operating agreeably to that Power. And We have now farther held the Intentions of every Artift to be directed by a Syjiem of various and well-approved Precepts. Befides all this,' we fettled it before, that all Art was founded in Habit ; and was peculiar to Man ; and was feen by becoming the Caufe of fome Ef- fect. It mould feem then, that the whole

Idea of Art was this An habitual

Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Effect, accord- ing to a System of various and well-approved PreceptsJ I replied, That his Account appeared to be probable and juft.

C §. 2 ;

1 8 Concerning ART,- \ %

§. 2. An d now then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have fettled between us what we believe Art to be ; lhall we go a little farther, or is your Patience at an end ? Oh ! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked fo leifurely, that much remains of our Way ; and I can think of no Method, how we may better amufe ourfelves.

M y Friend upon this proceeded with fay- ing, that if Art were a Cauf e > (as we had agreed it was) it muft be the Caufe of feme- i thing. Allow it, faid I. An d if it be ' the C aufe of fomething, it muft have a Sub- jett to operate on. For every Agent has need ^ of its Patient ; the Smith of his Iron, the r *^. Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship. I anfwered, It was true. If then,

faid he, the Subjects of particular Arts be thus evident : What Idea fhall we form of that univerfal Subjeff y which is common to all Art? At this Queftion, it muft be con- feffed, I was a little embarafled,

X

A Dialogue* 19

This induced him to afk me* How many forts of Subje&s I allowed of ? Here I could not help hefitating again* There

is nothing, continued he, fo difficult in the Queftion. You muft needs perceive, that all Natures whatever can be but either con- tingent or necejfary. This may be, re^ plied 1 1 but even yet I do not comprehend you. Not comprehend me ! faid he $

then anfwer me a Queflion : Can you con- ceive any Medium between Motion and No-* Motion^ between Change and No^Change ?

I replied, I could not. If not,

can you conceive any tiling hi the whole Order of Beings which muft not be either liable to thefe, or not liable ? Nothing*

Call thofe things therefore, faid he, W.hich are liable to Change and Motion^ con- tingent Natures - y and thofe, which are not liable^ necejfary Natures: And thus you have a Divijion, in which all things are in<* eluded. We have fo, faid I.

C 2 In

20 Concerning A R f ,

In which therefore, faid he, of thefe Na- tives rfiall we feek for this common Subject of Art ? To this, I told him, I was unable to anfwer. Refled, faid he, a little.

We have found Art to be a Caufe.

We have. And is it not effentialto every Caufe to operate ? or can it be a Caufe, and be the Caufe of nothing ? Impoffible.

Wherever therefore there is Caufe, there is neceffarily implied fome Operation.

There is. And can there poffibly be Operation, without Motion and Change ?

There cannot. But Change and

Motion muft needs be i?icompatihle with what is neceffary and immutable. They

muft. So therefore is Caufe. It muft.

And fo therefore Art. It muft.

Truth therefore, faid he, and Know- ledge 5 Principles and Demonftrations j the general and intelleftual Effences of Things ; in ihort, the whole immutable and neceffary Nature is no part of it reducible to a SubjeS of Art. It feems fo, faid I.

If

^Dialogue. 21

If therefore Art, faid he, have nothing to do with the Jleady, abjlratt, and ne- cejfary Nature, it can have only to do with the tranfient, the particular, and contingent one. 'Tis true, faid I; for

there is no other left. And mall we

then fay, replied he, it has to do with all contingent Natures existing in the Univerfe ? For aught, replied I, which to me ap- pears contrary. What think you, faid he, of thofe Contingents of higher Order ? fuch as the grand Planetary Syftem; the Succeffion of the Seafons ; the regular and uniform Courfe of all fuperior Natures in the Univerfe ? Has Art any Ability to intermeddle here ? No certainly, faid I. Thefe fuperior Contingents then, which move without Interruption, are, it feems, above it. They are. And fhall we fay the fame of thofe of lower fort; thofe, whofe Courfe we fee often inter- rupted; thofe, which the Strength and Cun- ning of Man are able to influence and con- troul? Give Inftances, faid I, of what C 3 you

22 Concerning ART,

you mean, I mean, faid he, Earth*

Water, Air, Fire ; Stones, Trees - y Ani- mals; Men themfelves. Are thefe Con- tingents within the reach of Art, or has Art here no Influence ? I mould think,

faid I, a very great one.

If this, continued he, be true, it mould feem that the common or universal Subject of Art was — all those con- tingent Natures, which lie within the reach of the Human Powers to influence. I acknowledge, faid I 3 it appears fo.

Thus far then, faid he, we have ad- vanced with tolerable Succefs. We have gained fome Idea of Art^ and fome Idea of its SubjeB. Our Inquiry, on the whole, has informed us, that Art is * — - an habi-* tual "Power in Man of becoming a certain

Caufe—— and that its Subject is every

fuch contingent Nature \ which lies within the reach of the human Powers to influence.

§•3

^Dialogue. 23

§. 3 . Tis true, faid I, this appears to have been the Refult of our Inquiry, and a full and ample one it feems to have been. A long one, replied he, if you pleafe, but not a full and ample one. Can any

thing, laid I, be wanting, after what you have faid already? Certainly, replied

he, a great deal. We have talked much indeed of Art, confidered as a Caufe - y and much of the SubjeB, on which it operates - 7 but what moves thefe Operations to com- mence, and where it is they end, thefe are Topicks, which we have as yet little thought of. I begged him then, that

we might now confider them,

He was willing, he faid, for his part, and immediately went on by afking, What I thought was the Beginning of Art ? I mean, faid he, by Beginning, that Caufe for the fake of which it operates, and which being fuppofed away, Men would be never moved to follow it. To this, I told him,

J was unable to anfwer. You will not

C 4 think

24 Concerning ART,

think it, faid he, fo difficult, when you have a little more confidered. Reflect

with yourfelf Was it not the Abfence

of Health, which excited Men to cultivate the Art of Medicine ? I replied, it was. What then, faid he, if the Human Body had been fo far perfect and felf- fufficient, as never to have felt the Viciffi- tudes of Well and III: Would not then this Art have been wholly unknown ? I replied, I thought it would. And

what, faid he, if we extend this Perfection a degree farther, and fuppofe the Body not only thus healthful^ but withal fo robujl, as to have felt no Uneafinefs from all Incle- mencies of Weather : Would not then the Arts of Building alfo and Clothing have been as ufelefs, as that of Medicine ? I replied, It feemed they would. But

what, faid he, if we bound not this Per- fection of ours even here ? What if we fuppofe, that not only Things merely necef fary, but that thofe alfo conducive to Ele- gance and Enjoyment were of courfe all implied in the Conflitution of Human Na- ture -,

y? Dialogue. 25

ture ; that they were all fteady, conflant, and independant from without, and as in- feparable from our Being, as Perfpiring, or Circulation : In fuch cafe, would not the Arts of Mufic, Painting and Poetry, with every other Art paffing under the Denomi- nation of Elegaiit, have been as ufelefs, as we have held thofe others of Medicine, Clothing, and Architecture? I replied, It feemed they would. It was then the Abfence of Joys, Elegancies, and Amufe- ments from our Constitution, as left by Nature, which induced us to feek them in thefe Arts of Elegance and Entertainment, It was. And what, faid he, are

Joys, Elegancies, Amufements, Health, Robuftnefs, with thofe feveral other ObjeBs of Defre, whofe Abfence leads to Art, but fo many different Names of that complex Being called Good, under its various, and multi- form, and popular Appearances ? I re- plied, It feemed fo»

If this then, faid he, be granted, it fliould feem that the Beginning or Prin- ciple

26 Concerning A R T,

ciple of Art was the Abfence of fomething thought Good; becaufe it has appeared that it is for the fake of fome fuch abfent Good that every Art operates - y and becaufe, if we fuppofe no fuch Abfence to have been, we fhould never have known any Art. I confefs, faid I, it feems fo.

But how then, continued he? If it be true that all Art implies fuch Principle, is it reciprocally true, that every fuch Principle mould imply Art ? I fee no

reafon, faid I, why not, Confider,

faid he. It might be thought a Good by fome perhaps, to be as ftrong as thofe Horfes, which are ploughing yonder Field $ to be as tall as thofe Elms, and of a Nature

as durable. Yet would the Abfence of

Goods, like tkefe, lead to Art ? Or is it not abfio'd to fuppofe, there mould be an Art of Impofibilites ? Abfurd, faid I, cer-

tainly. If fo, faid he, when we define

the Beginning or Principle of Art, it is not enough to call it the Abfence of fomething thought Good) unlefs we add 3 that the Good

be

^ Dialogue. 27

be a Good Pojfibk; a Thing attainable by Man ; a Thing relative to Human Life, and confident with Human Nature : Or does not this alfo appear a Requifite ? I replied,

I thought it did.

But ftill, continued he Is it a fuf-

ficient Motive to Art, that the Good dejired fhould be attainable? In other Words, does every Abfence of Good attainable lead to Art, or is our Account ftill too loofe, and Jn need of ftridter Determination ? Of none, faid I, which appears to me, Jlefleft, faid he ; there are fome of the pof Jible Goods fo obvious and eafy, that every Man, in an ordinary State of common na- tural PerfeBion y is able to acquire them, without Labour or Application. You will hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear Spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere Suggeftions of Will and unin- JfruSed Inflinffi. I granted, they might* It would be therefore impertinent, laid he, to fuppofe that Gpods, like thefe,

fhould

2§ Concerning ART,

fhould lead to Art, becaufe Art would be fuperfluous, and in no refpect neceifary. Indeed, faid I, it feems fo.

If therefore, faid he, neither Irnpqflibks lead to Art) becaufe of fuch there can be no Art 5 nor Things eafily pojjible, becaufe in fuch Nature can do without Art : what is it we have left, to which we may refer it ? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that middle Clafs of Things, which, however pof- fible, are ftill not fo eafy, but to be beyond the Powers of Will, and Inftinc~t unin- ftructed ? I replied, It feemed fo.

That there are many fuch things, faid he, is evident part doubt. For what Man would pay Artifts fo largely for their Arts, were he enabled by Nature to obtain what- ever he defired ? Or who would ftudy to be {killed in Arts, were Nature's original Powers to be in all refpecls fufficient ? I told him, It was not likely.

It fhould feem then, faid he, according %o this Reafoning, that the Beginning, Mo~

five.

v^ Dialogue. 29

' tive, or Principle of Art ; that Caufe y which firft moved it to A5tion y and, for the fake of which its feveral Operations are exerted, is—— the Want or Absence of some- thing appearing Good; relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed faculties. I replied, I could not deny, but that the Account appeared probable.

§.4. Let this then, faid he, fuffice, as to the Beginning of Art. But how mall we defcribe its End? What is it we mail pro- nounce this ? My Anfwer, I replied, muft be the fame as often already ; which was indeed, that I could not refolve the Queftion. It mould feem, faid he, not fo difficult, now we have difcovered what Beginning is. For if Beginning and End are Contraries and oppofed, it is but to invert , as it were, the Notion of Begin- ning, and we gain of courfe the Notion of End. I afked him, In what manner ? Thus, faid he, the Beginning of Art has

been

30 . ' Cone er ?itng ART*,

been held to htfomething, which, iffuppofed away. Men would be never moved to apply to Art, By Inverfion therefore the End of Art muft be fomething, which, while fuppofed away. Men will never ceaje applying to Art $ becaufe, were they to ceafe, while the End was wanting, they would ceafe with Im-* perfection, and their Performance would be incomplete. To this I anfwered, That

the Account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much Intelligence*

He replied. If it was, he would endea^ vour to be more particular. And what, continued he, fhould we fay, that every Art, according to its Genius, will of courfe be accomplijhed either in fome Energy, or in {ome IVork; that, beiides thefe two, it can be accomplifhed in nothing elfe • and con* fequently that one of thefe muft of necefjity be its End? I could not here but anfwer him with a Smile, That the Matter was now much obfeurer than ever. I find

then, faid he, it is proper we fhould be more explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our

Reafon-

A Dialogue. 31

Reafonings from fome clearer Point of View. I told him, It was quite necef-

fary, if he intended to be intelligible.

Thus then, faid he. You will grant, that every Art, being a Caufe, mujl be productive " of fome Effect-, for inftance, Mufic, of a Tune ; Dancing, of a Dance ; Architecture, of a Palace 3 and Sculpture, of a Statue. 'Tis allowed, faid I. You will

grant alfo, faid he r that in thefe Productions they are all accompliflied and ended: Or, in other words, that as Mufic produces a Tune, fo is it ended and accomplished in a Tune> and as Sculpture produces a Statue, fo is it ended and accomplished in a Statue. 'Tis admitted, faid I. Now thefe Pro-

ductions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like Units or Mathematical Points; but, on the contrary, all co7ifiJl of a certain Number of Parts, from whofe accurate Or- der is derived their Beauty and Perfection. For example $ Notes, ranged after fuch a manner, make a Tune in Mufic ; and Limbs, ranged after fuch a manner, make a

Statue

32 Concerning ART,

Statue or a Pidture. I replied, They dicL If then the Productions, continued he, of every Art thus confift of certain Parts$ it will follow, that thefe Parts will be either co-exiflent, or not; and if not co-exijlent, then of courfe fuccejjive. Affift me,

faid I, by another Inftance, for you are growing again obfcure. Co-exijlent, re-

plied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs, Body, and Head allfubjiji together at one in- dividual Injlant : Succejfive, as in a Tune or Dance, where there is no fuch Co-exiftence, but where fome Parts are ever pajjing away t and others are ever fucceeding them.

Can any thing be faid to exifl, faid I, whofe Parts are ever pajjing away 1 ? Surely, replied he, or how elfe exift Years and Seafons, Months and Days, with their

common Parent, 'Time itfelf ? Or indeed

what is Human Life, but a Compound of Parts thus fleeting - y a Compound of various and multiform Anions, which fucceed each other in a certain Order ? The Fad:,

faid I, appears fo.

This

A Dialogue, 33

This then, continued he, being the cafe, and there being this Difference in Produc- tions, call every Production, the Parts of which exiji fmcejjively, and whofe Nature hath its Being or EJfence in a Tranfition, call it, what it really is, a Motion or an Energy— Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies ; thus Riding and Sailing are Energies ; and fo is Elocution, and fo is Life itfelf. On the contrary, call every Production, whole Parts exifi nil at once, and whofe Nature de- fends not on a Tranjition for its EJfence, call it a Work, or Thing done, not an Energy

or Operation. -Thus a Houfe is a Work,

a Statue is a Work, and fo is a Ship, and fo a Pidture* I feem, faid I, to compre- hend you.

If then there be no Productions, faid he, but muft be of Parts, either co-exiftent or fucceffwe-, and the one of thefe be, as you perceive, a Work, and the other be an Energy*, it will follow, there will be no Production^ but will be either a Work or an D Energy,

34 Concerning ART,

Energy. There will not, faid I. But every Art, faid he, you have granted, is accomplijhed and ended in what it produces ? I replied, I had. And there are

no Productions, but Works or Energies ? None.

It will follow then, faid he, that every Art will be accomplished and ended in a Work or Energy.

To this I anfwered, That his Reafoning I could not impeach - y but that ftill the Di~ ftinCtion of Work and Energy was, what I did not well comprehend. There are

feveral Circumftances, faid he r which will ferve fufficiently to make it clear. I begged he would mention fome.

Thus then, faid he< — When the Pro- duction of any Art is an Energy, then the Perfection of the Art can be only perceived during that Energy. For inftance, the Per- fection of a Mulician is only known, while he continues playing. But when the Pro- duction

^ Dialogue. 35

dudtion of any Art is a Work, then is not the Perfection vifible during the Energy, but only after it. Thus the Perfection of the Sta- tuary is not fern during his Energies as a Statuary, but when his Energies are over; when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, but the Statue is left, as the Refult of all. 'Tis true, faid I.

Again, continued he,— in confe-

quence of this, where the Production is an Energy, there the Production is of NeceJJity co-eval with the Artift. For how mould the Energy furvive the Man $ the Playing remain, when the Mufician is dead ? But where the Production is a Work, then is there no fuch NeceJJity. The Work may well remain, when the Artift is forgotten - y there being no more reafon, that the Statue and the Artift mould be co-eval, than the Man and the rude Marble, before it received a regular Figure. You feem now 3 faid 1^

to have explained yourfelf.

D 2 1*

36 Concerning A R T,

.If then, faidhe, Work and Energy* be made intelligible Terms, you cannot but perceive the Truth of what we before af-

ferted that every Art, according to its

Genius, mujl needs be accomplijhed in one of thefe -, that, except in thefe two, it can be ac- complijhed in nothing elfe ; and confequenfly

that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY

be its End. I anfwered, That the

Reafoning appeared juftly deduced. So

much then, replied he, for the Ending or Accomplishment ofArt-, and fo much alfo for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Difqui- lit ion,

§.5. He had no fooner laid this, than I Was beginning to applaud him ; efpecially on his having treated a Subject fo copioufly, ftarted, as it were, by Chance, and without any apparent Preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by fay- ing, That as to my Praifes they were more than he deferved ; that he could pretend to no great Merit for having been, as I called

it,

'^ Dialogue. 37

it, fo copious, when he had fo often before thought, on what at prefent we had been talking. In fhort, fays he, to tell you a Secret, I have been a long time amufing myfelf, in forming an Effay upon this Sub- ject, I could not here forbear reproach- ing him, for having hitherto concealed his Intentions, My Reproaches produced a fort of amicable Controverfy, which at length ended in his offerings That, to make me fome amends, he would now recite me (if I pleafed) a fmall Fragment of the Piece $ a Fragment, which he had happened acci- dentally to have about him. The Propofal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without farther Delay, the Papers were produced.

As to the Performance itfelf, it muftbe conferled, in point of Stile, it was fomewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an Excefs. At the time however of recital, this gave me lefs Offence, becaufe it feemed, as it were, to palliate the Drynefs of what had paffed before, and in fome fort D 3 to

3 8 Concerning ART,

to fupply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows.

"OArt! Thou Praife of Man, and €C Ornament of Human Life! PorTeffed of <c Thee, the meaneft Genius grows defend <c ing, and has a juft Demand for a Portion <c of our Efteem. Devoid of Thee, the cc Brighter! of our Kind lie loft and ufelefs, u and are but poorly diftinguifhed from <c the moft Defpicable and Bafe. When cc we inhabited Forefts in common with <c Brutes, nor otherwife known from them

• c than by the Figure of our Species j Thou
• c taughteft us to affert the Sovereignty of our
• c Nature, and to affume that Empire, for
• c which Providence intended us. Thou-*
• < fands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee;
• c thoufands of Elegancies, Pleafures, and
• c Joys, without which Life itfelf would be
• c but an infipid Poffeffion.

"Wide and extenfive is the Reach

• fgf thy Dominion. No Element is

« there

^ Dialogue. 39

• • there either fo violent or (ofukle, fo yield-

<c ing or iojluggijh) as by the Powers of its " Nature to be fuperior to thy Direction. <c Thou dreadeft not the fierce Impetuofity " of Fire, but compelled: its Violence to " be both obedient and ufeful. By it Thou " foftenefl: the ftubborn Tribe of Minerals, " fo as to be formed and moulded into " Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons, " Armour, Coin ; and previous to thefe, " and other Thy Works and Energies^ " hence all thofe various Tools and Inftru- cc ments, which empower Thee to proceed " to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is

• c the fubtle A 1 r lefs obedient to Thy

£C Power, whether Thou willeft it to be a " Minifter to our Pleafure, or Utility. At cc Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds, " which charm the Soul with all the Powers " of Harmony. Under thy Inftrudlion it (C moves the Ship o'er Seas, while that <c yielding Element, where otherwife we " fink, even Water itfelf is by Thee cc taught to bear us -, the vaft Ocean to pro- cc mote that Jntercourfe of Nations, which D 4 Igno-

40 Concerning ART,

" Ignorance would imagine it was deftined " to intercept. Tofayhowthy Influence is sc feen on Earth, would be to teach " the meaneft, what he knows already. " Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable u and Pafture ; Lawns and Groves, and " Gardens, and Plantations; Cottages, Vil-

• c lages, Caftles, Towns; Palaces, Temples,

■ c and ipacious Cities.

"Nor does thy Empire end in Subjects ic thus in-animate \ Its Power alfo extends "thro 3 the various Race of Animals, " who either patiently fubmit to become cc thy Slaves, or are fure to find Thee an ir- « refiftible Foe. The faithful Dog, the " patient Ox, the generous Horfe, and the

• c mighty Elephant, are content all to re-

" ceive their Inftrudions from Thee, and u readily to lend their natural htftinSis or " Strength, to perform thofe Offices, which " thy Occafions call for. If there be found w any Species, which are ferviceable when H dead, Thou fuggefteft the Means to in- i* vefligatd and take them. If any be fo

favage,

^Dialogue. 41

" favage, as to refufe being tamed ; or of

• • Natures fierce enough, to venture an At-

w tack ; Thou teacheft us to fcorn their

• c brutal Rage -> to meet, repel, purfue, and

" conquer.

"And fuch, O Art ! is thy amazing « Influence, when Thou art employed only ?* on thefe inferior Subjects ; on Natures JSz- i* animate, or at beft Irrational. But when- cc e'er Thou choofeft a Subjeff more noble 9

• c and fetteft to the cultivating of Mind

<c itfelf, then 'tis Thou becomeft truly ami- << able and divine ; the ever flowing Source <c cf thofe fublimer Beauties, of which no " SubjeB but Mind alone is capable. Then " 'tis Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man- " kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of ? c Orators 5 the facred Train of Patriots and ? c of Heroes ; the godlike Lift of Philofo- fC phers and Legiflators; the Forms of wr- ? c tuous and equal . Polities, where private " Welfare is made the fame with public ; " where Crowds themfelves prove dik

c< interefted

42 Concerning ART,

<c interefted and brave, and Virtue is made " a national and popular Chara&eriftic.

"Hail ! facred Source of all thefe cc Wonders ! Thyfelf inftrudt me to praife <c Thee worthily, thro' whom, whate'er tc we do, is done with Elegance and Beauty - y " without whom, what we do, is ever grace-

<c lefs and deformed. Venerable Power !

" By what Name fhall I addrefs Thee ? " Shall I call Thee Ornament of Mind ; cc or art Thou more truly Mind itfelf? — cc 'Tis Mind Thou art, moft perfect " Mind - y not rude, untaught, but fair and " poliihed ; in fuch Thou dwelleft, of fuch " Thou art the Form -, nor is it a Thing " more poffible to feparateThee from fuch, " than it would be to feparate Thee from " thy own Exiftence."

My good Friend was now arrived to a very exalted Pitch, and was purfuing his Panegyric with great Warmth an d Fluency ; when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk

being

if Dialogue. 43

being near finifhed. The People, as we went along, began to look at us with Sur- prize ; which I, who was lefs engaged, having leifure to obferve, thought 'twas proper to admonifh my Friend, that he fhould give over. He immediately ceafed reading ; put his Papers up ; and thank'd me for flopping him at fo feafonable 3 Time,

§. 6. What remained of our Difcourfe palTed off with lefs Rapture, and was in- deed no more, than a kind of fhort Re- capitulation.

/?. He obferved to me, that our Inquiries had furnilhed out an Anfwer to four diffe- rent Queftions. For thus, faid he, if it be alked us, What Art is ? We have to Anfwer, it is — — an habitual "Power in Man, of becoming the Caufe of fome EffeB^ according to a Syjlem of various and well-- approved Precepts. If it be alked us, On whsxSubjedl Art operates ? We can anfwer, On a contingent^ which is within the reach

t

44 Concerning ART,

of the Human Powers to influence. If it be afked us, For what Reafon, for the fake of what Art operates ? We may reply, For the fake of feme abfent Good, relative to Hu- man Life, and attainable by Man, but fupe- perior to his natural and uninjlruBed Facul- ties. Laftly, if it be afked, Where 'tis the Operations of Art end? We may fay, Either in feme Energy, or in feme Work.

He added, That if he were not afraid of the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be almoft tempted to fay, That we had been confidering Art, with refpedt to ihofefour Caufes, fo celebrated once among Profeflbrs in the Schools. By thefe, upon Inquiry, I found that he meant certain Caufes, called the * Efficient, the -f Material, the % Finals and the. j[ Formal.

But

• P. 17. f P. 21. t p - 2 8 5 29.

I P- 34, 36.

A Dialogue,

45

But here, without farther explaining, he begged for the prefent that we might conclude, being fufficiently, as he faid, fatigued with the Length of what had paffed already. The Requeft was reafon- able I could not but own, and thus ended our Converfation 3 and foon after it our Walk.

The E N D,

TREATISE the Second :

A

DISCOURSE

O N

MUSIC, PAINTING,

AND

POETRY-

(49)

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER the First.

INTRODUCTION — Defign and Dijlribution of the Whole -—Preparation for the following Chapters,

CHAPTER the Second.

On the Subjects, which Painting imitates--*

On the Subjects, which Mufic imitates

Comparifon of Mufic with Painting.

CHAPTER the Third.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro' natural Media, or mere Sounds ----- ^.- Comparifon of Poetry in this Capacity, firjl with Painting, then with Mufic.

E CHAP*-

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER the Fourth,

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words fignificant -, the SubjeBs being fuch, to which the Ge??ius of each of the other two Arts is moft perfectly adapted. — Its Corn- par ifon in thefe Subjects, frfi with Paint- ing, then with Mufic.

CHAPTER the Fifth.

On the Subjects, which Poetry imitates by Words fignificant, being at the fame time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts, — 7 - The : Nature of thefe

Subjects. The Abilities of Poetry to

imitate them.—-- Cgmparifon of Pqetry in refpeB of thefe SubjeBs, firft with Paint- ing, then with Mufic.

CHAP-

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER the Sixth.

On Mufic confidered not as an Imitation \ but as deriving its Efficacy from another

Source. On its joint Operation by this

means with Poetry. An ObjeBion to

Mufic folved.- The Advantage arijing to

it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.--^-- Conclufon.

E 2

(S3)

DISCOURSE

O N

MUSIC, PAINTING,

and POETRY. |

CHAP. 1.

Introduction. Defign and Dijiribution of

the Whole. —Preparation for the following Chapters.

ALL Arts have this in common, Ch. L that they refpeff Human . Life. *~~* m — Some contribute to its NeceJJi~ ties, as Medicine and Agriculture $ others to its Elegance, as Mufk, Painting, and Poetry*

E 3 Now,

A Discourse on MUSIC,

Now, with relpeft to thefe two diffe- rent Species^ the ?iecejfary Arts feem to have been prior in time ; if it be probable, that Men confulted how to live and to fupport them/elves, before they began to deliberate how to render Life agreeable. Nor is this indeed unconfirmed by Fad:, there being no Nation known fo barbarous and ignorant* as where the Rudiments of thefe necejfary Arts are not in fome degree cultivated. And hence poffibly they may appear to be the more excellent and worthy, as having claim to a Preference, derived from their Seniority.

The Arts however of Elegance cannot be laid to want Pretenlions, if it be true, that Nature framed us for fomething more, than mere Exi/lence. Nay, farther, if Well- being be clearly preferable to Mere-being, and this without it be but a thing contemp- tible, they may have reafon perhaps to afpire even to a Superiority. But enough of this, to come to our Purpofe.

$.2.

PAINTING and POETRY. 55

§. 2. THE©efignof this Difcourfe is to Ch. Il treat of Music, Painting, and Poetry ; ^""^ to confider in what they agree, and in what they differ ; and which, upon the;

WHOLE, IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE OTHER TWO;

In entering upon this Inquiry* it is firft to be obferved, that the Mind is made confcious of the natural World and its Af- fections, and of other Minds and their Affections, by the feveral Organs of the Senfes (a). By the fame Organs, thefe Arts exhibit to the Mind Imitations, and imitate either Parts or Affections of this natural E 4 Wbrldi

(a) To explain fome future Obfervations, it will be proper here to remark, that the Mind from thefe Materials thus brought together, and from its own Ope-> rations on them, and in confequence of them, becomes

fraught with Ideas and that many Minds fo

fraught, by a fort ^Compact affigning to each Idea fome Sound to be its Mai^k or Symbol, were the firjl Inventors and Founders ^Language.

56 A Discourse on MUSIC,

3i. I. World) or elfe the Paffions, Energies, and

t^ other Affe&ions of Minds, 1 here is this

Difference however between thefe Arts and

Nature-, that Nature paffes to the Percipient

thro* all the Senfes : whereas thefe Arts ufe

only two of them, that of Seeing and that

• of Hearing. And hence it is that the fen-*

fible ObjeBs or Media, thro' which (h) they

imitate, can hzfuch only, as thefe two Senfes

are framed capable of perceiving • and thefe

Media are Motion, Sound, Colour, and

Figure.

Paint-

(b) To prevent Confufion it muil be obferved, that in all thefe Arts there is a Difference between the fenfible Media, thro" which they imitate, and the Subjects imitated. The fenfible Media, thro' which they imitate, mufl: be always relative to that Senfe, , by which the particular Art applies to the Mind -, but the Subject imitated may be foreign to thatSenfe, and beyond the Power of its Perception. Painting, for in- ftance, (as is fhewn in this Chapter) has no fenfible Media, thro' which it operates, except Colour and Figure : But as to Subjects, it may have Motions, Sounds, moral Affections and Aclions ; none of which are either Colours or Figures, but which however are all capable of being imitated thro 9 them. See Chapter the fecond, Notes (b), (c), (d}>

PAINTING WPOETRY, S7

Painting, having the Eye for its Or- Ch. I. gan, cannot be conceived to imitate, but thro' the Media of vijible Objefts. And farther, its Mode of imitating being always * motionlefs, there muft be fubftra&ed from thefe the Medium of Motion. It remains then, that Colour and Figure are the only Media, thro' which Painting imitates.

Music, paffing to the Mind thro' the Organ of the Ear, can imitate only by Sounds and Motions.

Poetry, having the Ear alfo for its Organ, as far as Words are confidered to be no more than mere Sounds, can go no fur- ther in Imitating, than may be performed by Sound and Motion. But then, as thefe its Sounds Jiand by * Compact for the various Ideas, with which the Mind is fraught, it is enabled by this means to imitate, as far as

Lan-

• See Note (a) Page 55.

58 A Discourse on MUSIQ

phi I. Language can exprefs ; and that 'tis evident "~ v ~"*"' will, in a manner, include all things.

Now from hence may be feen, how thefe Arts agree > and how they differ.

They agree j by being ^//MiMETiq or Imitative.

They differ, as they imitate by different Media; Painting, by Figure and Colour ; Music, by Sound and Motion; Painting and Music, by Media which are Natural; Poetry, for the greater Part, by a Medium* which is Artificial (c)+

As

(c) A Figure painted, or a Compofition of Mu- fical Sounds have always a natural Relation to that, cf which they are intended to be the Refemblance. But a Defcription in Words has rarely any fuch natural Relation to the fever al Ideas, of which thofe Wdrds are the Symbols. None therefore understand the Defcrip- tion, but thofe who fpeak the Language. On the con- trary, Mufical and Piclure-Imitations are intelligible to all Men.

Why

PAINTING and POETRY. 59

§.3. As to that Art, which upon the Ch. I, whole is mojl excellent of the three ; it muft be v "-"' v ~' obferved, that among thefe various Media of imitating, fome will naturally be more ac- curate, fome lefs ; fome will befi imitate one Subjedt; fome, another. Again, among the Number of Subjects there will be natu- rally alfo a Difference, as to Merit and De- merit. There will be fome fublime, and fome low ; fome copious, and fome Jhort ; fome pathetic, and others void of Pa/Jton-, fome formed to inJlruSi, and others not ca- pable of it.

Now, from thefe two Circumstances 5 that is to fay, from the Accuracy of the Imitation, and the Merit of the SubjeSi imitated, the Queftion concerning which Art is mojl excellent, muft be tried and de- termined.

This

Why it is faid that Poetry is not unwerfally, but only for the greater part artificial, fee below, Chapter the Third, where what Natural Force it has, is ex- amined and eftimated.

60 ^Discourse on MUSIC,

X

Ch. I. This however cannot be done, without " nr **^ a Detail of P articular s> that fo there may

be formed, on every part, juft and accurate

Comparifons.

To begin therefore with Painting.

CHAP.

PAINTING tfWPOETRY. 61

CHAP. II.

On the Subjects, which Painting imitates. — - On the Subjects, which Mujic imitates*—- Comparifon of Mujic with Painting.

THE fittest Subjects FoRCh.II, Painting, are all fuch Things^*^* and Incidents, as are * peculiarly cha- ratferifed by Figure and Colour.

Of this kind are the whole Mafs (a) of Things inanimate and vegetable-, fuch as Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landfldps — — The various Tribes of Animal 'Figures ; fuch

as Birds, Beafts, Herds, Flocks The

Motions and Sounds peculiar to each Animal

Species,

• P. 57*

(a) The Reafon is, that ihefe things are almoft wholly known to us by their Colour and Figure. Be^ fides, they are as motlonlefs y for the mofl part, in

Natyre y as in the Imitation.

62 A Discourse on MUSIC,

Eh. II. Species, when accompanied with Configura- T^^* - ^ tionSy which are obvious and remarkable (b)-* The Human Body in all its Appearances (as Male, Female; Young, Old; Handfome, Ugly ;) and in all its Attitude >s, (as Lying, Sitting, Standing, £$c. ) — — The Natural Sounds peculiar to the Human Species, (fuch as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, &c.) (c)— All Energies, Pajjions, and AffeBjons of the

Souk

(b) Instances of this kind are the Flying of Birds, the Galloping of Horfes, the Roaring of Lions, the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reafon is, that though to paint Motion or Sound be impoffible, yet the Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an im- mediate and natural Connection with a certain vifible Configuration of the Parts , the Mind, from a Profpect of this Configuration, conceives infenfibly that which is concomitant \ and hence 'tis that, by a fort of Fallacy ', the Sounds and Motions appear to be painted alfo. On the contrary, not fo in fuch Mo- tions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fifh ; or in fuch Sounds, as the Purring of a Cat; ; becaufe here is no (uchfpecial Configuration to be perceived.

(c) The Reafon is of the fame kind, as that given in the Note immediately preceding ; and by the fame Rule, the Obfervation mult be confined to

■ natural Sounds only. In Language, few of the Speakers know the Configurations ^ which attend it.

PAINTING and POETRY. 63

Soul, being in any degree more intenfe or Ch. II, violent than ordinary (d) All Anions

a?td Events, whofe Integrity or JVholenefs depends upon a jliort and ftlf -evident Sue- ceffion of Incidents [e) — •» Or if the Suc- ceffion be extended, then fuch ABions at leaft, whofe Incidents are all along, during

that Succejfion, fimilar (f) All Actions,

which being qualified as above, open them-

felves

(d) The Reafon is ft ill of the fame kind, viz. from their Vifible Effects on the Body. They natu- rally produce either to the Countenance a particular Rednefs or Palenefs ; or a particular Modification of its Mufcles-, or elfe to the Limbs, a particular Attitude. Now all thefe Effects zrefolely referable to Colour and Figure, the two grand fenlible Media, peculiar to Painting. See Raphael's Cartoons of St. Paul at Athens, and of his ftriking the Sorcerer Elymas blind : See alfo the Crucifixion of Poly crates, and the Suf- ferings of the Conful Regulus, both by S abator Rofa,

(e) For ofnecefftty every Picture is a Punftum Tempsris ^Instant.

(f) Such, for inftance, as a Storm at Sea ; whofe Incidents ofVifion may be nearly all included in foam- ing Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their erect Pofture, and Men hanging upon the Ropes. — — -

Or

64 <<& Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch. II. felves into a large Variety of CircumftanceS,

• m>/mmm ^ concurring all in the fame Point of 'Time (g)

All Aftiom which are known, and

known univerfally, rather than Aftions newly invented, or known but to few (V).

And

Or as a Battle ; which from Beginning to End pre- fents nothing elfe, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and Diforder. Nowfuch Events may be well imitated all at once -, for how long foever they laft, they are but Repetitions of the fame.

(g) For Painting is notboundedin Exten- sion, as it is in Duration. Befides, it feems true in every Species of Compofition, that, as far as Perplexity and Confufion may be avoided, and the Wholenefs of the Piece may be preferved clear and in- telligible ; the more ample the Magnitude j, and the greater the Variety ', the greater alfo, in proportion, the Beauty and Perfeclion. Noble Inftances of this are the Pictures above-mentioned in Note (d). See Ariflot. Poet. cap. 7. c o it kocW d,v\w (pva-iv r* irpayfji.uT(&> op(^, del [Av &c. See alfo Characleri- ficks, V. I. p. 143. zn&Bojfu, B. 1. cap. 16, UAchilk d* Homer e eflfi grand, &c.

(h) The Reafon is, that a Picture being (as has been faid) but a Point or Infant, in a Story well known the Spectator's Memory will fupply the pre- vious and the fubfequent. But this cannot be done,

where

Fainting and poetry. 6?

!

And thus much as to the Subje&s of Chill.' Painting. ^ v_1 "~

§. 2. In Music, the fittest Sub- jects of Imitation are all fuch Things

where fuch Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it may be juftly queftioned, whether the moll cele- brated Subjects, borrowed by Painting from Hi{lory 9 would have been any of them intelligible thro 3 the Medium of Painting only, fuppofing Hiftory to have been filent, and to have given no additional Information.

I t may be here added, that Horace, conformably to this Reafoning, recommends even to Poetic Imi- tation a known Story, before an unknown.

Tuque

Reclius Hiacum carmen deducts in aclus, Quam ft proferres ignota, indiclaq; primus.

Art. Poet. v. 12S.

And indeed as the being underjlood to others, either Hearers or Spectators, feems to be a common Requi- fite to all Mimetic Arts whatever ; (for to thofe, who underftand them not, they are in fact ho Mimetic Arts) it follows, that Perfpicuity muft be Effential to them all ; and that no prudent Artift would neglect, if it were pofllble, any juft Advantage to obtain this End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than the Notoriety of the Subjecl imitafed,

F and

66 A DiscotiRSE on MUSXC y

jCh. II. and Incidents, as are mofl eminently * cha* raBerifed by Motion arid Sound.

Motion may be either flow or fwifty

even or uneven, broken or continuous.-

Sound may be either foft or loud, high or Jow. Wherever therefore any of thefe Spe- cies of Motion or Sound may be found in an eminent (not a moderate or mean) degree? there will be room for Musical Imita- tion.

Thus, in the Natural or Inanimate Worlds Music may imitate the Glidings, Murmurings, Tofiings, Roarings, and other Accidents of Water, as perceived in Foun- tains, Catara&s, Rivers, Seas, &c. — —The fame of Thunder — -the fame of Winds, as well *;he ftormy as the gentle. — — In the Animal World, it may imitate the Voice of . fome Animals, but chiefly that of finging

Birds.- It may Mo faintly copy fome of

their Motions. — In the Human Kind, it can

alfa

PAINTING and POETRY. 67

alfo imitate fome Motions (i) and Sounds (k) ; Ch. I J and of Sounds thofe moji perfe£lly± which are expreffive of Grief 'and Anguijh (I).

And thus much as to the Subjects, which Mufic imitates;

§.3. It remains then, that we compare ihefe two Arts together. And here in- deed, as to Mafical Imitation in general, it muft be confeffed that ±— as it can, from its Genius, imitate only Sounds and Motions — » as there are not many Motions either in the F 2 Animal

(i) As the Walk of the Giant Polypheme, in the Paftoral of Acis and Galatea. — See what ample Strides be takes, &c.

(k) As the Shuts of a Multitude, in the Corona- tion Anthem of, Godfave the King, &c.

(I) The Reafch is, that this Species of Mufical Imitation moji nearly approaches Nature. For Grief, in moft Animals, declares itfelf by Sounds, which are not unlike to long Notes in the Chromatic Syftem. Of this kind is the Chorus of Baal's Priefts in the Oratorio of Deborah, Doleful Tidings, how ye, wound, &c,

68 A Discourse on MUSIC,

^h. II. Animal or in the Inanimate World, which ' J,r ~ vr ~*are exclujively peculiar even to any Species, and fcarcely any to an Individual — »- *a3 there are no Natural Sounds, which cha- raflerife at leafi tower than a Species (for the Natural Sounds of Individuals are ill

every Species the fame) farther, as

Mulic does but imperfeBly imitate even thefe Sounds and Motions (m) - — -On the contrary, as Figures, Poftures of Figures, and Colours chafa&erife not only every fen* Jible Species , but even every Individical% and for the moft part alfo the various * Energies

2xATa]fions of every Individual and

farther, as Painting is able, with the highefi Accuracy and Exatfnefs, to imitate all thefe Colours and Figures 5 and while Mufical

Imita-

• See Note (d) of this Chapter.

(m) The Reafon is from the DiJJimilitude be- tween the Sounds and Motions of Nature^ and thofe of Mufic. Mufical Sounds are all produced from Even Vibration, moll Natural from Uneven ; Mufical Motions are chiefty "Definite in their Meafure, moft Natural are Indefinite,

PAINTING and POETRY. 65

Imitation pretends at mojl to no more, than Ch. If the railing of Ideas Jimilar^ itfelf afpires to u raife Ideas the wry fame — - in a word, as Painting, in refpeft of its Subjetfs, is equal to the noblefi Part of Imitation, the imi- tating regular Aftions ponjijling of a Whole and Parts -> and of fuch Imitation, Muflc is

utterly incapable^ from all this it

muft be confeffed, that Musical Imita- tion is greatly below that of Painting, and that at bejl it is but an imperfeft thing.

As to the Efficacy therefore of Music, it muft be derived from another Source,, which muft be left for the prefent, to be eonfidered of hereafter *,

There remains to be mentioned Imi- tation by Poetry.

• Ch. VI,

F 3 CHAP.

r A Discourse on MUSIC.

CHAP. III.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro" natural Media, or mere Sounds— -—Comparifon of Poetry in this Capacity, frjl with Painting, then with Mufc*

h.III.TJ30ETIC Imitation includes every

s^v-— ' JL thing in it, which is performed either by

Picture-Imitation or Musical; for

its Materials are Words, and Words are

f Symbols by Compact of all Ideas.

Farther as Words, befide their being Symbols by Compaft, are alfo Sounds vari- oufly dijlinguified by their Aptnefs to be rapidly or Jlowly pronounced, and by the refpeftive Prevalence of Mutes, Liquids, or Vowels in their Compofition ; it will follow that, befide their Compact-Relation, they

will

I See Note (a) Cbap.h

PAINTING and POETRY. 71!

will have likewife a Natural Relation to all Ch. III! iiich Things, between which and them- felves there is any Natural Refemblance. Thus, for inftance, there is a Natural Re- femblance between all forts of harjh and grating Sounds. There is therefore (ex- clufive of its Signification) a Natural Rela- tion between the Sound of a vile Hautboy* and of that Verfe in * Virgil,

Stridenti miferum Jlipuld difperdere Carfften.

or of that other in *\> Milton,

• .

Grate on their Scrannel Pipes of wretched Straw,

So alfo between the fmooth fwift Gliding of a River, and of that Verfe in || Horace,

r ^.. at m e

Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis cevum<

And thus in part even Poetic Imitation

has its Foundation in Nature, But then

F 4 this

• Eel. 3. ver. 27. f In his

|1 Epift.2. 1, i. v. 42, 43,

I 72 A Discourse on MUSIC,

^h. III. this Imitation goes not far; and taken fp^"*^ without the Meaning derived to the Sounds from Cqmpaff, is but little intelligible, how- ever perfect and elaborate.

§.2. If therefore Poetry be compared with Painting, in refpe<3 of this its werely Natural and Inartificial Refem-r blance, it may be juftly faid that — —In as inuch as of this fort of Refemblance, Poetry (like Mufic) has no qther Sources,

than tbofe two of Sound and Motion-

• in as much as it often wants thefe Sources them/elves (for Numbers of Words neither have, nor can have any Refemblance to thofe Ideas, of which they are the Sym- bols) in as much as Natural Sounds

and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, are themfelves but * loofe and indefinite Ac- cidents of thofe Subjects, to which they belong, and confequently do but loofely and

indefinitely charadterife them laftly, in

as much as Poetic Sounds and Motions do

but

»-.-. *■•: — - — 3 — : — *— J — - . .- . \. — : z — r - T %

t ?. 67, 68,

PAINTING and POETRY. 73

faut faintly refemble thofe of Nature, which Ch. Ill, are themfehes confefled to be fo imperfeB^

and vague From all this it will

follow (as it has already followed of Mufic)

that Poetic Imitation founded

in mere Natural Resemblance is much inferior to that of paint* jng, and at bejl but very imperfect.

§.3. As to the Preference, which fuck Poet 1 c Imitation may claim before Musical, or Musical Imitation be- fore that 5 the Merits on each Side may appear perhaps equal. They both fetcli their Imitations from -f Sound and Motion. Now Music feems to imitate Nature bet- ter as to Motion, and Poetry as to Sound. The Reafon is, that in Motions (a) Mujk

has

t ^ 57.

(a) Music has no lefs than five different Lengthy of Notes in ordinary ufe, reckoning from the Semi- fcrief to the Semi-quaver 5 all which, may be infi- nitely

74 -rf- Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch. III. has a greater Variety ; and in Sounds, thofc of Poetry approach nearer to Nature (b),

If therefore in Sound the one have the Preference, in Motion the other, and the Merit of Sound and Motion be fuppofed nearly equal ; it will follow, that the Merit of the two Imitations will be nearly equal also.

nitely compounded, even in any one Time, or Mea-

fure Poetry, on the other hand, has but two

Lengths or Quantities, a long Syllable and a Jhort, (which is its Half) and all the Variety ofVerfe arifes from fuch Feet and Metres, as thefe two Species of Syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce.

(b) Musical Sounds are produced by even Vibrations, which fcarcely any Natural Sounds are — on the contrary, Words are the Product of uneven

Vibration, and fo are moft Natural Sounds

Add to this, that Words are far more numerous, than Mufical Sounds. So that Poetry, as to Imitation by Sound, feems to exceed Mufic, not only in nearnefi sf Refemblance, but even in Variety alfo.

CHAP,

PAINTING and POETRY, 75

CHAP. IV.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words fignificant 5 the Subjects at the fame time being fuch, to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is moft perfectly adapted. — Its Comparifon in thefe Subje3s 9 frji with Paintings then with Mafic*

THE Mimetic Art of Poetry hasCh.IV, been hitherto confidered, as fetch- ing its Imitation from mere Natural Re- femblance. In this it has been {hewn much inferior to Painting, and nearly equal to Music.

It remains to be confidered, what its Merits are, when it imitates not by mere Natural Sound, but by Sound fgnificant $ by Words, the compaft Symbols of all kinds pf Ideas, From hence depeifds its genuine

Force,

y6 A Discourse on MUSIC,

I Ch. IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find Sounds expreffive of every Idea, fo is there no Subjedi either of Pidhirer-Imitation, or Mufical, to which it does not afpire - y all Things and Incidents whatever being, in a manner, to be defcribed by Words.

Whether therefore Poetry, in this its proper Sphere, be equal to the Imitation of the other two Arts^ is the Queftion at pre- fent, which comes in order to be difcurTed.

Now as SuhjeBs are infinite, and thq other two Arts are not equally adapted to imitate all-, it is propofed, firft to compare Poetry with them in fitch Subjects, to which they are mofi perfectly adapted.

