Universal (metaphysics)
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| - | In [[metaphysics]], a '''universal''' is a [[type (metaphysics)|type]], a [[property (metaphysics)|property]], or a [[relation (metaphysics)|relation]]. The noun ''universal'' contrasts with ''[[individual]]'', while the adjective ''universal'' contrasts with ''[[particular]]'' or sometimes with ''[[concrete (philosophy)|concrete]]''. The latter meaning, however, may be confusing since [[G.W.F. Hegel|Hegelian]] and neo-Hegelian (e.g. [[British idealism|British idealist]]) philosophies speak of ''[[concrete universal]]s''. | + | In [[metaphysics]], a '''universal''' is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things. For example, suppose there are two chairs in a room, each of which is green. These two chairs both share the quality of "being a chair," as well as greenness or the quality of being green. Metaphysicians call this quality that they share a "universal." There are three major kinds of qualities or characteristics: [[type (metaphysics)|types or kinds]] (e.g. mammal), [[property (metaphysics)|properties]] (e.g. short, strong), and [[relation (metaphysics)|relations]] (e.g. father of, next to). These are all different types of universal. |
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| + | The noun "universal" contrasts with "[[individual]]", while the adjective "universal" contrasts with "[[particular]]". Paradigmatically, universals are ''[[abstract (philosophy)|abstract]]'' (e.g. humanity), whereas particulars are ''[[concrete (philosophy)|concrete]]'' (e.g. the person of Socrates). However, universals are not necessarily abstract and particulars are not necessarily concrete. For example, one might hold that numbers are [[abstract particular|particular yet abstract objects]]. Likewise, some philosophers, such as [[David Malet Armstrong|D.M. Armstrong]], consider universals to be concrete. | ||
| + | Most do not consider [[class (philosophy)|classes]] to be universals, although some prominent philosophers do, such as John Bigelow. | ||
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| + | ==Problem of universals== | ||
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| + | ''The [[problem of universals]]'' is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. The problem arises from attempts to account for the phenomenon of similarity or attribute agreement among things. For example, live [[grass]] and [[Granny Smith|Granny Smith apples]] are similar or agree in attribute, namely in having the attribute of greenness. The issue is how to account for this sort of agreement in attribute among things. There are two main positions on the issue: ''[[Problem of universals#Realism|realism]]'' and ''[[nominalism]]'' (sometimes simply called "anti-realism" about universals), along with ''[[conceptualism]]''. Realists posit the existence of independent, abstract universals to account for attribute agreement. Nominalists deny that universals exist, claiming that they are not necessary to explain attribute agreement. Conceptualists posit that universals exist only in the [[philosophy of mind|mind]], or when conceptualized, denying the independent existence of universals. Complications which arise include the implications of language use and the complexity of relating language to [[ontology]]. | ||
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| + | ==Particular== | ||
| + | A universal may have instances, known as its ''particulars''. For example, the type ''dog'' (or ''doghood'') is a universal, as are the property ''red'' (or ''redness'') and the relation ''betweenness'' (or ''being between''). Any particular dog, red thing, or object that is between other things is not a universal, however, but is an ''instance'' of a universal. That is, a universal type (''doghood''), property (''redness''), or relation (''betweenness'') ''[[Substance theory#Inherence|inheres]]'' in a particular object (a specific dog, red thing, or object between other things). | ||
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| + | ==Platonic Realism== | ||
| + | [[Platonic realism]] holds universals to be the [[referent]]s of general terms, such as the ''[[abstraction|abstract]]'', nonphysical, non-mental entities to which words like "sameness", "justice", and "beauty" refer. Particulars are the referents of proper names, like "Phaedo," or of definite descriptions that identify single objects, like the phrase, "that bed over there". Other metaphysical theories may use the terminology of universals to describe physical entities. Plato's examples of what we might today call universals included mathematical and geometrical ideas such as a circle and natural numbers as universals. Plato's views on universals did, however, vary across several different discussions. In some cases, Plato spoke as if the perfect circle functioned as the [[substantial form|form]] or blueprint for all copies and for the word definition of ''circle''. In other discussions, Plato describes particulars as "participating" in the associated universal. | ||
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| + | ==Ness-Ity-Hood Principle== | ||
