Truth-value link
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| - | '''Future contingent''' propositions (or simply, '''future contingents''') are statements about states of affairs in the future that are neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. | + | The principle of '''truth-value links''' is a concept in [[metaphysics]] discussed in debates between [[philosophical realism]] and [[anti-realism]]. Philosophers who appeal to truth-value links in order to explain how individuals can come to understand parts of the world that are apparently cognitively inaccessible (the past, the feelings of others, etc.) are called truth-value link realists. |
| - | The '''problem of future contingents''' is a [[logical]] [[paradox]] first posed by [[Diodorus Cronus]] from the [[Megarian school of philosophy]] and then reactualized by [[Aristotle]] in chapter 9 of ''[[On Interpretation]]'' (''[[De Interpretatione]]''). It was later discussed by [[Leibniz]]. [[Deleuze]] used it to oppose a "logic of the event" to a "logic of [[signification]]". | ||
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| - | Suppose that a sea-battle will not be fought tomorrow. Then it was also true yesterday (and the week before, and last year) that it will not be fought, since any true statement about what will be the case was also true in the past. But all past truths are necessary truths, therefore it was necessarily true in the past that the battle will not be fought, and thus that the statement that it will be fought is necessarily false. Therefore it is not possible that the battle will be fought. In general, if something will not be the case, it is not possible for it to be the case. This conflicts with the idea of our own [[free will]]: that we have the power to determine the course of events in the future, which seems impossible if what happens, or does not happen, was ''necessarily'' going to happen, or not happen. | ||
| == See also == | == See also == | ||
| - | *In [[Jorge Luis Borges|Borges]]' ''[[The Garden of Forking Paths]]'', both alternatives happen, thus leading to what Deleuze calls "incompossible worlds" | + | *[[Anti-realism]] |
| - | *[[Principle of distributivity]] | + | *[[Crispin Wright]] |
| - | *[[Principle of plenitude]] | + | *[[Philosophical realism]] |
| - | *[[Truth-value link]] | + | *[[Principle of bivalence]] |
| + | *[[Problem of future contingents]] | ||
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The principle of truth-value links is a concept in metaphysics discussed in debates between philosophical realism and anti-realism. Philosophers who appeal to truth-value links in order to explain how individuals can come to understand parts of the world that are apparently cognitively inaccessible (the past, the feelings of others, etc.) are called truth-value link realists.
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See also
- Anti-realism
- Crispin Wright
- Philosophical realism
- Principle of bivalence
- Problem of future contingents
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