§.2. To begin therefore with Paint- ing. A Subject, in which the Power of this Art may be mofi fully exerted, (whether it be taken from the Inanimate, or the Animal, or the Moral World) mufl be a Subject, which is principally and eminently charaBerifed by certain Colourj,

Figures^

PAINTING and POETRY, 77

Figures, and Poftures of Figures — *- whofe Ch, IV. Comprehenfion depends not on a SucceJJion of' Events -, or at leaji^ if on a SucceJJion, on a

Jhort and felf evident one which admits a

large Variety of fuch Circumfiances, as all concur in the fame individual Point ofTime y and relate all to one principal A3 ion.

As to fuch a Subject therefore In as

much as Poetry is forced to pafs thro* the Medium of Compact, while Painting applies immediately thro' the Medium of Nature ; the one being underftood to all, the other to the Speakers of a certain Lan- guage * only in as much as Natural

Operations muft needs be more affecting, than Artificial- — — in as much as Painting helps our own rude Ideas by its own, which are confummate and wrought up to the Per- fection of Art ; while Poetry can raife no ether (a) than what every Mind is furnifhed

with

• Note (c) p. 58.

(a) When we read in Milton of Eve, that Grace vjas in all her Steps, Heav'n in her Eye, In ev'ry Gefture Dignity and Love- 3

we

78 A Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch.IV. with before — in as much as Painting mews all the minute and various concurrent Cir- cumjlances of the Event in the fame indivi- dual Point of Time, as they appear in Nature $ while Poetry is Forced to want this Circumftance of Intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into fome de- gree of Detail—— in as much as this Detail creates often the Dilemma of either be- coming tedious^ to be clear ; or if not tedious , then obfcure — — laftly, in as much &$ all Imitations more fimilar> more imme- diate^

toe have an Image not of tliat Eve, which Milton tonceived, but of fetch an Eve onIy i as every one, by his own proper Genius, is able to reprefent, front reflecting on thofe Ideas, which he has annexed to thefe feveral Bounds. The greater Part, in the mean time, have never perhaps beftowed one accurate Thought upon what Grace, Heaven, Love, and Dignity inean; or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of Beauty, or aiked whence they are to be acquired, and by what Proportions they are confeituted. On the contrary, when we view Eve as painted by art able Painter, we labour under no fuch Difficulty ; became we have exhibited before us the better Con- ceptions of an Artist, the genuine Ideas of perhaps a Titian or a Raphael,

PAINTING and POETRY. 79

diate, and more intelligible, are preferable Ch. IV; to thofe which are lefs fo$ and for the •Reafons above* the Imitations of Poetry are lefs Jimilar, lefs immediate, and lefs in- telligible than thofe of Painting- — From

ALL THIS it Will folloWj that IN ALL

Subjects, where Painting can fully exert itself, the imita- TIONS of Painting are superior to those of Poetry, and conse- quently in all such Subjects that Painting has the Prefer rence.

§.3. And now to compare Poetry with Music, allowing to Mujic the fame' Advantage of a well-adapted Subject, which has already been allowed to Painting in the Comparifon juft preceding.

What fuch a Subject is, has already been * defcribed. And as to Preference, it

muft

• See Chap. II. §. 2,

80 A Discourse in MUSI'Q

Ch.IV. muft-be confeffed, that In as much as

Musical Imitations, tho' Natural, afpire not to raife the fa?ne Ideas, but only Ideas \\fmilar and analogous; while Poetic Imitation, tho' Artificial, raifes Ideas

the very fame in as much as the Definite

and Certain is ever preferable to the Indefi- nite and Uncertain ; and that more efpeci- ally in Imitations, where the principal (b) Delight is in recognizing the Thing

imitated

H P. 68, 69.

(b) That there is an eminent Delight in this very Recognition it f elf, abftracl: from any thing pleafing in the Subject recognized, is evident from hence that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can fee

highly charmed with Imitations, at whofe Originals in Nature we are /hocked and terrified. Such, for in- ftance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beafts, and the like.

The Caufe, afligned for this, feems to be of the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in the Sanity and Perfection, but alfo in the juft and na- tural Energies of our feveral Limbs and Faculties. And hence, among others, the Joy in Reasoning ; as being the Energy of that principal Faculty , our In- tellect or Understanding. This Joy ex- tends, not only to the Wife, but to the Multitude. For all Men have an Averfion to Ignorance and Error ;

and

PAINTING and POETRY. &x

imitated — it will follow from hence that — Ch.IV,,; fevEN in Subjects the best adapted to Musical Imitation, the Imita- tion of Poetry will be still more excellent.

and in fome degree* however moderate, are glad to learn and to inform themfelves.

He n c e therefore the Delight \ arifing from thefe Imitations ; as we are enabled, in each of them, to exercife the Reasoning Faculty ; arid, by com- paring the Copy with the Architype in our Minds, to infer that this is such a things and that, another; a Fact remarkable among Children, even in their firft and earlieft Days.

To, re yap [Ai[jt.i7<r2rci} 9 <rv[A(pVTQV roTg oiv^otairoi^ ai

• atJcov lj-), 7^ rung diatpspuo'i rwy aAAwy ^wwv, v ori

(Mpwsus ?&<; irgcarocs! xj to %uig£iv toT; fAiptipxin it&vtocs. 2v}ps?ov $\ rirk to avf/t.ftoiwQv eV* rtov sWwv* A yag aura Ai/th^w? ogtipev, ritm tx\ slxovus rccg potXiroi mgi€up£viz$, ^aigo^si) SeugvvTEq' oTov 3^/w» Tf pogtpois tcou ay^iuTocrcov^ 7% vexguv. *A*t<ov $1 >£ Tar*, on ^cavS'austv » povov ro7g (piXoo*o(pof? %$iroi 9 & AAo, ^ roTg aAAojj opoioog ' aAA* Isr* j3^p^u xojvwv?- <ni> ai>T*. A<» yap tsto p^a/^ycr* ra? elaovocg c^wre? 9 in cvpfixivsi ^Bca^vTocg fjt.avB'ccvsiv y£ cvX\oyi£e&ai f %i h*rw «Tov, 07* ar®- sWd©^. Arilt. Poet. c. 4*

G CHAP,

Zz A Discourse on MUSIC,

CHAP. V.

On the Subjetfs which Poetry imitates by Words fignificant) being at the fame time Subjefts not adapted to the Genius of

either of the other Arts The Nature of

thofe Subjetfs The Abilities of Poetry

to imitate them Comparifon of Poetry

in thefe Subje&s, firjl with Painting, then with Mujic.

Ch.V. T^HE Mimetic Art of Poetry A. has now been confidered in two Views — Firft, as imitating by mere natural Media ; and in this it has been placed on a level with Music, but much inferior to Painting It has been fince con- sidered as imitating thro' Sounds fignificant by Compatf, and that in fuch Subjects re- fpedtively, where Painting and Music have the fullefi Power to exert themfelves.

Here

PAINTING and POETRY. 8

Here to Painting it has been held inferior, Ch. V but to Mufic it has been preferred.

It remains to be conlidered ■ — -—what ether Subjects Poetry has left* to which the Genius of the other two Arts is notfo per- fectly adapted How far Poetry is able to

imitate them —and whether from the

Perfection of its Imitation, and the Nature of the Subjecls themfelves, it ought to be called no more than equal to its Sifter Arts ; or whether, on the whole, it fhould not rather be called fuperior.

§. 2. To begin, in the firii place, by comparing it with- Painting.

The SubjeBs of Poetry, to which the

Genius of Painting is not adapted, are ~ — -

all Actions, whofe (a) Whole is of fo

G 2 lengthened

(a) For a juft and accurate Defcription of 'Whole- fiefs and Unity, fee Ar'tft. Poet. Ch. 7&8. mdBoJu 9 his beft Interpreter, in his Treatife on the Epic Poem, B.II. ch. 9, io-, tu

84 ^Discourse on MUSIC, /

2h, V. lengthened a Duration, that no "Point of ~ vmm Time, in any part of that Whole, can be given fit for Painting ; neither in its Be' ginning, which will teach what is Subfe~ quent; nor in its End, which will teach what is Previous ; nor in its Middle, which will declare both the Previous and the Sub~ fequent. — — Alfo all Subjects fo framed, as to lay open the internal Conjlitution of Man, and give us an Infight into (b) CharaSlers, Manners, PaJJions, and Se?itiments.

The

(b) For a Defcription of Character, fee be- low, Note (c) of this Chapter.

As for Manners, it may be faid in general, that a certain Syjiem of them makes a Char after ; and that as thefe Syftems, by being differently compounded, make each a different Character, fo is it that one- Man truly differs from another.

Pa s s 1 o n s are obvious ; Pity, Fear, Anger ^ &c.

Sentiments are difcoverable in all thofe Things, which are the proper Bufinefi and End of Speech or Discourse. The chief Branches of this End are to Affert and Prove ; to Solve and Re- fute 1 to exprefs or excite Paffiom > to amplify In-

cidents >

PAINTING and POETRY. $ 5

The Merit of thefe Subje&s is obvious. Ch. V.^ They muft neceffarily of all be the moft affeBing*, the moft improving ; and fuch of which the Mind has the Jirongeji Corn- prehenjion.

For as to the affediing Part if it be

true, that all Events more or lefs affedi us, as the Subje5is y which they refpeft, are , more or lefs nearly related to us ; then fiirely thofe Events muft needs be moft af- feSling, to whofe Subjects we are of all the moft intimately related. Now fuch is the Relation, which we bear to Mankind '; and Men and Human Adtions are the Subje&s, here propofed for Imitation,

G 3 As

cidents, and to diminijb them. 5 Tis in thefe things therefore, that we muft look for Sentiment.

See Arift. Poet. c. 19. ? r , $\ x «1a rft AiaWv

• kvix 9 htroc V7tq ra Xoyn ie7 irotQawtEvourKvoti, Mef H

jS t»7cov, to, 7s uiro$iixvvvxi 9 x) to n Aufiv, x) to W0f}

86 ^Discourse on MUSIC,

Jh. V. As to Improvement — -there can be none furely (to Man at leaft) fo great, as that which is derived from a juft and decent Reprefentation of Human Manner^ and Sentiments. For what can more contribute to give us that Mqfler^Kjiowledge (c), with-*

out

(c) T N n I SATTON. But farther, befides obtaining this moral Science from the Con- templation of Human Life ; an End common both to Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry ; there is a pecu-. liar End to Tragedy, that of eradicating the PafTions of Pity and Fear. 9j Env &v t^y^tot, pifAvuris TrgdZjreus

twv tqistwv 7r&6-/?/AaJwv xaOa^o-iv, Arirt. Poet. c. 6. Tragedy is the Imitation of an Aclion important and per feci, thro* Pity and Fear working the Purga- tion OF SUCH-LIKE PASSIONS.

There are none, 'tis evident, fo devoid of thefe

two Pafions, as thofe perpetually converfant, where the Occasions of them are mofc frequent ; fuch, for infknce, as the Military Men, the Profeffors of Medicine, Chirurgery, and the like. Their Minds, by this Intercourfe, become as it were callous ; gain- ing an Apathy by Experience, which no Theory can ever teach them*

Now

PAINTING and POETRY. 87

out which, all other Knowledge will prove Ch. V. of little or no Utility ?

G 4 As

Now that, which is wrought in thefe Men by the real Difaflers of 'Life ', may be fuppofed wrought in others by the Ficlions of Tragedy ; yet with this happy Circumftance in favour of Tragedy, that, without the Difafters being real, it can obtain the fame End.

It muft however, for all this, be confefTed, that an Effect of this kind cannot reafonably be expected, except among Nations, like the Athenians of old, who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon thefe Theatrical Reprefentations. For 'tis not a fingle or cccafonal Application to thefe Paffions, but a con- Jlant and uninterrupted, which alone can leffen or re- move them.

It would be improper to conclude this Note, without obferving, that the Philofopher in this place by Pity means not Philanthropy, Na- tural Affeclion, a Readinefs to relieve others in their Calamities and Diflrefs ; but, by Pity, he means that Senseless, Effeminate Consternation, which feizes weak Minds, on the fudden Profpecl of any thing difafirous ; which, in its more violent Effects, is feen in Shriekings, Swoonings, &c. a Paffion, fo far from laudable, or from operating to the Good of others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who labours under its Influence, of all Capacity to cloth ■Jeafl good Office.

A Discourse on MUSIC,

A s to our Comprehenjion?--^- there is no^ thing certainly, of which we have (ojlrong Ideas, as of that which happens in the Moral, or Human World. For as to the Internal Part, or Active Principle of the Vegetable, we know it tut obfcnrely -, becaufe there we can difeover neither PaJJion, nor Senfation. In the Animal World indeed this Principle is more feen, from the Paf- Jions and Senfations which there declare themfelves. Yet all ftill refts upon the mere Evidence of Senfe -, upon the Force only of external and unajjifled "Experience. But in the Moral or Human World, as we have a Medium of Knowledge far more accurate than this 5 fo from hence it is 3 that we can comprehend accordingly.

With regard therefore to the various Events, which happen here, and the vari- ous Caufes, by which they are produced---- ia other Words, of all Characters, Manners, Human Paifions, and Sentiments^ befides fhe Evidence of Senfe, we have the higheft

Evidence

PAINTING and POETRY. 89

Evidence additional in having an exprefsCh. V.,;

Confcioufnefs of fomething Jimilar within j\*"V" > *1 of fomething homogeneous in the Receffes of our own Minds ; in that, which conftitutes to each of us his true and real Self, *

These therefore being the Subje&s, not adapted to the Genius of Paintings it comes next to be coniidered, how far Poetry can imitate them.

And here, that it has Abilities clearly equoly cannot be doubted; as it has that for the Medium of its Imitation, through which Nature declares herfelf in the fame Subje&s. For the Sentiments in real Life are only known by Men's * Difcourfe. And the Chara5lers } Manner s y and Pajfiom of Men being the Prompters to what they fay -, it muft needs follow, that their Dif- fourfe will be a conjlant Specimen of thofe QharaBers, Manners and PaJJions.

Format

f E. 84, Note {b) y

tgo A Discourse on MUSIC,

ICh. V. * Format enim Natura prius ?ios intus ad

cmnern Fortunarum habitum ; juvat, aut impellit ad

tram : Poji effert Animi Motus, Interprete

Lingua.

Not only therefore Language is an ade- quate Medium of Imitation, but in Senti- ments it is the only Medium; and in Man- ners and FaJJions there is no other, which can exhibit them to us after that clear y precife and definite Way, as they in Nature •{land alotted to the various forts of Men, and are found to conftitute the fever 'al Cha- racters of each (d) %

§•3-

• Hor. de Arte Poet. v. ic8.

(d) It is true indeed that (beiides what is done by Poetry) there is fome Idea of Character, which even Painting can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that fuch a Countenance may be found by Painters for JEneas, as would convey upon view a,

mid 9

PAINTING WPOETRY. <

§. 3. To compare therefore Poetry , in Ch. thefe SubjeBs, with Painting- — In as much as no Subjects of Painting are * wholly fn-

perior

• ^ Sh 58. 75> 76.

jtm#, humane, and yet a &ywy Difpofition. But then this Idea would be vague and general. It would be concluded, only in the grofs, that the Hero was Giod. As to that Syftem of Qualities peculiar to /Eneas only, and which alone properly conjlitutes bis true and real Character, this would ftill remain a Secret, and be no way difcoverable. For how de- duce it from the mere Lineaments of a Countenance ? Or, if it were deducible, how few Spectators would there be found fo fagacious ? 'Tis here therefore, that Recourfe muft be had, not to Painting, but ta Poetry. So accurate a Conception of Character can be gathered only from a Succejfion of various, and yet confijlent Aclions ; a Succeffion, enabling us to tonjee- ture, what the Perfon of the Drama will do in the future, from what already he has done in the pajl* Now to fuch an Imitation, Poetry only is equals becaufe it is not bounded, like Painting, to/hort, and, as it were, injiant Events, but may imitate Subjects of any Duration whatever. See Arijl. Poet* cap. 6-

ETl 0*1 WO? f-W TO TOIHT0V, ^XoT TY\V TTpOKlpEtTlV 07To7oC Ti? l<TtV, iV ol$ «X £S~* J?)A0V, £i 7Tp00ll(>£~T<Zl V

(pivysi o xiyoiv. See alfo the ingenious and learned Bojfu, Book 4. ch. 4.

i2 A Discourse on MUSIC,

h. V. perior to Poetry ; while the Subjects, here p r " defcribed, far exceed the Power of Paint- ing in as much as they are of all Sub- jects the moft *f offering, and improving, and fuch of which we have the Jlrongejl

Comprehenjion further, in as much as

Poetry can moft % accurately imitate them — in as much as, befides all Imitation, there is a Charm in Poetry, arifing from its very Numbers (e); whereas Painting has Pre- tence

f P. %$, &c.

% P. 89, bV.

(e) That there is a Charm in Poetry, arifing from its Numbers only, may be made evident from the five or fix firft Lines of the Paradife Loft; where, without any Pomp of Phrafe, Sublimity of Senti- ment, or the leaji Degree of Imitation, every Reader muft find himfelf to be fenfibly delighted ; and that, only from the graceful and mnple Cadence of the Numbers, and that artful Variation of the Cafura or Paufe, fo efTential to the Harmony of every good Poem.

A n JZngliJh Heroic Verfe confifts of ten Semipeds, or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned

the

PAINTING and POETRY. 93

tcnce to no Charm, except that of Imita- Ch. V.

tion only laftly, (which will foon be

• fhewn) in as much as Poetry is _ able to

cjjbciate Mufic, as a moft powerful Ally ; of which Affiftance, Painting is utterly in- capable From all this it may be

fairly concluded, that Poetry is not

only Equal, but that it is in fadi far Su- perior to its Sister Art of Paint-

§.4. But if it exceed Painting in Sub* jeffs, to which Painting is not adapted ; no doubt will it exceed Music in SubjeBs to

Mufic

• Chap. VI.

the Pakfes are varied upon different Semipeds in the Order, which follows ; as may be feen by any, whq will be at the Pains to examine

Paradise Lqst> B. I.

f Semiped 7

has its Paufe J — 6

fall upon j — — — 5

v- — - — 4

94 -^ Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch. V. Muiic not adapted. For here it has been

• preferred^ even in thofe Subje&s, which

have been held adapted the bejl of all.

§. 5. Poetry is therefore, on the whole, much superior to either of the other Mimetic Arts 5 it having been Jhewn to be equally excellent in the •f Accuracy of its Imitation - y and to imitate Subjects, which far surpass, as well in % Utility, as in || Dig- nity*

• Ch. IV. §. 3. f P. 89. % P. 86.

il See p. 83, 84. and p. 64, Note (g). See alfi P-59-

CHAP.

PAINTING and POETRY. 95

CHAP. VI.

On. Mufic confidered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another

Source. On its joint Operation, by this

means, with Poetry. - An Objection to

Mufcfolved. The Advantage arijing to

it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.-- — Conclujion,

IN the above Difcourfe, Music hasCh.VL been mentioned as an *Ally to Poetry, It has alfo been faid to derive its -f Efficacy from another Source, than Imitation. It remains therefore, that thefe things be ex- plained.

Now, in order to this, it is firft to be obferved, that there are various Affections, which may be raifed by the Power of

Mufic*

1 »i 1 1 1 ■ I ' m— i m il - ■ r. ii. 1 ' ,1 1 | | li 11 m i

• P. 93. f P. 69.

96 ^Discourse on MUSICy

Ch.VI. Mujic. There are Sounds to make us chearfuly or fad-, martial, or tender; and £0 of almoft every other AiFe&ion, which we feeh

It is alfo further obfervable, that there is a reciprocal Operation between our Af- feBions, and our Ideas ; fo that, by a fort of natural Sympathy, certain Ideas necefla- . rily tend to raife in lis certain Affections $ and thofe Affections, by a fort of Counter- Operation, to raife the fame Ideas.- Thus Ideas derived from Funerals, Tortures^ Murders, and the like, naturally generate the Affeftion of Melancholy. And when, by any Phyjical Caufes, that Affection hap- pens to prevail, it as naturally generates the fame doleful Ideas*

And hence it is that Ideas, derived from external Caufes, have at different times, upon the fame Perfon, fo different an Effedt. If they happen to fuit the Affections, which prevail within, then is their Impreffion ??ioJlfenJible, and their Effeft

mojl

PAINTING and POETRY. <) 7

mojl lofting. If the contrary be true, then Ch. VI, is the Effe<£t contrary. Thus, for inftance, a Funeral will much more affedl the fame Man, if he fee it when melancholy, than if he fee it when chearful.

Now this being premifed, it will fol- low, that whatever happens to be the Jlffeftion or Difpofition of Mind, which ought naturally to refult from the Genius of any Poem, the fame probably it will be in the Power of fome Species of Mufic to excite, But whenever the proper AffeBion prevails, it has been allowed that then all kindred Ideas, derived from external Caufes, make the mojl fenfible ImpreJJion. The Ideas therefore of Poetry muft needs make the moft fenfible Impreffion, when the (a) Affe&ions, peculiar \o them, are al- ready

(a) Quint il ian elegantly, and exactly appofite

to this Reafoning, fays of Mufic Namque &

voce &f modulatione grandia elate, jucunda dulciter,

moderate

H

98 A Discourse on MUSIC,

'h. VI. ready excited by the Mufic. For here &

~*~~ n - f double Force is made co-operate to one End* A Poet, thus ajjijiedy finds not an Audience in a Temper, averfe to the Genius of his Poem, or perhaps at bell under a cool In-* difference - y but by the Preludes,, the Sym- phonies, and concurrent Operation of the Mufic in all its Parts, rouzed into thofe nftry Affeclions y which he would moft d#re.

An Audience, fodifpofed, not only em- brace with Pleafure the Ideas of the. Poet, when exhibited - y but, in a manner, even anticipate them in their feveral Imagina- tions. The Superfluous have not a more previous Tendency to be frightned at the fight of Spedres, or a Lover to fall into Raptures at the fight of his Miflrefs y than a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of

Mufic,

moderata lenlter canity totaq\ arte confentit cum eorum, qiue dicuntur, Affectibus. Injl. Orator* 1. 1. cap. io.

PAINTING and POETRY. 99

Mufic, to enjoy all Ideas, which are fuitable Ch. VI. to that Temper.

And hence the genuine Charm of Mufic, and the Wonder s, which it works, thro* its great Profeffors (b). A Power, which confifts not in Imitations, and the raifing Ideas $ but in the railing AffeBions % to which Ideas may correlpond. There are few to be found fo infenfible, I may even fay fo inhumane, as when good Poetry is justly set to Music, jiot in fome degree to feel the Force of fo amiable an Union. But to the Mufes Friends it is a Force irrejijlible^ and pene- H 2 trates

(b) Such,- above all, is George Frederick Handel '; whofe Genius, having been cultivated by continued Exercife, and being itfelf far the fublimeft and moft univerfal now known, has juftly placed him with out an Equal, or a Second. This tranlient Tefti- mony could not be denied fo excellent an Artift, from whom this Treatife has borrowed fuch emi- nent Examples, to juftify its AiTertions in what it has offer'd concerning Mufic,

ioo A Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch.VI.trates into the deepeft Receffes of the Soul.

• PeBus inaniter angit,

Irritat, muket^faljis terroribus implet.

§.2. Now this is that Source ', from whence Mufic was -f faid formerly to de- ygoe its greatefl Efficacy. And here indeed, not in (c) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account alfo it has been called a % powerful Ally to Poetry. And farther, 'tis by the help of this Rea- foning, that the Objection is folved, which is raifed againfi the Singing of Poetry (as in Opera's, Oratorio's, &c.) from the want

of

• Horat.Epift. i. 1. 2. v. 21 r.

t P. 69. % P. 93.

(c) For the narrow Extent and little Efficacy c£ Music, confidered as a Mimetic or Imitative Art, fee Ch. II. §.3.

PAINTING and POETRY. 101

of Probability and Refemblance to Nature. Ch.VI. To one indeed, who has no mufical Ear, V- "^* W | this Objection may have Weight. It may- even perplex a Lover of Mufic, if it hap- pen to furprize him in his Hours of In- difference. But when he is feeling the Charm of Poetry Jo accompanied^ let him be angry (if he can) with that, which ferves only to intereft him more feelingly in the Subject, and fupport him in a jlronger and more earnefi Attention; which enforces, by its Aid, the feveral Ideas of the Poem, and gives them to his Imagi- nation with unufual Strength and Gran- deur. He cannot furely but confefs, that he is a Gainer in the Exchange^ when he barters the want of a fingle Proba- bility, that of Pronunciation (a thing merely arbitrary and every where different) for a noble Heightening of Affeffiions which are fuitable to the Occafion, and enable him to enter into the Subject with double Energy and Enjoyment,

h 3 §•

•*)

io2 A Discourse on MUSIC,

§. 3. From what has been faid it is evident, that thefe two Arts can never be fo powerful Jingly, as when they are pro* ferly united. For Poetry, when alone, muft be neceffarily forced to wafte many of its richeft Ideas, in the mere raifing of AfFeftions, when, to have been properljr relifhed, it fhould have found thofe Af- fections in their higheft Energy. And Mufic, when alone, can only raife Affec- tions, which foon languijh and decay, if not maintained and fed by the nutritive Images of Poetry. Yet muft it be re- membered, in this Union, that Poetry ever Jiave the Precedence - y its * Utility, as well as Dignity, being by far the more con* fiderable,

§.4. And thus much, for the prefent, £S to f Music, Painting, and Poetry ;

the

t Ch t V, §, 2. p, 83, t P. 55.

PAINTING and POETRY. 103.

the Circumftances, in which they agree, Ch.VI. and in which they differ; and the Pre-' vmm m Terence, due to one of them above the other two.

The END,

f

H 4

TREATISE the Third:

CONCERNING

HAPPINESS,

A

DIALOGUE.

CONCERNING

HAPPINESS,

DIALOGUE.

PART the First,

J. H. to F. S. I

NATURE feems to treat Man, Parti? as a Painter would his Difciple, *— -v— ■ to whom he commits the Out* Lines of a Figure lightly fketched, which the Scholar for himfelf is to colour and complete. Thus from Nature we derive Senfes, and Paffions, and an InteileQ:, which each of us for himfelf has to model into £ Character. And hence (the reverie

of

io8 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. of every Species befide) Human Characters -% ~ r alone are infinitely various ; as various in- deed, as there are Individuals to form them. Hence too, the great Diverfity of Syftems, and of Dodtrines, refpedting the Laws, and Rules, and Conduct of Human Life.

5 T i s in the Hiftory of thefe, my Friend,

you have fo fuccefsfully employed yourfelf.

You have been ftudious to know, not fo

much what Greeks, Romans, or Barbarians

have done - y as what they have reafoned, and

pi. what they have taught. ^Not_anEpkure

~ V has more Joy in the Memory of a deli-

^\ cious Banquet, than I feel in recollecting,

' what we have difcourf^d on thefe Sub-

o

jedts,

And here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the Contemrjt, in which we held thofe fuperiicial Cenfurers, who profefs to refute ^ what they want even Capacities to corn£rehend. Upon the Faith of their own Boafting (could that be

credited)

A Dialogue. 109;

credited) Sentiments are expofed, Opinions Part I, demolished, and the whole Wifdom of ^ Antiquity lies vanquished at their Feet. Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, they can with eafe difpatch a Lion, or dis- comfit a whole Legion. But alafs ! were they to encounter, not the Shadow, but the Subftance, what think you would be the Event then ? — Little better, I fear, than v/as the Fortune of poor Priam, when the feeble Old Man durft attack the Youthful Pyrrbus.

— * Telum imbelle fine iBu

Conjedt : rauco quod protenus cere repulfum, Etfummo Clypei neqiticcjuam umbone pependit ':

Among the many long exploded and obfolete Syftems, there was one, you may remember, for which I profeffed a great Efteem. Not in the leaft degree con- vinced by all I had heard againft it, I

durft

• /Eneld. I. 2. v. 544,

no Concerning HAPPINESS,

• art I. durft venture to affirm, that no Syftem

"" v ""*'was more plaufbk; that grant but its Principles y and the reft followed of courfe -, that none approached nearer to the Per- fection of our own Religion, as I could prove, were there occafion, by Authority not to be controverted. As you, I knew, were the Favourer of an Hypothecs fome- what -f different 5 fo I attempted to fup- port my own, by reciting you a certain Dialogue. Not fucceeding however fo happily in the Recolleftion, as I could wifh, I have fince endeavoured to tran- fcribe, what at that time I would have re- hearfed. The Refult of my Labour is the following Narrative, which I commit with Confidence to your Friendfhip and Can- dour.

^ §. 2. 'Twas at a time, when a certain A w Friend, whom I highly value, was my%*'» Gueft. We had been fitting together,

enter-

f Viz. the Platonic,

^Dialogue. rn

entertaining ourfelves with Shakefpear. Part I Among many of his Characters, we had^""* - * looked into that of Woo/fey. How foon, fays my Friend, does the Cardinal in Dif- grace abjure that Happinefs, which he was lately fo fond of? Scarcely out of Office, but he begins to exclaim

• Vain Pomp and Glory of the World 1 1 bate ye.

So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary with the Seafon - 7 and that in Adverfity we are of one Mind, in Prosperity, of another. As for his mean Opinion, faid I, of Human Happinefs, 'tis a Truth, which fmall Reflection might have taught him long before. There feems little need of Diftrefs to inform us of this. I rather commend the feeming Wifdom of that Eaftern Mo- narch, who in the Affluence of Profperity, when he was proving every Pleafure, was yet fo fenfible of their Emptinefs, their In- fufficiency to make him happy, that he

pro-

f Shake spear's Henry the Eighth*

-

ii2 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who -" v *"^ fhould invent a new Delight. The Re- ward indeed was proclaimed, but the De- light was not to be found. If by Delight, faid he, you mean fome Goody fomething conducive to real Happinefs y it might have been found perhaps, and yet not hit the Monarch's Fancy. Is that, faid I, poffible ? 'Tis poffible, replied he, tho' it had been the [Sovereign

I X jffiy^ ijMfr ^ n d indeed what wonder ?

Is it probable that fuch a Mortal, as an Eaftern Monarch ; fuch a pamper'd, flat- ter'd, idle Mortal > fhould have Attention, or Capacity to a Subjedt fo delicate? A Subject, enough to exercife the Subtleft and moft Acute ?

What then is it you efteem, faid I, the Sovereign Good to be ? It fhould feem, by your Reprefentation, to be fomething very uncommon. Alk me not the Queftion,

faid he, you know not where 'twill carry us. Its general Idea indeed is eafy and 1/ plain; but the Detail of Particulars is ^ ~ perplex'd

^Dialogue. 113,

perplex'd and long Paffions, and Opi- Parti.,

rlions for ever thwart us a Paradox ^ V ^M

appears in almoft every Advance. Befides, did our Inquiries fucceed ever fo happily, the very SubjeSl itfelf is always enough to give riie Pain. That, replied I, feems

a Paradox indeed. 'Tis not, faid he,

from any Prejudice, which I have con- ceived againft it ; for to Man I efteem it the nobleft in the World. Nor is it for being a Subjeft, to which rriy Genius does not lead me ; for no Subject at all times has more employ'd my Attention. But the Truth is, I can fcarce ever think on it, but an Unlucky Story ftill occurs to my Mind. " A certain Star-gazer, with his <£ Telefcope, was once viewing the Moon ; " and defcribing her Seas, her Mountains, " and her Territories. Says a Clown to c< his Companion, Let him fpy what he <£ pleafes -, we- are as near to the Moon, as " he and all his Brethren. 71 So fares ft alafs ! with thefe, our moral Speculations, Practice too often creeps, where Theory can foar. The Philofopher proves as weak,

yv

<l/WL a-fu? - c 3 a n & <

)

as

Vr 4 vK Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. as thofe, whom he moji contemns. A morti- •— v— ^ fying Thought to fuch as well attend it. Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your ge- neral Idea of the Sovereign Good. This is eafy from your own Account, however in- tricate the Detail.

Thus then, faid he, fince you are fo

urgent, 'tis thus that I conceive it. The

\f Sovereign Good is that, the Pos-

/ session of which renders us Happy,

And how, faid I, do we poffefs it ?

Is it Senfual y or Intellectual? There

you are entering, faid he, upon the Detail

This is beyond your Queftion. Not

a fmall Advance, faid I, to indulge poor

Curiofity ? Will yor raife me a Thirft, and

be fo cruel not to all^y it ? 'Tis not,

replied he, of my raifing, but your own.

Befides I am not certain, Ihould I attempt

to proceed, whether you will admit fuch

i£ Authorities, as 'tis poffible I may vouch.

That, faid I, muft be determined

by their Weight, and Chara&er, Sup-

pofe 3

A DlALOGUt

pofe, faid he, it fhould be Mankind; PartL the whole Human Race. Would you not ^J think it fomething ftrange^ to feek of thofe concerning Good, who purfue it a thou- fand Wapi and many of them contra- dictory ? r I confefs, faid I, it feems fo. And yet, continued he* were there a Point, in which fuch Dijfentients ever agreed^ this Agreement would be no meari Argument in favour of its Truth and Juji- nefs. But where, replied I, is this

Agreement to be found ?

He anfwered me by afking* What if it fhould appear* that there were certain Original Characteristics and Pre- \ J conceptions of GooD^ which were Na* \ / tural, Uniform ant^Com^n fo alb A/ Men 5 which all recognized in their various K Purfuits-> and that the Difference lay only \ \ in the applying them to Particu- ■ v la&s ? This requires, faid I, to be

illuftratedi As if, continued he* a

Company of Travellers, in fome wide Foreft, were all intending for one City, I a but

1 16 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Parti, but each by a Rout peculiar to himfelf.

""" v ~"*^ The Roads indeed would be various, and many perhapsy^? ; but all who travelled, would have one E?td in view, 'Tis

evident, faid I, they would. So fares

it then, added he, with Mankind in pur- fuit of Good. The Ways indeed are Many, JC but what they feeki^ ONE .

For inftance: Did you ever hear of any, who in purfuit of their Good, were for living the Life of a Bird, an Infedfc, or a Fifh ? None. And why not ? It would be inconfiftent, anfwered I, with their Nature. You fee then, faid he, they all agree in this- — that what they purfue, ought to be confjlent, and agreeable to their proper Nature, So ought it, faid I, undoubtedly. If fo, \J continued he, one Pre-conception is dif- covered, which is common to Good in gene- ral It is, that all Good is fuppofed fome-

thing agreeable to Nature, This in-

deed, replied I, feems to be agreed on all hands.

But

yf Dialogue, 117 ':

But again, faid he, Is there a Man Part EI

fcarcely to be found of a Temper fo truly *"" *"*"" mortified, as to acquiefce in the lowejl, and Jhorteji Necejfaries of Life? Who aims not, if he be able, at fomething farther, fome- thing better ? I replied, Scarcely one.

Do not Multitudes purfue, faid he, infinite Objects of Defire, acknowledged, every one of them, to be in no refpect Necejfaries ? Exquiiite Viands, deli- cious Wines, fplendid Apparel, curious Gar- dens ; magnificent Apartments adorned with Pictures and Sculpture - y Mufic and Poetry, and the whole Tribe of Elegant Arts ?

'Tis evident, faid I. If it be,

continued he, it fhpuld feem that they all confidered the Chief or Sovereign Good, not to be that, which conduces to bare Exifience or mere Being ; for to this the Necejfaries alone are adequate, I replied they were.

But if not this., it muft be fomewhat / O conducive to that, which is fuperior to mere / v ' Being. It muft. And what, con-

tinued he, can this be, but Well-Bein g ? CT%

I 3 Well- A*^<

IiS Concerning .HAPPINESS,

Part I. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in

"****** which differing Opinions paint it ? Or can

you fuggeft any thing elfe ? I replied,

T*°.cer?*J C ould not. Mark here, then, cqnr

. _v,/i tinuedhe, another Preconception^ in which

/ tthey all agree r-~ — r the Sovereign Good is

fomewhat conducive^ not to mere Beings but

to Well-Being. I replied, It had fo ap^

V^pearedf

Again, continued he. What Labour, what Expence, to procure thofe Rarities, which our own poor Country is unable to afford us ? How is the World ranfacked to its utmofl Verges, and Luxury and Arts imported from every Quarter ? — — Nay more — — --- How do we baffle Nature herr felf; invert her Order ; feek the Vegetables pf Spring in the Rigours of Winter, and Winter's Ice, during the Heats of Sum- mer ? I replied, We did. And yvhat Difappointment, what Remorfe, when Endeavours fail ? 'Tis true. If this then be evident, faid he, it fhould feem> that whatever wp delire as our Chief and

Sove-

^Dialogue. 119

Sovereign Good, is fomething which, as far Part I. as pojjible, we would accommodate to all Places**"~ >rm "\ and Times. I anfwered, So it appeared.

See then, faid he, another of its Cha- Jj \ raBerijlics, another P re-conception, ? & *%

But farther ftill What Contefts for

Wealth f What Scrambling for Property? What Perils in the Purfuit - 9 what Sollieitude

in the Maintenance ? And why all this ?

To what Purpofe, what End?— — Or is not the Reafon plain ? Is it not that Wealth may continually procure us, whatever we fancy Good; and make that perpetual^ which would otherwife be tranjient ? I replied, It feemed fo. Is it not far-

ther defired, as fupplying us from ourfehes $ when, without it, we muft be beholden to the Benevolence of others, and depend on their Caprice for all that we enjoy ? 'Tis true, faid I, this feems a Reafon,

A g a 1 n — Is not Power of every degree

as much contefted for, as Wealth ? Are not

Magiftracies, Honours, Principalities, and

I 4 Empire*

,

2Q Concerning HAPPINESS,

|Part I. Empire, the Subje&s of Strife, and ever-*

pV- . lafting Contention ? I replied, They

were. And why, faid he, this ? To

obtain what End ? Is it not to help us,

like Wealth, to the Poffefjion of what we defire? Is it not farther to afcertain, to fecure our Enjoyments- that when others would deprive us, we may hzftrong enough to rejijl them ? I replied. It was.

\^r

A Or to invert the whole— -t— Why are

there, who feek Receffes the moft diftant

and retired ? fly Courts and Power, and

r-* I fubmit to Parcimony and Obfcurity f Why

tC ^ all this, but from the fame Intention ?

1 1 ^ From an Opinion that fmall Pofieffions^

l*JL W^d moderately, are permanent that

ru-r -ir larger PoflefBpns raife Envy, and are more

• -^ frequently invaded—--—- that the Safety of

Power and Dignity is more precarious , than '~% . that of Retreat - ? and that therefore they have chofen, what is moft eligible upon the 'whole ? It is not ? faid I, improbable,

that they aft by feme fueh Motive,

Do

^ Dialogue, 121

Do you not fee then, continued he, two Parti. or three more Pre-conceptions of the Sove- reign Good, which are fought for by all, as ^ Eflential to conftitute it ? And what, >Lr>-« 

faid I, are thefe ? That it fhould

not be tranfient, nor derived from the Will of others, nor in their Power to take away ; but be durable, felf derived, and (if I may ufe the Expreffion ) i ndeprivable. t^-

I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. But we have already found it to be con- ; fidered, asfometbing agreeable to our Nature $ - /u*^ condiicive, not to mere Being, but to Well- Being; and what we aim to have ac common date to ,all Places and Times, We have.

CsK&Ti

There may be other Chara&eriftics, , faid he, but thefe I think fufficient. See j^, then its Idea ; behold it ? as collected from-v^ -*t the Original, Natural, and Univerfal Pre* J^u±t conceptions of all Mankind, The Sove- ;w^ reign Good, they have taught us, ought to be fomething — — Agreeable to our Nature 5 Conducive to Well-Being $

r- . i n Cnctrnmg HAPPIXES S,

Parti. A :odate to all Places axd

■~ v "*- Times 5 Durable, Self-derived, and

Indeprivable. Your Account, laid I,

appears juit.

It matters, continued he, little, how

they err in the - :n if they covet

that as agreeable to Nt which is in it-

r'moil Contrary if they would have

Durable, which is in itielf moll

Tranfient that as Independent, and their

own, which is moil precarious and

"Tis e if we know their

j&m enough, if we can dilcover, w

'tis they propcrfc the Means and Met

may be objure SB it happens. I an-

fwered, Their Aim was furficieni to prove it he had afTer r

Tis true, replied he, 'tis abundantly

\: indent. And yet perhaps, even tho* this

were ever fo certain, it would not be al- together f: reign, were we to examine, ad; how r the fbeceed in ap-

ring thefe Umvcrjah tc J :r Sub*

it

A Dialog ue, 123

JeSs. Should they be found juji in the P

Application, we need look no farther s ~*~ vmm S

The true S<r;ereign G :uld of courfe

be Plain and Otrjious ; and we fhould have no more to do, than to follow the beaten ad 'Tis granted, replied I. But

what if thev er Time enough for

that, faid he, when we are iatisfied that they do. We ought firft to infonn our- felves, whether they may not poffibly be in the Right. I firbmitted, and begged

him to proceed his own Way.

§. 3. Will you then, faid he, in this Difquiiition into Human Conduct, allow

me this —That fuch, as is the Species

of Life, which even, 7 one cbocfes; iiich ids Idea of Hat>pimfs> fuch his Canceptx of the Sovereign Good ? I feem, faid I,

to comprehend You, but mould be You would illuftrate. His V

he anfwered, was no more than this

If a Man prefer a Life of Indufir be-

caufe he has an Id: a of Happinefs in JP if he prefers a Life of Gaie: from a

like

124 ■ Concerning HAPPINESS,

Parti, like Idea concerning Pleafure. And the

~ vmmm ^fame, we fay, holds true in every other

Inftance. I told him, It muft cer« 

tainly.

And can you recoiled, faid he, any u>A/*/-Life, b ut what is a Life of Bii§njf x _ orjof ^.«tk '^ e ij ure ^ I anfwered, None. And

is not the great End of Bujinefs either Power, or Wealth ? * It is. Mull:

not every Life therefore of Bu/inefs, be either Political or Lucrative f It muft.

Again Are not IntelleB and Senfe,

the Soul's leading Powers ? They are.

And in Leifure are we not ever

feeking, to gratify one, or the other ?

We are. Muft not every Life there-

I f- fore of Leifure be either Pleafwrable, or

I + Contemplative? If you confine Pleafure,

^ faid I, to Senfe i I think it neceffarily muft.

y i / If it be not fo confined, faid he, we

' A confound all Inquiry, Allow it,

V

Mark then, faid he, the two grand

ss and of

Leisure

Genera, the Lives of Business and of

A Dialogue 1251,

Leisure mark alfo the fubordinate Part I. •

Species \ the Political and Lucra- tive, the Contemplative and Pleasurable Can you think of any- other, which thefe will not include ? I replied, I knew of none. 'Tis po£-

lible indeed, faid he, that there may be other Lives framed, by the blending of thefe, two or more of them, together* But if we feparate with Accuracy, we mail find that here they all terminate, I replied, fo it feemed probable.

If then, continued he, we would be exact in our Inquiry, we muft examine thefe four Lives, and mark their Confe~ quences. 'Tis thus only we mall learn^ how far thofe, who embrace them, find that Good and Happinefs, which we know they all purfue. I made anfwer, It

feemed neceffary, and I mould willingly attend him.

§.4. To begin then, faid he, with the Political Life. Let us fee the Good,

ufually

• 26 Concerning HAPPINESS,

(Part L ufually fought after here. To a private

• • • • • • • Man, it is the Favour of fome Prince, or

Commonwealth ; the Honours and Emo- luments derived from this Favour; the Court and Homage of Mankind ; the Power of commanding others ---— - To a | Prince, it is the fame Things nearly, only

greater in Degree ; a larger Command -> a ftridler and more fervile Homage $ Glory,

Conqueft, and extended Empire Am I

right in my Defcription ? I replied 5

I thought he was* Whether then, faid he, all this deferve the Name of Good or not, I do not cc itrovert. Be it one, or the other, it affe&s not our Inquiry. All that I would afk concerning it* is this—-- Do you not think it a Good (if it really be one) derived from Foreign and External Caufes ? Undoubtedly, replied I.

It cannot come then from ourfelves, or be felf-derived. It cannot* And what

fliall we fay as to its Duration and Stabi- lity f Is it fofrm and lajling, that we can- not be deprived of it ? I fhould imagine, faid I, quite otherwife. You infift not

then.

A Dialogue. 127;'

then, faid he, on my appealing to Hi/lory. Part I, 'i You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, L "" V ""Y of Empires, and their Owners. I re- plied, I did.

If fo, faid he, it fhould feem that this Political Good, which they feek, correfponds not to the Pre-conceptions of being Durable, and Indeprivable. Far from it. But

it appeared juft before, not to be felf- derived. It did. You fee then,

faid he, that in three of our Pre-conceptions it intirely fails. So indeed, faid I, it appears.

But farther, faid he— —We are told of this Good y that in the Pojfefjion it is attended with Anxiety, and that when lojl, it is ufually loft with Ignominy and Dijgrace; nay, often with Profecutions and the bit- tereft Refentments; with Mulcts, with Exile, and Death itfelf. 'Tis frequently, faid I, the Cafe. How then, faid he, can it anfwer that other Pre-conception, of contributing to our Well-Being ? Can that

contribute

28 Concerning HAPPINESS,

^art I. contribute to Well -Being, whofe Confe- " v ~"*""^ quinces lead to Calamity, and whofe Pre- fence implies Anxiety ? This, it muft be confefled, faid I, appears not probable.

But once more, faid he — — - There are certain Habits or Difpoftions of Mind, called Sincerity, Generofity, Candour, Plain-dealing, Juftice, Honour, Honefty, and the like. There are. And it has been generally believed, that thefe are agreeable to Nature. Afluredly.

But it has been as generally believed, that the Political Good, we Ipeak of, is often not to be acquired but by Habits, contrary to thefe ; and which, if thefe are Natural, muft of neceffity be unnatural. What

Habits, faid I, do you mean ? Flattery, anfwered he, Diffimulation, Intrigue: upon occafion, perhaps Iniquity, Falfhood, and Fraud. 'Tis poffible indeed, faid I,

that thefe may fometimes be thought necef- fary. How then, faid he, can that

Good be agreeable to Nature, which cannot be acquired, but by Habits contrary to

Nature f

^ Dialogue. 129;

Nature? Your Arguments faid I, Partly

feems juft. <— -v— %

I If then, faid he, We have reafoned rightly, and our Conclufions may be de- pended on; it fhould feem that the sup- posed Good, which the Political Life purfues, correfponds not, in any hijlance, to our P re-conceptions of the 'Sovereign Good. I anfwered, So it appeared.

§. 5. Let us quit then, faid he, thePoli* ticalLife, and pafs to the Lucrative. The Objedt of this is Wealth. Admit it.

And is it not too often, faid he, the Cafe, that to acquire this, we are tempted to employ fome of thofe Habits, which we have juft condemned as Unnatural? Such, I mean, as Fraud, Falfhood, Injuftice, and the like ? It mufl be owned, faid l %

too often.

Besides, continued he What fhall

we fay to the Efteem, the Friendship, and

Love of Mankind ? Are they worth having ?