| + | The '''''Ness-Ity-Hood Principle''''' is used mainly by English-speaking philosophers to generate convenient, concise names for universals or [[Property (philosophy)|properties]]. According to the Ness-Ity-Hood Principle, a name for any universal may be formed that is distinctive, "of left-handers" may be formed by taking the predicate "left-handed" and adding "ness", which yields the name "left-handedness". The principle is most helpful in cases where there is not an established or standard name of the universal in ordinary English usage: What is the name of the universal distinctive of chairs? "Chair" in English is used not only as a subject (as in "The chair is broken"), but also as a predicate (as in "That is a chair"). So to generate a name for the universal distinctive of chairs, take the predicate "chair" and add "ness", which yields "chairness". | ||
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| ==See also== | ==See also== | ||
| * [[Hypostatic abstraction]] | * [[Hypostatic abstraction]] | ||
| * [[Philosophy of mathematics]] | * [[Philosophy of mathematics]] | ||
| - | * [[Problem of universals]] | + | * [[Sortal]] |
| * [[The Secret of Hegel]] | * [[The Secret of Hegel]] | ||
| {{GFDL}} | {{GFDL}} | ||
Revision as of 22:46, 23 December 2014
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In metaphysics, a universal is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things. For example, suppose there are two chairs in a room, each of which is green. These two chairs both share the quality of "being a chair," as well as greenness or the quality of being green. Metaphysicians call this quality that they share a "universal." There are three major kinds of qualities or characteristics: types or kinds (e.g. mammal), properties (e.g. short, strong), and relations (e.g. father of, next to). These are all different types of universal.
The noun "universal" contrasts with "individual", while the adjective "universal" contrasts with "particular". Paradigmatically, universals are abstract (e.g. humanity), whereas particulars are concrete (e.g. the person of Socrates). However, universals are not necessarily abstract and particulars are not necessarily concrete. For example, one might hold that numbers are particular yet abstract objects. Likewise, some philosophers, such as D.M. Armstrong, consider universals to be concrete. Most do not consider classes to be universals, although some prominent philosophers do, such as John Bigelow.
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Problem of universals
The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. The problem arises from attempts to account for the phenomenon of similarity or attribute agreement among things. For example, live grass and Granny Smith apples are similar or agree in attribute, namely in having the attribute of greenness. The issue is how to account for this sort of agreement in attribute among things. There are two main positions on the issue: realism and nominalism (sometimes simply called "anti-realism" about universals), along with conceptualism. Realists posit the existence of independent, abstract universals to account for attribute agreement. Nominalists deny that universals exist, claiming that they are not necessary to explain attribute agreement. Conceptualists posit that universals exist only in the mind, or when conceptualized, denying the independent existence of universals. Complications which arise include the implications of language use and the complexity of relating language to ontology.
Particular
A universal may have instances, known as its particulars. For example, the type dog (or doghood) is a universal, as are the property red (or redness) and the relation betweenness (or being between). Any particular dog, red thing, or object that is between other things is not a universal, however, but is an instance of a universal. That is, a universal type (doghood), property (redness), or relation (betweenness) inheres in a particular object (a specific dog, red thing, or object between other things).
Platonic Realism
Platonic realism holds universals to be the referents of general terms, such as the abstract, nonphysical, non-mental entities to which words like "sameness", "justice", and "beauty" refer. Particulars are the referents of proper names, like "Phaedo," or of definite descriptions that identify single objects, like the phrase, "that bed over there". Other metaphysical theories may use the terminology of universals to describe physical entities. Plato's examples of what we might today call universals included mathematical and geometrical ideas such as a circle and natural numbers as universals. Plato's views on universals did, however, vary across several different discussions. In some cases, Plato spoke as if the perfect circle functioned as the form or blueprint for all copies and for the word definition of circle. In other discussions, Plato describes particulars as "participating" in the associated universal.
Ness-Ity-Hood Principle
The Ness-Ity-Hood Principle is used mainly by English-speaking philosophers to generate convenient, concise names for universals or properties. According to the Ness-Ity-Hood Principle, a name for any universal may be formed that is distinctive, "of left-handers" may be formed by taking the predicate "left-handed" and adding "ness", which yields the name "left-handedness". The principle is most helpful in cases where there is not an established or standard name of the universal in ordinary English usage: What is the name of the universal distinctive of chairs? "Chair" in English is used not only as a subject (as in "The chair is broken"), but also as a predicate (as in "That is a chair"). So to generate a name for the universal distinctive of chairs, take the predicate "chair" and add "ness", which yields "chairness".
See also