K Is

130 Concerning HAPPINESS,.

Parti. Is it agreeahky think you, to Nature ', to ' m ~v mmJ endeavour to deferve them ? Agreeable, faid I, to Nature, beyond difpute. If

fo, then to merit Hatred and Contempt, faid he, muft needs be contrary to Nature. Undoubtedly. And is there any

thing which fo certainly merits Hatred and Contempt^ as a mere Lucrative Life y fpent in the uniform Purfitit of Wealth? I replied, I believed there was nothing. If fo, faid he, then as to correspond- ing with our Pre-conceptions f the Lucrative Good y in this fefpeca, fares no better than the Political It appears not.

v And what fhall we fay as to Anxiety? Is not both the PoJfeJ/ton and Purfuit of Wealth, to thofe who really love it, ever anxious? It feems fo. And why

anxious, but from a Certainty of its Infta- bility ; from an Experience, how obnoxious it is to every crofs Event ; how eafy to be loft and transfefd to others, by the fame Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it ta ourfelves ? — -This is indeed the tritefl: of

all

A Dialogue, 13:'

all Topics. The Poets and Orators have Part I long ago exhaufted it. 'Tis true, faid I, Wnr ^|' they have. May we not venture then,

faid he* upon the whole, to pafs the fame Sentence on the Lucrative Life* as we have already on the Political—- — - that it propofes not a Good, correfpondent to thofe Pre-conceptions, by which we would all be governed in the Good, which we are allfeekingi I anfwered, We might

juftly.

§.6* If then neither the Lucrative Life, nor the Political, faid he, procure that Good which \ e defire : fhall we feek - . it from the Pleasurable? Shall we make Pleasure our Goddefs?

— - — - Pleafure§ Whom Love attends^ and foft Dejire^ and

Words Alluring, apt thefleddieji Heart to bend*

So fays the Poet, and plaufible his Doc-< rine. Plaufible, faid I, indeed.

K 2 L?^

[32 Concerning HAPPINESS,

artl. Let it then, continued he, be a plea* ~ >rmmJ jur -able World-, a Race of harmlefs, loving Animals $ an Elyfian Temperature of Sun- fhine and Shade. Let the Earth, in every Quarter, referable our own dear Country j where never was a Froft, never a Fog, never a Day, but was delicious and ferene. I was a little embarraffed at this un- expected Flight, 'till recolle&ing myfelf, I told him, (but ftill with fome Surprize) that, in no degree to difparage either my Country or my Countrymen, I had never found Either fo exquifite, as he now fuppofed them. There are then it

feems, faid h£, in the Natural World, and even in our own beloved Country, fuch things as Storms, and Tempefls -, as pinching Colds, and fcorching Heats. I replied, There were. And confe-

quent to thefe, Difeafe, and' Famine, and infinite Calamities. There are.

And in the Civil or Human World, we have Dijtord and Contention*, or (as the

Poet

i D I A t O G U E,

Poet better * defcribes it)

Cruel Revenge, and rancorous Dejpite, Dijloyal Treafon, and heart-burning Hate.

We have. Alafs ! then, poor

Pleafure ! Where is that Good, accommo* date to every 'Time \ fuited to every Place ; felf-derived, not dependent on Foreign Ex* ternal Caufes? Can it be Pleasure, on fuch a changeable, fuch a turbulent Spot, as this ? I replied, I thought not.

And what indeed, were the World, faid he, modelled to a Temperature the moji exaB ? Were the Rigours of the Seaibns never more to be known ; nor Wars, De- vaftations, Famines cr Difeafes? Admit- ting all this, (which we know to be //»* pojfible) can we find ftill in Pleafure that \kngthened Duration, which we confider as Ian Efential, to conftitute the Sovereign

pood f Aflc the Glutton, the Drinker,

K 3 the

ISpencer's Fairy Queen, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 221

Concerning HAPPINESS,

the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether they know any Enjoyment, not to be can- celled by Satiety ? Which does not haftily pafs away into the tedious Intervals of In- difference t Or yielding all this too,

' (which we know cannot be yielded) where are we to find our Good, how poffefs it in Age ? In that Eve of Life, declining Age, when the Power of Senfe, on which all de- fends, like the fetting Sun, is gradually for- faking us ?

I should imagine, faid I, that Pleafure was no mean Adverfary, fince you em- ploy, in attacking her, fo much of your Rhetoric. Without heeding what I faid, he purfued his Subject — Befide, if thi; be our Good, our Happinefs, and our End to what purpofe Powers, which bear n<

Relation to it ? Why Memory ? Wh

Reafon? Mere Senfation might have beei as exqui/ite, had we been Flies or Earti

Worms Or can it be proved other wifi]

I replied, I could not fay. No Ar\ maly continued he, pofjeffes its Faculties Ify

r CC:\

^ Dialogue, 13

vain. And (hall Man derive no Good Part from his bejl, his moil eminent ? From That, which of all is peculiar to himfelf ? For as to Growth and Nutrition, they are not wanting to the meaneft Vegetable , and for Senfes, there are Animals, which per- haps exceed us in them all.

§. 7. This feems, faid I, no mean Ar- gument in favour of Contemplation. The Contemplative Life gives Reafon all the Scope, which it can defire. And of all Lives, anfwered he, would it furely be the beft, did we dwell, like Milton's Uriel, in the Sun's bright Circle. Then might we plan indeed the moft Romanti c ~~ Kind of Happinefs. Stretch'd at Eafe, without Trouble or Moleftation, we might pafs our Days, contemplating the Uni- verie -, tracing its Beauty ; loft in Wonder ; ravifhed with Ecftacy, and. I know not what — -But here alafs ! on this fublunary, this turbulent Spot, (as we called it not long fince) how little is this, or any thing

like it, practicable ? Fogs arife, which

K 4 dim

36 Concerning HAPPINESS,

art I. dim our Profpe&s— the Cares of Life per- petually moleft us Is Contemplation fuited

to a Place, like this? It muft be owned, faid I, not extremely. How then is it the Sovereign Good, which fhould be Ac- commodate to every Place ? I replied, It feemed not probable.

But farther, faid he Can we enjoy

the Sovereign Good, and be at the fame time vexed) and agitated by Papon ? Does not this feem a Paradox ? I anfwered, It did* Suppofe then an Event were to happen — not an Inundation, or Majfacre — but an Acquaintance only drop a difrefpe£t~ ful Word-, a Servant chance to break a favourite Piece of Furniture — What would inftrudt us to endure this ? Contempla- tion, Theory, Abftradtions ? Why not, faid I ? No, replied he with Warmth, (quoting the Poet) not

• Wo all the Stars

Thou knew" ft by Name-, and all the Etherial Powers. Foi

• Par. Loft, B. 12* v. 576.

A Dialogue. 137

For does not Experience teach us, abun- Part] dantly teach us, that our deepeft Philofo- u, ~ v "" phers, as to Temper and Behaviour ', are as very Children for the moll part, as the meaneft and moft illiterate ? A little more Arrogance perhaps, from Prefumption of what they know, but not a grain more of Magnanimity 1 of Candour and calm Indu- rance.

You are fomewhat too fevere, faid I, in cenfuring of all. There are better and worfe among Them, as among Others. The Difference is no way propor- tioned y faid he, to the Quantity of their Knowledge ; fo that .Avhatever be its Caufe, it can't be imputed to their Speculations. — Befides, can you really imagine, we came here only to Think ? Is Affiing a Circum- ftance, which is foreign to Our Character ?

Why then fo many Social Affedliom,

which all of us feel, even infpite of our- felves ? Are we to fupprefs them All, as ufelefs and unnatural? The Attempt,

replied I, muft needs be found impra&i-

cable*

138 Concerning HAPPINESS,

?#rt I. cable. Were they once fupprejfed> faid j" - "*""" he, the Confequences would be fomewhat ftrange. We fhould liear no more of Fa- ther, Brother, Hufband, Son, Citizen, Ma- giftrate, and Society itfelf. And were this ever the Cafe, ill (I fear) would it fare with even Contemplation itfelf, It would certainly be but bad Speculating, among lawlefs Barbarians Unaffociated Ani- mals where Strength alone of Body was

to constitute Dominio7i, and the 'Conteft came to be (as * Horace defcribes it)

glandem at que cuhili 'a propter ,

TJnguibus & pugnis, deinfuflibus — -

Bad enough ? replied I, of all con- fidence.

It fhould feem then, faid he, that not even the best Contemplative Life, however noble its ObjeB, was agreeable to our present Nature, or conjiflent

with

• Sat. 3. 1, 1. v. 99.

A Dialogue. 139 ,

with our prefent Situation. I confefs, Part I,

faid I, you appear to have proved fo. But if this be allowed true of the Bejl % the moft Excellent •> what fhall we fay to the Mockery of Monkery y the Farce of Friars ; the ridiculous Mummery of being fequeftred in a Cloyjler? This furely is too low a Thing, even to merit an Examina- tion. I have no Scruples here, faid I, you need npt wafte your Time.

§.8. If that, faid he, be your Opinion, let us look a little backward. For our Memory's fake it may be proper to reca- pitulate. I replied, 'Twould be highly

acceptable. Thus then, faid he

We have examined the four grand Lives> which we find the Generality of Men em- brace , the Lucrative ', and the Political $ the Pleafurable, and the Contemplative. And we have aimed at proving that — - tofuch a Being as Man, with fuch a Body, fitch Affections , fuch Senfes, and fuch an In- tellect placed in fuch a World, fubjefl;

to fuch Incidents— not one of thefe Lives is

pro-

I 140 Concerning HAPPINESS,

I Part I. produdiive of that Good, which we find all .i"""""*"" Men to recognize thro' the fame uniform Pre-conceptions; and which thro' one or other of thefe Lives they all of them purfue.

§. 9. You have juflly, faid I, colle&ed the Sum of your Inquiries. And

happy, faid he, fhould I think it, were they to terminate here. I afked him,

Why? Becaufe, replied he, to in-

finuate firft, that all Mankind are in the wrong j and then to attempt afterwards, to fhew one's felf only to be right ; is a Degree of Arrogance, which I would not willingly be guilty of. I ventured here

to fay, That I thought he need not be fo

diffident- that a Subjedt, where one's

own Interejl appeared concerned fo nearly, would well juftify every Scruple, and even the fevereft Inquiry. There, faid he,

you fay fomething there you encourage

me indeed. For what ? Are we not

cautioned againft Counterfeits, even in Mat- ters of meaneft Value ? If a Piece of Metal he tender'd us, which feems doubtful, do

we

A Dialogue. 141'

we not heiitate ? Do we not try it by the Part I J Tejiy before we take it for Current? — And u ~" v ** - is not this deem'd Prudence ? Are we not

cenfured, if we adt otherwife ? How

much more then does it behove us not to be impofed on here ? To be diffident and fcrupuloufly exadt, where Impo/lure, if once admitted, may tempt us to a far wo?fe Bar- gain, than ever Glaucus made with Diotned ? ^ /y

What Bargain, faid I, do you mean ?

The Exchange, replied he, not of Gold for Brafs, but of Good for Evil, and

of Rappinefs for Mifery But enough of

this, fince you have encouraged me to proceed — We are feeking that Good, which we think others have not found. Permit me thus to purfue my Subjedi

§. 10. Every Being on this our Ter~

rejlrial Dwellings exifts encompa(jed with infinite Objecls - y exifts among Animals tame i and Animals wild; among Plants and Ve- getables of a thoufand different Qualities; among Heats and Colds, Tempefts and Calms, the Friendfhips and Difcords of

hetero-

14* Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. heterogeneous Elements What fay you ?

Are all thefe Things exactly the fame to it j or do they differ, think you, in their Ef- fects and Confequences? They differ^ faid I, widely. Some perhaps then, faid he, are Apt, Congruous, and Agreeable to its Natural State, I replied, They were. Others are In-apt, Incongruous? and Difagreeable. They are. And others again are Indifferent. . They are*

It fhould feem then, faid he, if this be 1 allowed, that to every individual Being* without the leajl Exception, the whole Ma fs of Things External, from the great eft to the medneft, flood in the Relations of either Agreeable, Difagreeable, or hidifferent. I replied, So it appeared.

f>

But tho' this, continued he, be true in the general, 'tis yet as certain when we defcend to Particulars, that what is Agree- able to one Species is Difagreeable to another - t and not only fo, but perhaps Indifferent to

A Dialogue; 143 ,

a third. Inftances of this kind, he faid, Part I* , were too obvious to be mentioned.

I replied, 'Twas evident* Whence then> faid he, this Diverfty ? — It cannot arife from the Externals — - for Water is equally Water ', whether to a Man, or to a Fijlo-y whether, operating on the one, it fuffocate, or on the other, it give Life and Vigour. I replied, It was. So is y^ ?

Fire, faid he, the fame. Fire, however various in its Confequences ; whether it harden or foften, give Pleafure or Pain. I replied, It was. But if this Z)/- Verfity, continued he, be not derived from the Externals, whence can it be elfe ? — » Or can it poffibly be derived otherwife than from the peculiar Conftitution, from the Natural State of every Species itfelf ? I replied, It appeared probable.

Thus then, faid he, is it that Every particular Species is, itfelf to itfelf the I cficJk Meafure of all Things in the U?tiverfe — that I. I as Things vary in their Relations to it, they

vary

144 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. vary too in their Value and that if their

Value be ever doubtful it can no way be ad~ jufted, but by recurring with Accuracy to the Natural State of the Species, and to thofe fever al Relations, which fuch a State of courfe creates. I anfwered, He ar-

gued juftly.

§. ii. To proceed then, faid he — Tho* it be true, that every Species has a Natural State, as we have afferted ; it is not true, that every Species has a Senfe or Feeling of it. This Feeling or Senfe is a Natural Eminence or Prerogative, denied the Vege- table and Inanimate, and imparted only to the Animal. I anfwered, It was.

And think you, continued he, that as many as have this Senfe or Feeling of a Natural State, are alienated from it, or in- different to it ? Or is it not more probable, that they are well-affeffied to it ? Experience, faid I, teaches us, how well they are all affe&ed. You are right,

replied he. For what would be more

abfurd,

,/f Dialogue. 141

abjure^ than to be indifferent to their own Part; Welfare 5 or to be alienated from it, as tho' - • *" v 1fS 'twas Foreign and Unnatural*? I replied, Nothing could be more. But, con-

tinued he, if they are welUaffeSied to this their proper Natural State, it fhould feem too they muft be well-affe£ted to all thofe Externals* which appear apt, congruous, and agreeable to it. I anfwered, They

muft. And if fo, then ill-affected of

averfe to fuch, as appear the contrary* They muft. And to fuch as appeaf

indifferent, indifferent* They muflv

But if this, faid he 3 be allowed, it will follow, that in confequence of thefe Appearances, they will think fome Exter-* rials worthy of Purfuit; fome worthy of Avoidance-, and fome worthy of neither* 'Twas probable, faid I, they fhould*

Hence then, faid he, another Divifion of Things external; that is, into Purfuable> Avoidable, and lndifferent—%. Divifion only belonging to Beings Senjitive and Animate^ becaufe all, below thefe,, can neither avoid L nor

146 Concerning HAPPINESS,

'art I. nor purfue. I replied, They could

1 ~ v ""~ ; not.

If, then, faid he, Man be allowed in the Number of thefe Senfitive Beings, this

Divifion will affect Man or to explain

more fully, the whole Mafs of Things exter- nal willy according to this Divifion, exijl to the Human Species in the Relations of Pur- fuabky Avoidable ', and Indifferent. I re-

plied, They would.

Should we therefore defire, faid he, to know what thefe things truly are, we muft firft be informed, what is Man's truly Natural Constitution. For thus, you may remember, 'twas fettled not long fince — that every Species was its own Standard, and that when the Value of Things was doubtful, the Species was to be jludied, the Relations to be deduced, which were confequent to it 5 and in this manner the Value of Things to be adjujled and apper- tained. I replied, We had fo agreed it. I fear then, faid he, we are en- gaged

A Dialogue. 147

gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Part I. ^1 Talk of more Difficulty, than we were at L ' firft aware of— But Fortuna Fortes — we muft endeavour to acquit ourfelves as well as we are able*

§. 12. That Man therefore has a Body, of a Figure and internal Structure peculiar to itfelf ; capable of certain De- grees of Strength^ Agility, Beauty, and the like ; this I believe is evident, and hardly wants a Proof* I anfwered, I was

willing to own it* That he is capable

too of Pleafure and Pain -> is poffefs'd of Senfes, AffecJions , Appetites, and Aver fans $ "this alfo feems evident, and can fcarcely be denied. I replied, 'Twas admitted*

We may venture then to range Him in the Tribe of Animal Beings. I replied, We might*

And think you> faid he> without Society \

you or any Man could have been born ?

Moft certainly not. Without

Society, when born, could you have been

L 2 brought

148 Concerning HAPPINESS,

^art I. brought to Maturity ? Moft certainly

'—v~— ' not. Had your Parents then had no

Social AJfeBions towards you in that peri- lous State, that tedious Infancy, (fo much longer than the longefi of other Animals) you mull have inevitably perifhed thro' Want and Inability. I muft. You

perceive then that to Society you, and every Man are indebted, not only for the Beginning of Being, but for the Continu- ance. We are.

Suppose then we pafs from this Birth and Infancy of Man, to his Maturity and

Perfection Is there any Age, think you,

fo felffiifficient, as that in it he feels no Wants? What Wants, anfwered I,

do you mean ? In the firft and prin-

cipal place, faid he, that of Foody then perhaps that of Raiment % and after this, a Dwelling, or Defence againft the Wea- ther, Thefe Wants, replied I, are furely Natural at all Ages. And is it not agreeable to Nature, faid he, that they fhould at all Ages be fupplied? Af-

furedly.

A Dialogue. 149

furedly. And is it not more agreeable Part I

to have them well fupplied, than-///? *"*"""

It is. And mojl agreeable, to have

them befi fiipplied ? Certainly.

If there be then any one State, better than all others, for the fupplying thefe Wants ; this State, of all others, mujl needs be mojl Natural. It muft.

And what Supply, faid he, of thefe Wants, fliall we efteem the meanejl, which we can conceive ? — Would it not be fome- thing like this ? Had we nothing beyond Acorns for Food-, beyond a rude Skin, for Raiment 5 or beyond a Cavern, or hollow Tree, to provide us with a Jewelling ? Indeed, faid I, this would be bad enough.

And do you not imagine, as far as this, we might each fupply ourfehes, tho' we lived in Woods, mere folitary Savages ?

I replied, I thought we might.

Suppose then, continued he, that our

Supplies were to be meyided — -for inftance,

that we were to exchange Acorns for

L 3 Bread-—*

Concerning HAPPINESS,

Bread — -Would our Savage Character be fufficient here ? Muft we not be a little better difciplined ? Would not fome Art

be requifite ? The Baker's, for example.

It would. And previoujly to

the Baker's, that of the Miller ? It

would. And previoujly to the Miller's,

that of the Hujbandman ? It would.

Three Arts then appear necejfary, even upon the loweft Eftimatiqn. 'Tis

admitted.

But a Queftion farther, faidhe— .Can, the Huibandman work, think you, with-r out his Tools? Muft he not have his Plough, his Harrow, his Reap-hook, and the like ? He muft. And muft not

thofe other Artifts too be furrifhed in the fame manner ? They muft. And

whence muft they be fumifhed? From their own Arts ? — Or are not the making Tools, arid the ujing them, two different Occupations ? I believe, faid I, they

are. You may be convinced, continued he^ by fmall Recollection. Does Agricul- ture-

A Dl ALOGUE. 151

iure make its own Plough, its own Harrow ? Part I. Or does it not apply to other Arts, for all *^ r "^ Neceffaries of this kind ? It does.

Again Does the Baker build his own

Oven ; or the Miller frame his own Mill ?. It appears, faid I, no part of their Bufinefs.

What a Tribe of Mechanics then,-feid he, are advancing upon us ? — Smiths, Car- penters, Mafons, Mill-wrights and all

thefe to provide the Jingle NeceJJary of Bread. Not lefs than fey en or eight Arts, we find, are wanting at the fewejl. It

appears fo. And what if to the pro-

viding a comfortable Cottage, and Raiment fuitable to an indujlrioits Hind, we allow a dozen Arts more ? It would be eafy, by the fame Reafoning, to prove the Number double, I admit the Number, faid I,

mentioned.

If fo, continued he, it fhouldfeem, that

towards a tolerable Supply of the three Pri- mary and Common Necejfaries, Food, Raiment y L 4 and

152 Concerning HAPPINESS,

l*art I. and a Dwellings not lefs than twenty Arte ^" v *" were y on tfye lowejl Account y requifte* It appears fo.

And is one Man equal, think you, to the Exercife of thefe twenty Arts ? If he had even Genius y which we can fcarce ima«  gine, is it poffible he fhquld find Leifure ? - I replied, I thought not. If fo>

then zfolitary y unfocial State can never fupph tolerably the common Necejfaries of Life, It cannot.

But what if we pafs from the Necejfa* ries of Life, to the Elegancies ? To Mufic,

Sculpture, Painting and Poetry? • What

if we pafs from all Arts y whether Neceffary or Elegant^ to the large and various Tribe oi Sciences f To Logic, Mathematics, Aftro-* jiomy, Phyiics ? t- Can one Man, imagine you, mafter all this ? Abfard, faid I, im-? poffible. And yet in this Cycle of Sciences $md Arts y feem included all the Comforts, as well as Ornaments of Life ; included all conducive, either toBeing y or to V/ell-Being,

it

A Dialogue. 153;

It muft be confeffed, faid I, it has Parti, the Appearance.

What then, faid he, muft be done? In what manner muft we be fupplied? I anfwered, I knew not, unlefs we made a Dijlribution — Let one exercife one Art; and another a different — • Let^ this- Man ftudy fuch a Science ; and that Man,

another*- Thus the whole Cycle (as you

call it) may be carried eafily into Perfeo tion. 'Tis true, faid he, it may; and

every Individual, as far as his own Art or Science, might be fupplied completely, and as well as he could wifh. But what avails 3 Supply in a Jingle Inftance ? What in this cafe are to become of all his numerous other Wants'? You conceive, replied I, what I would have faid, but partially. My Meaning was, that Artijl trade with Ar* tijl 1 each fupply where he is deficient, by exchanging where he abounds -> fo that 3. Portion of every thing may be difperfed throughout all, You intend then a State,

m

[r 54 Concerning HAPPINESS,

r^rtl, faid he, of Commutation and Traffic, ~"~ v I replied, I did.

If fo, continued he, I fee a new Face of things. The Savages, with their Skins and their Caverns, difappear. In their place I behold a fair Community rifing. No longer Woods, no longer Solitude^ but all is Social, Civil, and Cultivated — And can we doubt any farther, whether Society .be Natural ? Is not this evidently the State, which can bejl fupply the Primary Wants I It has. ap-

peared fo. > And did we not agree

fome time lince, that this State, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the mojl agreeable to our Nature? We did. And have we not added, fmce

this, to ^the Weight of our Argument, by paffing from the Necejfary Arts to the Ele- gant; from the Elegant, to the Sciences? We have. The more, faid he,

we confider, the more fhall we be con- vinced, that All thefe, the nobleft* Honours and Ornaments of the Human Mind, with- out that Lcijure, that Experience, that Emu- lation,

A Dialog uf 155

htion, that Reward, which the Social State Parti. clone we know is able to provide them, could never have found Exiflen or been in the leaft recognized, Ind faid I, I believe not.

Let it not be forgot then, faid he, in favour of Society, that to it we owe, not only the Beginning and Continuation, but the Well-Being, and (if I may ufe the Ex- preffion) the very Elegance, and Rationality of cur Exiftence. I anfwered, It ap-

peared evident.

And what then, continued he?— If Society be thus agreeable to cur Nature, is there nothing, think you, within us, to ex- cite and lead us to it ? 'No Impulje, no Pre- paration of Faculties f It would be ftrange, anfwered I, if there mould not. 'Twould be a Angular Exception^ faid he, with refpedt to all other herding Species — Let us however examine — Pity, Benevolence, Friendfhip, Love -, the general Diflike of Solitude, and Defire of Com- pany 5

156 Concerning HAPPINESS,

)■ Part I. pany ; are tfhey Natural AffeBions, which

"""*"*""' come of themjelves -> or are they taught us by Art) like Muiic and Arithmetic ? I fhould think, replied I, they were Na- tural, becaufe in every Degree of Men fome Traces, of them may be difcovered. And are not the Powers and Capacities of Speech> faid he, the fame ? Are not all '. Men naturally formed, to exprefs their Sen- timents by fome kind of Language ? I re-» plied, They were.

If then, faid he, thefe feveral Powers, and Difpoftions are Natural, fo fhould feem too their Exercife, Admit it. And

if their Exercife, then fo too that State, where alone they can be exercifed. A&-

mit it. And what is this State, but the

Social? Or where elfe is it poffible to con- merfe, or ufe our Speech ; to exhibit Actions of Pity, Benevolence, Friendship or Love ; to relieve our Averfon to Solitude, or gratify our Defire of being with others? I re-

pliedj It could be no where elfe.

You

A Dialogue, i$j

You fee then, continued he, a Prepa- Parti. ration of Faculties is not wanting. We are - ^ r " fitted with Powers and Difpofitions, which have only Relation to Society ; and which, out of Society, can no where elfe be exercifed* I replied, It was evident. You have ken too the fuperior Advantages of the Social State, above all others. I have.

Let this then be remember'd, faid he, throughout all our future Reafonings, re- member'd as a firft Principle in our Ideas of Humanity, that Man by Nature is truly a Social Animal. I promifed it

fhould.

§. 13. Let us now, faid he, examine , what farther we can learn concerning Him* As Social indeed, He is diftinguifhed from the Solitary and Savage Species ; but in no degree from the reft, of a milder and more friendlyNzturc. 'Tis true, replied I, He is not. Does He then differ no more from

thefe

158 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. thefe feveral Social Species, than they, each

~ v """" - ' of them, differ from one another f Muft we

range them ally and Man among the reft,

under the fame common and general Genus ?

I fee no Foundation, faid I, for

making a Diftin&ion.

Perhaps, faid he, there may be none ; and 'tis poflible too there may. Confider a little — Do you not obferve in all other Species, a Similarity among Individuals ? a fiirprizing Likenefs, which runs thro' each Particular? In one Species they are all Bold; in another, all Timorous; in one all Ravenous; in another, all Gentle. In the Bird-kind only, what ^Uniformity of Voice y in each Species, as to their Notes ; of Ar- chitecture ' y as to building their Neftsj of Food y both for themfelves, and for fup- porting their Young ■? 'Tis true, faid I.

And do you obferve, continued he, the fame Similarity among Men ? Are thefe all as Uniform, as to their Sentiments and ASlions ? I replied, By no means.

One

A Dialogue. 159

Parti.

One Queflion more, faid he, as to the Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed the Expreffion — Are thefe, think you, what we behold them, by Nature or otherwife? Explain, faid I, your Queftion, for I do not well conceive you. I mean,

replied he, is it by Nature that the Swallow builds her Neft, and performs all the Offices of her Kind : Or is (he taught by Art, by Difcipline, or Cujiom ? She acts, re-

plied I, by pure Nature undoubtedly. And is not the fame true, faid he, of every other Bird and Beaft in the Univerfe ? It is. No wonder then, continued he, '

as they have fo wife a Governefs, that a uniform Rule of ABion is provided for each Species. For what can be more worthy the Wifdom of Nature, than ever* to the fame Subftances to give the fame Law ? It ap- pears, faid I, reafonable.

But what, continued he, fhall we fay as to Man ? Is He too actuated by Nature purely ? I anfwered, Why not ?

If

l6o Concerning H \ I N E S S,

iPart I. If He be, replied he *ange in Nature ',

_J '^ W that with refpedt to Afc« rz/i?;^, {he fhould follow fo different a Condudt* The Particu- lars in other Species, we agree* fhe renders Uniform y but in Our's, every Particular feems a fort of Model by himfelf If Nature,

faid I, do not a&uate us,. what can we fup- pofe elfe ? Ax t Local CuJloms y faid he, Na- ture ? Are the Polities and Religions of par- ticular Nations, Nature ? Are the Examples, which are fet before us; the Preceptors who inftruit us ; the Company and Friends, with whom we converfe, all Nature ? No furely, faid I. And yet, faid he,

'tis evident that by thefe, and a thoufand incidental Circumftances, equally foreign to Nature, our Adtions, and Manners, and Characters are adjufted. Who then can imagine, we are adtuated by Nature only ? I confefs, faid I, it appears con- trary.

You fee then, faid he, one remarkable DiflinBion between Man and Brutes in ge- neral — --In the Brute, Nature does all; in

Man,

^ Dialogue. 161

Man, but Part only. 'Tis evident, Partial

laid L "^^'

But farther, continued 'he — ■*- Let us confider the Powers-, of Faculties, poffeffed by each — -Suppofe I was willing to give a Brute the fame Bifiruttion, which we give a Mam A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might arrive to fome fmall Degree of Mimicry ; but do you think, upon the whole, they would be much profited or altered? I replied, I thought not. And do you

perceive the fame, faid he, with relpedt to Man? Or does not Experience mew us the very reverfe ? Is not Education capable of

moulding us into any thing of making

us greatly Good, or greatly Bad-, greatly Wife, or greatly Abfurd? The Fad,

faid I, is indifputable.

Mark then, faid he, the Difference between Human Powers and Brutal — -The Leading Principle of Brutes appears to tend in each Species to onefingle Purpofe — to this^ in general, it uniformly arrives-, and here, M in

162 Concerning HAPflNESS,

] 3 art I. in general, it as uniformly fiops— At needs no

• ~* mm * J Precepts or Difcipline to instruct it ; nor

will it eafily be changed, or admit a 'diffe- rent Direction. On the contrary, the Lead- ing Principle of Man is capable of infinite Directions — •• is convertible to all forts of

Purpofes equal to all forts of Suhjefts -

neglected, remains ignorant, and void of every Perfection ——— cultivated, becomes adorned with Sciences and Arts^—czxi raife us to excel, not only Brutes, but our own Kind — with refpect to, our other Powers and Faculties, can inftrucl us how to ufe them, as well as thofe of the various Natures, which we fee exifting around us. In a word, to oppofe the two Principles to each

other The Leading Principle of Man, is

Multiform, Originally Uninjlrufted, Pliant and Docil — the Leading Principle of Brutes is Uniform, Originally InfirucJed ; but, in moft Inftances afterward, Inflexible and-

Indocil* Or does not Experience plainly

ihew, and confirm the Truth of what we aflert? I made anfwer> It did.

A Dialogue. 163

You allow, then, faid he, the Human PartL Principle, and the Brutal, to be things of different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do

they not each then deferve a different Ap- pellation ? I fhould think fo. Sup- pofe therefore we call the Human Principle Reason 5 and the Brutal, Instinct: would you object to the Terms ? I re- plied,^ I fhould not. If not, continued he, then Reafon being peculiar to Man, of all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may we not affirm of Him, by way of Diftinc-* tion, that He is a Rational Animal? I replied.. We might juftly.

Let this too then be remember'd, faid he, in the Courfe of our Inquiry, that Man is by Nature a Rational Animal. I-promifed it fhould.

§. 14. In confequence of this, faid he, as

often as there is Occafion, I fhall appeal as

well to Reafon, as to Nature, for a Standard.

What, faid I, do you mean by Nature?

M 2 Its

j

164 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. Its Meanings, replied he, are many

" J ^ v ~"""^ and various. As it ftands at prefent Op- pofed, it may be enough perhaps to fay, that Nature is that, which is the Caufe of every things except thofe Things alone, which are the immediate EffeBs of Reafon. In other words, whatever is not Reafon, or the EffeB of Reafon, we would eonlider as Nature, or the EffeB of Nature. I an-

fwered, as he fo diftinguifhed them, I thought he might juffcly appeal to either.

And yet, continued he, there is a re- markable Difference between the Standard of Reafon, and that of Nature -, a Diffe- rence, which at no time we ought to for- get. What Difference, faid I, do you mean ? 'Tis this, anfwered he ^*— ■ In Nature, the Standard is fought from among the Many -, in Reafo?i, the Standard is fought from among the Few. You muft ex- plain, faid I, your Meaning, for I mull confefs you feem obfcure.

Thus

A Dialogue, 165

Thus then, faid he Suppofe, as an Parti.

Anatomift, you were feeking the Structure u

of fome internal Part To difcover this,

would you not infpect a Number of Indi- viduals ? I fhould. And would you not inform yourfeif, what had been dis- covered by others ? I fhould. And fuppofe, after all, you fhould find a MuU titude of Inftances for one Stru&ure, and a few Jingular for a different : by which would you be governed ? By the Mul- titude, faid I, undoubtedly. Thus then continued he, in Nature the Standard, you fee, exijis among the Many, I replied, It had fo appeared.

And what, faid he, were we to feek the Perfection of Sculpture, or of Paint- ing ? Where fhould we inquire then ? —

Among the numerous common Artifts, or among xk&few and celebrated ? Among, the Few, faid I. What if we were to

feek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory—- Where then ? Among the Few ftill.

M 3 What

Concerning HAPPINESS,

What if we were to feek the Per- fection of true Argument, or a found

Logic Where then ? Still among

the Few. And is not true Argument,

or a found Logic, one of Reafon's greateft Perfections ? It is. You fee then,

continued he, whence the Standard of

Reafon is to be fought 'Tis from among

the Few, as we faid before, in contradi- ftinction to the Standard of Nature. I confefs, faid I, it appears fo.

And happy, faid he, for us, that Provi- dence has fo ordered it happy for us, that

what is Rational, depends not on the Multi- tude ; or is to be tried by fo pitiful a Teft, as the bare counting of Nofes. 'Tis bappy,

faid I, indeed But whence pray the Dif- ference ? Why are the Many to determine in Nature, and the Few only, in Reafon ? To difcufs this at large, faid he, would require fome time. It might in- fenfibly perhaps draw us from our prefent Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the Reafon, in as few words as poffible -, which fhould they chance to be obfcure, be not

too

A Dialogue.

too folicitous for an Explanation. I begged him to proceed his own way.

The Cafe, faidhe, appears to be this — In Natural Works and Natural Operations, we hold but one Efficient Caufe, and that confummately wife. This Caufe in every Species recognizing what is beft, and work- ing ever uniformly according to this Idea of Perfection, the Productions and Energies, in every Species where it ads, are for the moft ^zxt fimilar and exactly correfpondent* If an Exception ever happen, it is from fome hidden higher Motive > which tran- fcends our Compreheniion, and which is fctn fo rarely, as not to injure the general Rule, or render it doubtful and precarious* On the contrary, in the Productions and ^ Energies of Reafon, there is not one Caule but infinite — -as many indeed, as there are Agents of the Human Kind. Hence Truth being but one, and Error being infinite, and Agents infinite alfo : what wonder * they fhould oftener mifs, than hit the Mark ?— that Multitudes ihould fail, where one ale

M 4 {u&*

i68 Concerning HAPPINESS,

>artl. fucceeds, and Truth be only the Pofleffion of the chofen % fortunate Few? You

fecm to have explained the Difficulty, faid I, with Sufficient Perspicuity.

Let us then go back, faid he, and re- colled: ourfelves -, that we may not forget, what 'tis we are feeking. I replied, Moft willingly. We have been feek- ing, continued he, the Sovereign Good. In confequence of this Inquiry, we have dis- covered that all Things whatever exifl to

the Human Species in the Relations of either Purfuable, Avoidable, or Indifferent, To determine thefe Relations with Accuracy, we have been Scrutinizing the Human Nature ; and that, upon this known? Maxim, that every Species was its owm proper Standard \ and that where the Value- of Things was dubious, there the Species was to be jludied, and the Relations to be deduced, which naturally flow from it. The Refult of this Scrutiny has been — that we have firfl: agreed Man to be a Social Animal ; and fince^ to be a Rational So that if we

can

A Dialogue. 169

can be content with a defcriptive, concife Part I, Sketch of Human Nature •, it will amount u " - " v "" to this — that Man is a Social Ra-» tional Animal. I anfwered. It

had appeared (o.

§. 15. If then, faid he, we purfue our Difquifltions, agreeably to this Idea of Hu-r man Nature, it will follow that all Things will be Purfuable, Avoidable, and Indiffe- rent to Man, as they refped: the Being and Welfare of fuch a Social, Rational Animal I replied, They muft.

Nothing therefore in the firft place, feid he, can be Purfuable, which is de- JiruBive of Society. It cannot.

Ads therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and all acquired by them, whether Wealth, Power, Pleafure, or any thing, are evi- dently from their very Charafter not fit to be purfued. They are not.

But it is impoffible not to purfue many fuch things, unlefs we are furnifhed with Tome Habit or Difpofition of Mind, by

which

170 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men ~** m ~ mJ their own> and to regard the Welfare, and Intereft of Society. : It is impoffible. But the Habit or Difpofition of ren- dering to all their own> and of regarding the Welfare and Intereft of Society, is Justice. It is. We may there-

fore fairly conclude, that Nothing is natu- rally Purjuabky but what is either correfpon- dent to Juflice, or at leaf not contrary. I confefs, faid I, fo it appears.

But farther, faid he — 'Tis poffible we may have the beft Difpofition to Society; the moft upright Intentions ; and yet thro' Want of Ability to difcern y and know the Nature of Particulars, we may purfue many things inconfiftent, as well with our Private Intereft, as the Public. We may even purfue what is Right y and yet purfue it in fuch a manner, as to find our Endea- v vours fruitlefs, and our Purpofes to fail. I anfwered, 'Twas poffible. But this would ill befit the Character of a Rational Animal. It would. It is

necef-

A Dialogue. 171

neceffary therefore, we mould be furniftied Part 1 with fome Habit or Faculty ', inftru&ing us ^-^^ how tQ difcern the real Difference of all Particulars, and fuggefting the proper Means, by which we may either -avoid or obtain them. It is. And what is

this, think you, but Prudence ? I believe, faid I, it can be no other. If it be, faid he, then 'tis evident from this Reafoning, that Nothing is purfuable, which is not correfpondent to Prudence. I replied, He had fhewn it could not.

But farther ftill, faid he — Tispoffible we may neither want Prudence, nor fujlice to direct us • and yet the Impulfes of Appe- tite, the Impetuofities of Refentment, the Charms and Allurements of a thoufand flat- tering Objects, may tempt us, in fpite of ourfelves, to purfue what is both Impru- dent, and Unjuft. They may. But if fo, 'tis neceffary, would we purfue as becomes our Character, that we fhould be furnimed with fome Habit, which may moderate our Exceffesy which may temper

our

172 Concerning HAPPINESS,

3 art I. our Actions to the Standard of a Social "~" v ~* J State, and to the Intereft and Welfare, not of a Part, but of the Whole Man. Nothing, faid I, more neceffary. And

1 what, faid he, can we call this Habit, but the Habit of Temperance ? You

name it, faid I, rightly. If you think

fo, replied he, then Nothing can be Pur- ftiable, which is not either correfpondent to Temperaitce, or at leaji not contrary. I replied, So it feemed.

Once more, continued he, and we have done— 'Tis poffible that not only Rejhitment and Appetite, not only the Charms and Al- lurements of external Objects, but the Ter- rors too, and Dread of them may marr the Refiitude of our Purpofes. 'Tis poffible.

Tyranny and Superftition may af- fail us on one hand ; the Apprehenfions of Ridicule, and a Falfe Shame on the other — ? Tis expedient, to withftand thefe, we mould be armed with fome Habit, or our wifeft beft Purfuits may elfe at all times be de-r feated. They may. And what is

that

J Dialogue 173

that generous, manlike and noble Habit ; Part ] which fets us at all times above Fear and ^ mm0 ^ m Danger -, what is it but Fortitude? I replied, It was no other. If fo

then, continued he, befides our former Conclufions, Nothing farther can be Pur- fuable, as our Inquiries now have fhewn us, which is not either correfpondent to For- titude, or at leaf not contrary \ I admit, faid I, it is not*

Observe then, faid he, the Sum, the Amount of our whole Reafoning — - No- thing is truly Purfuable tofuch an Animal as Man, except what is correfpondent, or at leaf not contrary, to Justice, Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude. I al-

low, faid I, it appears fo. But if no-

thing Purfuable, then nothing Avoidable or Indifferent, but what is tried and eftimated after the fame manner, For Contraries arc ever recognized thro 7 the fame Habit, one with another. The fame Logic judges of Truth and Falfhood; the fame Mufical Art, of Concord and Difcord. So the fame

Mental

174 Concerning HAPPINESS,

• art L Mental Habitudes y of Things Avoidable and

""*'*-' Purfuable. I replied, It appeared pro-

bable.

To how unexpected a Conclufion then, faid he, have our Inquiries infenfibly led

us ? In tracing the Source of Human

Action, we have eftablifhed it to be thofe Four Grand Virtues, which are efteemed, for their Importance, the very Hinges of all Morality. We have.

But if fo, it fhould follow, that a Life, whofe Purfuings and Avoidings are go- verned by thefe Virtues, is that True and Rational Life, which we have fo long been feeking , that Life, where the Value of all things is juflly meafured by thofe Rela- tions, which they bear to the Natural Frame and real Conjiitution of Mankind — in fewer Words, a Life of Virtue appears to be the Life according to Na- ture. It appears fo.

Bur

A Dialogue,

• 7$

But infuch a Life every Purfuit, every Part I, Avoiding, (to include all) every Adlion will of courfe admit of being rationally jujlified. It will. But That, which being

Done, admits of a Rational Jujlifcation, is the EfTence or genuine Character of an Office, or Moral Duty. . Forthuslong ago it has been defined by the beft * Au- thorities. Admit it. If fo, then a Life according to Virtue, is a Life according to Moras, Offices or Duties. It appears fo. But we have already agreed it, to be a Life according to Nature. We have. Obferve then: A Life ac- cording to Virtue, according to Moral Offices, and accord- ing to Nature, mean all the same Thing, tho* varied in the Ex- preffion. Your Remark, faidl, feems juft.

S- 15.

• B y Tally in his Offices, and by other Authors

of Antiquity,

176 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part L §. 1 6. We need never therefore,- re- plied he, be at a lofs how to chufe, tho' the Objedts of Choice be ever fo infinite and diverfifkd* As far as nothing is in- confijient with fuch a Life and fuch a Cha*- rafter > we may juftly fet Exiftence before Death , prefer Health to Sicknefs , Inte- grity of the Limbs, to being maimed and debilitated y Pleafure to Pain ; Wealth to Poverty; Fame to Dishonour; Free G Go- vernment to Slavery; Power and Magi- ftracy, to Subje&ion and a private State—— Univerfally, whatever tends either to Being, or to Well-Being, we may be juftified, when we prefer to whatever appears the con- trary. And when our feveral Energies, exerted according to the Virtues above, have put us in Poffeffion of all that we require : what then can there be wanting to complete our Happinefs - y to render our State perfectly confonant to Nature , or to give us a more Sovereign Good, than that which we now enjoy ? Nothing, re-

plied I, that I can at prefent think of.

There

^Dialogue.

l 79

.Y w 1

There would be nothing indeed, faid\ ^ J -/

he, were our Energies never to fail; were all our Endeavours to be ever crowned with

due Succefs. But fuppofe the contrary

Suppofe the worfi Succefs to the mojl upT right Conduct ; to the wifeft Rectitude of Energies and A&ions. 'Tis poffible, nay Experience teaches us 'tis too often fad:, that not only the Purfuers of what is con- trary to Nature^ but that thofe who purfue nothing but what is JlriBly congruous to if % may mifs of their Aims^ and be frujirated in their Endeavours. Inquifitors and Monks may detefl them for their Virtue, and purfue them with all the Engines of Malice and Inhumanity. Without thefe, Pefts may affiid: their Bodies; Inunda- tions o'erwhelm their Property; or what is worfe than Inundations, either Ty- rants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They may fee their Country fall, and with it their braveft Countrymen; themfelves pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or N periihing

/

78 Concerning HAPPINESS,

I Part I. perifhing with the reft in the general Maffacre.

• — * cadit & RipheuSyjuJliJJimus unus Quifuit in Teucris, & fervantiflimus cequi*

It muft be owned, faidl, this has too often been the Cafe.

Or grant* continued he, that thefe greater Events never happen— —that the Part allotted us, be not in the Tragedy of Life, but in the Comedy. Even the Comic

Dijirejfes are abundantly irkfome -**

Domeftic Jars y the ill Offices of Neigh- bours Suipicions, Jealoufies, Schemes

defeated — —The Folly of Fools $ the Knavery of Knaves ; from which, as Mem- bers of Society, 'tis impoflible to detach ourfelves.

Where

•^^NEID, 1. 2. V. 426.

A Dialogue.' 179

i

Where then fliall we turn, or what Part I.' have we to imagine ? We have at length placed Happiness, after much Inquiry, in attaining the primary andjujl Requifites of our Nature > by a ConduB fuitable to Virtue and Moral Office. But as to correfponding with our P re-conceptions (which we have made the Teft) does this Syftem corf efpond better^ than thofe other s, which we have rejected ? Has it not appeared from various Facts* too obvious to be difputed, that in many 'times and Places it may be abfolutely unattainable ? That in many* where it exifts, it may in a moment be cancelled, and put irretrievably out of our Power, by Events not to be reji/fed? If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be queftioned, our fpecious long Inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to mew us a Good, of that Character which we require ; a Good Durable, Indepri*. vable, and Accommodate to every Circum-

Jlance — -Far from it Our Speculations

N 2 (I

1 80 Concerning HAPPINESS,

'art I. (I think) rather lead us to that low Opinion '^^ of Happinefs, which you may remember you * expreffed, when we firft began the Subject. They rather help to prove to us, that inftead of a Sovereign Good, 'tis the more probable Sentiment, there is no fuch Good at all. I fhould indeed, faid I,

fear fo. For where, continued he,

lies the Difference, whether we purfue what is congruous to Nature, or not con- gruous ; if the Acquifition of one be as dif- ficult, as of the other, and the PoJJejJion of both equally doubtful and precarious? If Qzjar fall, in attempting his Country's Ruin ; and Brutus fare no better, who only fought in its Defence ? It muft be

owned, faid I, thefe are melancholy Truths, and the Inftances, which you alledge, too well confirm them r

We were in the midft of thefe ferious Thoughts, defcanting upon the Hardfhips

and

T il " ■ • I ■ ■«.!■■ " I ■■ . -I

f See p. in.

-4 Dialogue. 181

and Miferies of Life, when by an Inci- Part I dent, not worth relating, our Speculations ' ***** were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more un- luckily our Queftion perplexed its

Iffue uncertain and myfelf impatient to

know the Event. Neceffity however was not to be refifted, and thus for the prefent pur Inquiries were poftponed.

N i CON-

CONCERNING

HAPPINESS,

DIALOGUE,

PART the Second.

BRUTUS perijhed untimely, and 'Part II Caefar did no more — Thefe Words w •v* ,, " ,, I was repeating the next day to myfelf, when my Friend appeared, and chearfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could not return his Compliment with an equal Gaiety, being intent, fomewhat more than ufual, on what had paffed the day before. Seeing this, he propofed a Walk into the Fields. The Face of Nature, faid he, will perhaps difpel thefe Glooms, No Affiftance, on my part, {hall be wanting, N 4 you

184 Concerning HAPPINESS,

art II. you may be allured. I accepted his Pro- ""*"*" pofal ; the Walk began ; and our former Converfation infenfibiy renewed.

Brutus, faid he, perijhed untimely r , and Csefat 'did no more 'Twas thus, as I re- member, not long fince you were expref- fing yourfelf. And yet fuppofe their For- tunes to have been, exactly parallel-

Which v/ould you have preferred ? Would you have been Ccefar or Brutus ? Brutus, replied I, beyond all controverfy. He aiked me, Why ? Where was the Dif- ference, when their Fortunes, as we now . iiipp -led them, were confidered as the fame f There feems, faid I, abflraft from kirns Fortunes, fomething, I know not what, imrinfically preferable in the Life and Cha- racter of Brutus. If that, faid he, be true, then muft we derive it, not from the Succefs of hi3 Endeavours, but from their Truth and Rectitude, fie had the Comfort to be confeious, that his Caufe was a juft pne. 'Twas impoffible the other fhould

have

A Dialogue. 185

have any fuch Feeling. I believe, Part II

faid I, you have explained it.

Suppose then, continued he, ('tis but merely an Hypothefis) fuppofe, I fay, we were to place the Sovereign Good in fuch

a Rectitude of Conduct in the Conduct

merely r , and not in the Event. Suppofe we were to fix our Happiness, not in the- actual Attainment of that Health, that Per- fection of a Social State, that fortunate Concurrence of Externals, which is con- gruous to our Nature, and which we have a Right all to purfue -> but folely fix it in the mere Doing whatever is correfpondent to fuch an End, even tho' we never attain, or are near attaining it. In fewer words — What if we make our Natural State the Stafidard only to determine our Conduct ; and place our Happinefs in the Rectitude of this

Conduct alone? On fuch an Hypothefis

(and we confider it as nothing farther) we Ihould not want a Good perhaps, to cor- refpond to our P re-conceptions -, for this, 'tis evident, would be correfpondent to them

all

t86 Concerning HAPPINESS,

irt II. all Your Doctrine, replied I, is fo

" v '"**'new and ftrange, that tho' you been copi- ous in explaining, I can hardly yet com- prehend you,

It amounts all, faid he, but to this

Place your Happinefs, where your Praife is. I afked, Where he fuppofed

that ? Not, replied he, in the Plea-

fores which you feel, more than your Difgrace lies in die Pain-r- — not in the cafual Prosperity of Fortune, more than your Difgrace in the cafual Adverfity— — but in juji complete Action throughout every Part of Life, what ever be the Face of Things^ whether favourable or the con-* trary.

But why then, faid I, fiich Accuracy about Externals ? So much Pains to be in- formed, what are Purfuable y what Avoids able ? It behoves the Pilot, replied he,

to know the Seas and the Winds; the Nature of Tempefts, Calms and Tides. They are the Subjects, about which his Art

is

A Dialogue. 187

is converfant. Without a juft Experience Part II, of them, he can never prove himfelf an Artift. Yet we look not for his Reputa-. tion either in fair Gales, or in adverfey but in the Skilfulnefs of his ConduB> be thefe Events as they happen. In like manner fares it with this the Moral Artift. He, for

a SubjeB, has the Whole of Human Life

Health and Sicknefs - y Pleafure and Pain ; with every qther poffible Incident, which can befal him during his Exiftence. If his Knowledge pf all thefe be accurate and exadt, fo too muft his Condudt, in which we place his Happinefs. But if this Know- ledge be defective, muft not his ConduEl be defe&ive alfo ? I replied, So it fhould

feem. And if his Conduct, then his

Happinefs ? ? Tis true.

You fee then, continued he, eventho* Externals were as nothing ; tho' 'twas true, in their own Nature, they were neither Good nor Evil; yet an accurate Knowledge pf them is, from our Hypothefis, abfolutely

necejfary.

188 Concerning HAPPINESS,

art II. necejfary. Indeed, faid I, you have

mmvmmm/ proved it.

He continued^ — Inferior Artifts may be at a fiand, becaufe they want Materials. From their Stubbornefs and IntraB ability^ they may often be difappointed. But as long as Life is paffing, and Nature con- tinues to operate, the Moral Artijl of Life has at all times, all he defires. He can never want a Subject fit to exercife him in his proper Calling; and that, with this happy Motive to the Conftancy of his Endeavours, that, the croffer, the harfher, the more untoward the Events, the greater his Praife, the more illuflrious his Repu* fation.

All this, faid I, is true, and cannot be denied. But one Circumftance there ap- pears, where your Similes feem to fail. The Praife indeed of the Pilot we all6w to be in his ConduB -, but 'tis in the Succefs of that Conduct, where we look for his Mapfinefs* If a Storm arife, and the Ship

be

A Dialogue, 189

be loft, we call him not happy, how well Part II foever he may have conducted. 'Tis then ^—v-"- only we congratulate him, when he has reached the defired Haven. Your

Diftin&ion, faid he, is juft. And 'tis here lies the noble Prerogative of Moral Artifts y

above all others But yet I know not how

to explain myfelf, I fear my Do&rine will appear fo ftrange. You may proceed,

faid I fafely, fince you advance it but as an Hypothecs.

Thus then, continued he— —The End in others Arts is ever dijlant and removed.. It confiits not in the mere Conduct, much lefs in a Jingle Energy ; but is the jujl Re- fult of many Energies, each of which are efTential to it. Hence, by Obftacles un- avoidable, it may often be retarded: Nay . more, may be fo embaraffed, as never pof- fibly to be attained. But in the Moral Art of Life, the very Conduct is the End, the very ConduB, I fay, itfelf, throughout every its minuteft Energy $ becaufe each of thefe, however minute, partake as truly of

ReBitude %

tgb Concerning HAPPINESS*

• art II. Re5iitude> as the largejl Combination of them ■>

if ^ rmJ when conlidered collectively. Hence of all Arts is this the only one perpetually complete in every Inftant, becaufe it needs not, like other Arts* Time to arrive at that Perfection, at which in every Infant 'tis arrived already. Hence by Duration it is not rendered either more or lefs perfedtj Completion^ like Truth, admitting of no Degrees, and being in no feftife capable of either Intenjion or Remijfion. And hence too by neceflary Connection (which is a greater Paradox than all) even that Happi^ nefs or Sovereign Good, the End of this Moral Art, is itfelf too~ in every Injlant) Confammate and Complete ; is neither heigh-* tened or diminijhed by the Quantity of its Duration^ but is the fame to its Enjoyers, for a Moment or a Century.

Upon this I fmiled. He afked me

the Reafon. 'Tis only to obferve, faid I, the Courfe of our Inquiries* — A new Hy- pothefis has been advanced — — -Appearing fomewhat ftrange, it is defired to be ex- plained—-

A Dialogue. 19I

plained You comply with the Requeft, Parti

and, in purfuit of the Explanation, make mm<m it ten times more obfcure and unintelligible, than before. 'Tis but too often the

Fate, faid he, of us Commentators. But you know in fuch cafes what is ufually done. When the Comment will not ex- plain the Text, we try whether the Text will not explain itfelf. This Method, 'tis poflible, may affift us here. The Hypo- thecs, which we would have illuftrated* was no more than this- — -That the Save* reign Good lay in Refiitude of ConduB -, and that this Good corresponded to all our Pre** conceptions. Let r : examine then, whether, upon trial, this Correfpondence will appear to holdj and, for all that we have advanced fince, fuffer it to pafs, and not perplex us* Agreed, faid I, willingly, for now 1 hope to comprehend you.

§. 2. Recollect then, faid he. Do you not remember that one Pre-conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be accommodate to all Times and Places 2 I remember it.

And

ig2 Concerning HAPPINESS,

trt II. And is there any Time, or any Place,

w ^ mmmJ whence ReBitude of Conduct may be ex- cluded? Is there not a right Adtion in Profperity, a right Aftion in Adverfity ? — May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable Behaviour, not only in Peace, in Power, and in Health; but in War, in Oppreffion, in Sicknefs and in Death ? There may.

And what fhall we fay tothofe other Pre-conceptiom to being Durable, Self- derived, and Indeprivable ? Can there be any Good fo Durable, as the Power of al- ways doing right ? Is there any Good con- ceiveable, fo intirely beyond the Power of others ? Or, if you hefitate, and are doubt- ful, I would willingly be informed, into what Circumftances may Fortune throw a brave and honeft Man, where it fhall not be in his Powerto adl bravely and honejlly ? Jf there are no fuch, then Retfitude of Con- due}, if a Good, is a Good Indeprivable. I confefs, faid I 5 it-appears fo.

But

ii Dialogue, 19;

But farther, faid he- — Another Pre- Part] conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be v / "" Agreeable to Nature. It was. And

can any thing be more agreeable to a Rational and Social Animal^ than Rational and Social Conduct f Nothing. But

Reclitude of Conduct is with us Rational and Social Conduct. It is*

Once more* continued he— —Another Pre-conception of this Good was, to be Con* ducive,, not to Mere-being, but to Well- being. Admit it* And can any thing, believe you, conduce fo probably to the Well-being of a Rational Social Animal, as the right Exercife of that Reafon, and of thofe Social Affections ? Nothing. And what is this fame Exercife, but the highejl Rectitude of Conduct ? Certainly.

§. 3. You fee then, faid he, how well our Hypothefis, being once admitted, tal- lies with our Original Pre-conceptions of the Sovereign Good. J replied, it in-

O deed

194 Concerning HAPPINESS,

art II. deed appeared fo, and could not be denied* " -v ^" - 'But who, think you*, ever dreamt of a Happinefs like this ? A Happinefs depen- dent, not on the Succefs, but on the Aim ? Even common and ordinary Life, replied he 3 can furnifh us with Examples. Afk of the Sportfman where lies his En- joyment ? Afk whether it be in the Pof- fejjion of a flaughter'd Hare, or Fox ? He would rejed:, with Contempt, the very

Suppofition He would tell you, as well

as he was able, that the Joy was in the Purfuit in the Difficulties which are ob- viated -, in the Faults, which are retrieved; in the ConduB and Dire&ion of the Chace

thro' all its Parts that the Completion of

their Endeavours was fo far from giving them Joy, that inftantly at that Period all their Joy was at an end. For Sportf-

men, replied I, this may be no bad Rea- foning. It is not the Sentiment, faid he, of Sportfmen alone. The Man of Gal- lantry not unoften has been found to think after the fame manner,

— Meus

A Dialogue. 195

• Meus ejl amor huic Jimilis ; nam Part II*

Tranfuolat in medio pofita, &fugientia capiat.

To thcfe we may add the Tribe of Buil- ders and Projectors. Or has not your own Experience informed you of Numbers, who, in the Building and Laying-out, have expreffed the higheft Delight 3 but fhewn the utmoft Indifference to the Refult of their Labours, to the Manfion or Gardens, when once finifhed and complete ?

The Truth, faid I, of theft Examples is not to be difputed. But I could wifh your Hypothefis had better than thefe to fupport it. In the ferious View of Happi- nefs y do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it (as we faid before) not on the Succefs, but on the Aim? More, even in this light, faid he, than perhaps at firft you may imagine. There are Inftances innumerable of Men, bad as well as good, who having fixed, as their Aim, a certain CcnduB of their own, have O 2 fo

• Hor. Sat. II. L.i. v. 107.

196 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. fo far attached their Welfare and Happinefe to it, as to deem all Events in its Profecu- tion, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and not worthy their Regard. I called on him for Examples,

What think you, faid he, of the A£- faffin, who flew the firft Prince of Orange $ and who, tho' brought by his Conduct to the moft exquifite Tortures, yet confcious of what he had done, could bear them all unmoved ? Or (if you will have a better Man) what think you of that fturdy Roman, who would have difpatched Porfenna ; and who, full of his Defign, and fuperior to all Events, could thruft a Hand into the Flames with the fteadieft Intrepidity ? I replied, That thefe indeed were very un- common Inftances.

Attend too, continued he, tojEpi- curus dying, the Founder of a Philofophy,

little favouring of Enthufiafm " This I

<c write you (fays he, in one of his Epiftles)

• c while the loft Day of Life is paj/ing, and

• ,^ ' ' - / , -t i i^f ij^ji^ f- 4J thai

^Dialogue.

u that a Happy One. The Pai " my Body are ?iot capable of I cc tened. Yet to thefe we oppofe " the Soul, which arifes from t)

<c of our paft Speculations •" 1

confonant to this, in another PL

ing, that a Rational Adverjity u ter

than an Irrational Profperity.

And what think you ? Had he not

placed his Good and Happinefs in the fup- pofed ReBitude of his Opinions, would he not have preferred Profperity, at all rates, to Adverfty ? Would not the Pains, of which he died, have made his Happinefs

perfect Mifery ? And yet, you fee, he

difowns any fuch thing. The Memory of his paft Life, and of his Philofophical In- ventions were, even in the Hour of Death it feems, a Counterpoife to fupport him. It muft be owned, faid I, that you appear to reafon juftly. t

Pass from Epicurus, continued he, to

Socrates. What are the Sentiments of that

O 3 divine

i 9 3 Concerning HAPPINESS,

art II. divine Man, fpeaking of his own unjuft

'~ sr ~ mmJ Condemnation ? " Crito, fays he, if it

cc be pleafng to the Gods this way, then be

" it this way" And again " Anytus

" and Melitus, I grant, can kill me-, but " to hurt or injure me, is beyond their " Power" It would not have been be- yond it, had he thought his Welfare de- pendent on any thing they could do ; for

they were then doing their worft«*

Whence then was it beyond them?

Becaufe his Happinefs was derived not from without, but from within ; not from the Succefs, which perhaps was due to the Reditude of his Life, but from that Recti- tude alone, every other thing difregarded. He had not, it feems, fo far renounced his own Doctrine, as not to remember his

former Words ; that " To whom ever

<c all things, conducive to Happinefs, are de- < c rived folely, or at leaf nearly from him- " f e tf> an d depend not on the Welfare or " Adverfty of others, from the Variety of " whofe Condition his own mujl vary alfo : iC He it is, who has prepared to himfelf the

" mojl

A Dialogue. 199

" mojl excellent of all Lives He it is> who Part II

" is the Temperate, the Prudent , and the u

" Brave- He it is y who, when Wealth or

" Children either come or are taken away,

" will bejl obey the Wife Man's Precept

<c For neither will he be feen to grieve, nor cc to rejoice in excefs, from the Trujl and cc Confidence which he has repofedin himfelfi" — -You Ijave j. §ketch_at_leaft of his Mean- ing, tho' far below jjis own Attic and truly elegant Expreffioiu I grant, faid I,

your Example ; but this and the reft are but fingle Inftances. What are three or four in Number, to the whole of Hu- man Kind ?

If you are for Numbers, replied he ? what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have, joyfully met -Death, rather than defert their Country, when in danger ? They muft have thought furely on another Happinefs than Succefs, when they could gladly go, where they faw Death often inevitable. Qr what think you of the many Martyrs O 4 for

200 Concerning HAPPINESS,

^art II. for Syftems wrong as well as right, who

• " Nr "" have dared defy the worft, rather than

fwerve from their Belief? You have

brought indeed, faid I, more Examples

than could have been imagined.

Besides, continued he, what is that Comfort of a Good Conscience, cele- brated to fuch a height in the Religion which we profefs, but the Joy ariiing from a Confcience of right Energies-, a Con- fcience of having done nothing, but what is confonant to our Duty ? I replied,

It indeed appeared fo.

Even the Vulgar, continued he, re- cognize a Good of this very Character, when they fay of an Undertaking, tho' it fucceed not, that they are contented; that they have done their bejl, and can accufe themfelves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their Content, their Good, their Happinefs y not in the Succefs of Endeavours, but in the ReBitude? If it be not the Redtitude which contents them, you muft

tell

A Dialogue. 201

tell me what 'tis elfe. It appears, Part II.

replied I, to be that alone.

I hope then, continued he, that tho' you accede not to this Notion of Happinefs, which I advance; you will at leaft allow it not to be fuch a Paradox, as at firft you feemed to imagine. That

indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.

§. 4. Granting me this, faid he, you encourage me to explain myfelf — We have fuppofed the Sovereign Good to lie in Recti- tude of Conduct. We have. And

think you there can be Redlitude of Con- dud:, if we do not live conjijlently ? In what Senfe, faid I, would you be un- derstood? To live conjijlently , faid he, is the fame with me, as To live agreeably to fome one Jingle and confonant Scheme^ or Pur- pofe. Undoubtedly, faid I, without this, there can be no RecSitude of Conduct. All Rectitude of Conduct then, you fay, implies fuch Confijlence. It does.

And does all Confidence, think you, imply

fuch

202 Concerning HAPPINESS,

iPartll.fuch ReBitude? I afked him, Why

■J""*"* - — ' not ? 'Tis poffible, indeed it may,

faid fie, for aught we have difcovered yet to the contrary, But what if it fliould be found that there may be numberlefs Schemes, each in particular conftftent with itfelf, but yet all of them different, and fome perhaps contrary ? There may, you know, be a conftftent Life of Knavery, as well as a conftftent Life of Honefty ; there may be a uniform Practice of Luxury, as well as of Temperance, and Abfterniouf- nefs. Will the Confiftence, common to all ofthefe Lives , render the Conduffi in each, right ? It appears, faid I, an Abfur-

dity, that there ihould be the fame Recti- tude in two Contraries. If fo, faid he, we muft look for fomething more than mere Confiftence, when we fearch for that ReBitude, which we at prefent talk of. A conftftent Life indeed is requifite, but that alone is not enough. We muft de-* termine its peculiar Species, if we would be accurate and exafl:. It indeed ap«?

pears, faid I, neceffary,

Nor

A Dialogue. 203

Nor is anything, continued' he, more Part II. eafy to be difcuffed. For what can that peculiar Conjijlence of Life be elfe, than a Life, whofe feveral Parts are not only con- fonant to each other, but to the Nature alfo of the Being, by whom that Life has been adopted ? Does not this laft De- gree of Confiftence appear as requifite as the former? I anfwered, It could not

be otherwife,

You fee then, faid he, the true Idea of right Conduft. It is not, merely To live conjijlently ; but 'tis To live conjijlently with Nature, Allow it.

But what, continued he ? Can we live conjijlently with Nature, and be at a lofs how to behave ourfelves ? We cannot.

And can we know how to behave ourfelves, if we know nothing of what befals us-, nothing of thofe ThingS and Events, which perpetually furround, and affeft us ? We cannot, You fee

then,

204 Concerning HAPPINESS,

"Part II. then, continued he, how we are again fallen infenfibly into that Do&rine, which proves the Neceffity of fcrutinizing, and knowing the Value of Externals. I re-

plied, 'Twas true. If you affent, faid he, to this, it will of courfe follow, that, To live confidently with Nature, is y To live agreeably to ajujl Experience ofthofe Things, which happen around us. It appears fo.

But farther ftill, faid he. — Think you any one can be deemed to live agreeably to fuch Experience, if he feledl not, as far as poffible, the things moft congruous to his Nature f He cannot. And by the fame Rule, as far as poffible, muft he not rejeB fuch as are contrary? He

muft. And that not occafionally, as

Fancy happens to prompt , but fteadily, conjiantly, and without Remiffion. I fhould imagine fo. You judge, faid

he, truly. Were he to acft otherwife in the leaft inftance,, he would falfify his Profeffions y he would not live according to that Experience, which we now fup-

pofe

A Dialogue. 20 j

pofe him to poffefs. I replied, He Part II

would not. v— v—

It fhould feem then, faid he, from hence, as a natural Confequence of what we have admitted, that the EJfence of right Conduct lay in Selection and Rejection. So, faid I, it has ap-

peared. And that fuch Selection and

Rejection fhould be confonant with our pro- per Nature. 'Tis true. And be Jieady and perpetual, not occafional and in- terrupted. 'Tis true. But if this be the EfTence of Right ConduB, then too it is the Effence of our Sovereign Good, for in fuch Conduct we have fuppofed this Good to confift. We have.

See then, faid he, the Refult of our

Inquiry. The Sovereign Good, as

conftituted by ReBitude ofConducJ> has, on our ftri&eft Scrutiny, appeared to be this — ■ To live perpetually selecting, as far as possible, what is congruous to Nature, and rejecting what is

con-

sc6 - Concerning H A P P I N E S S,

Part II. CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAI 1

Selecting and that Rejecting only, 'Tis true, faid I, fo it appears.

§.5. Before we haften then farther, faid he, let us flop to recolledt, and fee whether our prefe.nt Concluiions accord with our former. — We have now fuppofed the Sovereign Good to be Rectitude of Con- duct, and this ConduSl we have made con- lift: in a certain Selecting and RejecJmg. We have. And do you not imagine

that the Selecting and Rejecting, which we propofe, as they are purely governed by the Standard of Nature, are capable in every inftance of being rationally justified?

I replied, I thought they were. But if they admit a rational Juftifcation, then are they Moral Offices or Duties >, for thus * you remember yefterday a Moral Office was defined. It was. But

if fo, To live in the Practice of them, will

be

• Sup. p. 175,

A Dialogue. 207

be To live in the Difcharge of Moral Offices. Part II.

It will. But To live in the Dif-

charge of thefe, is the fame as Living ac- cording to Virtue, and Living according to Nature. It is. So therefore is

Living in that Selection, and in that Rejec- tion, which we propofe. It is.

We need never therefore be at a lofs, faid he, for a Defcription of the Sove- reign Good. We may call it, Rec- titude of Conduct. If that he too

contracted, we may enlarge and fay, 'tis— To live perpetually Selecting and Rejecting according to the Stan- dard of our Being.— If we are for ftill different Views, we may fay 'tis . To live in the Discharge of Mo- ral Offices — To live according to

Nature To live according to

Virtue To live according to

Just Experience of those Things,

which happen around us. Like

fome finifhed Statue, we may behold it every way; 'tis the fame Objedr, tho'

varioufly

2o8 Concerning HAPPINESS,

J Part II. varioufly viewed ; nor is there a View, 1 *-"~~^~ m - J b u t is natural, truly graceful, and en- gaging.

§.6. I cannot deny, faid I, but that as you have now explained it, your Hypothefis feems far more plaufible, than when firft it was propofed. You will

believe it, faid he, more fo ftill, by con-

fidering it with more Attention. In the

firft place, tho' perhaps it efteem nothing really Good but Virtue, nothing really Evil, but Vice, yet it in no manner takes away the Difference^ and Diftintlion of other Things. So far otherwife, it is for eftabliihing their Diftindcion to the greateft Accuracy. For were this neglect- ed, what would become of Selection and Rejetfion, thofe important Energies, which are its very Soul and EfTence ? Were there no Difference, there could be no Choice* 'Tis true, faid I, there could not.

Again, faid he. It is no meagre, mor- tifying Syftem of Self-denial — It fuppreffes

no

^Dialogue. 209

no Social and Natural Affections, nor takes Part II. , away any Social and Natural Relations-— It prefcribes no Abftainings, no Forbear- ances out of Nature - y no gloomy, fad, and lonely Rules of Life, without which 'tis evident Men may be as honeft as withy and be infinitely more ufefiil and worthy

Members of Society. It refufes no Plea-

fure, not inconfiftent with Temperance

It reje&s no Gain, not inconfiftent with

Juftice Univerfally, as far as Virtue

neither forbids nor dijfuades, it endeavours to render Life, even in the moji vulgar Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and eafy as poffible. Nay, could it mend the Condi- tion of Exiftence in any the moji trivial Cir- cumftance, even by adding to the amplefl Pofleffions the pooreft meaneft Utenfil, it would in no degree contemn an Addition

even fo mean. Far otherwife It would*

confider, that to negledt the leaft Acqui- fition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall fhort of that perfedl and accurate Condu5l y which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends,

P And

2io Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. And yet, tho* thus exa& in every the minuteft Circumftance, it gives us no Soli- citude as to what Rank we maintain in Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor 5 whether merged in Bufinefs, or confined to Inactivity, it is equally confident with every Condition, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choofe its own Life, it would be always that, where moft focial Affections might exteniively be exerted, and moft done to contribute to the Welfare of Society. But if Fate order otherwife, and this be de- nied ; its Intentions are the fame, its En- deavours are not wanting; nor are the Social, Rational Powers forgotten, even in Times and Circumftances, where they can leaft become confpicuous.

It teaches us to confider Life, as one great important Drama, where we have each our Part allotted us to aft. It tells us that our Happinefs, as Aviors in this Drama, conlifts not in the Length of our

Part,

A Dialogue. >2ii

Part, nor in the State and Dignity, but in Part IT. the j uji, the decent, and the natural Per- formance.

If its Aims are fuccefsful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, de- rived from their Succefs, and feels them as fully, as thofe who know no other Happi- nefs. The only Difference is, that having a more excellent Good in view, it fixes not, like the Many, its Happinefs on Succefs alone, well knowing that in fuch cafe, if Endeavours fail, there can be nothing left behind but Murmurings and Mifery. On the contrary, when this happens, 'tis then it retires into itfelf, and reflecting on what is Fair, what is Laudable and Honejl (the truly beatific Vifion, not of mad Enthujiajls, but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wife and the Good) it becomes fuperiour to all Events; it acquiefces in the Confcioufnefs of its own Rectitude -, and, like that Manfion founded, not on the Sands, but on the Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempeft and Inundation.

P 2 §. 7 .

212 Concerning HAPPINESS,

§.7. Here he paufed, and I took the Opportunity to obferve, how his Subjeft had warmed him into a degree of Rap- ture , how greatly it had raifed both his Sentiments and his Stile. No wonder, faid he. Beauty of every kind excites our Love and Admiration; the Beauties of Art, whether Energies or Works -, the Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or Inanimate. And fliall we expedl lefs from this Supreme Beauty ; this morale meiital, and original Beauty - y of which all the reft are but as Types or Copies? Not how- ever by high Flights to lofe Sight of our Subject, the whole of what we have ar- gued, may be reduced to this—

All Men pursue Good, and would be happy, if they knew how; not happy for Minutes, and miferable for Hours, but happy, if poffible, thro 1 every Part of their Exijience. Either therefore there is a Good of this Jieady durable Kind, or there is none. If none, then all Good muft be

tranfient

7f Dialogue. 217

tranjient and uncertain ; and if fo, an Ob- Part II j je£i of loweji Value, which can little de- v "" nr " ferve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But if there be a better Good, fuch a Good as we are feeking -, like every other thing, it mufi be derived from fome Caufe - y and that Caufe muft be either external, internal, or mixt, in as much as except thefe three, there is no other poffible. Now ajleady, durable Good, cannot be derived from an external Caufe, by reafon all derived from Externals muft fluctuate, as they fluctuate. By the fame Rule, not from a Mixture of the Two -, becaufe the Part which is external will proportionally dejlroy its EJfence. What then remains but the Caufe internal-, the very Caufe which we have fuppofed, when we place the Sovereign Good in Mind-, in Rectitude of ConduB; in juft Selecting and Rejecting? There feems indeed no

other Caufe, faid I, to which we can pof- fibly affign it.

Forgive me then, continued he,

^ould I appear to boaft We have

P 3 proved,

214 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. proved, or at leaft there is an Appearance ^^we have proved, that, either there is no Good except this of our own ; or that, if there be any other \ 'tis not worthy our Re- gard. It muft be confeffed, faid I, you have faid as much, as the Subjeft feems to admit,

§,8. By means then, faid he, of our Hypothefis, behold one of the faireft, and moft amiable of Objedts, behold the true and perfect Man : that Or- nament of Humanity ; that Godlike Being ; who, without regard either to Pleafure or Pain y uninfluenced equally by either Projpe- rity or Adverfty, fuperiour to the World and its bejl and worfl Events, can fairly reft his All upon the RecJitude of his own Conducl ; can conftantly, and uniformly, and manfully maintain it ; thinking that, and that alone \ wholly fufficient to make him happy.

And do you ferioufly believe, faid I, there ever was fuch a Character ? And

what, replied he, if I fhould admit, them

never

A Dialogue. ai£

never was, is, or will befuch a Character ? — Part II that we have been talking the whole time of a Being, not to be found ;

Afaultlef$MonJler,which the World ' ne'er faw?

Suppofing, I fay, we admit this, what then? Would not your Syftem in fuch a cafe, faid I, a little border upon the chimerical ? I only afk the Queftion. You need

not be fo tender, he replied, in expreffing yourfelf. If it be falfe, if it will not in- dure the Teft, I am as ready to give it up, as I have been to defend it. He muft be a poor Philofopher indeed, who, when he fees Truth and a Syjiem at variance, can ever be folicitous for the Fate of a Syftem.

But tell me, I pray-^ — Do you objeft to mine, from its Perfection, or from its Imperfection? From its being too excel- lent for Human Nature, and above it 5 or from its being too bafe, and below it ? It feems to require, faid I, a Perfection, to which no Individual ever arrived. That very Tranfcendence, faid he, is an P 4 Argu-

216 Concerning HAPPINESS,

'art II. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a mm>rmJ Rank inferior, it would not be that Per- fection, which we feek. Would you have it, faid I, beyond Nature 1 ? If you mean, replied he, beyond any particular or individual Nature, rnoft undoubtedly I would.— —As you are a Lover ©f Painting, you fhall hear a Story on the Subjedt.

"In ancient days, while Greece was " flourifhing in Liberty and Arts, a cele- " brated Painter, having drawn many ex- " cellent Pictures for a certain free State, % and been generoufly and honourably re- " warded for his Labours, at laft made " an Offer to paint them a Helen, as a f Model and Exemplar of the rnoft ex- " quifite Beauty. The Propofal was rea- " dily accepted, when the Artift informed " them, that in order to draw one Fair, <c 'twas neceffary he fhould contemplate u many. He demanded therefore a Sight "of all their fineft Women. The State, H to affift the Work, affented to his Re- "..queft, Thev were exhibited before

"Jiim>

A Dialogue. 217

cc him ; he fele&ed the moft beautiful ; Part IL " and from thefe formed his Helen, more " beautiful than them all."

You have heard the Fadt, and what are we to infer?- — Or can there be any other Inference than this that the Stan- dard of Perfection, with refpeffi to the Beauty of Bodies, was not (as this Artift thought) to be difcovered in any Individual^ but being difperfed by Nature in Portions thro* the many, was from thence, and thence only, to be collected and recognized 1 ? It appears, faid I, he thought fo. The

Pidture, continued he, is loft, but we have Statues ftill remaining. If there be Truth in the Teftimony of the beft and faireft Judges, no Woman ever equalled the De- licacy of the Medic e an Venus, nor Man the Strength and Dignity of the Farnhefan Hercules. 'Tis generally, faid I, fo

believed.

And will you, faid he, from this unpa- ralelled and tranfeendent Excellence, deny

thefe

zi8 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. thefe Works of Art to be truly and ftri&ly '"" V "- J Natural? Their Excellence, replied I,

mull be confefled by AH; but how they can be cajled fo ftri&ly Natural, I muft own a little ftartles me. That the

Limbs and their Proportions, laid he, arc fele&ed from Nature, you will hardly I believe doubt, after the Story juft related* I replied, 'Twas admitted. The

Tarts therefore of thefe Works are Na- tural. They are. And may not the fame be afferted, as to the Arrange- ment of thefe Parts ? Muft not this too be natural, as 'tis analogous we know to Nature ? It muft. If fo, then is the Whole, Natural. So indeed, faid I, it fhould feem. It cannot, re- plied he, be otherwife, if it be a Fa<ft be- yond difpute, that the Whole is nothing more, than the Parts under fuch Arrangement. Enough, faid I, you have fatisfied me*

If I have, faid he, it is but to transfer what we have afferted of this fubordinate Beauty, to Beauty of a higher Order-, it is

but

A Dialogue. 219

but to pafs from the External, to the Part II.

Moral and Internal For here we fay, by parity of Reafon, that no where in any particular Nature is the perfect Character to be feen intire. Yet one is brave ; an- other is temperate \ a third is liber ah, and a fourth is prudent. So that in the Multi- tude of mixed imperfect Characters, as be- fore in the Multitude of imperfecl Bodies, is expreffed that Idea, that Moral Stan- dard of Perfection, by which all arc tried and compared to one another, and at laft upon the whole are either juftified or condemned- — that Standard of Perfection, which cannot be but mofi Natural, as it is purely colle&ed from Individuals of Na- ture, and is the Teft of all the Merit to which they afpire. I acknowledge^

faid I, your Argument.

I might add, faid he, if there were Occaiion, other Arguments which would furprize you. I might inform you of the natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of

Specific Ideas-, that every Individual was

2 but

220 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. but their Type, or Shadow; that the

Mind or IntelleB was the Region of Pof-

Jibles-y that what ever is PoJJible, to the

Mind actually Is; nor any thing a Non- entity, except what implies a Contradic- tion ; that the genuine Sphere and ge- nuine Cylinder, tho' Forms perhaps too 'perfect, ever to exiji conjoined to Matter, were yet as true and real Beings, as the grojfejl Objedls of Senfe -, were the Source of Infinite Truths, which wholly depend on them, and which, as Truths, have a Being moil unalterable and eternal. But thefe are Reafonings, which rather belong to another Philofophy -, and if you are fatisfied with- out them, they are at beft but fuperfluous.

He waited not for my Anfwer, but proceeded as follows. 'Tis thus, faid

he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an Idea of the perfeB Character : a Character, which I am neither fo abfurd, as to impute to myfelf ; nor fo rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. We have propofed it only, as an Exem-

2 P^AR

A Dialogue. 221

plar of Imitation, which tho' None Part Il.lj we think can equal, yet All at leaft may

follow an Exemplar of Imitation, which

in proportion as we approach, fo we ad- vance proportionably in Merit and in

Worth an Exemplar, which, were we

moft felfijh, we mould be Fools to rejedt ; if it be true, that to be Happy, is the ultimate Wijh of us ally and that Happinefs and Moral Worth fo reciprocally correfpond, that there can be no Degree of the one, without an equal Degree of the other. If there be

Truth, faid I, in your Reafonings, it can- not certainly be otherwife.

He continued, by faying The Pro*

ficiency of Socrates, and indeed of every honeft Man, was fufficient to convince us, could we be fteadfaft to our Purpofe, that fome Progrefs at leaft might be made toward this Perfection — How far, we knew not —

The Field was open The Race was free

and common to All — Nor was the Prize, as ufual, referved only to the Firft; but All, who run, might depend on a Reward,

having

222 Concerning HAPPINESS,

• art II. having the Voice of Nature, would they
• ~ V "- J but liften, to allure them,

• Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus

abibit.

§. 9. Here he paufed, and left me to meditate on what he had fpoken. For fome time we pafled on in mutual Silence, till obferving me on my part little inclined to break it, What, faid he, engages you with an Attention fo earneft ? I was

wondering, faid I, whence it fhould hap- pen, that in a Difcourfe of fuch a nature, you fboyld fay fo little of Religion , of P/ovide?ice> and a Deity. I have not,

replied he, omitted them, becaufe not in- timately united to Morals ; but becaufe what ever we treat accurately, fhould be treated feparately and apart. Multiplicity of Mat- ter naturally tends to Confufion. They are weak Minds indeed, which dread a ra- tional Sufpence 5 and much more fo, when in the Event, it only leads to a furer Know- ledge, « 11 ■ . 11 ,. 11 1 11 » • * ' " **

• JEn£j.d. I. v. V. 305.

A Dialogue. 223

ledge, and often flrengthens the very Sub- Part II. jedt, on which we fufpend. Could I how- ever repeat you the Words of a venerable Sage, (for I can ckll him no other) whom once I heard differting on the Topic of Religion, and whom ftill I hear, when ever I think on him; you might accept perhaps my Religious Theories as candidly, as you have my Moral. I prefled him

to repeat them, with which he willingly complied.

The Speaker, faid he, whofe Words I am attempting to relate, and whom fot the prefent I name Theophilus, \v t > of a Chara&er truly amiable in every part. When young, he had been fortunate in a liberal Education ; had been a Friend to the Mufes, and approved himfelf fuch to the Public. As Life declined, he wifely retired, and dedicated his Time almoft wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he never forget the Mufes, whom once he loved. He retained in his Difcourfe (and fo in the Sequel you will foon find) a large

Portion

224 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. Portion of that rapturous, anti-profaic Stile, in which thofe Ladies ufually choofe to ex- prefs themfelves.

We were walking, not (as now) in the chearful Face of Day, but late in the Even- ing, when the Sun had long been fett. Ck- cumftances of Solemnity were not wanting to affect us ; the Poets could not have

feigned any more happy a running

Stream, an ancient Wood, a ftill Night,

and a bright Moonfhine. 1, for my own

part, induced by the Occafion, fell inlenfibly into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the Moon. From thence I wandered to other heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, and Empires, and I know not what.

Who lives in the Moon, faid he, is perhaps more than we can well learn. 'Tis enough, if we can be fatisfied, by the help of our beft Faculties, that Intelligence is not confined to this little Earth, which we in- habit ; that tho* Men were not, the World would not want Spectators, to contemplate

its

cc

A Dialogue, 225 } »

its Beauty, and adore the Wifdom of its Part IF Author. «-*v*.

cc This whole Universe itfelf is but

<c one City or Commonwealth

" a Syjiem of Subjidnces varioufly farmed, <c and varioufly aBuated agreeably to thofe cc Forms* — - a Syftem of Subftances both

immenfely great and fmall, Rational^

Animal, Vegetable^ and Inanimate.

cc As many Families make one Village, many Villages one Province, many Pro- <c vinces one Empire ; fo many Empires, " Oceans, Wafted and Wilds, combined, " compofe that Earth on which we live, cc Other Combinations make a Planet or a " Moon; and thefe again, united, make " one Planetary Syftem., What higher " Combinations fubfift, we know not, cc Their Gradation and Afcent 'tis impof- " fible we fhould difcover. Yet the ge- " nerous Mind, not deterred by this Im- cc menlity, intrepidly paiTes on, thro* Re- " gions unknown, from greater Syftem

cc

.226 Concerning* HAPPINESS,

Part II. " to greater, till it arrive at that greatejl^ " where Imagination flops, and can ad- " vance no farther. In this laft, this <c mighty, this ftupendous Idea, it beholds <c the Universe itfelf, of which every " Thing is a Part, and with refpedt to "which not the fmalleft Atom is either " foreign or detached.

" Wide as it^s Extent, is the Wifdom " of its Workmanfhip, not bounded and " narrow, like the humbler Works of Art. " Thefe are all of Origin no higher than " Human. We can readily trace them to <c their utmofl Limit, and with accuracy " difcern both their Beginning and their iC End. But where the Microfcope that u can mew us, from what Point Wifdom cc begins in Nature ? Where the Telefcope " that can defcry, to what Infinitude it u extends ? The more diligent our Search, " the more accurate our Scrutiny, the " more only are we convinced, that our " Labours can never finiflij that Subjects

" inex-

A Dialogue. 225]

" inexhauftible remain behind, ftill un-Partlj 1 " explored. <— -v-*

" Hence the Mind truly wife, quit- <c ting the Study of F * articular \r, as know- " ing their Multitude to be infinite and in- " comprehenjible, turns its intellectual Eye cc to what is general and compreheniive, <c and thro' Generals learns to fee, and re- " cognize what ever exifts.

cc cc

It perceives in this view, that every Subftance, of every degree, has its Na- <c ture, its proper Make, Constitution or " Form, by which it a£ls y and by which " it fuffers. It perceives it fo to fare with " every natural Form around us, as with " thofe Tools and Inftruments, by which " Art worketh its Wonders. The Saw is cc deftined to one A&; the Mallet, to an- " other 5 the Wheel anfwers this Purpofe; " and the Lever anfwers a different. So " Nature ufes the Vegetable ', the Brute, " and the Rational, agreeably to the proper u Form and Confiitution of every Ki?td. The Q^2 " Vegetable

228 Concerning HAPPINESS,

■art II. cc Vegetable proceeds with perfect Infenfa bility. The Brute poffeffes a Senfe of " what is pleafurable and painful, but ftops~ " at mere Senfation, and is unable togofar- ,<c ther. The Rational, like the Brute, has " all the Powers of mere Senfation, but en- joys fuperadded a farther tranfcendent Fa- culty, by which it is made confcious, not only of what it feels, but of the ^Powers thdmfehes, which are the Sources of thofe very Feelings; a Faculty, which recognizing both itfelf and all Things elfe, becomes a Canon, a Corrector, and " a Standard UniverfaL

C€ Hence to the Rational alone is im~ " parted that Master-Science, of what " they are, where they are, and the End <c to which they are deftined.

" Happy, too happy, did they know " their own Felicity ; did they reverence <c the Dignity of their own fuperior Cha- cc rafter, and never wretchedly degrade €l themfelves into Natures to them fubor-

<c dinate*

<c

A Dialogue. 229!

« dinate. And yet alafs ! : 'tis a Truth too Part ii 1 <c certain, that as the Rational only are ^ -rvr " " iiifceptible of a. Happinefs truly excel- " lent, fo thefe only merge themfelves 11 into Miferies paft Indurance,

7 Assist us then, Thou Power " Divine, with the Light of that Re a- <£ son, by which Thou lighteneft the " World 5 by which Grace and Beauty is , " diffufed thro' every Part, and the WeW cc fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up- <c held ; that Reafon, of which our own is " but a Particle or Spark, like fome Pro- " metheanYixZy caught from Heaven above. cc So teach us to know ourf elves, that we c< may attain that Knowledge, which " alone is worth attaining. Check our <c vain, our idle Refearches into the Laws, " and Natures, and Motions of other Be- " ings, till we have learnt and can prac- " tife thofe, which peculiarly refpect our- " felves. Teach us to be fit Aftors in " that general Drama, where Thou haft flf allotted every Being, great and fmall, its

0^3 !' P ro -

>3<> Concerning HAPPINESS,

nit II. cc proper Part, the due Performance of which ^ r *" / " is the only End of its Exiflence?

<c Enable us to curb Desire within " the Bounds of what is Natural. Enable " us even to fufpend it, till we can employ " it to our Emolument. Be our fir/l " Work, to have efcaped from wrong Opi- cc nion, and bad Habit ; that the Mind, <c thus render'd fincere and incorrupt, may " with Safety proceed to feek its genuine " Good and Happinefs.

<c When we are thus previoufly ex-

" ercifed, thus duly prepared, let not our

€C Love there flop, where it firft begins ;

" but infenfibly condudt it, by thy invi-

cc fible Influence, from lower Obje&s to

" higher, till it arrive at that Supreme,

" where only it can find what is adequate

" and full. Teach us to love Thee, and

<c Thy Divine Administration

cc to regard the Univerfe itfelf as our true <c and genuine Country, not that little ca- ff foal Spot, where we firft drew vital

" Air.

A Dialogue. 23 1

<c Air. Teach us each to regard Himfelf Part II„|

" but as a Part of this great Whole ;

" a Part which for its Welfare we are as

<c patiently to refign, as we refign a fingle

" Limb for the Welfare of our whole

<c Body. Let our Life be a continued

" Scene of Acquiescence and of Grati-

cc tude; of Gratitude, for what we enjoy ;

" of Acquiefcence, in what we fuffer ; as

" both can only be referable to that con-

" catenated Order of Events, which can-

cc not but be bejl> as being by Thee ap-

cc proved and chofen.

"In as much as Futurity is hidden cc from our Sight, we can have no other " Rule of Choice, by which to govern our " Conduct, than what feems confonant to " the Welfare of our own particular Na- cc tures. If it appear not contrary to Duty " and moral Office, (and how mould we " judge, but from what appears?) Thou " canft not but forgive us, if we prefer " Health to Sicknefs ; the Safety of Life " and Limb, to Maiming or to Death. Ojt < c But

232 Concerning HAPPINESS,

'art II. " But did we know that thefe Incidents, " or any other were appointed us , were " fated in that Order of incontroulable "• Events, by which Thou preferveft and '"■ adprneft the Whole : it then becomes cc our Duty, to meet them with Magna- " nimity; to co-operate with Chearfulnefs " in what ever Thou ordaineft; that fo " we may know no other Will, than thine ", alone, and that the Harmony of our " particular Minds with thy Umverfal 9 <c may be fteady and uninterrupted thro' < c the Period of our Exiflence.

• c Yet, fince to attain this Height, this

cc tranfcendent Height, is but barely pot- " fible, if poffible, to the moft perfect cc Humanity: regard what within us is " Congenial to Thee-, raife us above our- <c felves, and warm us into Enthujiafm* cc But let our Enthufiafm be fuch, as befits cc the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal, fC gentle, rational, and humane — not fuch / <c as to debafe us into poor and wretched 5 C Slaves, as if Thou wert our Tyrant, 2 cf not

A Dialogue. 233

cc not our kind and common Father ; Part II. " much lefs fuch as to transform us into cc favage Beafts of Prey, fullen, gloomy, <c dark and fierce ; prone to perfecute, to <c ravage, and deftroy, as if the Luft of <c MaiFacre could be grateful to thy Good- cc nefs. Permit us rather madly to avow " Villany in thy Defiance, than impioufly cc to aiTert it under colour of thy Service. " Turn our Mind's Eye from every Idea " of this Character ; from the Servile, Ab- u jed:, Horrid and Ghaftly, to the Gene- rous, Lovely, Fair and Godlike.

cc

" Here let us dwell jr-r r- be here our <c Study and Delight. So mall we be en- <c abled, in the filent Mirrour of Coniem- cc plation, to behold thofe Forms, which

" are hidden to Human Eyes that ani-

" mating Wisdom, which pervades and

6 f rules the Whole that Law irrefiftible,

cc immutable, fupreme, which leads the <f Willing, and compels the Averfe, to co- " operate in their Station to the general ff Welfare-™that Magic Divine, which

,"234 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Bart II. " by an Efficacy paft Comprehenfion, can { >~~v mmJ « transform every Appearance, the moft " hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit all " Things Fair and Good to Thee, " Essence Increate, who art of u purer Eyes, than ever to behold Iniquity.

" Be thefe our Morning, thefe our €C Evening Meditations — with thefe may

" our Minds be unchangeably tinged •

" that loving Thee with a Love moft dif- " interefted and fincere; enamoured of " thy Polity, and thy Divine Admi- " nistration ; welcoming every Event " with Chearfulnefs and Magnanimity, as <c being befi upon the Whole, becaufe or- " dained of Thee ; propofing nothing of <c ourfelves, but with a Referve that Thou <f permitteft; acquiefcing in every Obftruc- " tion, as ultimately referable to thy Pro-

<c vidence in a word,' that working this

<c Condud, by due Exercife, into perfed " Habit; we may never murmur, never " repine ; never mifs what we would ob- <c tain, or fall into that which we would

" avoid;

A Dialogue. 235

cc avoid ; but being happy with that tran- Part II.

" fcendent Happinefs, of which no one

" can deprive us ; and bleft with that Di-

" vine Liberty \ which no Tyrant can an-

cc noy; we may dare addrefs Thee with

<c pious Confidence, as the Philofophic Bard

« of old,

" ConduEl me, Thou, of Beings Canfe Divine, €C Where-e're Tm dejlitfd in thy great Dejign. " Affiive I follow on : forjhoidd my Will cc Rejt/i, Tm impious; but mujl follow JlilL

In this manner did Theophilus, faid he, purfue the Sub] eft, to which I had led him. He adorned his Sentiments with Exprefiions even more fplendid, than I have now employed. The Speaker, the Speech, the happy Circumftances which concurred, the Night's Beauty and Still- nefs, with the Romantic Scene where we were walking, all together gave the Whole fuch an Energy and Solemnity, as 'tis im- poffible you fhould feel from the Coldnefs of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for 2 my

f

236 Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. my own part, returned home fenfibly touched, and retained the ftrongeft Feel- ings of what I had heard, till the follow- ing Morning. Then the Bufinefs of the Day gently obliterated all, and left me by Night as little of a Philofopher, as I had ever been before.

§. 10. And is it poffible, faid I, fo foon to have forgotten, what feems fo ftriking and fublime, as the Subject you have been now treating? 'Tis Habit, replied

he, is all in all. 'Tis Praffiice and Exer-°< cife, which can only make us truly any thing. Is it not evidently fo, in the moft com- mon vulgar Arts ? Did mere ^Theory alone ever make the meaneft Mechanic ? And is the Supreme Artijl of Life and Manners to be formed more eafily, than fuch a mc ? Happy for us, could we prove it near fo eafy. But believe me, my Friend, good Things are not fo cheap. Nothing is to he had gratis^ much lefs that which is moft valuable.

Yet

A Dialogue. 237!

Yet however for our Comfort, we have Part I' this to encourage us, that, tho' the Diffi- ^^ r " culty of acquiring Habits be great and painful, yet nothing fo eafy, fo pleafant, as their Energies, when once wrought by Exercife to a due Standard of Perfection. I know you have made fome Progrefs in Mujic. Mark well what you can do, as a Proficient this way— You can do that, which without Habit, as much exceeds the wifeft Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to afcend a Cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with Facility 5 and (left you fhould think I flatter) not you yourfelf alone, but a thoufand others befide, whofe low Rank and Genius no way raife them above the Multitude. If then you are fo well affured of this Force of Habit in one Inftance, judge not in other Inftances by your own prefent Infufflciency. Be not fhocked at the apparent Greatnefs of the perfeB Moral Character, when you com- pare it to the Weaknefs and Imperfection of your own. On the contrary, when thefe

dark,

238 Concerning HAPPINESS,

art II. dark, thefe melancholy Thoughts aflail

• • "--* you, immediately turn your Mind to the

Conlideration of Habit. Remember how

eafy its Energies to thofe, who pojjefs it ;

and yet how impracticable to fuch, zspof

fefs it not.

It mufl be owned, faid I, that this is a Satisfaction, and may be fome kind of Affiftance in a melancholy Hour. And yet this very Dodtrine naturally leads to , another Objeftion. — Does not the Difficulty of attaining Habit too well fupport a certain Affertion, that, defend Virtue as we will, 'tis but a Scheme of Self denial?

By Self denial y faid he, you mean, I

fuppofe, fomething like what follows

Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon bids me for- bear -If I obey Reafon, I deny Appetite;

and Appetite being a Part of myfelf to deny it, is a Self denial What is true thus in Luxury, is true alfo in other Subje&s , is evident in Matters of Lucre, of PoWer, of Refentment, or whatever elfe we purfue

by

A Dialogue, 239

by the Dictate of any Paflion. You Part II.

appear, faid I, to have ftated the Objection juftly.

To return then to our Inftance, faid he, of Luxury. Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon

bids me forbear If I obey Reafon, I deny

Appetite — —and if / obey Appetite, do I not deny Reafon ? Can I act either 'way, with- out rejecting one of them ? And is not Reafon a Part of my f elf, as notorioufly as Appetite ?

Or to take another Example — - 1 have Depolite in my Hands. Avarice bids

me retain Confcience bids me reftore. Is

there not a reciprocal Denial, let me obey which I will? And is not Confcience a Part of me, as truly as Avarice?

Poor Self indeed muft be denied* take which Party we will. But why (hould Virtue be arraigned of thwarting it, more than Vice her contrary ?- — Make the moil of the Argument, it can come but to

this — -

240 Concerning , HAPPINESS,

Part II. this If Self-denial be an Objection to

Virtue, fo is it to Vice-— If Self-denial be no Objection to Vice, no more can it be to Virtue. A wonderful and important Con- clufion indeed !

He continued by faying, that the Soul cfMan appeared not as a Jingle Faculty, but as compounded of many that as thefe Fa- culties were not always in perfect Peace one with another, fo there were few Ac- tions which we could perform, where they would be all found to concur. What then are we to do ? Sulpend till they agree ?- —

Abfurd, impoffible. Nothing therefore

can remain, but to weigh well their feveral Pretentions; attend to all, that each has to offer in its behalf; ' and finally to purfue . the Dictates of the Wijejl and the Beft, This done, as for the Self-denial, which we force upon the reft ; with regard to our own CharaBer, 'tis a Matter of Honour

and Praife with regard to the Faculties

denied, 'tis a Matter of as fmall Weight, as to contemn the Noife and Clamours of a

mad

A Dialogue, 24

mad and fenfelcfs Mob, in deference to the Part fober Voice of the worthier, better Citi-* v- * v " zens. And what Man could be juftified, fhould he rejed thefe, and prefer a Rabble ?

§. 10. In this place he paufed again, and I took occafion to acknowledge, that my Objection appeared obviated. As the Day advanced apace, he advifed that we might return home; and walking along leifurely, thus refumed to himfelf the Dif- courfe.

I dare fay, continued he, you have feen many a wife Head fhake, in pronouncing that fad Truth, how we are governed all by

Interest. And what do they think

fhould govern us elfe ? Our Lofs, our

Damage, our Dijintereft? -Ridiculou*

indeed ! We fhould be Idiots in fuch cafe, more than Rational Animals. The only Queftion is, where Intereft truly lies : for if this once be well adjufted, no Maxim can be more harmlefs.

R »f

42 Concerning HAPPINESS,

lit II. " I find myfelf exifting upon a little " v "" J " Spot, furrounded every way by an im-

" menfe unknown Expanfion. Where

cc am I ? What fort of Place do I " inhabit ? Is it exactly accommodated, " in every Inftance, to my Convenience ? "Is there no Excefs of Cold, none of " Heat, to offend me ? Am I never an- <c noyed by Animals, either of my own <c kind, or a different ? Is every thing " fubfervient to me, as tho' I had ordered

c< all myfelf ? No — nothing like it

" the fartheft from it poffible. The

" World appears not then originally made " for the private Convenience of me alone? — ?c It does not. — But is it not pofiible fo to " accommodate it, by my own. particular

J c Induftry? If to accommodate Man

" and Beaft, Heaven and Earth, if this be cc beyond me; 'tis not poffible. — What cc Confequence then follows ? Or cart

. " there be any other than this if I feek

(C an Liter eft cf my own* detached from that

" of

A Dialogue. 243 '

" of others \ Ifeek an Inter eft which is chi- Fart II <c mer j ca i y an d can never have Exijlence ? m ^ r "

"' How then muft I determine ? Have " I no Intereft at all ? — If I have not, I cc am a Fool for flaying, here. "lis a " fmoaky Houfe, and the fooner out of <c it, the better. — -But why no Intereft? — > cc Can I be contented with none, but one " feparate and detached ? — Is a Social <c Interest joined with others fuch an cc Abfurdity, as not to be admitted ? The " Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd- " ing Animals, are enough to convince " me, that the thing is, fome where at u lea/I, poffible. How then am I afliired,

" that 'tis not equally true of Man ?

<c Admit it ; and what follows ? — If fo, " then Honour and Justice are my cc Interest— then the whole Train cc of Moral Virtues are my In te- cc rest; without feme Portion of which, not even Thieves can maintain Society,

R 2 " But

cc

• 244 Concerning HAPPINESS,

l ?art II. " But farther ftill — I flop not here—

I purfue this Social Inter efl, as far as 1

« can trace my feveral Relations. I pafs

" from my own Stock, my own Neighs

" bourhood, my own Nation, to the whole

" Race of Mankind, as difperfed through-

" out the Earth. — Am I not related to them

€c all, by the mutual Aids of Commerce ;

" by the general Intercourfe of Arts and

c< Letters 5 by that common Nature, of

<c which we all participate? Again— : —

" I muft have Food and Clothing.

" Without a proper genial Warmth,

" I inftantly perifh. Am I not rela-

" ted, in this view, to the very Earth

" itfelf ? To the diflant Sun, from

cc whofe Beams I derive Vigour ? To that

" ftupendous Courfe and Order of the infi-

" niteHojl of Heaven, by which the Times

" and Seafons ever uniformly pafs on ?■ —

" Were this Order once confounded, I

<c could not probably furvive a Moment ;

" fo abfolutely do I depend on this common ge-

(< neral Welfare.

" What

A Dialogue. 245

" What then have I to do, but to Part I]

" enlarge Virtue into Piety? Not*- - "^

• only Honour and Jii/lice, and what I

" owe to Man, is my Intereft -, but Grati- <c tude alfo, Acquiefcence, Resignation^ Ado- <c ration, and all I owe to this great Polity, m and its greater Governor, our com- « mon Parent.

€ * But if all thefe Moral and Di- " vine Habits be my Interest, I " need not furely feek for a better. I " have an Intereft compatible with the

cc Spot on which I live 1 have an In-

cc tereft which may exift, without altering " the Plan of Providence ; without mend- cc ingy or marring the general Order of <c Events — I can bear what ever happens, " with manlike Magnanimity ; can be <c contented, and fully happy in the Goody " which I poffefs ; and can pafs thro' this " turbid, this fickle 2 . fleeting Period, with- <c out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur- €C muringSj or Complaints*"

And

Concerning HAPPINESS,

And thus, my Friend, have you my Sentiments, as it were abridged ; my Sen- timents on that Subject, which engages every one of us. For who would be un- happy ? Who would not, if he knew hew, enjoy one perpetual Felicity ? Who are there exifting, who do not at every inftant feek it ? 'Tis the Wifh, the Em- ploy, not of the Rational Man only; but of the Sot, the Glutton, the very loweft of our Herd. For my own Syftem, whe- ther a juft one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only fay on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, 'tis a grateful Error, which I cherifh and am fond of. And yet if really fuch, I fhall never deem it fo facred, as not wil- lingly, upon Conviction, tQ refign it up to Truth,

Little pafs'd after this worth rela- ting. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common Topics. Yet one Obfer-

vation

^Dialogue. 247

vation of his I muft not omit. 'Twas Part II

what follows. When we are once, ^ m ~ v ~ m

faid he, well habituated to this chief, this moral Science, then Logic and Physics become two profitable Adjuncts: Logic y to fecure to us the Poneffion of our Opinions; that, if an Adverfary attack, we may not bafely give them up : Phyjics, to explain the Reafon and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that we may know fomething of that Univerfe, where our Dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add a Saying (and may its Remembrance never efcape you) while you find this great, this Majier-Science wanting, value Logic but as Sophijtry, an4 Phyjics but as Raree-Jhew ; for both, aflfure yourfelf, will be found nothing better.

'Twas foon after this that our Walk ended. With it ended a Converfation, which had long engaged us ; and which, according to my Promife, I have here en- deavoured to tranfcribe.

THE END.

Advertifement to the Reader.

rT*H E Author has chofen to feparate all Notes from his firji and third 7rea- tifes, and thus fubjoin them to the E?id 9 becaufe thofe T!reatifes, being written in Dialogue^ from their Nature and Genius admit not of Interruption. One of his Reafons for adding Notes was, to give Weight to his AJJertions from the Autho- thority of antient Writers. But his chief and principal Reafon was, to excite (if pojfible) the Curiofty of Readers, to exa- mine with flriBer Attention thofe 'valuable Remains of antient Literature. Should he obtain this End, he Jhall think his Labours (juch as they are) abundantly rewarded.

NOTES

O N

TREATISE the Firft;

C ONCERNING

A R T.

NOTE I. p. 6. All Art is Cause.] Artis maxume proprium, creare & gignere. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 22. *Er* ^ T 9C^ 'iroiiToc rrsa: yev&riv. All Art is employed in Produc- tion, that is, in making fomething to be. Arijlot* Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6. c. 4.

The aclive efficient Caufes have been ranged

and enumerated after different manners. In the

fame Ethics, they are enumerated thus — dflix ydp

^Qxtviv sivoci (pv<rig 9 ^ dvoiyxTi, >£ tv)(y\' tli.il vx$ 9 x)

7rdv to SI dvQpum. The fever al Caufes appear to be

Nature, NeceJJity, and Chance ; and befides thefe, Mind

or Intellect, and whatever operates by or thro" .Man.

1. 3. c. 3. The Paraphrafl Andronicus in explaining

this laft PafTage, Uoiv to $1 dvQpumt, adds lw ts^wu,

v aXM Tig irpot]r]$ y as for inffance Art^ or any other

human Action.

Alex-

NOTES on Treatise the Fir/!.

Alexander Aphrodisiensis fpeaks of effi- cient Caufes as follows : 'AAA* pm rx.wpm ^» woiWHXy (p6(nq rs, vtf riyyv, *} wpoa/pgffiff. The Caufes, which are Jiriclly and properly efficient, are Nature, Art, andtach Man's particular Choice ofAclion.

• ■*;! Yfyuff p. 160. B. Edit. Aid.

In what manner Art is diftinguifhed from the reft of thefe efficient Caufes, the fubfequent Notes will attempt to explain.

Note II. p. 6. Of that Painter famed in Story, &c] See Valer. Max. 1. 8. c. n.

Note III. p. 12. Art is Man becoming a Cause, Intentional and Habitual.] Ari- ftotle, in his Rhetoric, thus accurately enumerates all the poffible manners, either direct or indi- rect, in which Mankind may be faid to acl or do any thing* Tldvls; $ri 7r^ac]ra(ri irocvroc, roc fx\v 9

• d* aula?' roc di, di aula? ruv fxiv av [a* di aulas',

roi y*h J*a ri%w wpalrv(n 9 roc Si i£ 'ocvdyw rut £>' i% ccjocyxYi;, roc [Av fiioc, roc S\ (pCtrsr w'n 7rctv1cc y o<rx p% $1 aula? repair kg 1, roc juev, octto rv%yq' roc $\ % (pu<TH' roi Js £/<%. "Ocra Jg ft aula?,- y-oci uv aVJol ccilioi, roc [Av £l tQo$, roi £1 Si ogefyv' xoci roc ph $tol Xoyirmnv ogifyv, roc $1 JI dkoyirov. to S\ fl ph C»An<rtff, /xe7« Aoj/a o£?£t? olyo^M — - aXoyoi $ ogz%£iS<> ppyi xaj l?riQvpioc, ure ttgcvIoc o<toc 7rpd1r)f<7iv, dvocy- m Trgalrew dl di]i&$ t7r\<x, % Sid Tifpfw, J*c& €/av, Jia

NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.

All Men do all Things either of them/elves , or #<?/ 0/ themfelves. The Things ivhich they do not of them/elves, they do either by Chance ; or from Neceffity ; <7#^ /fo • Things done from Neceffity, they do either by Compulfeon, which is External NeceJ/ity, or by Nature, which is Internal. So that all Things ivhatfoever, which Men do not of themfelves, they do either by Chance, or from Compulfeon, or by Nature.

Again, the Things, whuh they do of themfelves, and $f ivhich they are themfelves properly the Caufes, feme they do thro* Cuflom and acquired Habit, others thro* iriginal and natural Defre. Farther, the Things done thro\ natural Defre, they do either thro' fetch Defer* affifled by Reafon, or thro' fetch Defer e devoid ofReafon, If it be afeifled by Reafon, then it affumes the Denomi- nation of Will; on the contrary, the irrational Defer es

ere Anger and Appetite.

Hence it appears that all Things whatever, which Men do, they neceffarily do thro o?ie of thefe feven Caufes, either thro' Chance, Compulfeon, Nature, Cu- ftom, Will, Anger, Appetite, Arijl. Rheu 1. i. c. io.

It remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to eonfider with which of thefe Caufes we ought to arrange Art.

As to Chance, it may be obferved in general of all Cafeual Events, that they always exclude Inten- tion or Defegn ; But Intention and Defegn, are from

Art

NOTES on Treatise the Firft.

Art infeparable. Thus is the Difference between

Art and Chance manifeft.

As to External Compulsion, we have it

thus defcribed Bixiw $\ ? a y d^x/i sgwOa/. That is

an Ad of Compulfiony the efficient Principle of which is from without 9 independent of the Doer. Ethie. Nic. I. 3. c. 1. Again, in the fame Treatife, I. 6. c. 4. we are told of the Works of Arty that they are fuch, £>v n a\yy\ & 7? noivvV, the efficient Principle of which is in the Doer or Agent. Thus therefore is Art diftinguifhed from Compulfion.

These two Caufes, Chance and Compulfiony are mentioned and confidered in the Dialogue, Pages 6 and 7.

Nature, or rather Natural Necessity, is that Caufe, thro' which we breath, perfpire, digeft, circulate our Blood, ' &c. Willy Anger y and Appetite ', are (as already obferved) but fo many Species of Natural Desire, confidered either as affifted by Reafon, or elfe as devoid of it. Now tho' Natural Defire and Natural Neceffity differ, becaufe in the one 'we acl fpontaneoujly y in the other not fpontane- oufyy yet both of them meet in the common Genus Gf Natural Power. Moreover this is true of all Na- tural Power y that the Poiver itfelf is prior to any Energies or Acts of that Power. 'Oj yoL% U 7a ttq\- XctKtg jjgiv, y\ TroW&ytiq ctxx<rou y rug <XHrQwnq lXc£&Q~ jusv, «AA' dvdc'7roi\iv y '£%ovles lp££»i<ra/A£0a, « p££wr«- pivoi zxopw. For [to inflance in the natural Powers of Senfaticn] it was not from often feeing , and often

hearingy

NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 255

hearings that we acquired thofe Senfes ; but on the con- trary, being firft pojfejfed of them, we then ufed them, not through any Ufe or Exercife did we come to pojfefs them, Arijl. Ethic. 1. 2. c. 1.

Now the contrary to this is true in the cafe of any Powers or Faculties not natural, but acquired by Cuftom and Ufage. For here there ate many Ener- gies and Ads, which muft necefTarily precede the Exiftence of fuch Power or Habit, it being evident (as is faid in the fame Chapter) that U 7uv opotoov ivscyuuv ui tfyiq yfyvovloci, from fimilar and homoge- neous Energies, it is that Habits are obtained. So again, in the fame Place, & y&^ feT'pMvlots 7rmsTv 9 ravloc ttomijIsS |W,av9«vo^£u' olov onco^ofxH]fjsg oix6$oy.Oi yivovlou, yux\ niQugi'£ov]sg xiQocgircci The Things which we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus . by building Men become Builders, and by praftifmg Mujic they become Muftcians.

Thus therefore is Art diftinguifhed from all Natural Power of Man, whether Natural NeceJJity, Will, Anger, or Appetite. But Art has been already diftinguifhed from Chance and Com- pulsion. So that being clearly not the fame with fix of thofe feven Caufes by which all Men do all Things, it muft needs be referred to the feventh, that is, to Custom or Habit.

It muft be obferved, the natural Caufes or Powers in Man, confidered as diftinct from Art, are treated in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9.

And

256 NOTES on Treatise the Firji*

And now as we have fhewn Art to be a certain Caufe working in Man, it remains to mew how it is diftinguimed from thofe other Caufes befide Man, which we fuppofe to operate in the Univerfe. Thefe are either fuch Caufes as are below him, like the Vegeta- tive Power, which operates in Vegetables, the Sen- fitive in Animals ; or elfe fuch Caufes as are above him,' like God, and whatever is elfe of Intelligence more than human.

The Causes below us may be all included in. the common Genus 0/* Nature; and of Nature we may fay univerfally, as well of Nature without us as within us, that its feveral Operations, contrary to thofe of Art, are not in the leaf degree derived from Cuftom or Ufage. Thus the Author above cited — - Qy<|b yoL^ i-coy (p\xm ovluv csAAw? JOi^/Jar tnov XiQo?

av pvgiocxi? avlov iVi^y n; a,m pmlwv, ah ro ttu*

• m%. None of thofe Things, which are what they are by

Nature, can be altered by being accujlomed. Thus a Stone \ which by Nature is carried downward, can never be accujlomed to nount upward, no not thd* any one Jhould ten thoufa?id times attempt it by throwing the Stone upward. The fame may be faid of accufioming Fire to move downward. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. 1. Again, in the Works of Nature, fuch as Trees, Animals, and the like, the efficient Principle is *//-

tally united to the Subjecls, wherein it operates.

h dvloTg £p£8o-i Toivla, rviv d^w. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6» c. 4. But in the Works of Art, fuch as Statues or Houfes, the efficient Principle is difunited.from the Subjecls, and exifts not in the Things done or made,

but

NOTES on Treatise the Firft.

but in the Doer or Artifl — m y\ apx* m *» n-oiSVJij aAAa /xjj h 7w iroixpivu. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4. It is indeed pofllble that, even in Works of Art, the Subjecl arid efficient Caufe may be ««/ta/, as in the Cafe of a Phyfician becoming his own Patient, and curing himfelf. But then it muft be remembered that this Union is xara truju^eSwoVj merely acci- dental, and no way effential to the conftituting of Art, confidered as Art. By this therefore is Art clearly dirtinguifhed from Nature, whofe Defi- nition informs us that it is — oif/jn rii kcc\ mVx t* xwbT&m x} ygs[At7v tv w uVap^et irpuluc 9 xaG* oc\J]o x) pvi v.M arvpG&rMQs. A certain Principle or Caufe of moving and ceafing to move, in feme Subjecl wherein fuch Principle exijls immediately, ejfentially, and not by way of Accident. Arift. Natur, Aufc. 1. 2* c* 1.

The C au s e s, which are of Rank supeRiour to Man, fuch as the Deity, can have nothing to do with Art, becaufe being (as is laid in the Dialogue, p. 11.) perfeSf and complete, and knowing all from the Beginning, they can ne\ , admit of what is additional and fecondary. Art therefore can only belong to Beings, like Men, who being imperfecl Know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them by Helps fecondary and fubfequent. It was from a like Confideration that Pythagoras called himfelf a Philosopher, that is to fay (according to his owA Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of what was wife and good, but not a PorTerTor«> which he deemed a Character above him. Con- fonant to this we read in Plato's Banquet, OeJ*

9fHS

NOTES on Treatise theFirft.

f&p, &c. No God phihfophize s, or defires to become wife, for He is so already. Nor, if there be any other Being wife, doth he phihfophize for the fame Reafon. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil phihfophize \ for this is the Misfortune of Indocility, without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear to onefelf fufficient in all thefe Refpecls. In general there- fore, he who thinketh himfelf in no want, defireth not that, which he thinks himfelf not to need. Who then, faid Socrates to Diotima, (the Speaker of this Narration) Who are those who philoso- phize, if they are neither the Wife nor the Indocil? That (replied fhe) may be now confpicuous even to a Child. They are those of middle Rank,

BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203.

torn. 3. Edit. Serrani.

Here we fee (agreeably to what is faid in the Dialogue, pages n. and 12.) that as to acquired or fecondary Habits, fome Beings are too excellent for them, and others too bafe , and that the Deity above all is in the Number of thofe tranfcen- dent, and is thus, as a Caufe, diftinguifhed from Art.

There are, befides the Deity and -Nature now fpoken of, certain other external Caufes, which are mentioned in the firil Note as diftincl: from Art ; namely Chance and Neceffity. But of thefe hereafter, when we confider the Subjecl of Art.

Note

N O T E S on Tr e at ise the Firft. Note IV. p. 13. Faculties, Powers, &c.

ARE OBSCURE AND HIDDEN THINGS ENER- GIES and Operations lie open to the

Senses.] 'Ei o\ %$ hiysiv rt ixotrov TtTIcoy, ol&v

\l TO VQ'&lMV, IS Ti" TO dt&TiJtKOVy 7rp6"lfp2V ItTHj- XS7TlWy Tl TO V0£iV, XOt) TV' TO d&Qf.Vi&OLl* 7TpO-

Ifpat J^ nal ,<ra(f>£s-«p«» wpoff '^aaj twv Sumpim luri ui zvepysioti. yrooevlvy^dvofAsv y&p aVJai?, xai toV $vva,pEi<; ano t»7wv i7rivoxpsv. If we are to ex- plain what each ofthefe things are, as for inftance, ivhat the intelligent Principle , what the fenfitive, we muft firft inquire what it is to think, what to fee, hear, and life the Senfes. For with refpecl to us Men, the Energies are prior and more evident than the Powers, becaufe it is in the Energies we are firft cmverfant, and comprehend the Powers from them. Therttift. in lib. 2. de Anima, p. 76. Edit. Aid. Fol.

Note V. p. 15. Are there not Pre- cepts, &c. ] Vid. Plat, in Min. torn. 2. p. 316^ 17. -Edit. S err an.

As to thofe low Habits here mention'd, from which we diftinguifh Art by the Number and Dignity of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Deno- mination of MxlaioTsxyia, of which ^uintilian gives the following Account. Ma7«io7e^v/« quoque eft quadam, id eft, fupervacua Artis Imitatio, quce nihil fane nee boni nee malt habeat, fed vanum laborem : qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex fpatio diftante miffa, in acum continuo & fine fruftratwie infer ebat • quern, cum fpeftafifet Alexander^ donafje dicitur ejufdem S 2 legit-*

<*

i

NOTES on Treatise theFirft.

leguminis modio. Quod quidem pramium fuit illo opere digniffimum. Inft. Orat. 1. 2. c. 20.

Note VI. p. 17. An Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Ef- fect, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS- ]

The Peripatetic Definition of Art is "E£»£ ^/7<£ AoT« dhyiS-xs 7rom7uiV) — ati efficient Habit : , joined with found and true. Reafon. Ariftot. Ethic. Nic 1. 6. c. 4.

The Stoic Definition, as we find it in Sext. Eftipir. adverfus Logicos, p. 392. is, 2uru/*« h xoila,Ar,tyzuv IPysyvfAWnrfASiim Trgog r\ reX©* wwyiro* im h roo (3t«. Thus tranflated by Cicero in Die- denies de Grammat. 1. 2. Art eji Perceptionum exerci- tatarum colleclio, ad unum exitum vita utilem perti- nentium. And again by Quintilian^ Inft. Orat. \. 2. C. 18. Art em conftare ex perceptionibus confentientibus & coexerchatis ad finem utilem vita. The fame De- finition is alfo alluded to in the Academics of Cicero^.

1. 2. c. 7. where it is faid Art vero qua potejl

effie^ nifi qua non ex una; aut duabus,fed ex multis animi perceptionibus conjiat?

There is a third Definition of Art cited by Shiintilian in the fame piace, and afcribed by him to

Qleanthes — An ejl potejias via (id eft, ordine) efficient*

Now if we compare thefe Definitions with that in the Dialogue, we (hall find them all to correfpond.

The Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Caufe of fime Effecl, is .the, fame as "Efys 7rot7ilian in the

Peripa-

NOTES on Treatise the Firft.

Peripatetic Definition. According to a Syfl 'em of 'vari- ous and well-approved Precepts, is the fame as p{\oi Xoy* aX^aj. For found and true Reafon muft needs be the Bafis of allfuch Precepts.

Again, as to the fecond Definition-.— The Words

Tvrvpoc, xalaA^swv [a.SyJlem of ' Comprehenfions, ox of certain and evident Truths'] correfpond to the latter Part of the Definition in the Dialogue — According to a Syjtem of various and well-approved Precepts. The Word zFyEyvpvKo-p-cvuv [that is to fay, worked in by Habit and Excercife] correfponds to the firft Part, that Art is a Caufe founded in Habit. And the reft [7r£>oV t) tiX<&,'&c. that is to fay, a*SyJlem which has refpecl to feme ufeful and ferviceable End or Purpofe in Human Life'] , mews the Syftem here mentioned to regard Practice and Aclion, not Theory and Specu lation. And thus does it correfpond with the Defi- nition of the Dialogue, where it is faid that Art is an Habitual Power not of merely contemplating and knoiving, but of becoming the Caufe of feme Effect. It is not indeed exprelfed in the Dialogue, that this Effecl: has refpecl: to the Utility of Human Life, be- caufe this latter Circumfiance is referved to the Defi- nition of the final Caufe of Art, given page 29.

As to the third Definition of Art, poteflas via efficiens, a Power operating methodically, it may be obferved, that by being called an operating Power, it is diftinguifhed from Powers purely fpeculative ; and as it is faid to operate methodically, or in a Road and regular Procefs, it is diftinguifhed from Chance as well as blind Neceffity. And thus far it correfponds S 3 with

NOTES 0* Treatise the Firjl.

with what is ofFer'd in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this Definition, whether the Power therein mentioned be Original and Natural, or Se^ condary and Habitual, becaufe Powers of either fort may operate methodically. And perhaps Cleantbes intended not to diftinguiih fo far, but took Art in that larger and more general Senfe, adopted fome- times by the Stoics \ as when they defcribe Nature her/elf to be a Ilu^ rc^^nxov o$ca (dccoi^ov irgog ytvsa-iv, an artificial Fire, proceeding methodically to Production or Creation, For it is not to be imagined, they in- tended by this to infinuate that Nature was a Fire, which had learnt by Habit fo to operate. On the contrary, by artificial it is probable they intended no more than fome active efficient Principle, working with ReaJ on, Order, and Method -, of which Principle they confider'd Fire to be the properejl Vehicle, as being of all Bodies the moll fiubtle, and that into which the reft are all ultimately refolvable. Vide Diog. Laert. 1. 7. Seel. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 22.

Note VII. page 22. It should seem that the common or universal subject of art was- — All those contingent Natures; which lie within the reach of human Powers to influence.]

The Cause here treated is the Material,

the "TA',1, or c T7rox£t]w,£vov, or to eg a yw(\&\. t*

Of a Contingent, we have the following Defini- tion — — As^w <T ii>£iX£ojZl 9 xj TO EvJfp^P^flW, ou

H

NOTES 0* Treatise tbeFirJt.

diet rxT cUvvxtov. I call that a Contingent, which not being necefjary, but being fuppofed to be, there will follow nothing impojjible from fuch Suppojition. Arift. Anal, prior. 1. i. c. 13.

That this is true in Works of Art, is evident. It is not necefjary, that a given Fragment of fuch a Rock mould affume the Figure of Hercules : but there follows nothing impojjible, if we fuppofe it fo figured. 'Tis for this reafon, that the Subjecl of Art is in the Dialogue called a Contingent,

But however, to explain the whole of what is faid in this Place, it is necefTary to go backward, and deduce what we would fay from fome remoter Considerations.

The Peripatetics held the End or Aim of their Philofophy to be the difcovering and knowing the

&%y}»i the primary and creative Principle of all Things. They purfued this Inquiry, by beginning their Contemplation from thofe things, which are to usfirjl in the Order of our Comprehension, and fo amend- ing gradually to that which is truly firfl, in the real Order of Beings.

The fir ft and original Objecls of our Compre- henfion are thofe nearer and more immediate, viz. the Objecls of Senfe, with which we are fur- rounded on every Side. Thefe Objecls we perceive to be all in motion -, and the Motions are multiform, various, and often oppofite to each other. The Con- S 4 fequences.

NOTES on Treatise the Firft.

fequences of this we perpetually behold. By -fuch Motions we fee that not only the mere local Site of thefe Beings is changed, but their very Bulk, and Figure, and Qualities; nay more than this, even

the Beings them/elves are made to feparate and perijb, while new Beings arife from the Re-afTemblage of the fcattered Parts, which Parts different Motions can as well concrete, as difunite. The Beings or Gbjecls of the Character here defcribed, the Peripatetics denoted un- der the common Appellation of the ra, xwpzva, >£ (pS&Jlx, the Beings moving and corruptible*

From thefe moving and perijbable Cbjecls, they palled to thofe fublinier and more tranfcendent Objects of Senfe, which they faw adorn the Heavens. Here likev/ife they difcovercd Motion ; but then this Mo- tion was uniform and conftant t the Be- ings moved, fave in the relation Oi As therefore they beheld no Change in the . EJJence of thefe Beings, they deemed them [ their Hypothecs , incorruptible, and out of them Ci i- bliihed another Clafs of Beings, that is to fay, the rd kiwpeva x&i a<p$ufla 9 the Beings moving and in* corruptible.

From thefe fublimer Objects of Senfe, they palled to Objecls of pure Intellecl ; to Bodies devoid of all Motion, and of all Quality, fave that in- feparable one of Figure j fuch Bodies for inftarice as the Cube, the Sphere, and the reft of Bo- dies mathematical. From mathematical Bodies, and the Truths refulting from them, they paflfed to the Contemplation of Truth in general; to the Soul, and its Powers both of Intuition and Syl-

kgization ;

■ N O T E S on Treatise the Firjl.

logization ; to Being univerfal, and above both Time land Place ; and thus at laft to that fupreme Caufe 9 the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the fame, immutable and eternal. The feveral Objecls of this intellectual Comprehenfwn they ftiled not merely a<pQxp]x y but ol(pQ<x,flx *j awvj/U, Beings incorrup- tible and immoveable.

In this manner did the Peripatetics fpeculate. And hence was it they eftablifhed to themfelves three Species of Philofophical Employment one about

Beings motionlefs and eternal •> another, about Beings moveable and eternal-, and a third, about Beings moveable and perijhable. The firft they held the proper Employment of the Metaphyfician ; the two laft of the AJlronomer and the Naturalijl.

Aio rpzTt; cci Traoty pulsion* ri p\v ttspi omivtuqv* v

<$£, 7TSg) XlVXpSVOV p£V, ol(p $ Ot (i\ OV $1* V\ Js, 7TZ(H T&

(pSoifict. Idcirco Tres funt Traclationes \ una, de im- mobili-, altera de eo, quod movetur quidem, fed eft interitus expers ■ tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiis. Ariftot. Natural. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 7. Ato ^ Tgs7$ oCl Trgocypcilnoa' r\ ju,£y, 7rso\ >uvx pivot hJ (piccolo,' v $£ 7T£gi wvy/xeva, ol(p$rotfloL $£• r) J«, 7T£g\ aMiirnloi >£ Sl(pSocp7u. Themiflii Paraphrafis in he.

This threefold Subjecl of Philofophic Inquiry is elegantly explained in the following Paflfage.

T* §1 to ri\(§f £$""* TY\q 'ApirolsXixris (p iAo<ro

V UO')(Yl\), 1 W TWV TTCCVTOOVl $Yipwf>yov olirUv 7 tSjv #el *t) w<raul«$ fp£«<r«v oItto- NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. foixvvcri yxg 7rdv1oov dp^/Vf xj CLVUtAOlJoV £% iKimq £\ ra, ttolv\oc iroctocy^oci, Tivoc $1 roc ayovloc vpoiq ilg rxro to te'A®* ; (Paph oft ?i JjJWxaAja tow h X^ vt p >b /t**ta)3oA?7 virxwovluv' loiocvroc Je eo roc Iv y>£V£(T£l Hy (Propel. 0C7T0 yocp T*7c0l>, , Jiflt jU,£(T«V [AOC- Be[aolImuv~ 9 clvccfofjiEv I«y7»? eVI roc del >£ uxrocvloos t^s" ocGodpocrxq vq-ici$ 9 E7n T*/jy trptalw 7roiv7oov ctwyv. Udcrn; yocp xivria~ius 9 8 xaT gV/av aVw?, 5 xoI« 7roiov 9 fi KOcla TQTTQVy TCC jUSV £l» y£V£<T£l ><J (p^OPOC Y.0c\oi 7rdc<TCCV wvwiv Y.ivvvloci 'roc Je gvpgcvioc ytxloc, y^ovw rriv xccloi, rQirov. AiO ^'/5>J IvTQOtlu); 00*£V£lV OLTCQ TWV 7roXVTP07TOOg MllitfAlMV gTTl TCt KXid fXlOCV 9 K, [AOVYjV X.lVnO~lV Y.IVV [*£VOC, Xj 8TW$ in) THN AKINHTON KA£ AEI niAX- TH2 EXOT2AN APXHN. Aj*j*ov« £& r#s xoflifyQ£uts 9 P»X2. Edit. Tenet. 8vo, 1545. The Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to this threefold Divijion of Subjects, as may be feen in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occafion to the prefent Comment. He has chofen however to flile the roc 'oWv»«, or Heavenly Bodies rather Contingents of higher Order than Beings necejfary y as imagining the former to be their truer Character. It may be here added, that the Peripatetics con- fined 3>u(tk or Nature ', for the moll part, to this Earth of our's, where they confidered her as the active Principle of Life in Plants and Animals. Hence therefore they diftinguifhed not htxEffefts&om thofe of Art 9 ~ by their Necejfity (for the Effeels of both they treated' as contingent) but from the Caufe in 2 Natural NOTES on Treatise the Firfi. Natural Subjects operating within, in Artificial with- out, as has been already oberved, p. 256, 257. I t may be farther added, that they placed thefe Efiecls of Art and Nature, and indeed all other Contingents whatever, in a middle Rank between Things Neceffary, and Things Impofiible. The Rea- fon was evident. Things Neceffary could not but be ; Things Impofiible could not be ; but Contingents were rcc iv^e^oy.svoc >«} livoci >cj pn tivat 9 that is, were equally fiuficeptible both of Being and Non-being* But yet tho' all Contingents admitted on their Hypothecs both of Being and Non-being, yet they fuppofed fome to have a greater Tendency to Ex- igence, and others to have a lefs. The firft Species; of thefe they filled rol w hn ro -rroXv the Things which happen for the mojl part -, the laft, roi iir sAarlov, the Things which happen lefs frequently. Now as it is evident that both Nature and Art opener obtain their End, than mifs it (for complete Animals are more frequently born than Monfters, and the Mufician, if an Artift, ftrikes oftener the right String than the wrong) hence it was, that they ranged the Efiecls of Nature and Art among thofe Contingents which were rol cog lv\ to ttoAu, Contingents of greater Frequency. But yet as thefe Effecls were not from the Hypothecs neceffary, and contrary to thefe upon occafion happened, hence it was, that whenever either Nature or Art became Caufes of the t« eV gAa-rJo:', thofe rarer Events, in fuch cafe they f Nature and Art J were confidered by NOTES o» Treatise the Firft. by thefe Philofophers as Virion nxloi (ru,a|3£j3i»jtoV Caufes by way of Accident , and not according to their own EJjence and diftinguifhing Character. In fuch Instances it was that they affumed the Name of T^'x" or ' Avloixoflov, Fortune or Chance, tu^» having moftly Preference to Works of Men, vvlopoclov to Works of Nature. The Inftance£ given by Themijlius, in Cafes of Chance and Fortune, are as follow. A Tile falls from a Houfe. The End of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, whither Nature would carry it by the common Law of Gravity. In falling it ftrikes and wounds a Paf- fenger. This lajl Event is from Chance. Again, a' Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, he dilcovers a hidden Treafure. This lajl Event is from Fortune. And thus, adds Themijlius, r oi'Jly iracifyq 7% (aicc, aAAy jueu xaQ* ocvjr.v ai1*a, aAAa <5e Kara <TVfj^sQriKog. The fame individual A£f ion is the Caufe of one Thing from its own peculiar Character 9 and of another Thing, by way of Accident. And again, iri jU,EV SV *j TCOU 8TW? Wp(Zoilv6v\<dV Y\ TW (jWlt/ ?1 TW -TTDOtXlOSVlV <X,{]lctV 7TW$ StfTsTvy GtAA' 8 X^S"' ^ulxv . 8 }^ th'Iwv p^a^fv kte 7r^o»iA3-iv o ai^ww^p, »te w xsgocpis xxlwiyjy), aAA' ei a^« xala avpfisPwos. — 0/* thefe Events we may call Nature or Human Will in a man- ner the Caufe, but yet not fo from themfelves, and ac- cording to their own peculiar EJfence ; for it was not for the fake of what happened that either the Pajfenger went forth, or the Tile fell downward, but if any thing' it was by Accident. Themift. in lib. 2. Natur. Aufcult. p. 26. Edit. Aid. See alfo Ariflot. Natur. Ah I cult. La. c. 4, 5, 6. It NOTES on Treatise the Fhji. I t mud be here obferved, that koctoc <ru i a|3£|3Ws' [by accident] means in no Part of thefe Quotations accidental, as {landing for cafual -, for this would be mere Tautology, as to what is here faid concern- ing Chance. It means rather fomething by way of Appendage \ fomething Adventitious ; in other Words, it means Accident ', as adhering to Subjiance 9 without which it can have no Beings tho' fuppofe it ahfent or taken away, the Nature of Subjiance is no way affecled. It was in this Senfe, the Peripatetics fuppofed Chance and Fortune to be Accidents or Ap- pendages to Nature^ and Mind. According there- fore to them, the Suppofition of Chance and Fortune was fo far from excluding Nature and Mind from the Univerfe, that they demonflrably proved their Exigence in it. For admitting their Account of Chance and Fortune to be juft ; if we grant the Acci- dents to exift, much more muft we grant the $ub- jeffs, and this too with that fuperior Dignity and Priority of Exiflence, which is evidently due to all Subjects above their Accidents. Well therefore did the Philofopher conclude tire gov fya. to n 'A-JTO^aTov,

• * Tux* t» N», *) rriq ^uVeco?. Subfequent in Ex-

iftence^ are Chance and Fortune to Mind and Nature. Arijlot. Natur. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 6. From what has been faid, we fee the Reafon of that Enumeration of Caufes mentioned in the Be- ginning of the firft Note, where they are defcribed to be Necessity, Nature, Man, and For- tune. To NOTES on Treatise the Firjt. To Necessity they referred all thofe Things and Event?, which they fuppofed of necejjary Ex- igence-, fuch as the Univerfe, the Heavenly Bodies, and their Motions; Truth, and all Univerfals, together with the *Aex% or Principle, or firji Caufe of all Things. To Nature, Man, and Chance, they re^ ferred all Contingents ; to Nature and Man, obtaining their End, they referred Contingents of greater Fre- quency. ; to the fame Caufes, confidered as operating befde their End, and thus becoming Chance or For- tune , they referred thofe oppofite Contingents , of Ex- igence lefs ufual. And hence as Art and Fortune were both con- verfant about the fame Subjecls {viz. the Contingent , and not the Neceffary) and were both referable to the fame Origin (viz. Man, becoming a Caufe, ei- ther designedly or undefignedly) hence the Meaning of that Yerfe, cited by Ariftotle from Agatho ; T?X V7i ™X W *$~ £ p% £ > *} tux* i'zx vm ' Art loveth Fortune ■> Fortune loveth Art. As much as if he had faid, that thefe were kindred Powers, which amicably confpired to affift each other ; that Art often helped Fortune, by judi- cious Conducl ; and that Fortune often helped Art, by lucky Incidents. See Ariftot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4. More might be cited, but we cannot lengthen a Note, which has proved, 'tis to be feared, too long already. Note NOTES on Treatise tbeFirft. Note VIII. p. 23. I mean, said he, by Beginning, that Cause for the Sake of which, &c] As the Cause here fpoken of, is that Caufe ufually called Final, it may be afked, how it comes in this place to be confidered as a Beginning, The Anfwer is, that what comes lafl in Practice, ftands in Theory firfi ; or in other Words, the Order of Ideas in the Intellect of the Artift is exactly in- verted y with refpect to the Order of his Energies, Thus Jmmonius*~--'&x$oXx yxp r^s ph Seapixs' to teA^ yiyviroci ccpx/i ?%$ 7rpujr£oo$' £p7rctXiv dl Tnq 7Tpoi%iU$ TO TEA^, oifX/i TY\$ &EUplX?, OWV ■ OwoJ , o'|Mi^' J iiriTOcliU ohov 9 xiyti jc«6' IuV7q\ InsTcx*- yw oixov 'sroitiirai ' osrsp lo cueTsronrfAOiy xooXvtiyJv ©/aj3pwi> >ej xaujW»TWV tvtq Si j»x ay yivoiro 9 pvi yw pews Qpotpyg. 'EvtcuOsv »v app££T#* t%$ 0EwptW. TvpQ- Ga&uv Je (p7i<r!v* 'AAAa t«to «jc av yivoiro^ pj 3^- VQfAiVUV TQ%WV' VTOl Si *JC UV yivOiVTV, fAVI Jliroj3A)]0£V* TCOV 0£jU£A»W oV Je QefAtXlOl Sit ' &V jSA^OflfV, jU?) c pup£- ()fi<r?i? ?*?? ^S?. sWaoOa xcct£Xyi%£v £ hup(<x. .Evt£u0» «v app^ETa* ij zrpocjra;. zrporspov yccg Spvrrei rw yw* lid' HTM (3aAAft TO!/ QspihlQV' llTOC sy£tpSi T0l%it$* ?tj vf-spov l"sriT&ria , i rw Qpo(pyv y yrig Ifi teA^ tjjs -arpa^Ew?. i? J' «p?C'J T ?? ^p^eoog, Ti\<&> t%$ Oewp/af. A/*/*, ft xaTuy. p. i5» <&#/. #«rtf. 8vo. For ** general the End of Theory is the Beginning of Practice; and fo reciprocally ', /fo ifo*/ of Practice, the N O T E S on Treatise the FirJ. the Beginning of Theory, Thus for inftance : An Ar* chitecl, being ordered to build a Houfe, fays to himfelf I am ordered to build a Houfe 5 that is to fay, a certain Defence, to protecl againfl the Rains and the Heats. But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds and fays But there can be no Roof if there be no Walls ; and there can be no Walls, without fome Foun- dations -, nor can there be laid Foundations, without open- ing the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End. Hence therefore commences the Praclice or Aclion. For firft he opens the Earth ; then lays the Foundation ; then raifes the Walls-, and laflly puts on the Roof, which is the End of the Aclion or Praclice, [but Beginning of the Theory] as the Beginning of the Praclice was the End of the Theory. See alfo Arift. Ethic. Nicom. 1-3- c -3* Note IX. p. 24. Was it not the Abfence of Health, &<:.] Vide Platon. de Rep. 1. 1. torn. 2. p. 341. Edit. Serrani. tf D,<T7r^ (g(pjjv tya) it pz 1^0 Sit iyXpKE? (TWlAXTl, SiVXt (TOO [A OCT I, Yl ZTDOfT^eTrxi TJV®">* srsr <;*«.' a-j, on zrxvrolzroMri {a£v %v zj^ovStnou. £ia. ■rx'jrx x) n -ri^vT] £r"iv ictTpwyj vv\> l-jpf^j?, on troopa lo tffovvifiv, >£ sx IfcocweT auric toistw £ivcti. £htem~ admodum, inquam,fi a mequareres, an fatisfit Corporis tit fit Corpus, an alia quapiam re indigeat : refponderem y emmno indigere. Atque hac quidem de Caufa medicine ars nunc eji inventa, quomam Corpus per fe profigatum eft, neque ipft fatis eft, ut fit hujufmodi. Note X. p. 26. Or is it not absurd to suppose there should be an art of Impos- NOTES m Treatise the Firjt. Impossibilities ?] What is here faid concerning the Difference between thofe things for which we may poflibly ioijh, and thofe which we aclually purfue, is expreffed in the Ethics of Ariflotle, 1. 3. £• 2. TlpQix,[pi<n$ ph y&p ix fr-i rwy aJtoaTwv xj si' T*J (pairj zrpoaipfilt&a*, Joxo»] oCv jjA/9*©^ eiWj. fiu\y<ri<; $ eVi tow aJuvaTwv, oiov a0ava<na$. There is indeed no^ determined Choice of dttion with refpecl to Things impoffible ; tf/z^Z if any one Jhould fay he had fo deter- mined, he would appear to be a Fool, But there may be a Willing or Longing after things impojfible ; as for inflame, never to die. Note XL p. 27. The Suggestions of Will, and uninstructed Instinct.] Will 9 |3a'toi<riff, or "Opsgi? Xoyirwi ; uninflrucled Inflincl 7 2pE%i$ dxoyir®*. See before, Note ILL Note XII. p. 29. The Want or Absence of something appearing good; relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural and unin- structed Faculties.] The Cause here defcribed is the to I %&** 9 or final. Ariflotle in his Phyfics, 1. 2. c. 3. in enumerating the various forts of Caufes, reckons among the reft to ? «? to tI- A<^», xj r uyuQov ruv clhXuv. to yap a hexoc jSeA- lirov, xj teA^ twv »aawv iSiXu sivcu. To thefe may be added that Caufe, which is confidered as the End, and Good ef all the reft. For that, for whofi fake all T tbi NOTES on Treatise theFirft. the others are deemed neceffary, has juft Pretenfions to be bejl, and to be the End of them all. To this he fubjoins, confonant to what is faid in the Dialogue— JiaCpepsTw Je y.n$h uvtq inrzw d'yoctjov * (pctivoy.evQV uyu^ov —- Let it make no Difference whether we call this End, real Good, or only apparent Good. So in the Beginning of his Ethics — Tlac-a -ri'/yn, ^ waivx p,(- tiv® 3 ICpts&cti £o}ce7. Aio xochwg <x,7rz(piv<x.vT0 r oty<x- S-ov, £ zrdvTa, tyUrai. Every Art, and every orderly Speculation, fo likewife every Aclion, and determined Choice ofPurfuit, appear all of them to tend toward fome Good. Well therefore have they pronounced Good to be that, toward which all things tend. In the Definition here treated, the Words [rela tive to Human Life] exprefs that Part of the Stoic Definition of Art [-^-pos r) TeA©-» '{v^pyirov toov tv tw £<w.] They were omitted in the Definition, p. 17. as more properly belonging to the prefent Defini- tion, which refpecls Art in its final Caufe. See pagerti. That what is perfecl and felf-fufficient is above the fecondary Helps of Art ; that our own JVeaknefs and Infufficiency, and the Profpect of procuring that ab- fent Good, by which we all hope to fupply ourfelves, where deficient ; that this is the Source not only of all Arts, but (joined to fecial Affection) is the Origin , and Ceme?it of Human Society; fee (befides the Place here treated) pages 11, t%% and of the third Treatife, p. 147 to p. 157, Thus NOTES on Treatise the Firft. Thus the Poet in Stobosus; p. 515. Need all things taught ; What cannot Need invent f Agreably alfo to this, Virgil, in his firft Georgic, having told us of the various Changes to the worfe, which happened in the natural World immediately fubfequent to the Golden Age, goes on to enumerate the feveral Inventions of Men, which were the na- tural Refult of this their newly indigent State. He at teft iums up the whole by faying Turn varies venere artes ; labor omnia vicit Improbus, & duris urgens in rebus egestas. Wh ere (according to the Doctrine in the Dia- logue) Wa n t is made the Beginning or Origin of Arts. The Poet even refers this Difpenfation, this Introduction of Indigence, Care, and' Solicitude, to the immediate Will of Providence, acting for the Good of Mankind 5 left Plenty mould lull them into floathful Lethargy, fo as to forget their noblejl and mojl aclive Faculties. Pater ipfe colendi Haud facilem effe viam valuit, primufq; per artem Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda, Nee torpere gravi pajfus fua regna veferno.. Note XIII. p. 32. Co-existent, replied he, as in a Statue, &e. Successive^ as in T 2 a NOTES on Treatise the Firft. a Tune or Dance, &c] This Divifion of Beings or Productions we find mentioned by Ari- Jlotle in his Phyfics, (1. 3. c. S.) where explaining his Doctrine concerning Infinite, he fays -— ' AAA' £7rf t •EroAAaxi? to £iva.i 9 wcrsr££ 11 Yipi^ot. iri 9 X&i cc,ycov 9 rw agi aAAo Ttcci ocAAo yiVEo7ott 9 »rw xat to ais-sipov. In as much as Being is manifold, fuch as is the Being of a Day or public Feflival, (which exifl by continually becoming fomething farther) fuch alfo is the Being and Nature of Infinite. The fame Sentiment foon after is more fully explained and opened, "£lrz to ccTrsipov a cJfT Aay*fioiv£iv 9 u$ rods ti* olov flfyOpwwov, n oiKictv " aAA* wf ify/ipa ABytltxi, xai aym 9 ol; ro slvou 9 ax u; idiot, tlq yiyovtv 9 aAA* oizi h ye»i(T£i aoa (pQopa. We are not to conceive of Infi- nite 9 as of a pojitive particular Sub/lance, like a Man er a Heufe \ but rather as we pronounce Exiftmce of a Day or public Feflival 9 which have their EJfence 9 not as fenfible 9 individual Subflances 9 but by a continued Procedure of Being and ceafing to be. Note XIV. p. 32. What is Human Life, but a Compound of Parts thus fleet- ing, &'c] It is not inelegantly faid in the Ethics fo often referred to C H £s ^m h&}- yuci 7k in 9 kou war®* ^p' toc\jt» xot\ th'toi? mpyw 9 oc xai p&Ai<ro<. ctyazra ' olov jaw jji,wix,os 9 T'a dxoy izrept roc /aeAtj, $\ (piAo/xa8"^, t? hoanln srfpl rat Sswp^ao/a. ' yVw $\ xx) tcov Xqiztuv EJtar©^. Life is a certain Energy, and each Man" energizes 'about thofe Subjects, and with thofe Faculties , for which he hath the greatejl Affection ; the Mufician 3 with his Hearing 9 NOTES on Treatise the Fir/!. Hearing* about Sounds harmonious ; the Studious, with his Intellett \ about Matters of Speculation ; and in like manner each Man elfe of the various forts befide. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 10. c. 4. Note XV. p. 34. Every Art will be ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR Energy.] The Cause here treated is the For- mal, called by various Names ; the tl$<&>, the Ao^^», the t* to, the to t* ?v slvxi. I n the Beginning of the above-cited Ethics, after the Author has told us that every Art, and Human Aftion tend to fome Good or End, he adds A*a(popa- $£ riq (poiivsTOii tcov t£\cou ' ra (j.tv yap licriv ivspyetxi ' Ta Js zrocg aura?,- 'ipya, tivu But there appears a Difference in Ends : For fome are Energies; fome, ever and above thefe Energies, are certain Works. In g>uintilian's Inftitutes the fame Diflinclion, with refpect to the End of Arts, is mentioned /. 2. c. 18, But here perhaps it may be afked, lid&Arts are ended and accomplished in fome Energy or Work, and this Energy or Work be almoft univerfally that abfent Good, toward which they all tend, and for the fake of which they are all exerted -, (Tor a Dance, which is an Energy, and a Houfe, which is a Work, are certain abfent Goods or Pleafures, for the fake of which certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be afked, whence then the Difference between the Formal Caufe and the Final-, the Final, as in Note XII. it has been already treated ? T3 The NOTES on Treatise the Firft. The Anfwer to this is, that they concur and are the fame. To ph yap ti so, xal to « hsxM 9 ivln, The Formal Caufe and the Final are one. Arift. Nat. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 7. If they differ, it is (as Joannes Grammaticus obferves in commenting on this Place J a Difference rather in the Time and Manner of our view- ing them, than in their own E [fence and Nature. It may not perhaps be improper to tranfcribe his own Words. Ttxvlov tw aptO^w to n riXog xat to rido;, T *i c^scrsi /U.0VT7 &<z(pepov, wj Hprirai, xal tw %povw. orccv fAv yccp tag yivo fJkevoVj xtx,) p-wco ou Oewpirrai, ^riXog irW ' OT0C.V (J'S, £0? *]<JV) yfVOjCXCTOV, £10*0$. 77>£ END tftfi/ ^ Form #n? numerically the fame, differing (as has been faid] //z Relation 0«#> , and Time. For thus the fame Thing, while confidered as in its Progrefs to Completion, but as not yet complete, is fo long an End ; when confidered as acluaUy complete, is no longer an End, but a Form. And thus is this Queftion one way anfwered, by acknowledging that thefe two Caufes co-incide, and differ not in their Effence or real Character, but rather in the Time and Manner of cur contemplating them. But there is another Anfwer, and that is derived from the twofold Nature of final Caufes. According to this Doclxine, Arts have not only a nearer and more immediate End, (as a Ship is the End of Ship- building, or Navigating the End of Pilotry) but they have a ftill remoter and higher End, a rsXo; te- ^mwtccIov, that is to fay, Man, Human-Kind, or (in other Words) the Utility or Elegance of Human Life. Thus the Stagirite. 'Et^Iv ydp 7ra>? y.cx\ quag riXog ' etp^wg' yap to a hsxa. For we our- selves NOTES 00 Treatise the Firji. selves alfo are in fome fort an End ; for the final Caufe is twofold. Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 2. If therefore we have refpecl: to this ultimate End, thefe two Caufes will be found to differ, and be really diftincl: from each other. And thus it is that in fome refpecls they agree, and in others they differ, according to the above Diftinclions eftablifhed by this Philofophy. Note XVI. p. 38. O Art ! Thou Praise of Man, &V.] Eujlratius, in the Beginning of his Comment on the Ethics of Ariftotle, has the follow- ing elegant Encomium on Arts. AbT yap p* cLyjpn- S~ov iocvlco VTrccffisiv tov ai/Opwsrov, dvewn^iulov /w,e- vovloc, xa\ %7$ p^sfpexn' x») «p£jwr"otf twu xXoym t%o[AOixy*£vov, ccX}C locvltji ts xoa o\\Xoiq $ioi t^ te%vvi$ roc xprHripoi xalofixv. "Eti 81 xou pipy (ro(pias cu rsp/vai, coj rr t v (pdviv jwjjuy^si/aj, xoci \J\ccig ^(»fj.ev»i 9 xa\ roc'ojoag stJVj TsrepiliQs[ji,evou ' u; xu\ <&& tv\q jw,h Jfn> olujccg tov (piXocro(pQV QCTroTriiJ.Trt^oci, 'imijac xou (rca^oclt ztoX\j7tocve7 xai "z*roAuju,s7aj3oA« <rvv$£$£[jt,zvo<; Q uvQpooziros, dsTroii xui 7roAAwv Ttoy s^coOfv £iV |3oii0«aif, <W, Tcpo^ tw £w ccixXwq, Xai TO £V CjV/V <X,VE[Jt.7ro£t$~0OS au7w 7r£piyivoilo^ Jtat //.?? Jja t^u twv ^aYKripoov tv&iotp dvaxo-nAoilo. 'Ei /w-su au rcoy pEifyvuv ^eup^druv i%o- fj*svo;, ovx tysi xocl "srpog t« Ia«t7&> xoci toc zs-pbg znpi- TZQiriVlV (TU)y,XT'§r > X0Cl0(,(pEpE&0il, UTTYipelYKTXCriV dl TiyVGil au7«, o'cat ra to^ avOpwsnvoj? vwfAourt Ipydtovloci p£p^<n/*«, w^eAH^Ewwv rcoy p£«p«vax7oui/7«i/ 7rao olvrx •CrpOff T& T£A£WT£p#. T 4 Note NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. Note XVII. p. 44. The Efficient, the Material, the Final, and the Formal.] That is to fay, to xivYxrocv, v\ "YAtj, to a fWna, to E3W. Thus Seneca in his 65th Epiftle. Caufam Ari- fioteles putat tribus modis did. Prima, inquit, caufa eft ipfa Materia, fine qua nihil poteji effici. Secunda, Opifex. Tertia, Forma quce unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam flatus ; nam banc Ariftoteles Idos (e7$o$) vocat. §uarta quoque, inquit, his accedit, Propofitum totius cperis. Qu id fit hoc, aperiam. Ms prima ftatua caufia eft : nunquam enim facia efifiet, nifi fiuififiet id, ex quo ea fwideretur, ducereturve. Secunda caufia, Artifiex eft : non poiuififiet enim &s illud in habitum ftatuce figurari, nifi accejfitjfient peritce manus. Tertia caufia eft Forma : neque enim flatua ifta Doryphoros aut Diadumenos voca- retur, nifi h<zc illi efifiet imprefifia fades, ^uarta caufia eft, faciendi Propofitum : nam nifi hoc fuijfet, facia non efifiet. g)uid eft Propofitum? §uod invitavit arti- ficem, quod ille fiecutus fecit. Vel pecunia eft hoc, fi venditurus fiabricavit ; vel gloria, fi laboravit in no- men y vel religio, fi donum templo paravit. Ergo &f hac Caufia eft, propter quam fit. An non putas inter caufias fiacli operis numerandum, quo remoto faclum non efjetV Aristotle's own Words are as follow. "E'J2 [AIV KV TOOTTOV MlllOV XsySTOCl TO g£ 8 yiVSTOtl TV hv7rxwovr(&> ' olov, o ^aX-aog th ccvfyiavTi^, x^ o ctpyvpt^y* TJ?V <piu.\r.C) yj r» Tbrwy yirr it 'AAAov t\, NOTES <w Treatise th-Firft. to eio*©*, *5 T ° N "^roc^nyixoc ' t«to f l$-W p hoy®* o t« t» ^u £tuat, Xj rot, t«t« j/svrj * oioy ra &% iruvm ra duo tzrpo? £V, ^ oAoog o otpivpo$, Xy roc juspn tos £1/ tw Aoj/w. ,; Eri, o3-£U i? apX"^ T ^? /Ae7«j3oXSff *] -srpwT*?, >j »j t^j r\ps[jt.vi<rsoo$ ' otoy o j3ovA£U tra?, ctijiov' ^ o 7roi]rjp^ t» Tixva • x) oAw? to 7rotau t» TTQtxfAtvv, xj to pil&ftocAXov Ty ^£]aj3aAAo/A£va. "Erj, w? to n t£A(^» ' THTO J* £0 T0 N » £v£)ta " OtOW T8 7T£pj72raT£rv fl vyiSlOL ' $ix ri yocg 7r£pi7rtx,T£7 ; (poiph hoc vyiocivvi, xai eittovtes ovroog, owpsQoc, awoJeJeoxttai to amov. In <?#£ manner that may be called a Caufe, out of which, exifiing as a Part of it, any thing is made or compounded. Thus is Brafs the Caufe of a Statue y Silver of a Cup, and fo alfo the higher Genera, in which thefe are included [as Metal, the Genus in- cluding Brafs and Silver ; Body, the Genus including Metal, &c. &c] In another way, the Form and Ex- emplar of any thing is its Caufe ; that is to fay, in other Words, the Definition or Rationale of its Effence [that which, characterizing it to be fuch a particular thing, diftinguifhes it from all things elfe] and of this Ra- tionale the fever al higher Genera. Thus the Caufe of the Diapafon or OcT:ave is the Proportion of two to one ; and more generally than that, is Number -, and is more- over the feveral Parts, out of which this Definition is formed. Add to this Caufe, that other, from whence the original Principle of Change, or of Ceafing to change ; as for inflame, the Perfon who deliberates is the Caufe of that, which refults from fuch Delibera- tion ; the Father is the Caufe of the Son ; and in gene- ral the Efficient, of the thing effecled -, the Power changing, of the thing {hanged. Befides thefe Caufes, there NOTES on Treatise the Firft. there is thai alfo, which is confidered as the End > that is to fay, the Caufe, for the fake of which the thing is done. Thus the Caufe of Exercifing is Health. For if it he afked, TVhy does he ufe Exercife ? JVe fay, To preferve his Health ; and having faid thus much, we think we have given the proper Caufe. Ariftot. Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 3. Addition to NOTE III. The Peripatetic Definition of Nature, given p. 257. tho' in fome degree illuftrated p. 266. yet being (iill from its Brevity perhaps obfcure, the fol- lowing Explication of it is fubjoined. In the firft place, by Nature the Peripatetics meant that Vital Principle in Plants, Brutes and Men, by which they are faid to live, and to be di- ftinguifhed from things inanimate. Nature therefore being another Name for Life or a vital Principle, the firji Aft of this Principle, throughout all Sub- jects, is univerfally found to be of the following kind ; namely, to advance the Subjecl, zvhich it en- livens, from a Seed or Embryo to fomething better and more perfect. This Progrejfion, as well in Plants as in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that Nature is a Principle of Motion. But then this Progrejfion or Growth is not infinite. When the Subject is mature, that is, hath obtained its Com- pletion and perfedl Form, then the Progrejfion ceafes. Here therefore the Bufmefs of the vital Principle becomes different. It is from henceforward no longer employed to acquire a Form, but to preferve to its Subjecl a Form already acquired. And thus is it NOTES on Treatise the Firft. it that Nature is a Principle of Reft, Stability ', or Ceafing to move. And fuch indeed fhe continues to be, maintaining, as long as poffible, the Form com- mitted to her Care, till Time and external Caufes in the firft place impair it, and induce at length its Diffolution, which is Death. And thus has it been (hewn how Nature may- be called a Principle both of Motion and 1 Ceasing to move. As to the reft of the Definition, namely that Nature is a Principle, which inheres in its Sub- ject immediately, effentially, and not by way of Acci- dent \ no more is meant by this, than that the Nature or Life in every Being, which hath fuch Principle, is really and truly a Part of that Being, and not detached and feparate from it, like the Pilot from the Ship, the Mufician from the In- ftrument. For to thefe Subjecls are thofe Artijls the Principles of Motion and Reft, yet do they in no Senfe participate with them of vital Sympathy and Union. * END of the NOTES en Treatise tbeFirJl. NOTES ON TREATISE the Third 5 CONCERNING HAPPINESS. NOTE I. p. 107. Nature seems to treat Man, &c] Ut Phidias pot eft a primo inftituere fignum^ idque perficere ; poteft ab alio incboatum accipere £s? abfolvere : huic eft fapientia f mills, Non enim ipfa genuit bominem, fed accepit a natura inchoatum : banc ergo intuens, debet inftitutum illud y quafi fignum, abfolvere. Cic de Fin. IV. 13. p. 304. Edit. Davif. Note II. p. 113. Practice too oftew creeps, fc>V.] See p. 136. and Note X, Note III. p. 114. The Sovereign Good IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY.] Kl^o-a yoi(> dyaQw, o» ivfcctpovss, hfatpovss. By thi PoJfeJJion of Things good, are 2 tht NOTES on Treatise the Third. the Happy made happy, Platon. Conviv. p. 204. torn 2. Edit^Serrani* Seedrrian, Epicl. 1. 3. c. 22. P- 453- The Reader will be pleafed to obferve, that, in all Quotations from the DifTertations of Epicletus collected by Arrian, the Author refers to the late Edition in two Volumes Quarto, publifhed by his learned and ingenious Friend, Mr. Ufton. Note IV. p. 115. Certain original Characteristics and Pre-concep- tions, &c.~\ The Pre-conceptions here fpoken. of, are called by the Latins, Pramotiones, or Antici- pationes-, by the Greeks, mpoXy^sis, or "Ewqwa, with the occafional Epithets of either xoim), ipfyvloi, or (pu(7i>cal.

• Tis evident that all Men, without the leaft

Help of Art, exert a kind of Natural Logic -, can in fome degree refute, and prove, and render a Reafon. Now this cannot be (as the meaneft Proficient in Logic well knows) without general Ideas, and general Propofitions, becaufe a Syllogifm of Particu- lars is an Impoffibility. There mud be therefore fome natural Faculty, to provide us thefe Generals. This Faculty cannot be any of the Senfes, for they all refpeet Particulars only. Nor can it be the rea- foning or fyllogizing Faculty, for this does not form fuch Generals, but ufe them when formed. There only therefore remains the Faculty called N*V, that is to fay, the Induclive Faculty ; the Faculty, which by Induclwn of fimilar Individuals, forms out of the 2 . particular NOTES on Treatise the Third. particular and the many what is general and one. This Species of Apprehenfion is evidently our firjl and earliejl Knowledge, becaufe all Knowledge by Reafoning dates its Origin from it, and becaufe, ex- cept thefe two, no other Knowledge is poflible. A s therefore every Ear, not abfolutely depraved, ' is able to make fome general Diftinclions of Sound ; and in like manner every Eye, with refpect to Objects of Fif on ; and as this general Ufe of thefe Faculties, by being diffufed through all Individuals, may be called common Hearing, and common Vifion, as op- pofed to thofe more accurate Energies, peculiar only to Artifts : fo fares it with refpect to the Intellect. There are Truths, or Univerfals of fo obvious a kind, that every Mind, or IntelleQ not abfolutely de- praved, without the leaft Help of Art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The Recognition of thefe, or at leaft the Ability to recognize them, is called Komg N*V, Common Sense, as being a Smfe common to all y except Lunatics and Idiots. Farther, as this Power is called Koivo$ N«V, fo the feveral Proportions, which are its proper Objects, are called ^poX^e*?, or Pre-conceptions, as being previous to all other Conceptions. It is eafy to gather from what has been faid, that thefe zrpo- xtysis muft be general, as being formed by lnduclion ; as alfo natural, by being conpnon to all Men, and previous to all Inftruction. Hence therefore their Definition. "En $ v\ TrpoXvi^ig, tvvoioe, (pvo-iwi rav xaQoA*. " A Pre -conception is the natural Ap- prehenfion of what is general, or univerfal" Diog, Laert. NOTES on Treatise the Third. Laert. /. 7. / 54 SeealfoJrrian.Epicl. 1. 1. c. 22. 1. 3. c. 6. C/V. afc Naturd Deor. 1. 1. c. 16, 17. P/«/. *fc PtoV. Philofoph. 910. c. Note V. p. 115. — And that the Dif- ference LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM to Particulars.] This was called 'Etpappoyri "srpohriyiK; l(pocpiJ.o^£tv rocT; liri jtxspa? gV/at;. Arr. EpiSf. 1. 1. c. 22. p. 114, 116. Edit. Upt. See an eminent Inftance, illuftrating the Truth of this Rea- foning, in the fame Author, /. 4. t.'i, p. 545. 'Evvoxpsv y&%, ori y &C. Note VI. p. 120. Why are there, who seek Recesses, &c] Multi autem fcf fiunt 9 & fuerunt^ qui eam^ quam dico, tranquilitatem expetentes 9 a negotiis publicis fie removerint^ ad otiumque perfu- gerint. His idem propofitum fiuit, quod regibus; ut tie qua re egerent, ne cut parerent^ liber tat e uterentur : cujus proprium eft fie vivere, ut veils, Square cum hoc commune fit potentiee cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi y otiofis : alteri fie adipifici id pojfie arbitrantur^ fi opes magnas habeant ; alteri fi contend fint & fiuo, & parvo. Cic de Offic 1. 1. c 20, 21. Note VII. p. 121. — The Sovereign Good, THEY HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, &C~\ The original Pre-conceptions of the Sove- reign Good here recited, may be juftified hy the following Authorities, from among many which are omitted. Agreeable NOTES on Treatise the "Third. Agreeable to NatIire. Neque ulla alia in re, nifi in Natura, quarendum effe Mud Sum- mum bonum, quo omnia referrentur, Cic. Acad. 1. r. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Davif. Conducive to well-being. — EpiSfetus calls that Truth or Knowledge, which refpecls our real Hap- pinefs [tw ccXyiQsiolv ryv wsp) ry\q Ivdcciponccc'] the Truth or Knowledge, which regards not mere Living, but which conduces to Living well [» rw Kefi t* ZHN, aAAa tw wpos ro ET ZHN.] Arrian. Epicl, 1. 1. c. 4. p. 28. Edit, Upt, *Ai xoivx\ Trepi JuJai/*ov»«ff £vvo»«» — TO ZHN KATA OT2IN, ^ rov xola (puV*v gwv, EYAAIMONIAN ae>»<t» •• wpof $ t*W, TO ET ZHN, ^ to £u e»»y, xj T ™ lufwfav, 'EYAAIMONIAN <pot<nv £»«i. O^r common Pre-conceptions concerning Happiness az// 2/

• fo Living according to Nature ; farther

than this, they fay it is Living or Exijling vjell, the Life of well-being. Alex, Aphrod. ^epi 4^. p. 157. Edit, Aid, Accommodate to allPlaces and Times— Antoninus, fpeaking of that Happinefs, which he deemed, our Sovereign Good, calls it fomething which was in our Power I1ANTAXOT *) AIHNE- K.X2S, every where and perpetually. I.7. f.54. Durable — and Indeprivable. -—Nt/i sta~ BILI & FIXO &f PERMANENTE BONO, BEATUS iffimmopoteft. Tufc. Difp. 1. 5. c. 14. p. 372. Edit, U Davif. rh >po N O T E S on Treatise the Third. Davif. So immediately after, in the fame page — - An dubium eft, quin nihil fit habendum in eo genere, quo vita beata completur- fi id poflit amitti ? nihil enim interarefcere, nihil exftingui, &c. Kal t£ cI\j]y\ 'A 'ivpoioc, w o Tiip^wv ly,'UTQ$i(roci $vvoc\a,i, 8 \iytA JLaio-ccp 7} Kocicrocpog (pthog, aAAa Jto'pa£, dvXnrrig, tstv- oijog^ ol\Xcc rpio-jwupia ; v\ $ ETPOIA ^yi'rwf 2^£j, w S TO AIHNEKE2 ^ ANEMnO AI- 2TON. And what fort of Happinefi is this, which any thing intervening may embarrafs ; / fay not Caefar, or Csefar'j Friend, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, a pjt^j thoufand things be fide? Happiness furely implies i-,/ nothing fo much, as Perpetuity and being su- perior to Hindrance or Impediment. rT*~ Arrian. EpiSf. 1. 4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit, Upt. See Vfc-vA- ^Ifo, lt 2 * €m ll ' P* 22 7' £\. IP ijp j* 5 *" Self-derived. — Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, ft 2&fe mo ^° f lt d-Huid effe beatum, id oportere totum poni in potestate Sapientis: nam, fi amitti \s3 vita beata potefl, beata effe nonpoteft. Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. y C. 27. p. 163. — TOf roTg p\v kccT uXfiQsixv y.zxoTg 'ivx <CtA.r~1 . ^ Tri^TXnJSTV) O,V§PC07Z® J , llT duly [ot 0£Ot] TO 7T0iV n . * fMo. That Man might not fall into real Evils, the p^"^ Gods have put the whole in his own Power. M. j £c/^ Ant. 1. 2. f. II. Tt'ydg Inv, ^rflsT nag mQpw7r(& ; Eura0-g»i, Ivdocipovwou, IIANTA 122 0EAEI 3-7^ IIOIEiN, pri xuXvzg-Qoci, pn^ uvyJxdi^EGQa.1. For 1 - what is it, that every Man living feeks ? To be fecurely n: fixed, to be happy, to do all things accord- iJ^ ing to his own Will, not to be hindered, not £^ip bi compelled. Arr, Epift. 1, 4. c. 1. p. 539, 540* sfiL- /vct^^-tfe^Tv tY^frl > ^ ^ Not 5 N O TE S 0/2 Tr e at ise the Third. 29 1 <L<r^^-£ctL J-^o>u^<3 y^CK^JL ^ } ^ £. 5 t^ -r jkt~L v -*,_ Note VIII. p. 125. The Political and L ucrat ive, the Conjte^^l_ajti_ve and TT e "a su r able .] This fourfold Diftinction of Lives is mentioned in Arijlotle's Ethics, 1. 1. c* 5* Note IX. p. 131. Pleasure Whom Love attends, &c. alluding to Homer, Iliad. 5. V. 214. Note X. p. 136. Suppose an Event were to happen — not an Inundation, &c] See Arrian.EpiSf. 1. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly addrerTed to the Seekers of Leifure, Retirement, and Study. Part of it has been already quoted p. 290.

• £) rig elvTi} y\ 'ivpoioc, &c. See alfo the fame Author,

1. 4. c. 1. p. 567. IIwV axxsis, 0c. and of the Dialogue here commented, p. 113. Note XL p. 137. — Is Acting a Circum- stance, &f*\] Etenim cogniiio contemplatioque na- . / turx manca quodammodo at que inchoata fit, ft nulla \> atlio rerum confequatur. Ea out em atlio in hominum A lommodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Cic de Offic j - Li. c . 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the Subfequent, is well worthy of Perufal. Note XII. p. 140. — If a Piece of Metal be tendered us, &c] See Arr. Epitt. 1. 1. c 10. p. I 10. 'OpUTS KJ £7Ti TX VOjWW-jtAal^, &C. Note XIII. p. 144. — Are alienated from it, or are indifferent to it?] Placet his, in* quit } quorum ratio mihi probatur, fimul atque natumfit '- :Ua animal r /A'a^ £ \KT\ £ 6 asT J Kg S ,ft , cV - fr?&* 292 N O T E S on Treatise the Third. animal (hlnc enim eft ordiendum) ipfum fibi conciliari, &f commendari ad fe confervandum, & fuum jlatum, & ad ea, qua confervantia funt ejusjlatus, diligenda ; alienari autem ab interitu, iifque rebus, qua interitum vldeantur afferre. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit, Dav, See alfo /. 5. e.g. DeOffic. 1. 1. c. 4. 'Oxas^sflos ir^og wJlvg hQvg yivoptvoi. Plut. Mor. p. 1 038. b. Note XIV. p.. 155. Let it not be forgot THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, &Y.] The whole Argument to prove Society natural to Man, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken from the fecond Book of Plato's Republic. See V K/ Plat. torn. 2. p. 369, &c. Edit. S errani. Note XV. p. 156. — Are not the Powers and Capacities of Speech,^.] The Argu- ment in favour of Society, from our being ponerTed of x6y&>^ or the /peaking Faculty, feems to have been much infixed on by the beft Authors of Ami* quity. Z.CrU&eL. XiriTiq, xx] zfmvt®? olyzXoiitf £co»' y.uWov, Jtj'Aov. <yT\&Fc+> 'O y ^ v ¥&&9 ®$ (pupsv, [a&tw n (puvig ?uQie7' Koyov eJe fj.6vov AvQpwnr®' £%£i twv (^uu)V. 'H l*\v »u (pcovri T«  9i$£o$ xa» Ai/ampy \<ri frnps'iov ' $10 xasi ro7g clWoig vTzdpftu i^uoig * /*%* y&$ ™7* "h (pv(ri; dvlwv z\ri\v- eyipcLiveiv aAA-zjAoif. c O Js Xoyog £tt) to JjjAay Iri TO WptygpOV, JC«i TO ftXaSepOV * wW ■»«» TO $ikaiov 9 xai re &Jnuv. T*Io }/#£ 7rpoV t# .«AAa f«a T0<i «v9pw- NOTES on Treatise the Third. 293 \ tLvQpuTffoiq Uiov 9 to povov ce^aOa hoc) mocmh, ycoc) hudix xoc\ dcftxv cxia-Ono-iv zyjiv ' y\ $t thtwv xoimvicz uroii? oixixv x»l woXn. The Reafon why Man is a Social Ani- mal, more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever, is evident from hence. Nature, we fay, makes nothing in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only poffejfed of Spe e ch. Bare Sound indeed may be the Sign of what is pleafurable or painful ; and for that reafon is it com- mon even to other Animals alfo. For fo far we perceive even their Nature can go, that they have a Senfe of thofe Feelings, and fignify them to each other. But Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, and in confequence of this, what is jufl and unjufl. It is therefore given to Men, becaufe this, with refpecl to other Animals, is to Men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Jufl and Unjufl, they only poffefs a Senfe or Feeling. Now 'tis the Participation or Com- tnunity of thefe, which makes and conflitutes both a Family, and a Polity. Ariflot. Polit. 1. 1. c. 2. voYipcxToc] ' di <Jg pcavcci twv voypocroov u<tiv i£ccyye\Ti- %Xl* Ky $1<Z T»T0 JsJWflM f\fMV V7T0 TY\q (pV<TS00$, TT^Oq ro oY dvTwv <nn[ACciv£iv v\^ocq oIkX-aXou; trig ^v^g id vorifAOC-rcc — 7voc kcx\ $vvwy.£Qot xotvuvclv aAA^Aoif, hoc) n , cvy.7ro\iT£v£<rQcu " xoivoqvmo v yoi% (^ooov o AvQf>u7r©* m J 1 **^? * Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul-, and Sounds °~ ty ^Y, ere declarative of thefe Ideas. And for this reafon ^^y* were thefe Sounds imparted to us by Nature, not only that we might indicate to each other thefe Ideas, but that we might be enabled to communicate and live in Associations. For M an is by Nature a Social Animal. Ammon.inL de Interpr. p. 16. b. U 3 Thus l NOTES^ Treatise the Third, Thus Cicero, fpeaking of Human Nature — Omim opportunities habilitatefque reliqui corporis, modera- tionem vocis, orationis vim, qua conciliatrix eft humane? maxume focietatis. De Legg. 1. i. c. 9, p. 35. Edit. Day if. Again minis Offices — -Sed qua natura principia fint communitatis & focietatis humana, repetendum altius videtur. Eft enim primum, quod cernitur in univerfi generis humani focietate. Ejus enim vinculum eft Ratio, & Oratio; qua docendo, dif^ndo, com- X municando, dijee^tando, dijudicando * conciliat inter fe homines, conjungitque naturali quadam focietate De Offic. 1. 1. c. 16. Thus too in his Treatife Be Nat. Deor. Jam vera domina rerum (ut vos foletis dicere) Eloquendi vis quam eft praclara, quamque divina? Qua primum efficit, ut ca, qua ignoramus, difcere, & ea, qua fcimus, alios docere poffimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac per- fuademus, hac confolamur officios, hac deducimus per- territos a timore, hac geftientes comprimimus, hac cupi- ditates iracundiafque reftinguimus : hac nos juris, le- gum, urbium focietate devinxit : hac a vita immant & ferd fegregavit. De Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 59. p. 243. Edit. Davif — See alfo Quint. Lift. I. 2. c. 16. and Alex. Aphrod. tts^I ^x> P ? *55* br Edit. Aid. Note XVI. p. 166. 'Tis from among the fe w, &'c] In omni enim arte, vel ftudio, vel quavis fcientia, vel in ipfa virtute, optimum quodque rarijji- mum eft. Cic.de Fin. 1. 2. c. 25. p. 158. Edit. Day. Note NOTES on Treatise the Third. 295 Note XVII. p. 167. — Working ever uni- formly ACCORDING TO THIS IpEA OF PER- FECION, &7.J Thus Boethius, addrefling the Deity, O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubemas 9 Terrarum ccelique Sator, qui tempus ab avo Irejubes, ftabilifqu e manens das cuncla moved ; - X, ^uem non e xt ernes pepulerunt finger e caufia Materia fluitantis opus ; verum insita Summi Forma boni, livore car ens : Tu cuncla superno Ducis ab exemplo, pulcbrum pulcherrimus ipfe JMundum mente gerens, Jimilique in imagine formans. Confol. Philof. 1. 3. Metr. 9, Note XVIII. p. 167. — From some hidden higher Motive, %.] MWIf Je pife ravroi [fc. rcc Ts'posTcJ zrccpd (pviriv hcr)v 9 oiXXcl rvi [a\v pe- — vf I fix? (pva-Ei a (pv<rsi 9 a,XX<x zcap^ (pucriu * t? $* nMKv 9 xai (pv<rsi xa* koctoc (pvtriv, *H /xsv y»o pspixri (pv<ris hog ufaq s-o%&^stcx,i 9 y.oti plan repwiv (pivyzi^ Aia t8to rvi /aeu t» av0pwx«r« (pvtrei to ripocs are (pvasi £5"^, «TE X&T& (pOQ-lV T'A oX'/J CpOfTSt, £7T£i JLOjdEV Titf aravri 7rapa (poVw (ouJsv ^/oj^ x&xov Id rw 7r»vll) ova %<Ti 7rup<x. (pvo-iv, dxXtz (pvcrst xal ytofloi (pvviv, Joannes Gram, in Ariftot. lib. 2. Natural Aufcult. Nihil enim fieri fine caufid pot eft : nee quicquam fit % quod fieri non poteft : nee, Ji id fiaclum eft quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. 1. 2. e. 28. p. 189. Edit. Davif. U 4 Nqts P«5 NOTES on Treatise the Third* Note XIX. p. 169. Man is a social ^ V Rational Animal.] Zuqv Xoywov ^ ttoAithcqV, ^C Xcyixov Kj xoivtevixov, Xoywov h) wpepov, thcfe are v / Defcriptions of Humanity, which we meet in every y Page of Epicletus and Antoninus. I t feems indeed to have been a received Opinion* of old, that fo intimate was the Relation between thefe two Attributes, that wherever there was Ra- tionality, Sociality followed of courfe. Thus Anto- ninus sri & to Xoywo]), luOuff -Kj 7roAmx,oy. 1. 10* f. 2. And again, more fully — - ^ ronm ttccv to tjjj vo£px$ (pCasccg [Atlo^ov, 7Tgog io a-vyyivlg opoiag cirivhi, v ^ [Auhhov ' o<rw ydg is~i xpzilTov 7r#pa roc aAAa, To'<raTft) jc, ?rpo? to n en^xtpva-ffOa* *rw omui'm kJ (TJj/itf lb-Gat Itoi^ot^ov. 1. 9. f. 9. I t is not perhaps foreign to the prefent SubjecT: \p obferve, that were the Eyes of any two Men what- ever to view the fame Objecl, they would each, from their different Place, and their different Organization^ behold it differently, and have a different Image. But were all the Minds in the Univerfe to recognize the

• . fame Truth, they would all recognize it as one, their

I Recognition would be uniform, and themfelves in a planner would be one alfo. The Reafon is, Per-' I ception by the Senfes admits of more and lefs, better

• and worfe ; but Perception by the Intellecl, like Truths

. J its Object, admits of no degrees, and is either no- \^ thing at all, or elfe total, uniform, complete, and one. Hence therefore one Source of the Society, and as it were N O T E S on Treatise the Tloird. 2 were Communion of all Minds, confidered as Minds, namely, the Unity of Truth, their common Object. Again, every juft and perfect Society ftands on the Bans of certain Laws, But Law is nothing more, than right and per f eft Reason, feen in bidding and forbidding, according to the Nature and ErTence of thofe Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore this Universe be one whole, or general Society, there muft be fome common, general Law for its Conducl and Welfare ; and this Law muft, of con- fequence, be fome right and per f eft Reason, which paries thro' all things, and extends to every Part. Well therefore might Antoninus fay in the Beginning of this Note, that every thing rational, was of courfe fecial, fince Reason and Law appear to be the fame, and Law to be the Support and Bafts of all Society. Thus too Cicero fequitur, ut eademftt in his [fc. Diis] qua humanp generi Ratio; eadem Veritas utrobique fit-, eademque Lex, qutzeftrecli praceptio, pravique depulfto. De Nat. Deor. 1, 2. c. 31. p. 180. See aKo the fame Author De Legg. 1. 1. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. Edit. Davif De Fin. 1. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See alfo Diog. Laert. 1. 7. f. 88. M. Anton. 1. 5. c. 16. 1. 6. c. 23, Arijl. Polit. as quoted in Note. XV. Note XX. p. 169. Nothing can be pur- suable, WHICH IS DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY.] Si enim fc erimus affecli, ut propter fuum quifque emo- lumentum fpoliet, aut violet alterum, difrumpi necefje tjl earn, qua maxime eft fecundum naturam, humani .generis Societatem. Cic. de Offic. 1. 3. c 5. Noti 97 NOTES on Treatise the Third. Note XXL p. 173. — For Contraries are IVER RECOGNIZED THROUGH THE SAME Ha- BIT, &c.~\ AoxsT Je Kf r] oiiruiv], t£ v) \-m<rv\y.Y\ tcou havVoov, r\ d£ 1T£p\ QcCTSpOV. Of ThingS contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For thus he, who knows Good to be fomething beneficial, knows Evil at the fame time to be fomething pernicious ; and he, who is deceived with refpocl to one of thefe, is deceived alfo with refpecl to the ether. Note XXII. p. 174..- — Those four Grand Virtues, &V.] Stobasus having told us, that of the Virtues fome were primary, fome fubordinate, adds — 7rpuT0i$ Jg lijrapa,; givoci, (ppovwnv, erw^poiruvjjv, ain ipsiqVy £ixccio<r\)-i)7iV ' xa,i rr)v y*\v (ppovntrw, 7vspi to, xpcftwxo'flot, ylvi^o'A ' rm $\ cootppoo-vv/iv "crip-t rag opy.cc$ t» aiOpwTra ' t>)v $t clvfyiictv, 7rgpi rag v7roy.ovdig ' r'h Jg JixxiocrvvYiv, uTc-pl rocg cLTrovBpwsig. The primary Vir- tues are four-, Prudence, Temperance, Forti- tude, and Justice: Prudence is employed in moral Offices -, Temperance, in Mens natural appetites and Purfuits ; Fortitude, in Endurings -, and Juftice, in Dijiributwis. Eel. Ethic, p. 167. That NOTES 0* Treatise the Third. That the Life according ta Virtue, was deemed the Life according to Nature, appears from what is faid by the fame Author, in the Page following — TLatTuv Sk rarcoy twv dpeluv to teA<§^» eivui 9 ro axo- AtfdeO? TV/ (pV(T£L t^YlV * l^urM SI T.KT60V Siot TUV iSlOJV wapEp^wOai Tvfyccvovlot rov olvQpoo7rov. The End of all thefe Virtues is, to live agreeably to Nature ; and each of them, by thofe Means, which are peculiar to itfelf is found to put a Man in poffeffion of this End. So likewife Cicero Etenim quod fummum honum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturse vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor, fentcntiam, cum virtute congruere femper. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 3. Note XXIII. p. 174. That Life, where the Value of all Things is justly mea- sured, &c. ] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203, 204. Note XXIV. p. 175. — That, which being DONE, ADMITS OF A RATINOAL JUSTIFICA- TION.] In the Original it is wpa^Gw mXoyov JVpC f * diiro\Q'yi<rp.Qv. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. f. 107. owep wpo.'x^vj ivXoyov £%£i rw ciiroKoylxv. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math em. 1. 7. Thus rendered by Cicero — Qfficium id ejfe dicunt, quod cur faclum fit, ratio probabilis reddi poffit. De Offic 1. 1. c. 3. The Reafon of its Greek Name, xaGwov, is given by Simplicius. K. a - brpwM £<T* rcc, yivofxivx xoflx ra yxovloi «j g7r*£«A- favlo^ — Moral Offices are thofe things which are done agreeably 30o NOTES on Treatise the Third. agreeably to what is fittings and expedient. Simplic. in Ench. c. 37. Note XXV. p. 176. — And when our se- veral Energies, exerted according to the Virtues above, have put us in pos- session of,&c] This was the Idea of Happiness, adopted by the old Academy ', or Platonics. Secun- dum naturam vivere, fie affectum, ut optime affici poffit, ad naturamque accommodatijfime. Cic. de Fin. 1. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics , who wer® originally of the fame School, held the fame. 'E t $ S'tw, 70 ai/9pco7nvo;/ ciy^ov ^v)(r,g zvipyaa, ytyvilctk waX dpslriv — tw ctpirrtv ^ TzXeiol&rnv — h Qua teXejw. If this be admitted ', it follows that Human Good or Happiness is, the energizing of the Soul according to the befl and mojl confummate Virtue, in a perfetl and complete Life. Ethic. Nic. 1. 1. c. 7. A perfetl and complete Life, they explained to be fuch a Life as was no way deficient either as to its Duration, its bodily Health, and its being attended with a proper Competence if external Goods, and Profperity. By the befl and mo ft confummate Virtue, they not only meant that Virtue, which was in its kind moll perfect, but which was the Virtue alfo of that Part, which is in each pf us mofi excellent. For there are Virtues of the Body, fuch as Strength and Agility ; and there are Virtues of the Senfes, fuch as- accurate Seeing, ac- curate Taking ; and the fame of every Faculty, from the loweft to that which is fupreme. The fovereign Good or Happinefs here fpoken of, is again repeated, in other Words, p. 179. where it is NOTES o;z Treatise the Third. 301 is called, the Attaining the primary and juji Re- quifites of our Nature , by a Conducl fuitabk to Virtue and moral Office. The primary and just Requisites here mentioned, are all Things requifite to the Ufe and Enjoyment of our Primary and Natural Perfections. Thefe Primary and Natural Perfections mean the Natural Accomplish- ments of both our Mind and Body. They were called by the Latins, Prima Nature, Prima fecundum Naturam ; by the Greeks, roc srpwTa ytcflot (pvciv, rd -srpcoTa Tys <pvvms. ^ n them were in- cluded Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Senfations, Memory, Docility, Invention, -&c. See Stob. Eel. Eth. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. 1. 5. c. 7, p. 364. A. Gell. 1. 12. c. 5. A like Sentiment of Happinefs, to this here fpoken of, is that mentioned by Cicero — Virtute adhibitd, frui primis anaturd datis. De Fin. 1.2. c. 11. p. 113. 'Tis there called the Opinion of the old Academics, and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by the fame Author. Honejie vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas prim as homini natura conciliet. Acad. 1. 2. c. 42. p. 240. In is to be obferved that Cicero, fpeaking of this Hypothecs, fays that it propofed an Idea of Happi- nefs, which was not properly in our own Pozver. Hoc non eft pofitum in nofird aclione ; completur enim &f ex eo genere vita, quod virtute finitur, & ex its rebus qua fecundum naturam funt, neque funt in nojlra po- tejlate. De Fin. 1. 4. c. 6. p. 287* Hence NOTES on Treatise the third. Hence therefore the Deficiency of this Doc- trine. However juftifiable, however laudable its End, it could not infure a due Succefs to its En- deavours. And hence too the Force of what is ob- jected to it in the Dialogue, from p. 177. to the EndofthefirftPart. Note XXVI. p. 185. — To place tHe Sove- reign Good in Rectitude of Conduct, &Y.] As the Conduct here mentioned implies a Conduct under the Direction of a befitting Rule or Law, and that, as oppofed to wrong Conduct, which has either no Rule at all, or at leaft one erroneous ; it may not be an improper Place to inquire, what was the antient Opinion concerning Law universal, that great and general Law, which flood oppofed to the municipal Laws of particular Cities, and Com- munities. Est quide ;, , ." ' Lex, recla ratio, natures con- 1 gruens, diffuja in omnes, con flans, fempiterna, qua vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreai nee erit alia lex Roma, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia poft- bac , fed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore una lex, eff fempiterna, IS immortalis continebit , unufque erit com- munis quafi magifler, & imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, difceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipfe fe fugiet, ac naturam hominis afpernabitur ; hoc ipfo luet maximas pcenas, etiamfi ccetera fupplicidy qua putantur, effagerit. Fragm. Cic. de Rep. 1. 3. Lex NOTES on Treatise the Third. 303 Lex eft ratio fumma, infita in natura, qua jilbet en quce facienda feint , prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. Eadem ratio, cum eft in hominis mente confirmata & confecla, lex eft* Cic. de Legg. 1. 1. c. 6. p. 22* Ag a 1 n . Lex vera — ratio eft recJa fummi Jovis, To which he fubjoins, as above, Ergo ut ilia divina mens fumma lex ejl ; ita cum in homine eft, perfecla eft in mente fapientis. De Legg. 1. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88. 'Tis in this Senfe the Apojlle tells us of the Gen- tiles, or Mankind in general, that they Jbew the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Confcience alfo bearing witnefs, and their Thoughts the mean while accufing, or elfe excufing one another. Rom. i. 11. As Cicero, in his Book of Laws above cited, follows the Stoic Difcipline, fo is it agreeable to their Rea- foning, that he make the original t Law, of which we here treat, to be the So ... gn Rea- son of the Deity himfelf Thus Chryfippus — Idem [fcil. Chryfippus'] legis perpetual if sterna vim, . qua; quafi dux vita &f magiflra qfficiorum ft, Jovem dicit ejje. Nat. Deor. L 1. c. 15. p. 41, So by the fame Philofophers in' Laertius, we are ordered to live according to Nature, «Vev zvsgyvv- loc<; uv u7rccyop£\j£iv 'itooQsv o vo^^y o xoivog, Qtnrzg !s~lv o^6o\ Xoy(§? ha zrcZvloov i%XPt / ' iV ® > '> o dvlog IV TW A»"lj y.0L^Y\y£^.QVl TXTU) TT.S TWV QvjoOV (iOT. oAwu) imyimws W», doing nothing, forbidden by the Uni- versal N O T E S on Treatise the Third, versal Law, that is to fay, by that right Reafofi^ which paffeth thro 9 all Things , and which is the same in Jove himfelf, the Governor and Conduclor of this nniverfal Adminijlration. Laert. 1. 7. f. 88. Agreeably to this Reafoning, Plutarch corrects thofe, who made Alxu, a Goddefs, and the Ajfeffor of Jove; for, fays he, Zsus ©ux £;£« P iV T ^ y A*W T*agetyov 9 &90C du\o$ Awn 7% ®£[ju<; £0, >£ vo^awv tu-psa-gtM©-* ^ Te\eioT»1<& 9 Jove te «tf Awi *r Right /tfr j&/j AJfeJfor, but is himfelf Right , and Justice, and of all Laws the mojl antient and perfect. Moral, p. 781. B. Thus Antoninus — ri\®> g\ Xoywrn £w&v, to £ffS0"9«» TW T?)J TTOXsodq tfj TtoXlltiMq T?J 7T£E(r£u1aT>K A<fyw xaJ Oso-^w. Tfo is»i <?/ Rational Animals is U follow the Reason and sacred Law of that City and mojl antient Polity, [in which all rational Beings are included.] 1. 2. f. 16. Th e moid fimple Account of this Law, which the Stoics gave, feems to be that recorded .by Stobaus ; according to which they called it Xoyov, oflov ovl» 9 zrowVuv, Right Reason, ordaining what is to be done, and* forbidding what is not to be done. Eel. Ethic. 178. See alfo the Notes of Turnebus and Davis upon Cic. de Legg. 1. 1. c. 6. Having premifed thus much concerning Law, nniverfal, it remains to fay fomething of that Rec- titude of Conduct, which is in this Part of the Dialogue NOTES on Treatise the Third. Dialogue propofed as our Happinefs. Rectitude, of Conduct is intended to exprefs the Term KaVgQuw, which Cicero tranflates recla Effeclio. KoflofQupoc, he tranflates Reclum Faclum. See De Fin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a KcflocQupx, was No/** w^oVa^a, a 'Thing com- manded by Law \ to which was oppofed aaapl^a, a Sin or Offence, which was defined No/a» aira- yocsvpcty a Thing forbidden by Law. Plut. Mor, 1037 C. What Law is here meant, which thus commands or forbids, has been fhewn above. Hence therefore may be feen the Reafon, Why we have faid thus much on the Nature and Idea of Law univerfal, fo intimate being the Union between this and right Conduct, that we find the latter is no- ' thing more than a perfect Obedience to the former. Hence too we fee the Reafon, why in one view it was deemed Happiness, to be void of Error or Offence, dwpoiplyflov etvoc^ as we find it in Arrian. Epifl. 1. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable was the necejfary Refult of Rettitude of Conducl, or gather in a manner the fame thing with it. I cannot conclude this Note, without remarking on an elegant Allufion of Antoninus to the primary Signification of the Word Kalo'plW*?, that is to fay, xxlol opOof, right onwards, Jlraight and direftly forwards. Speaking of the Reafoning Faculty, how, without looking farther, it rejls contented in its own Energies, he adds — - Ka0o N xcclopQwosiz oti toiuvIm -*- For which Reafon are all Aclions, of this X Species* co6 NOTES on Treatise the Third. Species , called Rectitudes, as denoting the Direfi- nefs of ibeir ProgreJJion right onwards. 1. 5. f. 14, So again in the fame Senfe, IvQsTuv ■srEpafvav, to hep »n, the Jlraight Road. 1. 5. f. 3. 1. 10. f. 11. One would imagine that our Countryman Milton had this Reafoning in view, when in his 19th Son- net fpeaking of his own Blindnefs, he fays with a becoming Magnanimity, Yet I argue not Againjl Heav V 's Hand or Willy nor bate one jot Of Heart or Hope , butfiill bear up, andjleer Right onwards * The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perufal^ being both fublime and ample. Note XXVII. p. 185. — The mere doing whatever is correspondent to such an End, even tho' we never attain it — ] Thus Epiffetus in Arrian, fpeaking of Addrefs to, Men in Power, and admitting fuch Addrefs, when juftified by certain Motives, adds that fuch Addrefs ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. Upon this an Objector demands of him, zrug ** Tup^w, « HofAon ; But how then am 1 to obtain that 9 which I want ? The Philofopher anfwers, *Eyu is <roi Tifyu') oTi wj TETSOMENQ2 *7r£?X*'

• X l ^ y-ovov, Ivoc Tjrpa^'/j? to crau7a) tu^ttov ; Did I ever

fay to thee, that thou -fbouUft go and addrefs, as tho* ihou wert to succeed; and not rather with this only View, that thou mightji do that, which is be- coming thy Character? — -And foon after, when NOTES on Treatise theThird. 307 when an Objection is urged from Appearance, and the Opinion of Mankind, he anfwers — oux oW • t< «M£ xaAo\ xj dyoc^og « Js» -arc^r t» Jo £ou s«jca, «Aa* t* IIEnPAXOAl KAAX22; JEww*/? /&?# #0/, that a fair and good Man does nothing for the fake of Appearance, but for the fake only of having DONE WELL AND FAIRLY? Arr.Epitt. J.J. C. 24. p. 497, 498. This Doclrine indeed feems to have been the Bafts of the Stoic Morals ; the Principle, which included, according to thefe Philofophers, as well Honour and Honefly, as Good and Happinefs. Thus Cicero — Facer e omnia, ut adipifcamur qua fecun- dum naturam fint, etfi ea non adfequamur, id effe & honeflum, & folum per fe expetendum & fummum bonum Stoici dicunt. De Fin. 1. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this is confonant that Sentiment of theirs in Plutarch — T>jv [Av (pu<riv civtyiv aoidtpopov tivoci * to £1 tyi @v<rei ofxoXoysTv^ dyccQov — And again — ro £J> xoclol (pvtriv, TtX© 3 sivcu — roc xfcja (pv<rw, d£ix(pop<x, ilvoti, Plut. Mor. 1060. D. E. See below, Note XXX. Note XXVIII. p. 185. — What if we make OUR NATURAL STATE THE STANDARD ONLY TO DETERMINE OUR CONDUCT, &C. ] 'Tis in this Senfe we find it elegantly faid in Plutarch by the laft mentioned Philofophers — ro^^a T ^ i^xi^oviaq th\ (puViv, *) to x«1« <f>ocnv that our natural State and what is confonant to it, are the El e m e n t 3 of Happinefs — and juft before, the fame natural State is called t» jtaQyjWI^ ap^, 7% \iXn r%g dpslyc, the Source of moral Office -, and the Subject Mat- ter ^/ Virtue. Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. Atqui itiam illud per/pi cuum eft, conftitui neceffe effe initium, quod fapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, fequatur ; id- JX 2 que 308 NOTESo« Treatise the Third. que initium ejfe naturte accommodatum : nam aliter ap- 1 petitio, &c. Cic. Acad. 1. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. Initiapro- poni necefie ejfe apta & accommodata nature, quorum ex feleclione Virtus poffit exiflere. De Fin. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 316. Cum vero ilia, qua officia e[fe dixi, proficif- cantur ab initiis nature ; ea ad hcec referri necejfe eji : ut recle did poffit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipifca- 7iiur principia nature ; nee tamen ut hoc fit bo no rum ultimum De Fin. 1. 3. c. 6. p. 217. Note XXIX. p. 185. We should not want a Good to correspond, &c.] Plutarch quotes the following Sentiment of Chryfippus, who patronized this Idea of Good Tov wsol dyaQuv xoi) xoixuv Koyov, ov dvVog utrdysi xu\ 8mup.di£si 9 !/x(puTwv qItAwQou zrpoXri^suv. Plut. Mor. 1041. E, Note XXX. p. 187. — -Yet we look not for his Reputation, &V.] What ghiintilian fays of Rhetoric, may with great Propriety be tranf- ferred to Morality. Nofter orator, Arfque a nobis finita, non funt pofita in eventu. Tendit quidem ad vicloriam, qui dicit ; fed, cum bene dixit 9 etiamfi non vincat 9 id, quod arte continetur 9 effecit. Nam & - gubernator vult falvd nave in portum pervenire : Ji tamen tempejlate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud; dum clavum reclum teneam. Et medicus fanitatem agri petit: ft tamen aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantid czgri, aliove quo tafu fumma non eontingit -, dum ipfe omnia fecundum rationem fecerit, medicince fine non excidit. It a or at or i bene dixi fie, finis eft. Nam eft ars ea in actu pofita, non in eventu. Inft. Orat. 1. 2. c. 17. Note N O T E S on Treatise the Third. Note XXX. p. 187. — He for a Subject HAS THE WHOLE OF HUMAN LlFE,£f^.] '(WlflS T*' «y w £>c7os" ; "TXoci tJj zrpoxiptasi, wept aV ava- £-pEpopzw Tvj^sloa t» kha oiyM S xa3t«. The EJJence of Good, m # peculiar Direction of Mind -, and the Effence of Evil, m a peculiar Direction alfo. What then are Externals? They ferve as Subjects to /fo Mind 1 s Direction, from converfing with which it obtains its proper Good or Evil. Arr. EpicT:. 1. 1. c. 29. Again c At uAojj, d&oKpopoi •' v Je %pwn? aulwv ovu d&<z,(pop<&. The Subjects are indifferent , but not fo the Use of them. Arr. Epicl. 1. 2. c 5. Thus Horace: Non pojfidentem multa vocaveris Recle beatum ; rettius occupat Nomen beati, qui Deorum Muneribus sapienter uti, J)uramque collet pauperiem pati y Pejufq; leto flagitium timet : ■ Non ille y &c. Od. L iv. 9. Even the Comic Poet feems not to have been unacquainted with this Dodbrine : Ch. Quid narrat? CI. Quid ille? miferum fe effe. Ch. Miferum ? quern minus credere eft f X 3 $uid NOTES on Treatise the Third. Quid relliqui eft, quin habeat qiuz quidem in homine dicuntur bona ? parentis, patriam incolumem, amicos, genus, cognates,, divitias : At que haec perinde funt ut illius animus, qui ea pof fifyt : Qui ut.i fcit 9 ei bona j illi, qui non utitur recle > mala. Heauton. Aa. L S. 2. V. 18. Note XXXI. p. 189. — The End in other Arts is ever distant, £sfa.] Sed in cateris artibus cum dicitur Artificiose, pofterum quodam mods &f confequens putandum eft, quod illi iTriyswYipcilixov appellant ; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur, id ad- primo reclijfime dicitur : quicquid enim a fapiente pro- ficifcitur, id continuo debet expletum efije -omnibus fuis parti bus' r f in eo enim pofitum eft id, quod dicimus ejfe expetendum. Nam ut peccatum eft patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, qua funt in effeclu ; fie timere, fie mesrere, fie in libidine ejfe, peccatum eft, ttiam fine effeclu, Verum ut hac, non in pofteris &f in confequentibus, fed in primis continuo peccata funt : fie ^a, quce proficifcuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione, recla funt judicanda, Cic.de Fin. I.3. c. 9. p. 228. T» toYa t|a*s rvfyoivei \ji Ag- yiwi vJ^PC*] ® n * ^ y r ° T * ^** ^*p a £ £T*r*S * *x, 9 uq-Trsp £7rl dp^Wioo; jca; b7roxp/<rsw$ xal ruv toihtcov, anXr.q y-ivslcci. y\ oXt) -urpafys, lav ri iyxjoyv}, aAA*~ im sfglvIqs (U£p«?3 xai oirx <%]> y.v\ ctX'ffy^v , •srAvfpej x,ct\

1. 7rpw&sj iavlvi to wponQh •urom' wf£ uttsTv, lyu

avi%u rol Ipx. M. Ant. 1. 11. f. 1. Et quemad- modum NOTES wi Treatise the Third. modum opportunitas (fie enim adpellemus ivKxip'uv) non fit major produclione temporis (habent enim fiuum mo- dum quacunque opportuna dicuntur) fie recla effeelio (xctlapQuriv enim ita adpello, quoniam reclum faclum xxlopQwpoc) recla igitur effeelio », item.convenientia, de^ nique ipsum BONtrto, qundin eo pojitum eft ut natures eonfentiat, erefcendi accejjionem nullam habst. Ut enim tpportumtas ilia 9 fie h<zc de quibus dixi, non fiunt tem- poris produclione major a: ob eamque caufiam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nee magis expetenda vita beata, fi fit longa, quamfi brevis : utuntur que fi mill, ut,fi cothurni laus ilia eft adpedem apte convenire^ neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur, nee major -es minoribus : fie quo- rum omne bonum convenientid at que opportunitate finitur y nee plura paucioribus, nee longinquiora brevioribus ante- ponentur. Cic de Fin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See alfo Dio. Laert. 1. 7. f. 101. M. Ant. 1. 6. f. 23. 1. 3. f. 7. Senec. Epift. 66. Note XXXIII. p. 191. — Recollect then, SAID HE, DO YOU NOT REMEMBER THAT ONE Pre-conception,&V.] In this, and the fubfequent Pages, the general Pre-conceptions of Good are applied to the particular Hypothefis of Goody advanced in this Treatife. See before, pag. .115, 121, 122. Note XXXIV. p. 192. And is there any Time or Place, whence Rectitude of Conduct may be excluded?] II a N- TAXOT xal AIHNEK D.X iiri <joi «>,, xx \ tv\ -arapatn; <ruj5*€«a"f* 0£ore£w? luapersw, xal toT; zzra- pxfav av9pw7roi$ ytocltx. ^iKOitocrCvw - zrpoirptPs'irQoii M. Ant. 1. 7. f. 54. X 4 Note NOTES on Treatise the Third, Note XXXV. p. 192. — Where it shall not be in his Power to act bravely AND honestly.] MwsV $v [J,0i As}/?, 7TU; yiVYl- 1a,i ' y o7ro£)S y&o a,v yivnlon, <tv csulo Qwgsk; jcaXw?, xou %<rou vol to a,7roQdcy \u\iyr\U.u. Arrian. Epict. 1. 4. c. 10. p. 650. Note XXXVI. p. 195. ——There are In- stances innumerable of Men bad, as well as G00D a £sV.] See a long Catalogue of thefe in Cicero's Tufculan Difputations ; Spartan Boys ; Barbarian Sages ; Indian Wives ; Egyptian Devotees, l$c. &c. The whole PaiTage is worth reading. Tufc, Difp. 1. 5. c. 27. p. 400, 401, &c. Note XXXVII. p. 196. — This I write yoijt (says he in one of his Epistles) while, ^f*] Tw pccxocpioiv olyoifleg tloc\ olpcx, reXtvlxUv v^ty fOCV TK b/y, iyp4(pO[A£V V[A?V TUUTOt. ' fptxFyVp lOlls TXTOCr. pyytoXvQwsi x»» ivfrsvlepMol zxciQn, vttb^oXw ax ocrra- ' Kinrovla. t« lv itzvloTg y,ey$xg ' cLvlnrapsroilfElo S\ TZoZ<Tl T«T0t? TO xal« tJ/U^V ^OcTpOV \lt\ TV) TM y^O" jiotwu riy.ni oixXoyHrytfv y.vfi[xv:—T)io. Laer. 1. 10. f. 22. Cum ageremus vita beatum iff eundem fupremum diem, fcribebamus hezc. Tanti autem morbi aderant vejica & vifcerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem poffit acce- dere. Compenfabatur tamen cum his omnibus ' animi kz- titia^ quam capiebam memorid rationum inveniorumque no/irorum -—Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. c. 30. p. 173. Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epkiir fu$y that a rational Adverfity was better than an irra- tional NOTES 0/z Treatise the Third. . 31 tional Profperity, The original Words are — y.^~t- tov eTvcci luXoylrw drv^(eTv 9 \\ dhoyirw; iv1v%el'ii. Dio. Laert. 1. 10. f. 135. Note XXXVIII. p. 198. O Crito, if it be pleasing to the Gods, &c] The three Quo- tations in this Page are taken from Plato ; the fir/l from the Crito, quoted by Epicletus at the End of the Enchiridion, and in many other Places ; the fe- cond from the Apology , quoted as frequently by the fame Author; the third, from the Menexenus or Epitaph. Plat. Opera, torn. 2. p. 248. Edit, Serran. See alfo Cic. Tufcul. 1. 5. c. 12. Note XXXIX. p. 199. If you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, £3V.] Sed quid duces & principes nominem-, cum legiones fcribat - . Cato fape alacris in eum locum prof eel as, unde redituras fe non arbitrarentur ? Pari animo Lacedesmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt : in quos Si?nonides, Die hofpes Sparta, nos te hie vidiffe jaeentes, Dumfanclis patrics legibus obfequimur. Tufcul. Difp. Li. c.42. p. 101. Note XL. Ibid. Martyrs for Sys- tems wrong, &c] That there may be a bigotted Objlinacy in favour of what is abfurd, as well as a rational ConJla?icy in adhering to what is right, thofe Egyptians above mentioned may ferve as Examples. Mgyptiorum morem quis ignoret ? quorum imbutce men- tes pravitatis erroribus qtiamvis carnificinam prius fubi- erint, quam ibim aut afpidem aut felem aut canem aut croco- NOTES on Treatise the Third. crocodilum violent: quorum etiam ft imprudentes quid- piam fecerint, pasnam nullam recufent. Tufcul. Difp. 1. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI. Note XLI. p. 200. — Celebrated to such a Height, in the Religion, which we profess, &c] 'Tis probable, that fome Analogies of this fort induced a Father of the Church (and no lefs a one than St. Jerom) to fay of the Stoics ', who made moral Reclitude the only Good, no- STRO DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT. Fid. Menag. in D. Laert. 1. 7. f. 101. p. 300. and Gatak. Prafat. in M. Anton. See alfo of this Treatife page no. and below, Note LXIV. Note XLII. p. 201. To live consistent- ly, &c] To live consistently is here ex- plained tO be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE SINGLE CONSONANT SCHEME OR PURPOSE ; and our Good or Happiness is placed in fuch Con- sistence, upon a Suppofition that thofe, who live inconfijlently^ and without any fuch uniform Scheme^ are of confequence miferable^ and unhappy. To ri- A®-* [j.vj Zyivuv arwc a we Jews, to ■of4.oXo t ya(ji.£vui tjw> ' T8T0 o' sr"* KaQ' tvot Xoycv kJ cru/^wvov £t?y, w? tww fj,M%py.svus ^wltiv xaxoJat/xovavlwv, Stob. Eel. Ethic. p. 171. t This Consistence was called in Greek opoXo- y'xoL, in Latin Convenientia, and was fometimes by itfelf alone confidered as the End. Tnv cfxoXoyioiv }iy*<7i rs\(&> ewea. Stob. Eel. Ethic, p. 172. See alfo Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 6. p. 216. So alfo in the fame laft named Treatife, c. 7. p. 220. — Ui enim hijlri- eni NOTES on Treatise the Third. eni aCfio, faltatori motus, non quivis, fed certus quidam eft datus : fie vita agenda eft certo genere quodam, non quolibet -, quod genus conveniens consentane- umque diciwus. Nee enim gubernationi aut medicina fimilem fapientiam ejfe arbitramur, fed aclioni Mi potius, quam mode > dixi, & faltationi \ ut in ipfa arte in/it 9 non foris petatur ex t re mum, id eft, artis ejfe Clio. 'Tis upon this Principle we find it a Precept in Cicero's Offices In primis aut em conftituen- dum eft, quos nos & quales ejfe velimus, & in quo genere vitae 1. i. c. 32. So likewife in the En- chiridion of EpiCtetus, c. 33. Tafcov tivx vfa yj*» pUXlYlpa, (TOtvlu ^ TU7TCV, h\ (p\)\a,£w ITtl TS (TSOCvlw (tiV, xj a,vQpu>7roi<; l7r»TuJ^awwv. Ordain to thyfelffome Cha- racter and Model of Life, which thou may ft maintain both by thyfelf and when thou art converfant with Mankind, So much indeed was refted upon this Prin- ciple of Confiftence, that even to be any thing con- fiftently, was held better than the contrary. Thus EpicletUS — "Eva, on $s7 ai/0p«7rw eTvxi, >S " dyaQov 5 xockov ' ri 70 ri'ysy.Q'jix.ov on ^i Z]?£pyz,^scrQoii to craula, -* ra IjcIc? It behoves thee to be one uniform Man, either good or' bad ; either to cultivate thy own Mind, or to cultivate things external Arr. Epi<5h I. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does he exprefs himfelf in a Place fubfequent ; where having rlrft counfelled againft that falfe Complai- fance, which makes us, to pleafe Mankind, forget our proper Character, and having recommended as our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds ~ — 'Ei $\ pv\ dptcrsi t£u7#, A(^» diroxXiW lir\ tocvccvVx ' ytvv iTf toov xivzihu, i?Tj twv jwwp^wv Aidpopx $ »tw N O T E S on Treatise the Third. Xzrp6(T0]7rcc. ov [juyvvioci ' ov Jvvouroii ttj ®sp<nT»iv XiiroM^U vourQoti k, 'A^a/ae/AVova—Arr. Epict. 1. 4. c. 2. p. 580. But if what I recommend thee do not pleafe, then turn thee totally to all that is contrary ; become a profligate of the moji projlitute kind Characters fo different are not to he blended -, thou canjl not acl at once Therfites and Agamemnon. So too Horace: Sjuanto constantior idem In vitiiSy tan to lev his mifer, ac prior Hit £%ui jam contentOy jam laxo fune laborat. Sat. 7. 1. 2. v. 18. See alfo Char after ifl'ics, V. i.p. 131. Note XLIII. p. 203. — It is not merely, to live consistently; but to live con- sistently wilh Nature.] 'OpoXoyvpevug tv\ (puvsi £?v ? Cleanthes in Stob. Ecl.^Eth. p. 171. — Congruenter natures convenienterque vivere. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c 7. p. 221. The nrfl Defcription of our End [to live conf/lently] was deemed defective, and therefore was this Addition made. See Stobaus in the Place cited. Arr. Epift. I. 3. c. 1. p. 352. Note XLIV. p. 204. - — To live consis- tently with Nature is, to live accord- ing to just Experience of those things, which happen around us.] Tix©* eV! to cpohoyvyAvoeg ryi (pvesi £»y " qttso ^puo"i7T7r^» (jot.- (piVepou ctfAoasvo? Tsrointrociy i£m%Jx£ tov TpoVcv t«tov, Zr,v y.cc\ IjU-TTf *p tun tm (p^n <t'J[aQociv6v1uv. Stob. Eel. Ethic, it 1. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. c 87. His verbis [fcil. NOTES on Treatise the Tloird. ' [fcil. vivere fecundum naturam'] tria fignificari Stoici dicunt. Utmm ejufmodi, vivere adhibentem fcientiam earum rerum, qua naturd cvenirent De Fin. 1. 4. c. 6. p. 286. See alfo the fame Treatife, /. 3. c. 9. p. 227. /. 2. c. 11. p. 113. where 'tis exprefTed — Vivere cum intelligentid earum rerum, qua naturd eve- nirent. Note XLV. p. 205.— To live perpetually selecting, as far as possible, what is congruous to nature, and rejecting what is contrary, making our end that Selecting, and that Rejecting only.] "O Tfi 'AfltValp®- 9 , to -xih(& x£*c&a*, 'Etf tw (JiW/fxwf ytf a7rap&£alw$ IxXiyzvQcci [aIv t# y.cC[qL (pu<nv, oiTrsaXiysfT^oci il roc ■arapa (pvcriv 9 V7roXtZ[j,£cx,v£i. Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.2. p. 497. Edit. Potter. This Sentiment was fometimes contracled, and exprefled as follows — — to ivXoyiTtiv Iv rcxTg lycXoycc^ fometimes, more concifely ftill, by the fingle Term to ivXoyirtw. See Plutarch 107 1, 1072. Cicers joins this, and the foregoing Defcriptions of Happi- nefs, together. Circumfcriptis igitur his fententiis, quas pofui, & fi qua fimiles earum Jint ; relinquitur^ ut fummum bonurn fit, vivere fcientiam adhibentem earum rerum, qua naturd eveniant, feligentem qua fe- cundum naturam, & qua contra naturam funt rejicien- tem, id eft, convenienter congruenterque natura vivere, De Fin. 1. 3. c 9. p. 227. See alfo De Fin. 1.2. c 11. p. 113. See alfo Diog.Laert. 1. 7. c 88. — Stob. Eel. Eth. 171. Note XLVI. p. 207. To live in the dis- charge of moral Offices.] 'Apx&np® 3 $1 (r£x<& NOTES on Treat is£ the Third. \ri\(& (p^ctj to Txdvloc rx xaOwovJa IviriXviflot £*#. Laert. I. 7. c. 88. — Stob. Eel. Eth. 171. — Officii emnia — fervantem vivere. Cic. de Fin. 1. 4. c. 6* p. 286. Soon after we meet the Phrafes — To live ac- cording to Nature ; To live according to Virtue* 'o Znvoov — ts'a^ elm, to opoXoyv- [ASV00S TYl (pVVSl £J|V, 07T£p Ifl XOlT dp/lm £?!/. Laelt. I. 7. c. 87. Confentire natures ; quod ejfe volunt t virtute, id eft, honeftate vivere — De Fin. 1. 2. c. 11. p. 113. Where, as has been already obferved page 174, and in the Note likewife on the Place, we find the Lives according to Nature and Virtue are con- fidered as the fame. However to make ti ., Tertion plainer, (if it be not perhaps fufficiently plain already) it may not be improper to confider, what Idea thefe Philofo* phers had of Virtue. In Laertius (where he delivers the Sentiments of Zeno and his followers) Virtue is called Aia'0£<n; Q[Ao?<oyv[Aevvi 9 a confiftent Difpofition 3 and foon after, A Mind formed to Confiftence thro' every Part of Life. Laert. 1. 7, c. 89. In Stobaus (according to the Sentiments of th$ fame School) it is called AiaOso-i? 4/up^iV <ri [*.$&& duly z?ep! otov tqv Gt'ov. A Difpofition of Mind, con- finant to itfelf throughout the whole of Life. Eel. Eth. p. 167. V So NOTES on Treatise the Third. So Cicero in his Laws — Confians 13 per pet ua rath vita, qua eji Virtus. — 1. i. c. 17. p. 55. So Seneca in his y^th Epiflle — Virtus enim convenientia conjlat : omnia opera ejus cum ipfd concordant, & congruunt. Thus therefore Confidence being the Eflence of Virtue, and upon the Hypothefis here advanced, the. Eflence alfo of Happinefi ; it follows hrft that a Vir- tuous Life will be a Happy Life. But if a Happy one, then of courfe a Life according to Nature ; iince no- thing can be Good, which is contrary to Nature, nor indeed which is not confonant, in ftricteft manner, to it. And here (as a proper Opportunity feems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great Simi- litude of Sentiments ; it may be even faid, the Unani- mity of almoft all Pbilofophers, on this important Subject concerning Ends, and Happiness. Those, whofe Hypothefis we have followed irt this Dialogue, fuppofed it to be Virtue and con-' sistent Action, and that without regard to For- tune or Succefs. But even they, who from their Hy- pothefis made fome Degree of Succefs requifite ; who refted it not merely on right Afiion, but on a Propor- tion of bodily Welfare, and good Fortune concomitant, even thefe made right Action and Virtue to be principal. \ ' Thus 2o NOTES on Treatise the Third. Thus Archytas, according to the Doctrine of the Pythagorean School. 'Evicupotriva p^poVi? dpelas h lulu^wt. Happinefs is the life or Exercife of Virtue, attended with external good Fortune, Opufc. Mytho- log. p. 678. Confonantto this Sentiment, he fays in the Beginning of the fame Treatife, ph dyu- Qoq dvyp oux ivQzoog Ivixipwv e£ dvdyxotg z&iy * $\ kfoiipuv, x} dyMs dvvig so. The good Man is not of necejfity happy ; [becaufe, upon this Hypothetic external Fortune may be wanting 5] but the happy Man is of necejfity Good, {becaufe, upon the fame Hypo- thecs, without Virtue was no Happinefs.] Ibid. p. 673. Again A*et y<h ydg xaxoJaijuovsv dvdfxai iov xaxov, ails lyoi vXav (kocxus % ydg dvld Xpstlxi) ails (tttciv'^oi. — The bad Man (fays he) muft needs at all times be miferable, whether he have or whether he want the Materials of external Fortune ; for if he have them, he will employ them ill Ibid. p. 696. Thus 'we fee this Philofopher, tho' he make Externals a Requifite to Happinefs, yet ftill without Virtue he treats them as of no Importance. Again — Avo f M teuvovIcu Iv tw 6/w * d y.h {rxuGpcorolgpa, ay tKx^ocv IQda^sv 'Oiuo-0"£Uff % * d £1 ivhsivolipa, rdv liropsCslo NiWp. T»v wv apsWv (p&pi JijAiiia"0«i (lege JflAstrfla*, Dorice pro OeAeiv) ph rdvlocv, dvvoccrQoci Jg >c) ryvuv, There are two Roads in Life diftincl from each other ; one the rougher, which the fuffering UlyfTes went ; the other more frnooth, which was travelled by Neftor. Nowofthefe Roads (fays he) Virtue defires indeed the latter \ and yet is /he not unable to travel the former. Ibid. p. 696. From which laft Sentiment it appears, that he thought Virtue, even in any Fortune, was capable of producing at leajl fome degree ^Happiness. As N OT E S on Treatise the Third. As for the Socratic Doclrine on this Subjeft, it may be fufficiently feen by what is quoted from it, in the Dialogue pag. 198, 199. And as the Senti- ments, there exhibited, are recorded by Plato , they may be called not only Socratic, but Platonic alfo. However, leaft this mould be liable to difpute, the following Sentiment is taken from Xenocrates, one of Plato's immediate SuccefTors, in the old Academy by him founded. H^ovcpa-r^ (pr t <r\v, 'EuJ^^ova tu/sa sTvoti A&ifxovoi. Xenocrates held that he was Eudaemon, cr Happy, who had a virtuous Mind; for that the Mind was every one's Daemon or Genius. Arijl. Top. 1. 2. c. 6. Here we fee Virtue made the Principle of Happiness, according to the Hypothecs of the Dialogue. There is an elegant Allufion in the Paf- fage to the Etymology of the Word 'E-j^uwi/, which fignifies both [Happy] and [psflejfed of a good Genius cr Damon ;] an Allufion which in translating 'twas not poffible to preferve. See below, Note LVIII. A s for the Peripatetic School, we find their Idea of Happiness, as recorded by Laertius, to be in a manner the fame with that of the Pythagoreans. It was pepsin? apd^ lv 6/w reAe/w — The Ufe or Exer- cife of Virtue, in a complete andperfecl Life. Laert. 1. 5. c. 30. We have already, in Note XXV, cited the fame Doctrine (tho' fomewhat varied in Ex- preflion) from the Founder of the Peripatetics, in his firft Book of Ethics. So again we learn from him-——— ©V* 7rpa.jriis rivh *j iv^ynfia Ae- Y yovloLi NOTES o» Treatise the Third. yovjoci to t£a(^, that 'tis certain Aclions and Energies , which are to he deemed the End. Ethic. Nic. 1. 1» c. 8. And again— "Ert y^ <&Mi\i iwtf $£[&,. t£- a©^ For 'tis the very Reclitude of Aclion, which is it/elf the End. Ibid. 1. 6. c. 5. And again, 'H eV fiizipovioi, ivspyua, rk eV*. Happinefs is a certain Energizing. 1. 9. c. 9. And more explicitly than all thefe Paffages in that elegant Simile, /. 1. c. 8. — "£lT7rso Je o\vu7ri&<riv ap^ o\ )taAAjr"ot ^J w^upcjajw £-£(p<Z]l)ivloCl 9 CiAA* 01 dyuVl^QfASVOi (t»TWV J/a^ TJVEf vj/icodtv ') arw >^ twv Iv tw 6<w kocXuv Xj ctyuvoov OI IIPATTONTES OP0I22 sV^oAot ytyvoficct. For as in the Olympic Games, not thofe are crowned, who are handfomejl and Jlrongefl, but thofe who combat and contend, (for 'tis from among thefe come the 'Victors ,) fo, with refpect to things laudable and good in human Life, 'tis the right Aflors only that attain the PoJJejfton of them. Nay, fo much did this Philofopher make Happinefs depend on right Aclion, that tho' he re- quired fome Portion of Externals to that Felicity, which he held fupreme ; yet ftill 'twas Honour and Vir- tue which were its principal Ingredients. Thus fpeak- ing of the Calamities and external Cafualties of Life, which he confefTes to be Impediments to a Happinefs perfeclly complete, he adds o'^oog ol x) h txtols J*a- Ao^w7ra 70 yw\o\, £7raJ#v pfyvi t^ iVKoAoog rrroXXsig xj ^iyoO\a.g ccrv^iccg, y<v\ $C dvuXynrictv, ccXXcz ytv- voco^ocg uv xj pzyxXo^v^og, *£; J' ei8"w di ivspysiai Jiuptat tyis (^wr,g, xccv:x7r£p uiropzv^ bJe;? u,v yhoilo twi/ fAaTtapiM a0Ai(^* * v$£7roli yccg 7rpci%£i to. fAicrrflx xj (pccvXoc. Tou y&g 00 g a,Xr$ug dyaQov xj 'iy<(ppova, zrci- ect<; oioy^oc rclg rv^ocg IvG-yj^ovxg (pipuv, x) ix rm C7TCLp%Qv]M &SL TOt, KftAAifa "STfdijliW ' KuQ(X,TTSp x} NOTES ohTre atise the Third. (jaxooTMTa, Xj (TK\jIoto(a.ov Ik 7m JoOtVJcov crxvluv xaA- A»~Oy \)'(TQ^Y\[XQL TTOiily TO V OC'JjOV £i TaOTTOV %j T^J «X- Aa? Tfp/ViV«? uTTocviots, 'Et J"' arcof, a^A*^ ^ugi; «Jf- 7to7e }-sW #v o lyiffitpuv. And yet, even in fuch Inci- dents, the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue fnines forth, when a Man with becoming Calmnefs endures ■many and great Misfortunes, and that not thro' Infenfi- hility, but being brave and magnanimous. Nay more,- if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that 'tis Actions, which are predominant in conflicting a happy Life, then can no one be completely miferable, who is ' happy in his right Condutl, becaufe he will never be the Aclor of what is deteflable and bafe. For 'tis our Opi- nion that the Man, truly wife and good, endures all' Fortunes with becoming Decency, and from whatever happens to arife, Jlill frames the fair eft Actions ; like as the good Commander ufes the Army, which he. happens to find, after the manner moft agreeable to the Rules of War \ and the Shoemaker, fr&m fuch Skins as others provide him, makes a Shoe, the beft that can be made from fuch Materials ; and fo in the fame manner all other Artifts befide. But if this be true, then he, who is happy in this Reclitude ^Genius, can in no Inflame be truly andftriftly miferable. Eth. Nic. 1. i. c. io. As for Epicurus, tho' he was an Advocate for Pleafure, yet fo high was his Opinion of a wiff and right Condutl, that he thought rational Adver- fity better than irrational Profperity. See Dial, p. 197. Hence too he reprefented that Pleafure 9 which he efteemed our Sovereign Happinefs, to be as infeparable from Virtue, as Virtue was from that. OJk £Oi> fl&'wj tfiv, avev ry £ppovi)*«^ *) xaAwj, k»J

• 2 iiKOiWS ■•"

324 NOTES on Treatise the Third. if we, 'Tis impofjible to live pleafurably, without living prudently i and honourably , and juftly ; or to live prudently *, and honourably and juftly, t without living pleafurably. Epic, in Laert. 1. 10. f. 132. T o conclude the whole, our Countryman Tho~ mas Hobbes, though he profefiedly explodes all this Doclrine concerning Ends, yet feems infenfibly to have eftablifhed an End himfelf, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain Energy or Action. For thus 'tis he informs us, in his Treatife called Human Nature^ that there can be no Content- ment, but in Proceeding ; and that Felicity confifteth, not in Having but in Prospering. And again, fome time after, having admitted the Comparifon of Human Life to a Race, he imme- diately fubjoins But this Race we mufi fuppofe to have no other Goal, nor other Garland, but being foremost and in it. And thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of Philofophers on the Subject of Ends, here treated. Note XLVII. p. 208. — Yet it in no man- ner TAKES AWAY THE DIFFERENCE AND DI- STINCTION of other things.] Cum enim vir- tutis hoc proprium fit, earum rerum, quce fecundum naturam fint, habere deleflum ; qui omnia fie exaqua- verwit, ut in utramque partem it a pari a redderent, uti nulla feleclione uterentur, virtutem ipfam fiiftulerunt. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 4. p. 207. Quid autem aperiius, quam, fi feleclio nulla fit ab Us rebus, quce contra naturam fint, earum rerum qua fint fecundum naturarn, tollaiur omnis ea, qua quara- tur NOTES on Treatise the Third. tur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. 1. 3, e.g. p. 227. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum : qiiam ft non ullam. ejfe diceremus, conf under etur omnis vita, ut ab Ariftone ; nee ullum fapientia munus aut opus in- venire tur, cum inter eas res, qua ad vitam degendam pertiner'ent, nihil omnino intereffet ; ?ieque ullum delec- tum haberi oporteret. Itaque cum ejfet fatis conjlitutum, idfolum ejfe bonum quod effet honejlum, & id malum fo- lum quod turpe ; turn inter h<zc & ilia, qua nihil vale- rent ad beate miferevt vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo dif- ferent, effe voluerunt, ut effent eorum alia aflimabilia, alia centra, alia neutrum. Ibid. 1. 3. c. 15. p. 246. C jeter a aut em et ft nee bona nee mala effent \ ta- men alia fecundum naturam dicebat, alia naturte effe contraria : iis ipf.s alia inter jetla & media numerabat. Acad. 1. 1. c. 11. p. 46. See Dial. p. 187. Note XLVIII, p. 208, It suppresses no SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, &V.J As much has been faid concerning the Stoic Apathy, or Infenfbility with refpetl to Pajfion, it may not t>e improper to inquire, what were their real Senti-^ ments on this Subject. ria0<^>, which we ufually render a Pajfion, is always rendered by Cicero, when fpeaking as a Stoic, Perturbafio, a Perturbation. As fuch therefore in the hrft place, we fay it ought always to be treated. The Definition of the Term tt^O^, as given by thefe Philofophers, was oppri zsKsovz^woi, trans- lated by Cicero, Appetitus vehementior. Tufc. 1. 4. c. 9. p. 273. Now this Definition may be more Y 3 eafily NOTES on Tre at ise the Third. eafily explained, if we firft inquire, what they meant by ©P//.71 'OiyA they defined to be (Dopa -^vyjiq IttI rt y a Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward fomething. Stob. Eel. Ethic, p. 175. A 9r»00> therefore, or Perturbation muft have been, according to their De- finition, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul, which was excejfive and beyond Bounds. Stob&us, from whom this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it ob- serves, « xiyn zreQvytijiz -stAsovc^ejv, a A A* yj»j Iv uiAfova^/AW a<rcc ' w yao ovvcty.si, jt&aXAov $ Ivsoysiot — that Zeno (its Author) does not call a 11^9^ fome- thing capable by Nature to pafs into Excefs, but fome- thing actually in Excefs already, as having its EJfence, not in mere Capacity, but in Acluality. Eel. Eth. p. 159. There is another Definition of the fame Term, which makes it to be fi a,\oy(& x} Tzr^pa (poViw tJ/u^Jjj xiWt?) a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature. D. Laert. 1. 7. f. no. Andronicus Rhodius adds, to this latter Definition, the Words $? uVo- M^w Jtaxx 8 uyM, from the Opinion of fomething Good or Evil. li^\ n«0. p- 523. So that its whole Idea is as follows. A Perturbation, or Stoic Pajfton, is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature, arifing from the Opinion of fomething Good or Evil. Thefe laft Words, founding the flaO^ or Perturbation on Opinion, correfpond to what Cicero fays, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the Stoic Philofophers, omnes perturbationes judicio fieri & opinions. Tufc. 1. 4. c, 7. p. 276. Laertius informs us, that they even made the Perturbations themfelves to be Judgments. boxsT as *u1«f% rcc wa,§r) apia-ng eivou. Laert. 1. 7. f. in. He fubjoins an Inftance to illuf- trate. 'His yxo (piXapyvpicc CiroX^lq sr* t» to ap- NOTES on Treatise the.Third. 32 yu'pwv x«Ao\ ifa». ^ ^5 (fays he) the Love^ of Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is a thing good and excellent, Plutarch records the fame Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. flaO^— xCy® 9 "&ovnpo$ x) axaAar^, ** (pauAtj? x} hypaflnpew xp««co? ctpofyorvirot xj pw^uv •urpoo-A^^wy. ^ Perturbation is a vitious and in- temperate Rea foning> which affumes Vehemence and Strength from bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor. p. 441. D. The Subftance of what is faid above, feems to amount to this; that riaO^y in a Stoic Senfe > implied a Perturbation, and not a P^<?« ; and that fuch Perturbation meant an irrational and violent Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judg- ment, which was erroneous and faulty. Nov/ from hence it follows, that the Man of perfect Character (according to their Hypo- thefts) muft of necemty be d™H;, Apathetic, or void of Perturbation. For fuch a Cha- racter, as has been fhewn, implies per feci Rectitude of Conduct. But perfect Reflitude of Conduct im-_ \ j&esjerfecl R eclitude of Judgment j and fuch Re&i- r* tude of JudgmenFexcTudes all Error and wrong Judg- ment : but if Error and wrong Judgment, then Perturbation of confequence, which they fuppofe to be derived from thence alone. That this was the Senfe, in which they under- ftood Apathy, we have their own Authority, as given us by Laertius. &x?i Si xal aTraOJj inai rov wqVqv* hoi to avsuTrWov slr/A, Laert. 1. 7. p. 117. Y 4 They NOTES en Treatise the "Third. They fay the wife Man is apathetic ', by being fuperior to Error — by being fuperior to Error, if they may be credited themfelves ; not, as for the moft part we abfurdly imagine, by being fuperior to all Senfe, and Feeling, and Affedion. The Sentence imme- diately following the foregoing, looks as if thefe Philosophers had forefeen, how likely they were to be mifunderftood. ETvxi £1 xj olxXov ^ttM, tm (puuXov, £y «ro) Xeyofxevov tw 0->cA»ipu) x) alpsVlw — - There is alfo another fort of Apathetic Man, who is bad \ who is the fame in Character, as the hard and inflexible. To the fame Purpofe EpicJetus. 'On M y&o ps sivoci oLTrctMv, u>g ccvfyidvloc, ocXXx rocg %^^g Typvvla, Tolg (pwixoig ^ lir^ir^g, cog IvitsGt}, ug ijov, ug dhXfyov, ug 7rcc7spa, ug iroXirm. FoR I AM NOT to be Apathetic, like a Statue, but I am withal to obferve Relations, both the natural and adventitious \ as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen, Am Epi&. 1. 3. c. 2. p. 359. Immediately before this, he tells us in the fame Chapter, n«0^* y-xg Mxxoog « yfvslxi, h p} ope£eoog aVorjJ^ai/aV'/K, i ixxXiveoog 7jrzpi7n7r\'6<TYig y that a Perturbation in no other way ever arifes, but either when a Defire is fruftrated, or an Averfion falls into that which it would avoid. Where 'tis ob- fervable, that he does not make either Defire or Averfion riciO», or Perturbations, but only the Caufe of Perturbations, when erroneoufly conducted. Agreeably to this, in the fecond Chapter of the Enchiridion, we meet with Precepts about the Conduct and Management of thefe two Affeclions— Net NOTES on Treatise the Third. "Not a word is faid about lopping off either ; on the contrary, Averfion we are directed how to employ- immediately, and Defire we are only ordered to fuf- pend for the prefent, becaufe we want a proper Sub- ject of fit Excellence to excite it. To this may be added, what the fame Philofo- pher fpeaks, in his own Perfon, concerning himfelf. Arr. Epitt. 1. i. c. 21. 'E^w p\v dpx^on, uv op£- yodfxoa *) z>ot\ivca x&la (pv<riv /, for my part, am fatisfied and contented, if 1 can desire and avoid agreeably to Nature. He did not remain it feems diifatisfied, till he had eradicated thefe Affections ; but he was fatisfied in reducing them to their natu- ral life. In Laertius we read recorded for a Stoic Senti- ment, that as the vitious Man had his 7ra0n, or Per- turbations , fo oppofed to thefe, had the Virtuous his 'EuwaOeiai, his Eupathies or Well- feelings, tranflated by Cicero Conftantice. The three chief of thefe were B»Aho-k, Will, defined opifcg hXoy® 3 , rational Defire; 'Ev^'uSbm, Caution, defined "ExxAtcn? 'ivhoy^, rational Averfion ; and Xapa, Joy, defined £7rotp<7i<; euAo}/©- 3 , rational Exultation. To thefe three $Y'mcvp2lEupatbies belonged many fill ordinate Species \ fuch as £vvoia 9 a,yol7rv)Tic, diiug^ Tfpipif, ivtypotrvvYi^ fu0u/Aia, &c. SeeLaert. 1. 7. f. 115, 116. Andron. Rhod. Trfpi TraOwv. Cic. Tufc. 1. 4. c. 6. Cicer c makes Cato, under the Character of a Stoic, and in explaining their Syitem, ufe the following ExprefTions. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur, in- tellegi native a fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur : a quo NOTES on Treatise the Third. quo initio profeclam communem human: generis focie- tatem perfequuntur. De Fin. 1. 3. c. 19. The fame Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius. <&x<t\ Je (oi Iltoomoi) Xj rr,v Trpoq to, Tixvoi (pi\o$-opyi<x,v (pv<nxyv sTvoa av%7<; They fay Parental Affeclion is natural to them. I. 7. f. 120. Again, foon after, in the fame Treatife de Fini- bus. ghiodque nemo in fumma folitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia ; facile intellegitur, nos ad conjunclionem congregationem- que hominum, & ad natural em communitatem effe natos. So Laertius. "AAAa \t.n «<T ev zpripia. ((pacrl) QiooG-sloct The virtuous Man (fay they, the Stoics) will never be for living in Solitude ; for he is by Nature focial^ and formed for Aclion. 1. 7. f. 123. Again, Cicero, in the above-cited Treatife. Cum autem ad_ tuendos confervando [que _hormn.es hominem natum effe videamus -, confentaneum eft huic nature, ut fapiens velit gerere, & adminiflrare rempublicam ; atque ut c natura vivat, uxorem adjungere, &f velle ex ed liber os. Ne amcres quidem fan clos a fapiente alienos effe arbitrantur. Ut vero confervetur omnis homini erga hominem focietas, conjunclio, caritas ; & emolu- menta & deirimenta communia effe voluerunt. De Fin. 1. 3. c. 20, 21. In Epicletus, the leading Duties, or moral Offices of Man, are enumerated as follows. IIoAmWQai, XxMAU O^i'yiC^Oii, hixXlVHV, OppWJ) OC(pOQU>G>A>, 00g iKCtfQV 78 rwv NOTES on Treatise the Third. T8TWV JfT 7T0/eTl/, W? 7TE(pVlt>XfJt.$V. AlT. Epiff. 1. 3. C. J. p. 386. The fame Sentiments may be found re- peated both in Stobaus and Laertius. I mail only add one more Sentiment of thefe Philofophers, and that is concerning FriendfAp. Ae- ■ ^/yff-t Je xj tjw (piklccv £v y.ovoig To7g GirxSoiiQiq elvon 7foy y2?j> *te Friendjhip exifls among the Virtuous only. Laert. 1. 7. f. 124. The Sum of thefe Quotations appears to be this ; that the Stoics, in the Character of their virtuous Man, included rational Defire, Aver/ton, and Exul- tation \ included Love and parental A jfeftion ; Friend- jhip , and a general Charity or Benevolence to all Man- kind j that they confidered it as a Duty, arifing from our very Nature, not to neglect the Welfare of pub- lic Society, but to be ever ready, according to our Rank, to act either the Magijlrate or the private Citizen ; that their Apathy was no more than a Freedom from Perturbation, from irrational and ex- (ejffive Agitations of the Soul ; and confequently that the Jlrange Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge, and^in the demolifhing of which there have been fo many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for which they were no way accountable. Note XLIX. p. 209. It rejects no Gain, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.] The Stoics were fo far from rejecting Wealth, when acquired fairly, that they allowed their perfect Man, for the lake of enriching himfelf, to frequent the Courts of Kings, and teach Philofophy for a Stipend. Thus Plutarch from a Treatife of Chryfippus Tw pw \z NOTES on Treatise the Third. ^ cospif-fuVai/ £7? ccpyvpico — Afor. p. 1047. ^* So likewife the Stoic Hecato, in his Treatife of Offices, as quoted by Cicero, Sapientis effe, nihil con- tra mores, leges, inflituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim folum nobis divites effe volumus, fed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublica. Singulorum enim facilitates & copies 9 divides funt civi-* tatis. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 15. Note L. p. 209. — Universally as far as Virtue neither forbids nor dissuades, it endeavours to render llfe, even in the most vulgar acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and easy as possible.] Etenim quod fummum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter natures viz 1 ere, id habet banc (ut opinor) fententiam, Cum vir- tute congruere femper : caetera autem, quae fecundum naturam efient, ita legere, fi ea virtuti non repug- JK /^narent. Cic.de Offic. I. 3. c. 3. f n

^v Alexander Aphrodisiensis, fpeaking of the

i dL~ Stoic Doctrine concerning the external Conveniencies, and common Utilities of Life, delivers their Senti- j \ ment in the following Words — xKXa, xj $i%<x ra- ^ vC -' (jJvxv apslrt; re avv rarot? ?cj ftps]??? y.6wiq, ^TjJfVoT ocv •& C ~ rov <ro(po]} tw yi£%ct)fn<TU£vnv Ixi^cci, h 'ire, osulw dvvaHov fJiAi^T*/;u p„/U twu 'IxXwv XctQsTv. Suppofing there lay Vir- tu - tue on the one fide, attended with thefe Externals, and <pk Virtue on the other fide, alone by herfelf, the wife ^ Man would never choofe that Virtue, which was dejlitute . j and fingle, if 'twas in his power to obtain that other, f- 15 *^ y) JJ A f which xf?JL- _ <P NOTES *» Treatise the Third. which was accompanied ivith thefe Advantages, U^\ Note LI. p. 209.--- -Nay, could it mend the Condition of Existence — by adding to the amplest possessions the poorest* meanest Utensil, it would in no degree contemn, &V.] — Si ad Warn vitam, qu<z cum vir- tute degatur, ampulla aut Jlrigilis accedat, fumpturum fapientem earn vitam potius, cui hcec adjefta fint — De Fin. I.4. c. 12. p. 300. NoteLII. p. 210— Could it indeed choose its own Life, it would be always that, where most social affections might be exerted, &V. ] Itemque magis eft fecundum naturam* pro omnibus gentibus (fi fieri po fit) ^n/ervandis aut ju^ jvandis, maximos labor es moleftiafque fufcipere, imitan- tern Herculem ilium, quern hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilia cceleftium conlocavit ; quam vivere in folitudine, non modo fine ullis ?nokftiis, fied etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundant em omnibus copiis ; ut excellas etiam pulchritudine & viribus. §>uocirca optima qui/que & fiplendidijjimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Cic. de Offic 1. 3. c 5. No t e LIII. p. Ibid. It teaches us TO CONSIDER LlFE, AS ONE GREAT IM- PORTANT Drama, where, &Y.] Thus Arifto the Chian Elvxi y&^ o t uoiov tw ayaQa ivoytfiK 1ov <ro(pov ' o; avis ©spcnTK ocvji ' Ay&pifMQ- v^jy xzrpoo-coTrov dvccXocQvj, ixccrspov VTrGxpiveloci 7rpoa">j- y.ov%$. The wife Man is like the good Ac! or > who, 1 ivhether he ajfume the Characler of Therfites or Aga- • memnon, iJez-Afi-jA St Id. ' ? / NOTES on Treatise the Third. memnon, acls either of the two Parts with a be- coming Propriety. D. Laert. 1. 7. f. 160. This Companion of Life to a Drama or Stage- play, feems to have been a Comparifon much ap- proved by Authors of Antiquity. See Epitt. Enchi- rid. c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor )( Mr.Upton. See titojll^ Anton. L 12. f. 36. and the \Y Notes of Gataker. Note LIV. p. 211. — It accepts all the Joys derived from their Success, &c. It fixes. not, like the many, its happiness on Success alone, &c] One of the wifeft Rules that ever was, with refpecl to the Enjoyment of external good Fortune, is that deliver 'd by Epicletus ; to enjoy it, »? K2o]ou 9 n, l(p y o<rov J&JoJai, in fuch manner as it is given, and for fuch Time as it is given, remem- bring that neither of thefe Conditions we have the Power to command. See Arr. Epicl. 1. 4. c i, p. 556. See alfo p. 573. of the fame. Note LV. Ibid. On the contrary, when THIS HAPPENS, *TIS THEN IT RETIRES^ INTO ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR, what is laudaele, &c.] See before, p. 322. o/xw? £\ *J iv ixtqis J*jaAa/x7ra, &C. Note LVI. p. 212. All Men pursue Good, C5V.] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics, and inculcated thro' every part of the DirTertations of Epicletus. Take an Example or two out of many. <&o<r{? <? olvln 7rav]og, to dimnv to oiy^ov, (piyysw to KQtKQv — — t« y&Q dy^x <rjfysvi$-£pM *J», *%& the Nature NOTES on Treatise the Third. Nature of every one to purfue Good, and fly Evil— for nothing is more intimately allied to us than Good. Arr. Epict. 1. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, /. 2. c. 22. o-vptpepovTi. To nothing is every Animal fo intimately allied, as to its own peculiar Welfare, and In- terest. So Cicero. Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem, ad eamque rapimur, nee facer e a liter ullo modo pojfumus, De Offic. 1. 3. c. 28. Note LVII. p. 213. — All derived from Externals, must fluctuate as they fluc- tuate.] See before, pag. 126, 130, 133. Note LVIII. Ibid. — When we place the Sovereign Good in Mind ] Djemon or Genius means every Man's particular Mind, and Reasoning Faculty. Aa/^wv — sVo? Js sViv o* IxdtrK v«? *S Xo?®>. M. Anton. I. 5. p. 27. Ge- nium ejfe uniufcujufque animum rationalem \ & ideo ejfe fingulos fmgulorum — Varro in Fragm. 'Tis from this Interpretation of Genius^ that the Word, which in Greek expreffes Happiness, is elegantly etymolo- gized to mean a Goodness of Genius or Mind. 'Ev^aipoviot er") Soclpm dyoc^og, M. Anton. 1. 7. f. 17. See Gataker on the_ Place. The Sentiment came \ 1 originally from the old Academics. See before, page 321. Note LIX. p. 214. Behold the true AND PERFECT MAN : THAT ORNAMENT, &C.\ £htam gravis vero y quam magniflca y quam co?ijlans con- ficitur 1 53 6 NOTES on Treatise the "Third. ficitur perfona fapientis? Qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honeftum effet, id effe filum bonum, femper ft neceffe eji beatus, vereque omnia JJia no mina^ poffidea t, qua y( inridm^bji^ Reclius enim appellabiiur rex, quam Tarquinius, qui nee fe nee fuos regere po- tuit : reclius magifler populi, &c. Cic. de Fin. 1; 3. c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hie, quifquis ejl, qui moderatione & cotiftantia quietus animo eft, fibique ipfe placatus 5 tit nee tabefcat moleftiis, nee frangatur timore, nee fi- tienter quid expetens ardeat defiderio, nee alacritate futili gejiiens deliquefcat \ is ejl fapiens, quern quari- mus, is ejl beatus ; cui nihil humanarum rerum aut s4 intolerqbik ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lata-^ I v^ ^ile.a d ec ferendum videri potefl. Quid enim videatur - ei magnum, &c. Tufc. Difp. I. 4. c. 17. p. 298. Note LX. p. 215. — Would not your Sys- tem in such a Case a little border upon the Chimerical ? &c] Chryfippus feems to have been fenfible of this, if we may judge from a Pauage of his, preferved in Plutarch. Aio xai A«  JoX» ( a£V SjtAOKfc Af^fiV, >iOc] 8 XO.TM T0V av0pw7roy KOtl tw dvQpuTrmv (pvviv. For this reafon, thro' the excef five Greatnefs and Beauty of what we affert, we ap- pear to fay things which look like Ficlions, and not fuch as are fuitable to Man and human Nature. Mor. 1 04 1. F. Note LXI. p. 216. In antient Days, when Greece, &V.] See Cic. de Invent. 1.2. c. 1. See aifo Maximus Tyrius, Diff. 23. p. 277. of the late Quarto Edition \ and Xenoph. Memor. 1. 3. c. 10. Note NOTES on Treatise the Third. 337 Note LXII. p. 219. No where in any PARTICULAR NATURE IS THE PERFECT CHA- RACTER to be seen intire.] The Stoics them- felves acknowledged, as we learn fromClemens oi Alex- andria, that their o a-opog, or perfect Man, was difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree -, cWeu- p£l(& navv <r(p6fya,. Strom, p. 438. Sextus_ Empi- J( ruuj gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as yet found him , //-sp^pt ts vvy aveupsTa oVI(§^ k»T dvlxg t« <ro$Z. AdvT PhyfTpT582. Edit . Lipfien f. ^ What Sextus fays, feems to be confirmed by Cicero, who fpeaking in his Offices the Language of a Stoic, has the following ExprerTions. Nee vero y cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemo- rantur, aut cum Fabricius Arijlidefue juJlinominantur$ aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his jufiitia, tanquam a Sapientibus, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic Sapiens eft, ut Sapientem volumus intellegi* Nee it, qui fapientes habiti funt, & nominati, M. Gato & C. Lezlius, fapientes fuerunt ; ne illi quidem feptem; fed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia fimilitudinem quandam gerebant, fpeciemque fapientum. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 4. Again, in his Lalius, fpeaking of the fame confummate Wifdom, he calls it, Safientia y quam fidhuc mortalis nemo eji confecutus. S o too £>uintilian. §uod ft defuit his viris fumma virtus, fie queer entibus, an orator -es fuerint, refpondebo y quo modo Stoici, ft interrogentur, an Sapiens Zeno y an Cleanthes, an Chryfippus, refpondeant ; magnos qui" iem illos ac venerabiks , non tamen id, quod natura ho- rrym Z minis' & f 1 NO TES on Treatise the Third. minis fummam habet, confecutos. Inft. Orat. 1. 12. c. 1. p. 721,722. Edit. Caper. So likewife Seneca : Scis, quern nunc bonum vlrum dicam? Hujus fecundse not*. Nam ille alter for- tajfe, tanquam phoenix, femel anno quingentefimo nafci- tur. Epift. 42. Note LXIII. p. 219. — I might inform you OF THE NATURAL PRE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH Rank of specific Ideas.] See Cicero in his Orator, near the Beginning. Sed ego fie Jlatuo, nihil ejfe in ullo genere tarn pulchrum, quo non, &c.&c. See alfo the Verfes of Boethius before cited, Note XVII. p. 295. <.' Note t XIV. p. 220, 221. — An Exemplar of Imitation, j which tho' none we think can equal, yet all at least may fol- LOW an Exemplar, &V.] Seneca gives it as a general Confefiion of the greateji Philofophers, that the Doctrine they taught, was not quemadmo- dum ipfi i^+erent, fed quemadmodum vivendum erTet. De Vita beatd, c 18. There appears indeed to be one common Reasoning with refpect to all Models, Exem- plars, Standards, Correctors, whatever we call them, and whatever the Subjecls, which they are deftined to adjuft. According to this Reafoning, if a Standard be lefs perfect than the Subject to be adjufted, fuch Adjufting (if it may be fo called) be- comes a Detriment. If it be but equally perfect, then is NOTES 0* Treatise the Third. 33^ is the Adjufting fuperfluous. It remains therefore r7) that it muft be more perfect, and that to any Tran- * / ' 7 ~^j fcendence, any Accuracy conceivable. For fuppofe a _ -^^j Standard as highly accurate, as can be imagined. If * Tk the Subjects to be adjufted have a Nature fui table, ^Av't : then will they arrive, by fuch Standard, to a degree of _ ^r*\, Perfection, which thro' a Standard /*/; accurate they / could never poflibly attain. On the contrary, if the feviq Subjects be not fo far capable, the Accuracy of the Standard will never be a hindrance, why they mould not become as perfecl, as their Nature will admit. It feems to have been from fome Sentiments of this kind, that the Stoics adorned their <ro<pog, or perfect Character, with Attributes fo far fuperior to ordinary Humanity. 'Exe?.-^ &.&©% eWv©* oLirpGv- iivjg, ixe?v(&> du]&pMi$ 9 poiK<x,^<&> 9 rttek© 3 'Twas he was fortunate j 'twas he was above 'van, , 'twas he was felf-fufficient, and happy, and per f eft. Plutarch. Mor. 1068. B. SeeiV^LXIL Some Philofophers have gone fo far, as not to reft fatisfied with the mojl per feci Idea of Hufrmity, but to fubftitute, for our Exemplar, even the fupreme Being, Gob Himself. Thus Plato, in his Theatetus, makes the great Object of our Endeavours, to be o/aoiwo-k tw 0ew xocju to JWIo'v, the becoming like to God, as far as in our power. He immediately ex- plains, what this Refemblance is. 'Qpoiutris §\, $U xauov xj o<rwv [tela (ppovvHTsus yzviv^ou. It is the be- coming juji and holy, along with JVifdom or Prudence, Plat. torn. 1. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. Z % Igis NOTES on Treatise the Third. The Go/pet appears to favour the fame Hypothefo. Be ye therefore perfecl^ even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfecl. Matt. v. 4$. What has been above faid, will be, 'tis hoped, a fufficient Apology for the Tranfcendence of the Cha- racter, defcribed in the Dialogue. Note LXV. p. 221. The Proficiency of Socrates— was sufficient to convince us— that some Progress, &V.] See Diog. Laert. 1. 7. C 91. p. 420. Tfix^piov Je to uVapxr^v iivxi Tviv dpslw — to yivi&oci Iv 7rpOKQ7ry Tag Trspi Xuxpdclyvy x} Aioy£vriv 9 &c* Note LXVL p. Ibid. — Nor was the Prize, AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIRST ; BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A Reward, having, £sY.] Verum ut tranfeundi /pes non fit^ magna tamen eft dignitas fubfequendi. QuincT. Inft. 1. 12. c n. p. 760. Exigo itaque a me y non ut cptimis par fim> fed ut malis melior. Senec. de Vita beata, c 17. '(We y<*% M*Aw» io-opou, x) fyta; «* ctp&u t« o-tipocl©* • * Ji Kpoio^, x) opus a x dpEXu Tvg xlwiug ' »^' dirXuq «Aa» rtvog rn; iirifAsXs lots •> &k tw uTroywHTiv tuv ctxpuv, d^ird^oc. For neither fhall I be Milo, and yet I neglecl not my Body ; nor Crcefus, and yet I neglecl not my Eft ate ; nor in general do we defift from the proper Care of any things thro* Defpair of arriving at that' which is fupreme. Arr. Epi&. 1. 1. c, 2. See alfo Horat. Epift. 1. I. 1. v. 28> &V, Nots NOTES on Treatise the tfbird. Note LXVII. p. 225. — This whole Uni- verse — is one City or Commonwealth — ] "O xoV/*(gp «Y0> plot zjoXh Iri Arr. Epicl. 1. 3. c. 24. p. 486. This was a Stoic Doctrine, of which Epicletus and the Emperor Marcus make perpetual mention. See of the laft, /. 12. / 36. So Cicero. Univerfius hie mundus una civitas com~ munis Deorum atque hominum^U tyman dus. De Legg 1. 1. c. 7. p. 29. See De Fin. 1. 3. c. 19. DeNat Deor, \. 2. c. 62, Note LX VIII. p. 227.— ^-Hence the Mind truly wise, quitting the Study of Par- ticulars, &c] The Platonics, confidering Sci- ence as fomething aficertained, definite, and Jleady 9 would admit nothing to be its ObjeSf, which was vague, infinite, and pajjing. For this reafon they excluded all Individuals, or Objects of Sense, and (as Ammonius exprefTes it,) raifed themfelves, in their Contemplations, from Beings particular to Be- ings univerfal, and which as fuch, from their own- Nature, were eternal and definite. The whole Paf- fage is worth tranferibmg. E'iprilxi on r\ (piXovoCpiu, yvttiVlS TToivlttV TCOV Q\>1uV 7] Gv\o6 IfiV. *E£yITYI0~0CV tfV 0* (piXo<ro(poi, Tivoc «v rp07rov ytvoovloci twv ovlwv liris-yifAQ- VS$ ' Xj Z7T£i£y) £60pWV T06 XOllol fJL£p(& y£VY\TC6 3% (pQoiplol CVI06, ST/ Oi Hj 0L7r£ip06 9 Y\ di l7ri<TYl[AY\ 06i6iU)Vi£ K}/GT£7r£- po6<r[AZvoov ts~i yvu<7is (to yoio yvwro\ ^yAsfei uVo rr\s yvuHTSus ZJ£pi\06[J.QocV£CrQai ' TO £lcc7T£ipov, a7Tfp»A'/57r7cii) dvy\yo6yov locvl^g diro twv ju,epj>iwv lir\ t» xa(5oA» 9 glthtX, hvlQ6 ^ ZT£7T£a06(T(X£VX. *X2j y06P @7)<TiV HAaTWV, Z 3 'E7r;r^*q 42 NOTES on Treatise the Third.

• E7ri<rYip'/i £tpv)l<zi, Tirccpet ro he; 'E7risroi<riv ri^ocg >£ o'pov

tvjoc •d^oocysiv ruv Ttrpoty^ocrcov ' txto &\ Tzropi^ojugGos hx tv,; u$ roi kocQoXu olvtx£po[Ay)>;. Ammonius in his Preface to Porphyry's Ifagoge, p. 14. Edit. 8vo. Consonant to this, we learn 'twas the Advice of Plata, with refpect to the Progrefs of our Specu- lations and Inquiries, to defcend from thofe higher Ge- nera, which include many fubordinate Species, down to the lowejl Rank of Species, thofe which include only In- dividuals. But here 'twas his Opinion, that our Inqui- ries Jhould flop, and, as to Individuals, let them wholly alone \ becaufe of thefe there could not pojjibly be any Science. Ato ^X? 1 Ttiy Ii£wjo1<z>tm <x,ttq tmi; ysvixw- Icctuv not] iqvi <zg Tjjocpi^xivilo IlXaloiv •urotvsa-Qai — — rvloev ivssrip'W, Porphyf. Ifagog. c. 2. Such was the Method of antient Philofophy. The Falhion at prefent appears to be fomewhat altered, and the Bufmefs of Philofophers to be little elfe, , than the collecting from every Quarter, into voluminous Records, an infinite Number of fen- fible, particular, and unconnected Facts, the chief Ef- fect of which is to excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known Saying of Antiquity be true, 'twas Wonder which induced Men firjl to philofophize,- we may fay that Philofophy now ends, whence ori- ginally it began. Note LXIX. p. 228. — A Faculty, which RECOGNIZING BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS ELSE, BECOMES A CANON, A CORRECTOR, AND a Standard universal.] See before, p. 162. In NOTES on Treatise the "Third. In Epicletus, 1. i. c. i. p. 6. the Au'uap? \oyiw, or reafoning Power , is called the Power y\ >*} dvlnv 0£w.py<r0, v? t olx\o<, ttmIoi. So Marcus — T<* ^ -rv l? XoyiYMq i\>VXVS ' tavlw 0f>& 9 locvlvv Ji&pOpOJ, &C. 7fl£ Properties of the reafoning Soul are, it beholdeth itfelf > it formeth itfelf &c. 1. n. c. i. So again Epifietus, U7T£p jW6V 7H Op&V ttj clxXSlV, >tj VYJ AiOi U7T£p CtuI* t» ^yv 9 kou roev cruvspj'wy ur^oq ocvjo, V7r\p jcap7rwv £?!pWl>, U7T£p OtVK, U7T£p £A«{* EU^aplW* TU 0£W ' jMEjM- y»jO"o f on #AAo Ti (rot crooks xpflrjou aVavrwu thtcov, T ° V PCpwOjW-evov avro;sy to $oxift.ci(^ov, to tw ol'fciotv war* Xoyixpevov. For feeing, for hearing, and indeed for Life itfelf and the various Means which co-operate to its Support ; for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine and Oil, for all thefe things be thankful to God: yet ke mindful that he hath given thee'fomething elfe, which is better than, all these; fomething which is to ufe them, to prove them, to compute the Value of each. Arr. Epicl. 1. 2. c. 23. p. 321. Note LXX. p. 228. That Master- Science, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY are, and the End to which, &c] See Arr. Epitf. 1. 2. c 24. p. 337. See alfo 1; 1. c 6. p. 36. and Perf Satyr. 3. v. 66. Note LXXI. Ibid. And never wretch- edly degrade themselves into Natures to them subordinate.] See Arr. Epecl. 1. 1. C. 3. p. 21. At& ruvTyv tm avyyzveioiv, 01 (Av airo- x?JvzVT£i-, Xvxqli; ofAQijoi yivo^oc^ clmroi xvA £7n'£yAot xat Shccfispok* 01 i\ AsWjv, olypioi xoc] 6*]pjwdaj aou dvTipspQi' ojetAe/W^ r^m dXooTrzxs^ &c. Thro* this Z 4. - Affinity N O T E S on Treatise the Third. Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or bafer Part) feme of us, degenerating, become like Wolves, faithlefs, and treacherous, and mifchievous ; others, like Lions, fierce, andfavage, and wild ; but the greater Part turn Foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched Animals. Cum cut em duobus modis, id eft, cut vi aut fraude fiat in- juria -, fraus, quafi vulpeculce, vis, leonis videtur. Cic. de Offic. 1. 1. c. 13. See alfo Arr. Epicl. 1. 2. c. 9. p. 210. In our own Language we feem to allude to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call Men, by way of reproach, Sheepifi, Bearijh, Hog- gifh, Ravenous, &c. Note LXXII. p. 229,— — That Reason, of WHICH OUR OWN IS BUT A PaRTJCLE, OR. Spark, &c."] di -^v^ccl ph tiroes ti<r)v Iv^s^bvoci ytcc) avvxtpsTs rta Gf^, olrs dvrv fxopia, acat, xoti ct7ro<r- irua-pccTu—Arr. Epicl. 1. 1. c. 14. p. 81.- — ■ im r /"■wv, bv zx<x.s~op zr^ofocrr.v y.o>a wyspovot Zsvg eJWev, d7ro<T7roc<7(A<x, Ictvris • «t© j $s l<rw \yj,rx vx$ X0(.\ Z.oy&. Alar. Ant. 1. 5. f. 27. Hipnanus aute?n ani- mus, decerptus ex mente divind, cum nullo alio nifi cum ipfo Deo (fi hoc fas eft diclu) comparer i pot eft* Tufc. Difp. I.5. c. 13. p. 371. Nots LXXIII. Ibid.— -Fit Actors in that GENERAL DsAMA, WHERE THOU HAST AL- LOTTED every Being, great and small, its proper Part, &>V.] See before, p. 210. and Note hill. See alfo Arr. Epicl. 1. 3. c. 22. p. 444-.- 2u r\M<& It - Mvourou, &c. The PafTage is fublime and great, but too long to be here inferted. Note NOTES on Treatise the Third. Note LXXIV. p. 230.— Enable us to curb Desire, &c. Enable us even to suspend it, &V. Be our first Work to have ESCAPED, &ff.] 'ATro^a -uroii zrotvra,'7ra<riv opsfcius, 7v<x stotI *) IvXoyug ops^GJf?. Abftain for a time from Defire altogether ', that in time thou mayfi be able to defire rationally. Arr. Epic~t. 1. 3. c. 13. p. 414. Again the fame Author — Xrifxepov — opi^si ovx l%yn- <rotfA£V) ix.yt\i(T£i zs"pog fxova, Ta zypoccipeltxoc To day my Faculty of Defire I have not ufed at all ; my Aver- fion I have employed with refpeft only to things > which are in my power, 1. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See alio Enchir. c. 2. and Char aft* V. III. p. 202. Horace feems alfo to have alluded to this Doctrine : Virtus ejlj vitium fugere ; & fapientia prima , Stultitia caruijje Epifl. 1. 1. 1. v. 41. Note LXXV. Ibid. — Let not our Love THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT insensibly conduct it, &c] See Plat. Symp. p. 210. torn. 3. Edit. Serrani. a« yap 9 s(pn 9 tov op 9m j Iqvtu £7n t8to 'srpaTjua,- app££<r0aj, &C Note LXXVI. Ibid. — Not that little casual Spot, where, &c.] See Arrian. Epift. 1. i. c 9. p. 51. Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cu- jatem fe ejfe diceret? Mundanum, inquit : totius enim mundi fe incolam & civem arbitrabatur. Tufc. Difp, I.5. c 37. p. 427. Note LXXVII. p. 231- — Teach us each TO REGARD HIMSELF, BUT AS A PART OF THIS NOTES on Treatise the Third. THIS GREAT WHOLE ; A PART, &'c] Hug »U "hiyiTM TCOU tXTQS TIVOC XOCTOt (p6(TlV, &C. Ifl whdt Senfe then (fays the Philofopher, fince all is referable to one univerfal Providence) are fome things called agreeable to oitr Nature ', a?id others the contrary P The Anfwer is. They are fo called, by confidering our/elves as detached, and feparate from the Whole. For thus may I fay of the Foot, when confidered fo apart, that 'tis agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. But if we confder it as a Foot, that is, as fomething not detached, but the Me?nber of a Body, it will behoove it both to pafs into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, and even upon occafion to be lopped off, for the Prefer- vation of the Whole. Were not this the cafe, it would be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind Jhould we conceive with refpecl to ourfelves. What art thou P A Man. If thou confder thy Being as fomething feparate and detached, 'tis agreeable to thy Nature^ in this View of Independence, to live to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou confder ihyfclf as a Man, and as the Member of a certain Whole ; for the fake of that Whole, it will occafionally behoove thee, at one while to be fck, at another while to fail and rifque the Perils of Naviga- tion, at another while to be in want, and at la ft to die perhaps before thy time. JVhy therefore doft thou bear thefe Events impatiently P Knowefi thou not, that after the fame man?:er as the Foot ceafeih to be a Foot, fo dojl thou too ceafe to be longer a Man P Arr. Epict. 1.2. c. 5. p. 191. Note LXXVIIL p. 231. In as much as Futurity, tsc ] M*%fe uv cLcnXa. ^01 ? rot l$,m, as) ruv iv(pisrz?uv 'i^opcu, Tzpoc to rvfyocvsiv rwv wra, NOTES on Treatise the Third. (pv<rtv *' oIuto? yoc^ y? o Oso? roiaTwu IxXexTixoi) Ittoi- %(rzv ' h o*e yz yi&w, on voarsTv [xoi ytocftsifAotpToci vuv, xai u'pjuwv av £tt' auro * >cat p^ to - *?, !•» (ppivotg ?*%ev, wp]wa «v £tti to ■arwAacrOat. .///r. EpiEt. 1. 2. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment was of Chryftppus. In the tenth Chapter of the fame Book we have it repeated, tho' in words fomewhat different. Aioctuto xaAw? Xtyxa-tv o\ (^*Aocro£fto}, 0% &c. Note LXXIX. p. 232. — That we may KNOW NO OTHER WlLL, THAN THINE ALONE, AND THAT THE HARMONY OF OUR PARTICU- LAR Minds with thy universal, &V.] TLhou J" dvlo tsto rwv ra iv$&[y.ov@* upilw «} 'iupoiocv €**, OTOCV TZroLvllX TXpofttAtiLl HOcJoi TW OVfJt.(p(dVl0tV TX ZTOif iKoLfU) oVl/ZOV®- 3 ■STpOC TYIV T» oA« $lOlltn\)£ £»A>J- o-i v. Tfo Virtue of a happy Man, and the Felicity of Life is this, when all things are tranfaffed in' Harmony of a Man's Genius, with the Will of Him, who adminifters the Whole. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. c. 88. p. 418. This is what EpiSfetus calls riv aV7* £*a-/i- criv <7wdcp[xo(rxi to*? yivopsvois, to attune or harmonize one's Mind to the things, which happen. DifT. 1. 2. c. 14. p. 242. Note LXXX. Ibid. Yet since to at- tain this Height — is but barely pos- sible, &c] See before, page 215, &V. See alfo Notes LX. andLXII. Note LXXXI. p. 233. — Such as to trans- form us into Savage Beasts of Prey, sul- len, C2V.] See before, Note LX.XI. Note NOTESo/2 Treatise the Third. Note LXXXII. p. 233. That animating Wisdom, which pervades, and rules the Whole, &V.] This Power is called by the Em- peror Marcus — tov $101 Trig *Vtaff hmovlot. Xoyov, xj — itKovo^vja. to wocv, 1. 5* £ 3 2, Note LXXXIII. Ibid. —That Magic Di- vine, WHICH, &C.~\ — >t} TO XJZGpOt, 8V T» ASOT- l&i *> to JVurnipiov, xj TS-ao-oi KOcxxpy'iUy w$ ax#y0#, Wff j3o ( 0?Op© J > £X£«H0fl iTTiytVVYi^CcltX. TWV (TtpVW xou xa- Awy. //,?) av au7<& uXXoTpioc t*th, a o~£ £«?, (pocvioct^x * aXXoi tyiv zfdcvlwv zwyyv Z7nXoy!^x. M. Ant. 1. 6, f. 36. — See alfo 1. 4. f. 44. 1. 3. f. 2. "Q.<j7rsg yo\% di. xw^woVat (ipu<rw) sVij/pa^ala ysXoTtz (pEpxtrtv, u xa(T layja piv £0 (powXix,^ Tip $ oAw T*roi'/iy,&7i %&pw tivoc zyporftycriv ' xtui; yi'fciccs ocv oiul^v 1(f)' lauJXff T*jy xaxiav, tok <T aAAoj? u a%pnros so. Chryfip. apud Plutarch, p. 1065. ^* OJJe ti ylyvsloci spyov l-irl %Qov) <rx oVp^a, Acci(xuv 9 Olrs xo.1 aiOfpiov OfToy woXov 9 xt eV) zrovju, TLXriv ottotoc pz^xri xaxot (rfpsjspwv ocvoitzig. AXXa, try x&i ra zrspKra'ct. i7ris~ucrcci ccplix Qs?vou 9 Kcti XQC-peTv tcc OLXOfTfxa, • xa) a (piXa <rot (p/Aa £rii>. ¥ fi& }^f Iij £y ixTTuvla, cvvhppoxxs i&Xx xxxoTcriv, .Qo-tT £»fls j/t^ygt&ai "sroivluv Xoyov dih loVlwv. forf. eoV/«. Cleantbis Hymn. apudSteph. in PoefiPhikf. p. 49, 50. [The Reader will obferve that the fourth of the above Verfes is fupplied by the Mifcell. Obfervationes Criticce, NOTES on Treatise the Third. Critica, Vol. VII. from a Manufcript of VoJJiui at Ley den.] Note LXXXIV. p. 234. — With these may our Minds be unchangeably tinged, &V.J j3a7r7fTai yocg v7tq twv (pav7a<nwi> r> ^up^ M. Ant. I. 5. f. 16. Note LXXXV. Ibid. With a Re- serve, &V.] ^6' wVsgatpeVfeo?. SeeEpicJ.Encbirid* c. 2. M. Ant. 1. 4. f. 1. 1. 5. f. 20. Seneca tranf- lates it, cum exception e. SoeDeBeneJiciis, 1. 4. f. 34.' Note LXXXVI. Ibid. — Never miss what WE WOULD OBTAIN, OR FALL INTO THAT WHICH WE WOULD AVOID, &V.] (jAts o^zyo^- vov a > 7rorvf)( i dcvstv 9 psT «ocAiWIa OT£pi7nV7£iv. Arr. Epi<5t. I.3. c. 12. p. 404. Note LXXXVIL p. 235. — Conduct me* Thou, fcV.J "Ay* $i (* 9 w Zfu, xal <ru y v\ 7r£7rpw|K£l/fl f , "Otto* *zaro6' Jjeaw Ij/a* diaTSTizFpEV©*. '£1$ %-^/QfiOCi oloxv^ * «sv &' ^f jtxii 0£Aw, Cleanthes in Epicl. Encb. c. 52* Thus tranflated by Seneca: Due me, parens, celfique dominator poli 9 £>uQeunque placuit ; nulla parendi mora eft : Ad. i NOTES on Treatise the Third. Adfum impiger. fac nolle : comitabor gemens, Malufque patiar, quod bono licuit pati. Epift. 107. Note LXXXVIII. p. 236. 'Tis Habit, re- plied HE, IS ALL IN ALL. 'TiS PRACTICE and Exercise, which can only, &c. &e. to the End of the Paragraph.] 'AAAa sroAA^ 'fai %piix>v •arapaorxEu^, kgu tvqvx woAAjj k&\ [^cc^yi^cctoov, T/ »v ; iXiri^uc, on rriv fxiy^nv t£)(vyi]) utto okfyuv Ir)v a7roAa€£u/ ; But (fays one, with refpect to the virtuous Character) there is need of much Pre- paration^ of much Labour and Learning. And what ? Doft thou expeS it Jhould be pojfible (anfwers the Philofopher) to obtain, by little Pains , the chief eft greatest Art ? Arr. Epift. 1. 1. c 20. prill. A^pvco jiJe Taup©^ 8 y'wiiou, JJe yivvacTog clvQpooTroq * «AAa 3s 7 p££ ^u#<rxw«i, zcapacntsuaVacS-ai, nai fxyi lou? TspoVTrrda)) £7rt- roc p7i$h Ts-pocrwovloc. No robuft and mighty Animal is complete at once ; nor more is the brave and generous Man. 'Tis neceffary to undergo the fe- ver eft Exercife and Preparation, and not rajhly plunge into things, which are no way fuitable. Ejufd. Diflfert. 1. 1. c 2. p. 18. See alfo the fame Author, 1. 1. c 15. p. 86. 1. ^. c 14. p. 243. Sedut nee medici, nee imperatores, nee oratores, quamvis artis pracepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum fine ufu & exercitatione confequi poffunt : fie officii confervandi pracepta traduntur ilia quidem (ut facimus ipfi -,) fed rei magnitudo ufum quoque exercitationemque defiderat. Cic. de Offic. 1. 1. c 18. w $ 'H0IKH l£ "E0OY2 TATspiyivtlui * oOsu x»\ two^x t%n)t£ — Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c, i» Note NOTES on Treatise the "Third. Note LXXXIX. p. 236. Nothing is to BE HAD. GRATIS, &C.] •srpoTnu v#h y'utloa. Arr. EpiSf. 1. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The fame Sentiment is often repeated by the fame Author. Note XC. p. 241. We are all go- verned by Interest, &c.~\ See of the Dia- logue y p. 212, 246. See alfo Notes LVI. andXCIL. Note XCI. p. 243. 'Tis a smoaky House, &c.] Kam>o? In ' oiTripxppou. M.Ant* 1. 5. c. 29. See Arr. Epicl. 1. 1. c. 25. p. 129. Note XCII. Ibid. Is a social Interest,^.] As the Stoics, above all Philofophers, oppofed a lazy inactive Life, fo they were perpetually recom- mending a proper regard to the Public, and encou- raging the Practice of every fecial Duty. And tho' they made the original Spring of every particular Man's Action, to be Self-love, and' the profpecl: of private Inter eft \ yet fo intimately united did they efteem this private Intereft with the public, that they held it impcjfible to promote the former, and not at the fame time promote the latter. TWu7w (pva-w ©tou MvnloH rvfyxvsiv, It (av ti h$ ro xoivov w^eXi^cov T«rpo(r(f)fipijI«i ' ovlas ouxetj dytoivuvyflov y!vs]cti 9 ro zrcivlot, aula IWa -srotsry. God hath fo framed the Na- ■ ture of the rational Animal, that it Jhould not be able ti obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal feme thing profitable to the Community. Thus is there no longer any thing unsocial, in doing all things for the sake of self, Arr. Epicl, 1. 1. c 19. p. 106. The NOTES on Treatise the "Third. The Peripatetic Doclrine was much the fame, Hoivluv $\ o^ajAAw/aevwv ttpo$ to x.oc\ov 9 xoci hoiTeivo- f&evoov tk K&Wiroc zrpoilTSiv, xotviti r av zrcivl) iiti roc Jiovla, xon l$ia, lyttzrco roi ^iy^roc ruv oiyotMm, £*9TE£ 7i Ctfl£TYi TOiXTQV If* * aS"£ TOV [A& dyOlQQV, &7 (pihotVTOv £ivcti ' y.(x,i yd() auroV ovwetoii rd ycaXd ■arparrwv, xat t»? aXXag u(ps\wei, JVere all to aim jointly at the fair Principle of Honour ; and ever ftrive to aft what is fairejl and mojl laudable, there would be to every one in common whatever was wanting, and to each Man in particular of all Goods the greateft, if Vir- tue deferve ju/lly to be fo efleemed. So that the good Man is neceffarily a Friend to self: For by doing what is laudable, he will always himfelf be profited, as well as at the fame time be beneficial to others. Ethic. Ni- com. 1. 9. c. 8. Note XCIII. p. 243. — If so, then Honour and Justice are my Interests, &c] Thus Cicero, after having fuppofed a fecial common Interefl to be the natural Interefl of Man, fubjoins imme- diately ghiodfi ita efil, una continemur omnes & ea- derti lege natura. Idque ipfum ft ita eft, certe violare alteram lege natures prohibemur. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 6. NoteXCIV, Ibid. — Without some Por- tion OF WHICH NOT E VEN THIEVES, £sV.] Cujus (fc. Jufiitia) tanta vis eft, ut ne Hit quidem 9 qui maleficio & feeler e pafcuntur, pojfint fine ulla par- ticula juftitia vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is fibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ilk autem, qui archi- NOTES on Treatise the Third. archipirata dicitur, nifi aquabiliter pradam, &V. De Offic. 1. 2. C. II* 'AAA' fe-*i» Kvccfxn, (pv(mm<; vws tvs xoiwvia?, sTvoci (pvasi >cj roi Mkixix, oY wi» l^iv i xowoovloc. f/ 07f y&i> 70~ SUoLlOV (TWi^tl T'M XQlVUVlOUly $jAo'v If IV l7Vi T«» a^xcolarwv f iv^j Joj«v]wu * btsa J« eVjv o'; A?ir"&» " on; ij 7tq6j aAA^Atff xon/wi/ia t;7r6 Jwaioffoi/Jif trw^sjoA tr,$ trpos txXXrjXac, Ai« T« j/a£ to ^ TrAsci/s/Jlgly aA- AwAa?, x> Jta to j^w iLsuo^ai, xj J»c& to Tj^ay to HpsT-rloy Jbxav, k, to t« avfx.e!fAsm (pvXuTTSiv, ?c) di# to CojOfTv to~£ a^fV£r"£po»?, ^i* tocZIoc y\ wpog ol\\v\- Xag dvloTg ywiwviot cv^ivsi • wv Tran tvvowIm hg «V •aAxao-i 7To»Kff*y. 'Ttt necejjary, Society £<?///£ tf^ta- fj/, /to Justice Jhould be natural alfo, by which Society exijls. For that Juftice holds Society together ', ?i evident in thofe, who appear of all the mojl unjujl, fuch I mean as Robbers or Banditti, whofe Society with each other is preferred by their Juftice to each ether. For by not afpiring to any unequal Shares, and by never falfifying, and by fubmitting to what appear t expedient, and by juftly guarding the Booty amaffed to- gether, and by ajfifling their weaker Companions, by thefe things it is, that their Society fubfifts ; the contrary to all which they do by thofe, whom they injure. Alex, Aphrod. wept \]^u%. p. 156. Edit. Aid. See alfo Plat. deRepub. 1. 1. p. 351. torn. 11. Edit. Serrani. Note XCV. p. 245. What then have I TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE VlRTUfi INTOPlETY I Not only Honour, fcfr.j A a All N O T E S on Treatise the Third. All manner of Events, which any way affect a Man, arife either from within himfelf, or from Caufes independent. In the former cafe, he main- tains an aftive Part ; in the latter, a pajjive. The aclive Part of his Character feems chiefly to be the Care of Virtue, for 'tis Virtue which teaches us what we are to aft or do ; the pajjive Part feems to belong more immediately to Piety, becaufe by this we are enabled to refign and acquiefce, and bear with a manly Calmnefs whatever befals us. As there- fore we are framed by Nature both to acl and to fuffer, and are placed in a Univerfe, where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither Virtue nor Piety is of itfelf fufficient, but to pafs becomingly thro' Life, we mould participate of each. Such appears to have been the Sentiment of the wife and good Emperor. dvmiv oAov loivlov, <&xai&- cuVtf ptv u$ rci vp* fau7« ivspyxpsvoi, lv ©*£ tok a^- Xoi; <r'ju€cx,m<n, ryj twv oAojv (puVn. T* <T Ips'i ri$ 9 tS viroXifytlxi Trip] aula, y 7rpa£st >:«T au7», £$ lis wv ^aAAflat, 8w t*7o*c apx« [/.tv®* , aujof Jiwuo- Trpa^cli/ to i»8v 7rp2<nro ( a«vov, >cj (piAEiv to vuv aTrove- fxifj^vov lc*J]u He (the perfe& Man) commits him- J elf wholly to Justice, and the universal Na- ture ; to Justice, as to thofe things which are done by himfelf-, and in all other Events, to the Na- ture of the Whole. What any one will fay y $r think about him, or acl again/1 him, he doth not fo much as take into confideration \ contented and abun- dantly fatisfied with thefe two things, himfelf to do justly what is at this Infiant doing, and to ap- prove i NOTES wTreatise/& Third. prqve and love what is at this injlant allotted him. M. Anton. 1. 10. f. u. TLdvloi txs7vx 9 iffi a Jifc wtpioSx wyv\ £A0e*v, vJVj ep££iv oYvacrai, saw ^»j <rau]w <f>9oy?j * t»7o Je £f"iv, lay ttxv'to 7rapsA0cv x.oci otXmw % xj to (jAxXov l7riTpg;J/u? tj* 7rpovo'ta, xj to 7rapo\ ^o'vow arfufc'uvp wpoV 'OSIOTHTA *J AIKAIOSTNHN • outOT>)Ta jAv, 'tva, (pi\y<; t% uttovs^o^vov' q~qi }/atf aulo *? ^Jo"*? sipfpf, >cj o"£ t«7w • Jtx«*oo"uvj]v <Js, Iva s^euOlpu; xj %wpW TTi^irXoKYiq >&yw te t! aA»i0n, «J 7rpoi<r<JYi$ ta, xala w'joiov x} xaT a£/av ^// /^ /&»£*, J/ tt/^/VA thou wijheft to arrive by a Road round about, thou mayjl infiantly pojfefs, if thou doji not grudge them to thyfelf; that is to fay, in other words, if every thing paft thou intirely quit, if the future thou truft 'to Pro- vidence, and the prefent alone thou adjuft according to Piety and Justice : according to Piety, that fo thou mayjl approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever it be, 'twas Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it ;) ac- cording to Jujlice, that fo thou mayjl genervujly and with- out Difguife both fpeak the Truth, and aft what is confo-- nant to [the general] Law, and the real Value of things, M. Ant. 1. 12. c. 1. See alfo 1. 7. c. 54, Note XCVI. p. 245. -I have av Inte- rest WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTER- ING the Plan of Providence ; without MENDING, ^f.] n«i&u£&«» Tal*V"t to .petitix- veu txat-a *tw 6eA»vJ wq &c. To be injlrucled that is to fay, to ham ft to will all things, as in fa ft they happen. And how do they happen f As He who ordains them, hath ordained. Now He hath ordained that tj:ere Jbould be Summer and Winter, and Plenty A a 2 and NOTES on Treatise the "Third. and Famine , and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of Contrarieties , for the Harmony of the Whole ; and to each of us hath He given a Body, and its 'Members, and a Fortune, and certain Affociaies. Mindful there-? fore of this Order, oughf l '*e to come for Inftruelion^ not indeed how we may alter'^- Ms already efablijhed, (for that neither is permitted /'- '•'%• would it be better fo to be -,) but how 3 while things continue around us, jufl as they are, and as is their Nature*, we may fill preferve our Judgment in harmony with all that happens. Arr. Epidt. 1. i. c. 12. p. 74. Note XCVIL p. 246. Who would be un- happy ? Who would not, if he knew how, enjoy one perpetual felicity ? &ff.] — ravin; (fc. lv£otiy.oviot.$) ya% X^? iV r< * ^-oivoi way- 1s; Trocvia, 7rpccr1ofj.£v. 'Tis for the fake of Happinefs, we all of us do all other things whatever. Ethic. Ni- com. 1. 1. c. 12. fub. fin. See before, of the Dialogue pages 212, 241. arid Notes LVI and XCIL Note XCVIII. Ibid. — — If it happen to BE ERRONEOUS, 'TIS A GRATEFUL ERROR, WHICH I CHERISH, &V.] 'Ei $\ l£<27raMeV?a rivot £<Jet fj.u§s7v, o'7* tcov ixTo; cnrpoaiptToov aVev £f* Tf^oq VUolq, lyOO frlv YjQiXoV TflV Ct7rCCTW TOtVTYIV, l£ f\C riuiXXov zvpowg y.ol\ drocpd^jug Qiuirs&oii. Were a Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Ex- ternals, that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing ; I, for my own part, would defire a Deceit, which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and un- dijlurbed* Arr. Epict. 1. 1. c. 4. p. 27. Note NOTES on T 're at ise the Third. Note XCIX. p. 247. When we are onc*e, said he, well habituated to this «*.— moral Science, then Logic and Phy- sics beco. : "wo prof table Adjuncts, &fr.] Ad eafque virtuu us difputatum ejl, Dialefti- tarn etiam adjungu . Phyficam, eafque ambas vir~ tutum nomine adpellant : alteram, quod habeat ratio- nem, ne cut falfo adfentiamur, neve, &c. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c, 21. p. 265. The threefold Division of Philosophy into Ethics, Phyfics, and Logic, was commonly received by moft Seels of Philofophers. See Laert. !. 7. c 39. See alfo Cicero in his Treatife de Legi- bus, Li. c. 23. and in his Academics, 1. 1. c 5. Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philofophandi rati$ triples, &c. Plutarch, de Piacit. Philof. p. 874. END of the NOTES <w Treatise the Third.

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